

8 MAR 1967
NIE 85-67
2 March 1967

~~SECRET~~
CONTROLLED DISSEM

LEJ LIBRARY
Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 44-29
Document # 60

8a

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER 85-67
(Supersedes NIE 85-65)

Key Issues and Prospects for Castro's Cuba

Submitted by

[Signature]

DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

As indicated overleaf
2 MARCH 1967

Authenticated:

[Signature]
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USIB

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

~~SECRET~~
CONTROLLED DISSEM

Nº 459

MAR 2000

~~SECRET~~

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, and NSA.

Concurring:

Dr. Edward W. Proctor, for the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Dr. Louis W. Tordella, for the Director, National Security Agency

Abstaining:

Dr. Charles H. Reichardt, for the Assistant General Manager, Atomic Energy Commission and Mr. William O. Cregar, for the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

~~WARNING~~

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.

~~GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
THE PROBLEM	1
CONCLUSIONS	1
DISCUSSION	3
I. THE "EXPORT OF REVOLUTION"	3
II. THE CUBAN-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP	5
III. CASTRO'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE US	8
IV. THE ECONOMY	8
Performance and Short-Run Prospects	8
Education and the Longer Run	10
V. CASTRO'S HOLD ON POWER	11

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

KEY ISSUES AND PROSPECTS FOR CASTRO'S CUBA

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the outlook over the next two years.

CONCLUSIONS

- A. The Castro revolution has survived adversity, but it has not prospered. Increasingly the regime is keying its hopes for major material progress to the more distant future, when it expects the economic and social impact of its large-scale education and long-term economic programs to be felt.
- B. The level of the economy in 1966 was only slightly above that reached in 1958, the last prerevolutionary year; per capita private consumption was down nearly 25 percent, though favored groups in the population were better off. Economic gains in 1967 and 1968 will probably be minor, with little or no improvement in living conditions.
- C. Fidel will almost certainly persist in providing encouragement and training support to "anti-imperialist" and insurgent movements abroad, and in extending material aid to a few of them. Poor prospects for success in Latin America help to account for his increased support to revolutionary elements in Africa, where there are more opportunities and fewer risks.
- D. Differences about Communist revolutionary tactics and the amount of aid required by Cuba will continue to produce frictions in the Cuban-Soviet relationship. But Cuba remains important to the Soviets; they have little practical choice except to keep backing Fidel.
- E. Castro has continued the process of institutionalizing his revolution and has talked of sharing more responsibility with his inner circle.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

of colleagues. We believe that he will remain clearly preeminent, however, and his hold on power will remain strong.

F. In the unlikely event of Fidel's death or incapacitation during the next two years, a collegium headed by his brother Raúl and President Dorticós would probably take control. We doubt that this arrangement could long endure; at some point it would probably give way to a power struggle of unpredictable outcome.

1.5(c)(d)
3.4(b)(1)(6)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DISCUSSION

1. Castro's regime has survived for eight years, but much of the original impetus and appeal of his revolution has worn away. Castro has been forced to modify or stretch out a number of plans and goals set in the early years, and to settle back to a more prosaic and longer range approach. Though Castro retains his personal magnetism for many people, his government also relies heavily on repressive measures and elaborate security machinery. These patterns, along with Fidel's espousal of Marxism-Leninism and his dependence on the Soviet Union, have alienated many Latin Americans who once found the Cuban leader attractive.

I. THE "EXPORT OF REVOLUTION"

2. Generally speaking then, there has been little ready receptivity for Fidel's revolutionary exhortations in his natural target area, Latin America. Despite the persistent failures of the revolutionary groups he has supported in Latin American countries, he is clearly determined to provide selective support for such efforts. He has proclaimed that he would help "anti-imperialist" revolutionary movements anywhere in the world; he has sent teams of Cuban military personnel to several African countries; and he has pledged to send regular military units to North Vietnam if Hanoi requests them.

3. Castro's behavior in advocating and assisting revolution is not always logical and realistic. In the past few years, he has been canny enough to keep his risks low, but the fact is that he is a compulsive revolutionary. The form and extent of his efforts, vocal and material, vary with changing circumstances but the central theme remains constant. He insists that revolutionary violence is necessary to bring about any meaningful political change. He claims that when boldly led guerrilla units can take to the field and sustain themselves there, they will precipitate the conditions which will assure their eventual success.


4. These views have brought Castro into disagreement with Soviet leaders and into conflict with leaders of most of the principal Communist parties in Latin America. In November 1964, the Soviets helped to work out a compromise which called for support to insurgency efforts in a few Latin American countries, but specified that in all cases the local Communist Party should determine whether violent or peaceful means were to be pursued. Fidel soon began chipping at the edges of this agreement, and at the Tricontinental Conference in January 1966 in Havana he issued a more general call for insurgency in Latin America. This proved to be counterproductive: on the one hand, it failed to evoke discernible revolutionary response; on the other hand, it helped to precipitate counter-subversive moves by various Latin American governments.

5. Cuba's efforts to stimulate revolution elsewhere in the hemisphere have nonetheless continued; they have included Castro's own verbal proddings, the formation in Havana of a Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO) to provide encouragement, the regular propaganda outpourings of Havana radio, and some

~~SECRET~~

Cuban training and material support.¹ Even so, insurgency movements in Latin America have lost, rather than gained, ground during the past year or two. The insurgency undertaken in Peru in mid-1965 was defeated and the organization largely destroyed. Guerrilla groups in Colombia remain small and fragmented and become active only sporadically. While the action of insurgents in Venezuela picked up in late 1966, it has not reached the menacing level of 1963. The insurgency in Guatemala, which broadened in 1966, has now slackened somewhat, and the Guatemalan military have become more effective in their efforts to deal with it. In other Latin American countries, despite Castro's urgings over the past year that revolutionists take up arms, none took up any. Fidel himself has increasingly complained that Latin Communist leaders spend all their time theorizing and debating instead of going out to fight.

6. In Africa, Castro's government has considerably expanded its assistance to various "anti-imperialist" regimes and organizations over the past two years. This has ranged from support of the Massamba-Debat regime in Congo (Brazzaville)² to helping movements directed against Portuguese African colonies. Castro has clearly felt that he could send teams of Cuban personnel into a number of African countries without running any particular risks.³ These



1.5(c)(d)
3.4(b)(1)(6)

The number of Africans coming to Cuba has been steadily increasing. Some arrive for higher education and technical training. A small number are receiving guerrilla indoctrination and training in insurgency tactics; this is under the auspices of the Directorate General of Intelligence—the external operations branch of the Cuban Ministry of Interior.

~~SECRET~~

Cubans are evidently selected, in part, for darkness of skin so that they may be less conspicuous and more assimilable during their sojourn in the host countries.

7. Cuban propaganda to Africa has also increased markedly; indeed, the primary change since late 1965 in Radio Havana's international service has been to provide regular daily broadcasts to Africa in French, Portuguese, Spanish, and English. The Cuban Government has plans to begin broadcasts in Swahili, for up to eight hours daily, in 1968. The Soviets, in contrast to their notable differences with Castro on tactics in Latin America, seem reasonably content to have him undertaking these engagements with mutual friends in Africa.

8. We believe that during the next two years Castro will continue his activities in support of Latin American revolutionaries, waxing hotter on some occasions and cooler on others. In part because of the improving capabilities of Latin American security forces, and in part because of the waning appeal of Castroism, we do not think this will prove to be a serious threat. In several small countries of the Caribbean area, however, the political fabric is so fragile that turmoil brought on by other forces might lead to a situation which Fidel could exploit.

~~_____~~ With respect to Africa, we anticipate a gradual further build-up of the Cuban presence. In certain circumstances, a small Cuban force might again affect the outcome of a political crisis in one African country or another—as in Brazzaville in 1966. In any case, an increasing Cuban presence in Africa plus the return of Africans now training in Cuba are likely to give Castro a larger role in the African liberation movement.

1.5(c)(d)
3.4(b)(1)(6)

9. Of all the revolutionary movements he would like to help, Castro seems to have the strongest sentiments toward the National Liberation Front (and the North Vietnamese forces) in Vietnam. He has been deeply perturbed that the US has been able to carry out its military build-up and operations on the present scale without major counteraction by the Soviets. For many months, his government has been pressing the Soviet Union and other Communist governments to provide more effective military support for North Vietnam. He has implied that the Soviets lack fortitude, and has made repeated public pledges that if Hanoi requested them, he would send Cuban volunteers of whatever sort specified, even including regular military units with their equipment. We believe that if Hanoi did ask, Castro would try in one way or another to fulfill this promise.⁴

II. THE CUBAN-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP

10. For the Soviets, having Fidel on their side is hardly an unmixed blessing. Certain of the hopes they once had must now be dimmed—e.g., that they could use Cuba to enhance their offensive posture vis-à-vis the US; that the island

⁴There are already some Cuban military personnel—observers and perhaps a few technical or support personnel—in North Vietnam, but there almost certainly are no regular combat units present. Evidence on numbers is inconclusive.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

could become an effective distribution point for the dissemination of their doctrine in the hemisphere; that Cuban development could advertise the Communist way for other small countries. Castro's Cuba nevertheless remains important to Moscow: it represents one of the few victories for the Communist camp in recent years; it provides the only breakthrough in the Western Hemisphere. In terms of more immediate political considerations, the Soviets find it helpful to have the Cuban Government more or less with them—or at least not against them—in their moves to isolate China within the Communist camp. Finally, the Soviets almost certainly realize that they could not abandon Cuba without sustaining great damage to their prestige, especially vis-à-vis the US, and to the credibility of their commitments, especially within the Communist world.

11. The divergencies that have developed between Havana and Moscow are, however, as apparent as their common interests. They relate not only to their differences over Vietnam and about revolutionary tactics toward Latin America; they also have to do with what economic programs are suitable to Cuba and with the related problem of continued economic aid. Despite the Cuban economy's extraordinary dependence on Soviet assistance, Fidel has gone out of his way during the past year to stress that Cuba is developing its own Communist approach in the light of its own special circumstances. He has criticized the Soviets for impure Marxism-Leninism in their resort to "capitalist" material incentives in their own economy. And he has accused them of helping the enemies of the Cuban Revolution through extending economic aid to Chile and other Latin American governments.

12. When the Soviets accepted Fidel's embrace in 1961, they probably did not realize how expensive it would prove to be. Cuba has become the largest single recipient of Soviet economic aid. Over the span of 1962 through 1966, Cuba has used up nearly \$1.1 billion in economic credits and grants from the USSR. (This compares with Soviet disbursements of economic aid in the same period of \$518 million for India, \$331 million for Afghanistan, and \$251 million for the United Arab Republic.) In addition to providing credits and grants to Cuba, the USSR has been purchasing sugar from Cuba at prices considerably higher than world prices for most of the period since 1961.⁵ The cumulative value of the Soviet sugar subsidy has amounted to about \$350 million. Soviet military aid provided to Cuba since 1961 has amounted to an additional \$700 million.

13. We believe that the Soviets are resigned to continuing enough aid to keep the Cuban economy at least at its present level, and to provide some opportunity for growth. During the past five years, Soviet exports to Cuba have ranged from \$410 million in 1962 to \$470 million in 1966. Soviet credits to Cuba now seem to be keyed to making up the difference between a ceiling at about this 1966

⁵The USSR paid 4 cents a pound for Cuban sugar in 1961 and 1962; it has paid 6 cents a pound since then. In January 1964, the Soviet Government agreed to buy the following amounts of Cuban sugar at the 6 cent rate: 2.1 million tons in 1965, 3 million in 1966, 4 million in 1967, and 5 million annually in 1968, 1969, and 1970.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

figure and the level of Cuban exports to the USSR. These credits probably will be reduced in 1967 and 1968 as a result of the expected increase in Cuban sugar production and consequently in exports to the USSR. The overall reduction in Soviet aid to the Cuban economy will be moderate, however, as lower aid in the form of credits will be offset in large part by what amounts to an increased Soviet subsidy for Cuban sugar. It is likely that the world market price for sugar, at least through 1967, will remain less than one-half the price paid by the USSR.

14. About 80 percent of Cuba's trade is now with Communist countries. The USSR in 1966 accounted for more than 50 percent of total Cuban imports and some 45 percent of total Cuban exports. We believe that the Soviets will continue to encourage Castro to trade somewhat more with non-Communist countries, but, for reasons noted in paragraphs 22, 23, and 24, we do not expect more than a marginal change in the pattern during the next two years.

15. Soviet provision of military equipment to Cuba is no longer large in volume, particularly in comparison with the high levels reached in 1962 and 1963. Some step-up in deliveries began in the last quarter of 1966, however, and continued in early 1967. We believe this is a phase of a continuing Soviet replacement and resupply program, designed to replenish the stocks used up and worn out by the Cubans. In a few cases, the new items are more advanced than those which were already in Cuba, and the result will be to strengthen some Cuban units. For example, at least 11 Mig-21D jet fighters (limited all-weather capability) have been delivered to Cuba since October 1966. Also new for Cuba, though a standard ground-support weapon in the USSR since 1954, is the 200 mm multiple rocket launcher; there are now 25-30 of these in Cuba. We have also noted certain additions to Cuban holdings of naval equipment—six more KOMAR cruise-missile boats, making 18 altogether, and two more SO-1 subchasers, giving Cuba eight of this class, as well as six older ones. Further replenishments and some other new items will probably be delivered over the next two years; indeed, the rate of resupply may pick up slightly because a number of items in the Cuban inventory have reached or are approaching a nonoperational condition.⁶

16. We do not believe that the Soviets will again try to turn Cuba into a strategic base of their own, as in 1962. We think it highly unlikely that the USSR will attempt to reintroduce strategic missiles into Cuba. We recognize that the Soviets have the technical capability clandestinely to reintroduce the components of a strategic weapon system. But the build-up of strategic forces in the USSR in recent years would make the installation of strategic weapons in Cuba of less significance to the Soviet strategic posture than in 1962. In any event, we believe that the risk of another grave confrontation with the US would be unacceptable to the Soviets.

⁶ Examples of such items are: trucks and prime movers for artillery which simply wear out, Mig-15 and Mig-17 jets which are sometimes cracked up before they wear out, and surface-to-air missiles which have definite, limited operational lives.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

17. While the Soviets could derive a limited practical advantage from using Cuba as a base for logistical support to submarine patrols, we think that in this case too they would see the risk of adverse US response as outweighing the potential benefit. The Soviets might, on the other hand, consider making defensive use of Cuba by installing a strategic warning facility on the island. Theoretically at least, certain types of over-the-horizon radar could cover most of the continental US from Cuba, and possibly improve by some 15 minutes the USSR's present warning time of missile attack—provided, of course, that the data could be reliably passed to the Soviet Union. Such a facility might be publicly announced as a space-tracking station.

III. CASTRO'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE US

18. Castro has a deep and abiding animosity toward the US. To begin with, he has a full measure of the anti-Yankee sentiment instinctive with so many revolutionary Latin Americans. Added to this are resentment over the Bay of Pigs, the missile crisis and the continuing US economic denial program, and a strong feeling against US policy in Vietnam. To Fidel, recent developments in Vietnam have been a source of particular indignation: he views the war there as a test of his doctrine of guerrilla revolution against "imperialist" powers and "reactionary" governments, particularly the US and those it supports. He is also doubtless aware that his stance on Vietnam attracts favorable attention to him in many quarters of the world. And the Vietnam situation probably gives him some inner personal concern about how far the USSR will go to support a small Communist state if doing so risks conflict with the US.

19. All things considered, we believe the chances are remote for any significant improvement in Castro's attitude toward the US in the next year or so—particularly if the Vietnam war goes on. Even if it were settled, his underlying fear of, and hostility toward, the US—as well as his interest in fostering revolutions abroad—would remain strong obstacles to any major betterment of US-Cuban relations.

IV. THE ECONOMY

Performance and Short-Run Prospects

20. The Cuban economy has made little progress since Castro took power. Though the gross national product has moved slightly beyond the level reached before the revolution, on a per capita basis it has declined about 10 percent, and living conditions are generally lower. Total goods available for private consumption have remained about the same since 1961, and the increase in population has meant that per capita private consumption has been steadily falling. In 1966, per capita private consumption was nearly 25 percent below the prerevolutionary level. By no means all Cubans are worse off, however. Many in the party and military, among the students, and among those who had been extremely poor now undoubtedly find their economic lot better.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

21. The year 1966 was one of economic setback because of the poor sugar harvest—less than 4.5 million metric tons compared to more than 6 million in the previous year. The primary cause of the reduced crop was a severe drought in 1965, but the application of less fertilizer was also a factor. No net gains were made in the industrial and construction sectors. In spite of the drought, there was a significant improvement in nonsugar agriculture, reversing the downward trend evident since 1961. This improvement was not enough, however, to offset the fall in sugar production. The supply of goods and services available to the economy in 1966 was about the same as in 1965 because of increased assistance from abroad. While there was no evident decline in overall availability of foodstuffs in Cuba during 1966, a sharp cut in supplies of rice (an important Cuban staple) caused the rice ration to be reduced by half and produced irritation among consumers. The rice problem resulted from the cut in Communist China's exports of rice to Cuba from 250,000 metric tons in 1965 to 135,000 in 1966. A number of other basic foodstuffs are also still being rationed.

22. Cuba's total trade deficit in 1966 was about \$265 million, or some 45 percent larger than in 1965. Most of the foreign credits obtained by Cuba during 1966 came from the USSR; drawings on credits from other Communist countries were negligible. Cuba's total debt to all Communist countries now runs to some \$1.3 billion. Cuba's drawing against credits provided by non-Communist countries amounted to about \$70 million during 1966. Its holdings of convertible currency at the end of 1966 were some \$50 million, and its total indebtedness to non-Communist countries was close to \$100 million, largely accumulated within the past three years.

23. The Castro government will continue to obtain credits from non-Communist countries during the next several years. But it cannot long continue to build up its indebtedness to these countries at the pace of 1966. Therefore, Cuba will need to hold down imports from non-Communist countries in the next two years, even though Cuban export earnings in the free world may increase somewhat, particularly if the world price of sugar rises. In any case, there will be little shift in Cuba's trade pattern away from its strong orientation to the Communist camp—and especially the Soviet Union.

24. The output of the Cuban economy will probably rise somewhat in 1967 and 1968, primarily as a result of a rise in sugar production. The sugar harvest in 1967 will be on the order of six million metric tons—perhaps more. Given reasonably good weather and fairly effective operation of the new cane collection centers, the harvest will again increase in 1968. Even so there will probably be little improvement in the total supply of goods in Cuba. Cuba's capacity to import from non-Communist countries is not likely to improve much, and, for reasons noted in paragraph 13, increased Cuban sugar exports to the USSR in 1967 and 1968 will probably not mean an increase in the present level of Soviet exports to Cuba.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

25. Cuba's limited ability to increase imports will continue to restrict its supply of industrial raw materials, semifinished goods, and building materials. Consequently, we expect little change in either industrial production or construction activity during the next two years. The outlook for nonsugar agriculture is not so clear; on the basis of past performance we think gains will be moderate in 1967 and 1968. In sum, the general economic outlook is for only minor gains in 1967 and 1968, and little or no improvement in living conditions.

26. Despite this prospect, we do not expect the Castro administration to make major changes in economic policy during the next two years. Various Cuban officials have spoken about a return to greater emphasis on the development of industry, as opposed to the current emphasis on agriculture, but they also note that this is out of the question before 1970. Fidel has recently been criticizing material incentives as un-Communist as well as ineffective; for all his talk about these in earlier years, however, his government never relied much on them in practice. Castro has long been pressing, though without notable success, to remove employees from the swollen bureaucracy and make them available for more productive work. The administration's hopes to correct the economy's low productivity seem to center on the application of better technology, increased use of fertilizer, and some improvement in management and in the mobilization of labor; efforts in these fields are unlikely to have significant effect for some years.

Education and the Longer Run

27. Increasingly, the Castro regime is having to key its hopes to the more distant future, when it expects the economic and social impact of its large-scale programs of primary education to be greater. A major tenet of Castro's revolution from the outset has been to stress the role which the younger generation would some day play—an emphasis of special importance in a country where 40 percent of the population is now under 15 years old. Some 2,000,000 full and part-time students are enrolled in Cuban educational institutions. Many of them are in the basic program to teach peasants and laborers to read and write. But the full-time enrollment of young people has also sharply increased compared with prerevolutionary years; and the government presently furnishes scholarships to more than 150,000 of these. Perhaps 30,000 are now studying at the universities; this number is to expand substantially over the next few years. The government has also been putting increasing emphasis on technical education; there are now, for example, nearly 20,000 taking training in agrarian technology.

28. These Cuban programs have many weaknesses, one of the most glaring being the quality of the teaching. Nevertheless, because the beginning point for much of the population was so low and the scope of the effort has become so large, we think the effect on Cuba over the next decade or two is bound to be significant. On the economic side, in particular, we believe this will gradually bring enough gain in technical competence to improve productivity. We are more inclined to doubt the long-run effectiveness of the ideological indoctrina-


~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~


tion, even though it permeates the whole educational system. We suspect there is much more parroting of Marxist phrases than there is absorption of doctrine; we doubt that the magnetism of communism would be strong to Cubans if it were not coupled with *Fidelismo* and its accompanying revolutionary mythology. The system is probably effective, however, in closing the minds of the younger generation to political systems other than the one they know.

V. CASTRO'S HOLD ON POWER

29. The Cuban Government is still very much a one-man show; Fidel's flamboyant personality continues to dominate the scene. He remains a superb demagogue and an effective political tactician. He is capable of inspiring loyalty or fear in his chosen subordinates and of whipping up enthusiasm among the Cuban masses. It is true that, over time, this mass appeal has diminished considerably as various popular hopes have been disappointed.



30. Now 40 years old, Castro enjoys exceptional energy and stamina, and is in reasonably good health.



1.5(2)(d)
3.4(b)(1)(6)

31. The Castro regime's security organizations have become increasingly proficient; there is no longer any significant organized opposition within Cuba. Those Cubans who become thoroughly dissatisfied think it more prudent to find means, legal or illegal, to go into exile than to stay and try to work against the regime.⁷ The number of political prisoners in Cuba has steadily grown; it is

⁷ When in October 1965 Castro announced his "open-door" policy for refugees, some 250,000 Cubans hurried to put their names on the eligibility lists. Probably several hundred thousand more Cubans would like to depart and would sign up were it not for the regime's penalties against them. In its first year the US refugee airlift carried about 45,000 to the US, and there remains a backlog which would take the airlift years to transport.

~~SECRET~~

now on the order of 25,000 to 50,000. The regime also has a relatively new system of forced labor camps; called Military Units to Aid Production, these are made up of conscripts, 16 and over, who are considered "undesirable elements" by the regime and judged unreliable for induction into the regular armed services. Probably 25,000 to 30,000 men are now serving in these camps, generally under degrading conditions.

32.



33.

~~_____~~ Fidel has continued the process of institutionalizing his revolution. He has set up a Communist Party framework along the classic lines—and then put his own faithful Fidelistas in the controlling positions. The eight-man Politburo, which Fidel heads and which is composed entirely of men who were associated with his 26th of July Revolutionary Movement, is clearly the power-wielding group of the party. It was members of this group whom Fidel recently named, one by one, when he spoke of sharing additional responsibilities with other leaders.⁸ By contrast, the Old Communists—those who belonged to the party when Castro fought his revolution—have no representation in the Politburo, and have been gradually phased out of key cabinet jobs as well.

1.5(c)(d)
3.4(b)(i)(c)

34. The Cuban Communist Party *per se*, however, is far from being an effective organization for the exercise of power. Neither it, nor any one entity among the military and security organizations, provides a single, sure mechanism

⁸Members of the Politburo:

- Fidel Castro Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief, First Secretary of the Communist Party, and President of the National Institute of Agrarian Reform.
- Raúl Castro Vice Prime Minister, Second Secretary of the Communist Party, and Minister of the Armed Forces.
- Oswaldo Dorticós President of the Republic and head of the Economic Commission of the Central Committee.
- Juan Almeida First Vice Minister of the Armed Forces.
- Ramiro Valdes Minister of the Interior.
- Armando Hart Secretary of Organization for the Central Committee and Chairman of the Education Committee of the Central Committee.
- Guillermo García A member of the Army General Staff and former Commander of the Western Army.
- Sergio del Valle Vice Minister of the Armed Forces.

Except for Dorticós and Hart, each of these men holds the rank of major (comandante), the highest rank in the Cuban military establishment.

~~SECRET~~

for running the country. Fidel holds the pieces together; his control of all the reins of power is at once the strength and potential weakness of the government.

35. In the unlikely event of Castro's death or incapacitation during the next two years, a collegium headed by his brother Raúl and President Dorticós, and perhaps including other members of the present Politburo or top military commanders, would probably take control. We doubt that this arrangement could long endure; sooner or later it would probably give way to some form of power struggle. The outcome of such a contest for power in Cuba is unpredictable,

~~_____~~ The effect on Cuba's foreign affairs is beyond useful speculation.

1.5(c)(d)
3.4(b)(1)

111

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DISSEMINATION NOTICE

1. This document was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy is for the information and use of the recipient and of persons under his jurisdiction on a need-to-know basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments:

- a. Director of Intelligence and Research, for the Department of State
- b. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- c. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, for the Department of the Army
- d. Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), for the Department of the Navy
- e. Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
- f. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
- g. Assistant Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
- h. Director of NSA, for the National Security Agency
- i. Director of Central Reference, CIA, for any other Department or Agency

2. This document may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrangement with the Office of Central Reference, CIA.

3. When this document is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain it for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the document should either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be requested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1953.

4. The title of this document when used separately from the text should be classified: **FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

DISTRIBUTION:

White House
National Security Council
Department of State
Department of Defense
Atomic Energy Commission
Federal Bureau of Investigation