



● ROUTINE

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STATE/INR JCS/ME (DIA) CIA/DMC EWS NSA TREAS NSC/S WH/ST/INR PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES  
SDO BR OCA NFAC

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DIST 30 NOVEMBER 1977

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1.5 (c)

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1. PRESIDENT AUGUSTO P I N O C H E T AND SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS BELIEVE THAT THEY CANNOT TRUST NOR HAVE ANY CONFIDENCE IN U.S. POLICY TOWARDS CHILE BECAUSE OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

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DATE [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

(class/location)

1.5(c)

SUPPORT FOR THE HIGHLY CRITICAL DRAFT RESOLUTION IN THE UNITED NATIONS (UN) ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHILE. THEY DO NOT FORESEE ANY POSSIBLE IMPORVEMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND CHILE AS LONG AS THE CURRENT U.S. PRESIDENT IS IN OFFICE AND AS LONG AS HE CONTINUES TO ALLOW HIGHLY LIBERAL OFFICIALS TO INFLUENCE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY.

2. PRESIDENT PINOCHET IS DISAPPOINTED AND DISILLUSIONED ABOUT THE U.S.'S LACK OF RECOGNITION OF THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN CHILE. PINOCHET AND THE MAJORITY OF THE MILITARY FEEL THAT, INSTEAD OF BEING ENCOURAGED TO CONTINUE WITH THEIR EFFORTS, THEY ARE STILL BEING UNFAIRLY CRITICIZED WITH THE SAME INTENSITY AS BEFORE THEY TRIED TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION. THEY THEREFORE CONSIDER IT A WASTE OF TIME TO CONTINUE WORRYING ABOUT THE PRESENT FEELINGS OF THE U.S. AND, LEAST OF ALL, ABOUT THE UN COMMISSIONS WHICH THEY BELIEVE HAVE BEEN TRADITIONALLY PENETRATED AND INFLUENCED BY MARXIST-ORIENTED ELEMENTS. THE ATTITUDE OF PINOCHET AND SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS TO THE DRAFT RESOLUTION IS ONE OF GROWING INDIFFERENCE BECAUSE THEY FEEL THE UN AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE TO IGNORE ANY EFFORTS

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(Class/Action)

THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT MIGHT MAKE TO IMPROVE ITS INTERNATIONAL IMAGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS.

3. PRESIDENT PINOCHET AND THE MILITARY OFFICERS BELIEVE THAT THE U.S. CO-SPONSORSHIP OF THE UN RESOLUTION WITH CUBA IS ABSURD AND TOTALLY INCOMPREHENSIBLE POLITICALLY. THEY CITE THE FACT THAT CUBA HAS BEEN CREATING PROBLEMS FOR THE U.S. FOR MANY YEARS, EVEN TO THE POINT OF A FULL-SCALE CUBAN INTERVENTION IN AFRICA, AND STATE THAT THE IRONY OF IT ALL IS THAT CUBA MIGHT NOW WIN A RESOLUTION AGAINST CHILE BECAUSE OF THE U.S.'S VOTE OF SUPPORT. SINCE CUBA HAS A LONG AND STEADY HISTORY OF POLITICAL INTERVENTION AND CHILE WAS BASICALLY FOLLOWING A NORMAL COURSE OF ACTION AFTER OVERTHROWING A MARXIST GOVERNMENT, THE U.S.'S INTERNATIONAL POLICY IS OBVIOUSLY THE ONE WHICH IS COMPLETELY OUT OF TOUCH WITH REALITY.

1.5 (c)

4. COMMENT:

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

(classification)

1.5 (c)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

5. THE CHILEAN MILITARY SEES ITSELF AS A TRADITIONAL ALLY OF THE U.S. AND BELIEVES THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ENCOURAGED IT DURING THE PERIOD OF POPULAR UNITY TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST THE MARXIST GOVERNMENT OF FORMER PRESIDENT SALVADOR A L L E N D E. ONCE ALLENDE WAS OVERTHROWN, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TURNED ITS BACK ON CHILE AND BECAME STRONGLY CRITICAL OF A GOVERNMENT THEY HAD ORIGINALLY WANTED TO ESTABLISH. NINETY PERCENT OF THE CHILEAN MILITARY IS DEEPLY HURT BY THE ACTIONS OF THE U.S. DURING WHAT IT CONSIDERS CHILE'S MOST CRITICAL PERIOD AND BELIEVES, THEREFORE, EVEN THOUGH U.S./CHILE RELATIONS MIGHT IMPROVE, THEY WILL NEVER BE THE SAME. IN THE EVENT RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. DO NOT IMPROVE, THE CHILEAN MILITARY HAS LEARNED BY NOW THAT IT CAN SURVIVE WITHOUT U.S. AID AND IF CHILE'S ECONOMIC SITUATION IMPROVES, CHILE CAN DEVELOP A CLOSER RELATION WITH OTHER COUNTRIES FROM WHOM IT CAN OBTAIN SUCH NECESSITIES AS TECHNOLOGY, MILITARY EQUIPMENT, AND CAPITAL GOODS.

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(classification)

6. (EMBASSY COMMENT: ALTHOUGH SOMEWHAT STRONGER, THE VIEWS ATTRIBUTED TO PINOCHET AND OTHER SENIOR OFFICERS ARE CONSISTENT WITH DIRECT COMMENTS FROM GOC OFFICIALS IN RECENT WEEKS. WE HAVE NO DOUBT THEY REPRESENT THE FEELINGS OF THE MOMENT. WE ARE LESS CERTAIN THEY WILL GUIDE GOC POLICY BEYOND THE NEAR TERM. PINOCHET HAS A WELL-KNOWN PROPENSITY TO TAKE EXTREME POSITIONS WHEN ANGRY. WHILE THE GOC MAY WORRY LESS ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS IMPROVEMENT FOR THE SAKE OF ITS RELATIONS WITH THE U.S., THOSE IMPROVEMENTS CORRESPOND AT LEAST AS MUCH TO INTERNAL PRESSURES. IF SOMEWHAT LESS DIRECTLY AND URGENTLY, WE EXPECT IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. TO REMAIN A LONG-RUN GOC OBJECTIVE.)

1.5 (c)

*See*

7. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1.5 (c)

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