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Short-Term Prospects for the African Nationalist Movements in Angola and Mozambique

Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
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Concurring:

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Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

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SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS FOR THE AFRICAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS IN ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the prospects of the African nationalist movements in Angola and Mozambique over the next year or so.

CONCLUSIONS

A. The guerrilla activities of Angolan nationalists have been for the past two years confined by the Portuguese military to sporadic fighting in a restricted northern area. There is little evidence of active dissidence elsewhere in Angola. The Government of the Republic of Angola in Exile (GRAE), in Leopoldville, is the political backing of the guerrillas. The GRAE is autocratically but inefficiently controlled by Holden Roberto; it is torn by internal dissension and tribal rivalries and disheartened by its lack of progress. Roberto will probably seek help, including arms, from the USSR and Communist China, and we foresee some increase in Communist influence in the next year or so. (*Paras. 8, 11, 14, 16-17, 21*)

B. Roberto may be forced by others in the GRAE to share control and direction, but probably not for some months at least. The Angolan nationalist movement will be able to keep the rebellion alive at the present level if, as seems likely, it retains access to the Congo sanctuary, but we do not believe it will seriously challenge Portugal's hold in Angola over the next year or so. (*Paras. 18-20, 22-23*)

C. The principal nationalist movement in Mozambique is Mondlane's Frelimo. The movement has not yet progressed to the point of open fighting, though a few raids and excursions in the north, based on Tanganyika, are likely during the next year or so. The Portuguese military and security services appear

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to have control of the situation and the Mozambique nationalist movement is more important in terms of African politics than as a physical threat. (*Paras. 28-29, 35-37*)

D. Despite a few steps to liberalize their colonial policy, the Portuguese have not taken, and are not likely to take, any significant steps to meet the pressures brought on them to move towards self-determination or independence for their African territories. Portugal may be able to preserve its present control of Angola and Mozambique for a good many years. But, we believe that the growing political and military costs of maintaining control of the African provinces will almost certainly force Portugal eventually to accommodate to nationalist aspirations for self-determination and independence.¹ (*Paras. 1-5, 41*)

¹The longer term Portuguese position will be discussed in an NIE on Portugal scheduled for August, 1964.

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DISCUSSION

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ON PORTUGUESE AFRICA

1. Angola and Mozambique have been Portuguese possessions since the 16th century. Many Portuguese, and particularly Dr. Salazar, believe that Portugal has a moral responsibility to bring Christianity and civilization to its territories and consider that any surrender of this civilizing mission would be dishonorable. They hold that Africans as a whole are not yet capable of managing their own affairs and claim that events in the newly independent African countries demonstrate that premature independence is a serious mistake for the Africans. There are, in addition, economic reasons why the Portuguese want to retain their African colonies. Angola is an important source of foreign exchange; both Angola and Mozambique provide protected markets and investment opportunities.

2. In 1951, Angola and Mozambique, as well as all other Portuguese territories, were redesignated overseas provinces and are claimed by Lisbon to be integral parts of the homeland. They send a few deputies to the Portuguese National Assembly. Nevertheless, their administration and many of the laws governing them are very different from those obtaining in mainland Portugal. They are governed directly by Lisbon through a Governor General responsible to the Minister of Overseas Territories and such limited local autonomy as they possess is exercised largely by the overseas white minority.² There is little or no prospect that Salazar or any likely successor will make significant moves towards independence for Angola and Mozambique in the foreseeable future.

3. The growth of nationalist sentiment and political organization in Angola and Mozambique has been slow. Historically, the Africans in these areas have been insulated from contact with the outside world, and even the most innocuous African organizations have been suppressed. Moreover, the virtual lack of educational opportunities for Africans either in the territories or in Portugal, particularly at the secondary and university levels, has precluded the growth of politically conscious groups comparable to those in the former British and French colonies.

4. In the recent past, the Portuguese have been attempting to improve their standing with the Africans. In both Angola and Mozambique certain onerous aspects of the treatment of Africans have been alleviated or eliminated, including widespread compulsory labor, forced cotton cultivation, and the designation of *indigenato* (native ward of

²There are about 200,000 whites in Angola and about 100,000 in Mozambique.

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the state). Particularly in Angola civic action programs to improve basic health and housing, and stepped up educational projects, mainly at the primary level, have been introduced. Moreover, Lisbon has made some gestures towards increasing African participation in political affairs in the provinces by reforms which make it possible for a few additional Africans to vote. However, these moves are unlikely to prove any more effective in meeting African nationalist demands than were earlier modest attempts to improve Africans' juridical and social status. They reveal no change in Dr. Salazar's basic determination to preserve the centralized authority of the Portuguese state. Lisbon is aware that there is a strain of separatism among the Portuguese settlers both in Angola and Mozambique, but also knows that the threat of rebellion has increased their sense of dependence on Portugal.

5. In the absence of any permitted political activity inside the provinces, Angolan and Mozambique nationalists in exile have formed organizations dedicated to achieving independence. The development of such organizations has been impeded by strong tribal rivalries as well as the distrust between black Africans and mulattoes. None has enlisted any significant support from the white Portuguese community. None had demonstrated a significant capability to accomplish anything until 1961 when, under the leadership of Holden Roberto's Union of the Populations of Angola (UPA), widespread violence erupted in northwestern Angola. This caught the Portuguese by surprise and provided new hope for the nationalist cause. More fundamentally, it revealed that Portugal's attempt to insulate its possessions against the general trend of African political awakening had failed.

6. The ability of the Angolan nationalists to establish a guerrilla force in the territory opened the way to new sources of material and diplomatic support in Africa. In 1963, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Liberation Committee designated Portuguese Africa as one of its prime targets and thereby added to African agitation and pressure for independence for Angola and Mozambique.

II. ANGOLA

A. The GRAE: Its Policies and Backing

7. The Leopoldville-based GRAE, formed in April 1962, achieved a certain standing in August 1963 when the foreign ministers of the OAU recommended that all states extend diplomatic recognition. (About half the African states and a few Middle Eastern states have done so.) Officially it is a political coalition, but for all practical purposes the UPA is the GRAE.

8. Both the GRAE and the UPA have been dominated by Holden Roberto who has exercised virtually sole control over the nationalists' policies, finances, administration, and broad military strategy. In

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practice, his authority represents the primary unifying element in the GRAE, whose ministers distrust each other, and frequently divide along tribal or party lines.

9. Roberto's policies and long-range intentions are uncertain. Prior to 1961 he favored nonviolence, and even now he probably recognizes that his primitive forces cannot achieve military supremacy over the Portuguese. He now probably hopes that a campaign of military and economic attrition will prove so costly to the Portuguese that eventually they will negotiate Angolan independence. Politically, his long and friendly association with the Congolese Premier, Cyrille Adoula, and the support he has received from such countries as Nigeria and Tunisia have given him a reputation for moderation. He is regarded widely in Africa as a politician who wishes to preserve his connections with the West. Roberto has a reputation for being stubborn and authoritarian.

10. The GRAE draws most of its strength and leadership from the better educated Bakongo tribe in northern Angola (and the adjacent region of the Lower Congo). They compose about 10 percent of Angola's 4.5 million black Africans. It has also received some backing from the less cohesive, northern Kimbundu tribal group which includes about 15 percent of the black Africans. The GRAE's predominantly Bakongo guerrilla force receives the active support of a substantial proportion of the populace in these tribal homelands, e.g., some have become guerrilla fighters, others serve as porters to carry supplies from the Congo.

11. We have no reliable evidence that the GRAE, or any other liberation movement for that matter, has enlisted significant support elsewhere among Angola's melange of some 100 tribes. While African nationalist sentiment may exist, there have been no signs of organized revolt among the southern or eastern tribes. There is strong tribal enmity between the Bakongo-Kimbundu tribes and the powerful Ovimbundu peoples of central Angola, who account for more than one-third of the Angolan blacks. Also, Roberto's high-handed treatment of non-Bakongo in the GRAE has vitiated his occasional attempts to offset charges of tribal favoritism by appointing a few representatives of other tribes to nominally important positions. Finally, the GRAE is still almost exclusively a black African organization and Roberto, like many Angolan blacks, remains suspicious of the mulattoes in and out of Angola. As a result, mulatto dissidents have mostly supported the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), which has been the UPA's only significant rival among Angolan nationalist groups.

12. Despite the trappings of an organized revolutionary movement, the GRAE functions at a low order of efficiency and remains chiefly a small band of exiles in Leopoldville who derive uncertain political power from a limited tribal base, and from a degree of acceptance by the

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outside world of their claims to be the revolutionary government. Nevertheless, the GRAE is a going nationalist movement and if it persists and has some modicum of success, it could have an appeal beyond its presently restricted tribal base.

13. The UPA's rival, the MPLA, split into two competing factions in 1963, and its fortunes have seriously declined since the OAU recognized the GRAE. It never demonstrated any significant following in Angola, but its leadership is politically sophisticated and enjoyed relatively wide international contacts. Several of the MPLA's well-educated leaders have had long time Communist associations and until 1963 the MPLA received Bloc financial and material aid. After an internal power struggle, one faction came under the sway of militant pro-Communists, led by former Secretary General Viriato da Cruz. The remainder of the organization, led by a black African, Agostinho Neto, has been reorganized in a front including a number of tiny Angolan African parties, including some sponsored by the Portuguese. For the Portuguese, this grouping is probably less unacceptable than the GRAE, even though Neto has had contacts with the anti-Salazar followers of Humberto Delgado.

B. The Current Situation

Military

14. The military situation in Angola has dragged on with little change during the past two years. Fighting is confined largely to sporadic guerrilla warfare, with operations centered in pockets (amounting to about four percent of Angolan territory) in rugged country near Carmona, in the northwest, and in Cabinda³ (see map attached). Support for the guerrillas in Angola is largely by overland trail from the Congo. The size of the guerrilla force varies from time to time. The GRAE claims to have trained several thousands, but the number active at any one time is probably in the hundreds. Nevertheless, the guerrillas tie down about a quarter of the 40,000 Portuguese troops deployed throughout Angola. The Portuguese are also using civilian auxiliary units on the ground and in the air. The guerrillas are able to harrass small Portuguese patrols, and cut road communications but Portuguese combat casualties are small. The Portuguese have improved their counter-guerrilla operations and have placed strong pressure on the

³The small Angolan exclave of Cabinda, located between Congo (Brazzaville) and Congo (Leopoldville), is much more vulnerable to rebel attack. Africans in Cabinda have formed a number of small nationalist parties, who have had close ties with the MPLA. They have received support from Congo (Brazzaville), and have launched guerrilla assaults against the territory. Roberto has denounced Cabindan separatism and indicated strong GRAE interest in the territory. The establishment of a firm presence in Cabinda would be a major political victory for the Angolan nationalists.

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nationalists' makeshift communications and supply lines. The nature of the guerrilla supply system is such that a number of refugees have been victims of Portuguese attacks on supply trails. In present circumstances, the Portuguese seem unable to stamp out the revolt, but the guerrillas can do little beyond continuing their present level of activity.

Political

15. The nationalists' lagging military effort has caused widespread disappointment with the leadership of Holden Roberto in many quarters of his movement and among its sympathizers. His critics contend that despite some 70 tons of Algerian-supplied war material and more, better-trained guerrillas in the field, the nationalists have failed to show any significant progress. Annoyed by their inability to expand operations, and resentful of continuing deficiencies of food and equipment, the military commanders have become increasingly critical of Roberto's autocratic administration and his inability to secure additional assistance for them and their men. Meanwhile, some African states, e.g., Nigeria, have indicated concern over the GRAE's bumbling and have cut off aid until they see an improvement. The OAU's Liberation Committee which has given about \$85,000 to the GRAE, has delayed further assistance. To some extent, Roberto is the victim of the expectations stirred by the OAU's decision to support the GRAE exclusively. Most of these expectations have remained unfulfilled. Partly because Roberto has concentrated responsibilities in his own hands for so long, he has now become the chief whipping boy.

16. Among the chief causes of dissension in the GRAE is Roberto's unwillingness to delegate authority and even to consult his associates. To a degree the conflict also reflects personal ambitions and tribal jealousies, but the grievances which threaten his power in the GRAE are as keenly felt in Roberto's own UPA. Although criticism and plotting are focused against Roberto, they are not always intended to topple him from power, but rather reflect a rough consensus that he must somehow be divested of a significant share of his power, and that fairly substantial changes are required in the Angolan nationalist leadership.

17. In an effort to preserve his control, Roberto has sought to win new support and assistance abroad. In January 1964 he publicly announced his willingness to accept support from Communist nations, and subsequently indicated his intention to send arms-seeking missions to Peiping and Moscow. More recently, apparently at the behest of the Algerians and possibly to facilitate aid from the Communists, Roberto agreed to accept into the GRAE the Communist-backed da Cruz faction of the MPLA. Roberto probably hoped that these moves would also stimulate assistance from the OAU and the West. The Communists have given some low-key political praise to Roberto and the

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GRAE for the first time, but no GRAE delegation has yet departed for the Bloc and substantial Communist assistance does not seem close at hand. Nor has da Cruz come to Leopoldville to join the GRAE.

C. Prospects

The Outlook Within Angola

18. We believe Roberto has about an even chance to retain his present monopoly of power in the GRAE over the next few months. Probably the decisive consideration is the inability of the dissidents to agree on a course of action or a successor. Even though his prestige is tarnished, no other personality associated with the GRAE is so widely known in independent Africa or in Angola. Also, his opponents are still aware that he commands the loyalty of the Bakongos who dominate the nationalist forces, and it is questionable whether a non-Bakongo could obtain their support.

19. In time, however, and perhaps during the period of this estimate, there is a good chance of an alliance between military leaders and dissident political elements either to dilute substantially Roberto's present powers or to depose him. Even though Roberto will almost certainly court Peiping and Moscow, we think that it is unlikely that he will be able to obtain assistance abroad sufficient to stave off reduction of his power.

20. Even if Roberto receives some windfall to see him through a few additional months—for example, the forthcoming African Heads of State Conference in Cairo may provide some new backing as a demonstration of African anticolonialist fervor—we doubt that he has the talent or flexibility to make voluntarily adjustments which would satisfy his more important critics, or to improve significantly the GRAE's performance. Roberto's departure, however, would not in itself foreshadow a stepped-up war effort or administrative improvement in the GRAE which remains woefully short of well-trained political and military cadres. Indeed, it might lead to deterioration in the effectiveness of the organization or even fragmentation.

21. Meanwhile, the outlook is for continued political squabbling inside the GRAE, with Roberto hanging on while hoping for some event on which he can capitalize. Both the USSR and Communist China are interested in probing the opportunities presented by the GRAE's difficulties, and we foresee some growth of Communist influence during the period of this estimate. The likelihood of such growth would be increased by the entrance of da Cruz' radical MPLA faction into the GRAE. Da Cruz, who advocates a Cuban-type revolution, and has probably received funds from Peiping, is capable of organizing dangerous factions within the coalition. However, as mulattoes, he and his fol-

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lowers will be suspect. Furthermore, Roberto is unlikely to accept military advisors from Communist states in Angola or at his headquarters or his training camps in the Congo. Adoula and any likely successor named by Congo President Kasavubu would probably take the same position. In any case, it seems certain that internal bickering will occupy much of the GRAE's energy and, arms deficiencies and logistics difficulties apart, prospects for an expansion of the conflict or improved military effectiveness of the nationalists are dim.

22. Nevertheless, we believe the nationalists can continue to keep the rebellion alive at something approaching the present low level of activity indefinitely if they have continued access to sanctuary in the Congo. We believe this to be true whether or not the nationalists obtain substantial new equipment (and it seems reasonable to assume that they will obtain some supplies).

23. On the other hand, there appears little likelihood that during the next year or so the rebellion will spread widely or flare up in new areas of Angola, although sporadic acts of violence may occur. The nationalists are not likely to persuade the hitherto unaffected tribes in the central and southern regions to join the struggle except in the now improbable event of a clear success for the nationalist cause or, at the very minimum, unless these now passive tribes can be provided with substantially more arms and direction than appears feasible. Indeed, the nationalists' threat to Portugal's overall position in Angola will probably not become serious until they can open other fronts, e.g., from Katanga, or unless military requirements elsewhere, e.g., in Mozambique or Portuguese Guinea, should drain away the currently vastly superior Portuguese forces and air power. In sum, we believe the GRAE will not seriously challenge Portugal's hold in Angola over the next year or so.

D. Probable External Developments Affecting Angola

The Congo (Leopoldville)

24. The course of Angolan events will depend in part upon events in the neighboring Congo. Adoula has provided the training camps from which the guerrillas also are supplied, and considerable freedom of action in conducting political and military activities. The UN military presence in the Congo ended on 30 June and Adoula's mandate as Prime Minister expired. Kasavubu must appoint an interim government to hold office until there can be elections under the new constitution which itself cannot be adopted before 10 July. In these circumstances, the composition and political orientation of the Leopoldville government will be uncertain, to say the least. It will be faced with staggering security and political problems of its own, and the net effect may be a decline in its ability and willingness to give aid and comfort to the Angolan nationalist movement.

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25. Any government in Leopoldville will remain aware that the rail transport facilities from Katanga through Angola are of great importance to the marketing of Katanga's minerals. Hence, Leopoldville will remain wary of an extension of the area of the Angola rebellion and will probably continue to insist on some control over GRAE policies with regard to opening a "second front" from Katanga or Kasai.

26. Adoula apart, most Congolese leaders have shown little interest in Angola. However, in the event that Adoula is not renamed Prime Minister, a successor regime, unless it were clearly radical and leftist, would probably allow the GRAE to use present facilities, thus showing its bona fides as a supporter of African nationalism. But it might be less helpful to the GRAE than Adoula. If Adoula were replaced by a more radical, leftist regime, it would probably be anxious to help the Angolan cause more vigorously. But it is doubtful that the regime could be of much practical help, as it would probably have its hands full at home.

The OAU

27. Whatever Roberto's personal fortunes or the obstacles facing the nationalist forces, the GRAE is probably here to stay. To a considerable degree the prestige of the OAU became involved when it adopted the GRAE as its chosen instrument in the Angolan insurrection. However, the limited capability of the African states to force a military decision of the issue will likely cause OAU members to rely heavily on international pressure, both in the OAU and in the UN, to press for a change in Portuguese policies.

III. MOZAMBIQUE

A. The Nationalist Movement

28. The nationalist movement of Mozambique is still in the formative stage, heavily dependent upon sympathetic African and other governments for hospitality and assistance. Virtually all nationalist activity is carried on outside Mozambique, mainly in Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika. Portugal's pervasive security measures and the political inertia of the African populace, have so far kept the poverty-stricken Africans in Mozambique nearly free of nationalist agitation. About 99 percent of Mozambique's 6.5 million Africans are illiterate.

29. The principal nationalist organization is the Mozambique Liberation Front, often known as Frelimo, which is led by Dr. Eduardo Mondlane, a US-educated former professor whose nationalism is of a relatively moderate, Western-oriented cast. Frelimo was formed in 1962, as a merger of two small exile nationalist groups. In Frelimo Mondlane is the main unifying element as well as being the only important leader. Frelimo has adopted a political stance in accord with his views.

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30. During its brief existence Frelimo has been beset by dissension which has diverted its attention and has caused the breakaway of two small factions which have formed rival organizations. There are other small exile Mozambique nationalist organizations but none of these has any sizable political following inside Mozambique.

31. Mondlane has sought to build up his fledgling organization and to increase Frelimo membership and capabilities inside Mozambique. Grievances against the Portuguese exist among Mozambique Africans, but they are difficult to mobilize. Moreover, the Portuguese security apparatus, including a network of African informants, is such that all political activities must be carried out clandestinely. However, there is evidence that Frelimo has established some cells in Mozambique, including a few far to the south. In addition, the nationalists have a capability to smuggle money and messages into Mozambique, and to exfiltrate individuals. Although we do not have figures on Frelimo's followers, we believe its numbers within Mozambique are small.

32. Mondlane has secured substantial assistance in recent months. The African Liberation Committee has pledged some \$85,000, and Frelimo has received funds, guerrilla warfare and educational training, and scholarships from a variety of sources including: Communist China, the USSR, Czechoslovakia, the UAR, and Israel. US individuals and organizations have also made educational grants to members of Frelimo. In January, Algeria provided an arms shipment now held by the Tanganyikan Government and some 175 Frelimo men trained in Algeria in guerrilla warfare have returned to Tanganyika. The Dar es Salaam Government will probably soon make available some of the arms and a site for military training.

33. Growing pressure both from inside the nationalist movement and from other Africans seems to have convinced Mondlane that he must attempt organized violence on some scale. Nevertheless, Frelimo must overcome many grave obstacles before it can launch any sizable guerrilla campaign, which would have to be based on Tanganyika. There is a great shortage of arms and of organizational skills. There is still a high degree of apathy among primitive Mozambique Africans who appear unwilling to risk personal security for uncertain political goals, and who are divided by ethnic and linguistic differences (there are some 9 ethnic and 37 linguistic groups). The terrain in northern Mozambique does not lend itself to guerrilla operations. Finally, Frelimo's Tanganyika headquarters is some 1,000-1,500 miles from such centers of power as Beira and Lourenco Marques.

B. The Portuguese Position and Settler Attitudes

34. Since the troubles began in Angola, the Portuguese have moved steadily to reinforce their military position in Mozambique, and have expanded the garrison to 17,000. In addition, they have embarked on

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a military airfield and road construction program to facilitate rapid troop deployment, and established new outposts in the northern and border areas. Even though the Portuguese cannot prevent incursions by small groups along exposed frontiers, it is unlikely that an uprising would take them as much by surprise as was the case in northern Angola. Although Mozambique's whites hold long standing grievances against Dr. Salazar's policies, the vast majority of them would be unwilling to envisage the disappearance of European control.

C. Prospects

The Outlook Within Mozambique

35. The Mozambique nationalist movement has gained some new international recognition during the past year but still lacks an important political following, and is confronted by well-prepared and greatly superior security forces. We believe that this situation is unlikely to change soon, and that the tempo of nationalist activities inside backward Mozambique is unlikely to accelerate much in the next year.

36. However, the return to Tanganyika of Frelimo's trainees from Algeria has provided the organization with its first operational capability. Thus, we look for Frelimo to launch a few forays across the border or to carry out minor terrorist or sabotage incidents in urban areas. It is unlikely that these events will cause the authorities very much difficulty, although they would have an unsettling effect on the white community.

37. Frelimo can look ahead to an increasing trickle of adherents with rudimentary guerrilla training, but its top command has evidenced little promise of the ability to cope with the problems of military and political organization. Moreover, the degree to which Frelimo can turn latent African hostility to Portuguese rule into militant resistance remains an open question. On the whole, we believe that while manifestations of African unrest will probably emerge in due course, Portuguese forces will probably retain the capability to repress such outbreaks for a considerable time.

Probable Reactions of Neighboring States

38. The fortunes of the Mozambique nationalists will be affected by the course of events in the neighboring states, particularly Tanganyika and Nyasaland. President Nyerere has played a role roughly analogous to that of Adoula in relation to Angola. While generally supporting the nationalists, he has limited both their activities and the amounts of military equipment to reach them. Although he will probably permit sufficient freedom of action to Frelimo to forestall serious criticism from more militant Africans, he is genuinely fearful of retaliatory action by the Portuguese, and he will seek to avoid becoming deeply involved.

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Should Nyerere be replaced by a more radical leader, e.g., External Affairs Minister Kambona, the Mozambique nationalists could count on much greater support and encouragement.

39. In Nyasaland (scheduled to become independent on 6 July), President Banda is well aware of the potential stranglehold Portugal has on Nyasaland's only access to the sea via the rail link to Beira. Preoccupied with events in Nyasaland, Banda is likely to permit some low-level nationalist subversive and propaganda activities against Mozambique to take place, but he has gone to great lengths to avoid offending Lisbon.

40. When Northern Rhodesia achieves independence in October, moderate Prime Minister Kenneth Kaunda will need to retain some degree of Portuguese friendship in order to ship his country's copper through either Beira or Lobito in Angola (a third alternative—the Congo's Route Nationale—is costly and highly uncertain). In these circumstances, Kaunda is likely to be chary of deep involvement in Mozambique or Angolan affairs.


IV. LONGER RANGE PROSPECTS

41. Although we do not foresee a significant buildup in the political or military capabilities of the Angolan and Mozambique nationalists during the next year or so, in the long run time is almost certainly on their side. Aside from the eventual fate of Roberto or Mondlane, some version of their movements will continue. As education and contacts with the outside world, including other Africans, increase, political dissatisfaction throughout the Portuguese areas is almost certain to grow and erupt into active opposition. Portugal may be able to preserve its present control of Angola and Mozambique for a good many years. But, we believe that the growing political and military costs of maintaining control of the African provinces will almost certainly force Portugal eventually to accommodate to nationalist aspirations for self-determination and independence.⁴ In the interim, Communist assistance to the nationalists may permit serious inroads into the various nationalist organizations and thereby pose additional difficult decisions for the West.

⁴The longer term Portuguese position will be discussed in an NIE on Portugal scheduled for August, 1964.

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ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE



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