



[REDACTED]
STATE/INR NMCC/MC (DA) CIA/NMCC MRC NSA [REDACTED] SDO ONE CBS

● PRIORITY

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NSC/S

[REDACTED]

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

~~SECRET~~

DIST 4 OCTOBER 1973

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

M

1.5 (c)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1.5 (c)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1. [REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED]

1.5 (c)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THAT THE ARMED FORCES DISCOVERED THAT
LEFTIST EXTREMIST ELEMENTS ARE REORGANIZING IN SANTIAGO, AND THAT
THE MILITARY IS PREPARING TO UNDERTAKE ACTIONS TO ELIMINATE
THIS THREAT. THIS REPORT ALSO NOTED THAT THE DAILY CURFEW

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DATE JUN 11 1999

(66)
A-118

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(classification)

(dissem controls)

FOR SANTIAGO HAD BEEN ADVANCED FROM THE USUAL HOUR OF 10:00 P.M. TO 8:00 P.M. FOR 4 OCTOBER.)

2. ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] THE NEW CURFEW HOURS FOR SANTIAGO WERE PUT INTO EFFECT IN ORDER TO ALLOW THE ARMED FORCES TO CARRY OUT AN OPERATION TO CAPTURE SOCIALIST PARTY (P.S.) SECRETARY GENERAL CARLOS A L T A M I R A N O. [REDACTED] SAID THAT THE MILITARY HAS INFORMATION CONCERNING ALTAMIRANO'S WHEREABOUTS WHICH IT CONSIDERS TO BE RELIABLE. [REDACTED] THAT THE MILITARY HAD COME CLOSE TO CAPTURING THE P.S. LEADER [REDACTED] AND THAT THE MILITARY BELIEVES IT WILL BE SUCCESSFUL IN THE OPERATION [REDACTED]

1.5 (c)

3. [REDACTED] COMMENT: WHILE IT MAY BE TRUE THAT THE MILITARY WILL UNDERTAKE AN OPERATION TO CAPTURE ALTAMIRANO DURING [REDACTED] THE ADVANCING OF THE SANTIAGO CURFEW WOULD APPEAR TO BE AN EXCESSIVE MEASURE TO TAKE FOR AN ISOLATED OPERATION, THUS IT MAY BE THAT THE ALTAMIRANO OPERATION IS PART OF A MUCH LARGER PLAN TO ROUND UP LEFTIST LEADERS AND TO SURPRESS EXTREMIST ELEMENTS.

1.5 (c)

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1.5 (c)

DENY IN TOTO

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