

~~SECRET~~

Nº

3

15935

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

1998

Economic Intelligence Report

RECENT TRENDS IN SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE



CIA/RR ER 64-23

August 1964

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Office of Research and Reports

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

227974

~~SECRET~~

Economic Intelligence Report

RECENT TRENDS IN SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE

CIA/RR ER 64-23

~~WARNING~~

~~This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Office of Research and Reports

~~SECRET~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

FOREWORD

This report on recent trends in Soviet foreign trade was prepared in response to the expressed needs of the intelligence community as stated by their representatives on the Economic Intelligence Committee. Drafts were submitted to the representatives of the Department of Commerce and the Department of State for review and comments. Insofar as possible, these comments have been included in the final revision.

The principal source used in the preparation of this report was the series of annual foreign trade handbooks published by the Ministry of Foreign Trade, USSR. In addition, use was made of Soviet economic journals and newspapers; Department of State despatches from foreign posts; and foreign broadcast reports, particularly the FBIS Daily Report (USSR and East Europe).

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

BLANK PAGE

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
Summary and Conclusions	1
I. Over-All Trends	3
A. Value and Direction	3
B. Commodity Composition	3
II. Trade with the Free World	7
A. With the Industrial West	7
B. With Less Developed Countries of the Free World	10
III. Trade with Communist Countries	13
A. With the European Satellites	13
B. With Communist China	16
C. With Other Communist Countries	17
IV. Soviet International Payments Position	19
A. With the Free World	19
B. With Communist Countries	23
V. Recent Developments	25

Appendix

Statistical Tables	29
------------------------------	----

Tables

1. Soviet Foreign Trade, 1961-62	4
2. Shares of the Industrial West and the European Satellites in Soviet Imports of Machinery and Equipment, 1959-62	6
3. Soviet Trade with the Free World, 1961-62	8

	<u>Page</u>
4. Soviet Trade with Selected Countries of the Industrial West, 1961-62	9
5. Estimated Soviet Foreign Aid Deliveries to the Less Developed Countries of the Free World, 1958-62	11
6. Soviet Trade with Selected Less Developed Countries of the Free World, 1961-62	12
7. Soviet Trade with the European Satellites, 1961-62	15
8. Soviet Trade with Communist China, 1959-62	17
9. Soviet Trade with Other Communist Countries, 1961-62	18
10. Soviet Trade with the Free World, 1960-62	21
11. Soviet Extensions of Credit to Communist Countries, 1960-62	24
12. Geographic Distribution of Soviet Foreign Trade, 1955-62	31
13. Commodity Composition of Soviet Exports, 1955-62	32
14. Commodity Composition of Soviet Imports, 1955-62	33
15. Commodity Composition of Soviet Exports to the European Satellites, 1955-62	34
16. Commodity Composition of Soviet Imports from the European Satellites, 1955-62	35
17. Commodity Composition of Soviet Exports to Communist China, 1955-62	36
18. Commodity Composition of Soviet Imports from Communist China, 1955-62	37
19. Commodity Composition of Soviet Exports to the Industrial West, 1955-62	38

	<u>Page</u>
20. Commodity Composition of Soviet Imports from the Industrial West, 1955-62	39
21. Commodity Composition of Soviet Exports to Less Developed Countries, 1955-62	40
22. Commodity Composition of Soviet Imports from Less Developed Countries, 1955-62	41

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

RECENT TRENDS IN SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE*

Summary and Conclusions

The compounded internal economic problems of the USSR in 1963 were reflected in the country's foreign economic activity: the rate of growth of foreign trade, which in 1962 had risen to 14 percent, returned to the level of 6 percent that it had averaged in 1960 and 1961. Preliminary Soviet trade data indicate that a substantial part of the growth in 1963 was accounted for by Communist countries. Trade with the countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) increased by 7 percent compared with 17 percent in the previous year. Commercial exchanges with the industrial West registered an increase of about 8 percent, roughly comparable to the rate of increase in 1962, and trade with the less developed countries of the Free World was about 20 percent above the level of 1962 as drawings on Soviet credits continued at a high level. Trade with Communist China decreased by 21 percent from the previous year and with the remaining Communist countries showed no increase.

The disastrous Soviet wheat harvest and Khrushchev's new chemical fertilizer program brought Soviet balance-of-payments problems to the forefront in 1963. Normal purchases from the Free World, which had diminished Moscow's gold treasure at the rate of about \$80 million** annually over the previous 10 years, were not to be supplemented by \$800 million in wheat purchases in 1963-64 at a time when the benefits of new credits from the industrial West were being increasingly offset by repayments on previous credits. The impact on the Soviet purchasing program in the industrial West was almost immediately evident as new orders for capital goods dropped off sharply after August 1963 and almost dried up completely in November. The seriousness with which the Soviet leadership regarded the payments crisis was evident in reports that the Soviet import plan was deliberated at the highest levels of the Party and government. This seriousness also was evident in the persistent efforts of Soviet negotiating teams in Western Europe to obtain longer term credits (up to 15 years) to buy chemical and related equipment for the expanded fertilizer program.

Finally, the relatively rapid increases in Soviet trade with the European Satellites*** were unaccompanied by any real success on the part of the USSR in promoting future economic relations on a multilateral basis. What appeared to be a major Soviet effort in 1962 to manipulate the economic relations of the CEMA membership in the future through a

* The estimates and conclusions in this report represent the best judgment of this Office as of 15 June 1964.

** Dollar values are given in current US dollars throughout this report.

*** The terms European Satellites and Satellites as used in this report refer to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania.

1.
~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

supranational planning body was finally thwarted by Satellite and particularly by Rumanian efforts in 1963. At the end of 1963, Moscow was planning its future economic relations with other CEMA countries on a bilateral basis, at least through 1970.

Soviet foreign trade in 1962 scored its sharpest growth since 1959, in contrast with the internal economic difficulties shown in indicators of aggregate output and investment. A level of \$13.5 billion was achieved in foreign trade in 1962 -- 14 percent above the level of \$11.8 billion in 1961 and a marked departure from the average annual increase of 6 percent in the previous 2 years.

Leading the significant growth in trade was the increase of \$1.1 billion in Soviet trade with the European Satellites, which overshadowed the decline in Soviet trade with Communist China. Soviet trade with the Communist countries as a whole registered its first significant increase in 3 years.

Another dynamic factor in the growth of Soviet foreign trade in 1962 was the rise of about \$400 million in Soviet foreign aid deliveries to the less developed countries of the Free World. Although new Soviet aid commitments declined sharply, deliveries of both military and non-military aid to these countries totaled nearly \$800 million.

A third major factor in the growth of Soviet trade in 1962 was the substantial increase in Soviet imports from the industrial West featuring machinery and equipment, an increase facilitated by the availability of credits from Western suppliers of equipment.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

I. Over-All Trends

A. Value and Direction

Following a 2-year lull, Soviet foreign trade in 1962 reached a record \$13.5 billion -- an increase of 14 percent above the previous year (see Table 1*). This increase, paced by a rise of more than \$1 billion in trade with the European Satellites, contrasted sharply with the average annual increase of 6 percent from 1959 to 1961 and brought the average annual rate of growth of Soviet foreign trade since 1958 to 12 percent, well in excess of the average annual rate of growth of industrial production, which was 7 percent.

The largest gain was registered in exports, which increased from \$6 billion to slightly more than \$7 billion, while imports increased somewhat more than \$620 million, to \$6.45 billion. The USSR has now moved into fifth place, ahead of Canada, as a trading nation and accounts for almost 5 percent of the total world trade. By far the largest part of Soviet trade is conducted with other Communist countries; trade with the Free World amounted to little more than \$4 billion in 1962, or less than 1-1/2 percent of the total world trade. In spite of its rapid growth, however, trade continues to account for a relatively insignificant share of aggregate Soviet economic activity: exports still account for less than 3 percent of Soviet gross national product.

The geographic division of Soviet foreign trade in 1962 was roughly 70 percent with other Communist countries and the remainder with the Free World. The share of the Communist countries in Soviet foreign trade has been declining in recent years, dropping from about 75 percent in 1959. Nevertheless, the more rapid increase in Soviet trade with the European Satellites than in the total Soviet trade has increased the share of these countries from 52 percent in 1959 to 56 percent in 1962, while Communist China accounted for only 6 percent in 1962 as against 20 percent in 1959. Because of the more rapid increase in Soviet trade with the industrial West in recent years, the USSR continues to conduct far more trade with the industrial West (18 percent of the total) than with the less developed countries (9 percent).

B. Commodity Composition

One of the most significant changes in the commodity composition of Soviet trade in 1962 was the sharp rise in unspecified exports, which accounted for 45 percent of the total increase in exports (see Table 13**). The growth in this category is related to the large

* P. 4, below.

** For data on the commodity composition of Soviet trade, see Tables 13 through 22, Appendix, pp. 32 through 41, below.

Table 1

Soviet Foreign Trade ^{a/}
1961-62

Area or Country	1961					1962				
	Exports	Imports	Balance ^{b/}	Turnover ^{c/}	Percent of Total Soviet Trade	Exports	Imports	Balance ^{b/}	Turnover ^{c/}	Percent of Total Soviet Trade
	Million US \$					Million US \$				
Total	5,998	5,828	170	11,826	100.0	7,035	6,450	585	13,484	100.0
Communist countries	4,321	4,147	174	8,468	71.6	4,909	4,563	347	9,472	70.2
European Satellites	3,400	3,044	356	6,444	54.5	3,971	3,588	384	7,559	56.1
Communist China	367	551	-184	919	7.8	233	516	-283	750	5.6
Other Far Eastern Communist countries ^{d/}	211	163	48	374	3.2	262	179	83	440	3.3
Albania	20	22	-1	42	0.4	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Cuba	287	312	-25	599	5.1	371	234	137	605	4.5
Yugoslavia	36	55	-19	90	0.8	72	46	26	118	0.9
Free World	1,677	1,681	-4	3,358	28.4	2,125	1,887	238	4,012	29.8
Industrial West	1,060	1,088	-28	2,148	18.2	1,105	1,265	-160	2,370	17.6
Less developed countries	507	584	-77	1,092	9.2	568	614	-46	1,182	8.8
Unallocated ^{e/}	110	9	101	119	1.0	453	8	444	461	3.4

- a. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown. For exports and imports in 1955-62, by geographic area, see Table 12, Appendix, p. 31, below.
- b. Exports minus imports. A positive balance is indicated by no sign, a negative balance by a minus sign.
- c. Exports plus imports.
- d. Mongolia, North Korea, and North Vietnam.
- e. Unallocated geographically in the Soviet statistical handbooks.

~~SECRET~~

increase in unallocated exports to the Free World, which appear to be largely military exports.*

The largest increase in specified exports -- more than \$200 million -- was registered by machinery and equipment, with the Communist countries accounting for most of the gain. The share of other commodity categories fell in 1962 in spite of increases in absolute terms. Thus fuels were relatively less important in 1962 in spite of a gain of \$112 million. Exports of coal continued to increase, as they have since 1958, and in fact accounted for a larger proportion of the increase in the fuels category than petroleum. There was a sharp drop in the growth of exports of petroleum -- an increase in value of less than 7 percent in 1962 (more than 10 percent in volume) as domestic requirements have kept pace with increases in production.

Soviet exports of grain increased marginally -- about 335,000 metric tons** -- with total exports valued at about \$530 million. The sharp drop in exports to the industrial West tended to offset the substantial increase in exports to the European Satellites. An increase in net exports of about 1 million tons was achieved, however, as imports of wheat from Canada fell from almost one-half million tons in 1961 to zero in 1962.

The increase of 11 percent in Soviet imports in 1962 came about largely as a result of a growth of \$505 million in imports of machinery and equipment, which were valued at \$2,240 million in 1962. More than one-third of total Soviet imports in 1962 was machinery and equipment, which showed a substantial increase above recent years. As in past years, the greater part (\$1,620 million) of Soviet imports of machinery and equipment originated in the European Satellites. The remaining \$600 million came from the industrial West. The relative importance of each of these areas in supplying Soviet requirements for imported machinery and equipment is evident when comparing the share of the industrial West and the European Satellites in total Soviet imports and in Soviet imports of machinery and equipment, as shown in Table 2.*** One-third of the machinery and equipment imported was transportation equipment, purchases of which totaled \$746 million. More than three-fourths of this equipment came from the European Satellites. Imports of chemical equipment declined by roughly 17 percent to \$159 million in 1962 -- the first drop since the beginning of the Seven Year Plan (1959-65). The efforts of the USSR to upgrade its lagging wood-processing industry have led to increased imports of wood-processing equipment, the value of which reached an all-time high of \$146 million in 1962, up from less than \$49 million in 1961, with almost the entire increment coming from the industrial West. With the considerably larger increase in imports than in exports of machinery and equipment, the Soviet net import position became

* See IV, A, p. 19, below.

** Tonnages are given in metric tons throughout this report.

*** P. 6, below.

~~SECRET~~

Table 2

Shares of the Industrial West and the European Satellites
in Soviet Imports of Machinery and Equipment
1959-62

	Percent			
	<u>1959</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1962</u>
From the industrial West				
Total imports	14.9	19.0	18.7	19.6
Machinery and equipment	21.7	27.2	27.1	26.6
From the European Satellites				
Total imports	49.7	50.1	52.2	55.6
Machinery and equipment	76.9	72.1	71.8	72.4

even more pronounced in 1962, when net imports of machinery amounted to almost \$1.1 billion.

In addition to the one-third of total Soviet imports in 1962 that comprised machinery and equipment, another one-third was accounted for by consumer goods (largely consumer manufactures) and the remaining one-third by a mixed basket of manufactures, semimanufactured goods, and raw materials. The bulk of Soviet imports of consumer goods is of Communist origin.

Over time the commodity composition of Soviet foreign trade has shown basically little change in either exports or imports. Soviet exports continue to be heavily oriented toward raw materials, fuels, and semimanufactured goods. Although exports of machinery and equipment almost doubled during 1955-62, their share in total exports in 1962 was even less than in 1955, when they were almost 18 percent of the total. Fuels have become more important in the total, but the share of other raw materials and semimanufactured goods -- for example, textile fibers -- has been reduced. Soviet imports continue to be dominated by machinery and equipment needed for current industrialization programs. Consumer goods retain a significant place -- 28 percent -- in Soviet imports.

The commodity composition of Soviet foreign trade does not reflect that of a highly industrialized country trading on the basis of either comparative or absolute advantage. In its progress toward industrialization the USSR has achieved a reduction in the costs of producing capital goods relative to those of raw material and agricultural production, but such structural changes in the Soviet economy have not yet been reflected in Soviet trade to any appreciable extent. The USSR

remains a net importer of capital goods, while its exports are dominated by much the same crude and semiprocessed materials that it has exported for decades.

II. Trade with the Free World

Soviet trade with the Free World rose by 19 percent in 1962 -- an impressive gain, particularly in view of the general economic slowdown suffered by the USSR. The absolute increase in this trade, \$654 million, in 1962 was the largest in the postwar period and in percentage terms was consistent with the average growth of 17 percent in Soviet trade with the Free World since 1955. This trade amounted to more than \$4 billion (see Table 3*) and represented almost 30 percent of the total Soviet trade, the highest share in more than a decade.

Of the total increase in trade in 1962, about \$448 million represented exports, but exports to identified countries increased by only \$106 million, leaving an increment of about \$340 million unaccounted for. The entire increase of \$206 million in imports is identifiable as to country of origin. Although this is by no means certain, it would appear that the value of military exports to the less developed countries was included in the trade totals.**

A. With the Industrial West

The increase of more than 10 percent in Soviet trade with the industrial West in 1962 reflected an increase of 16 percent in imports, while exports lagged behind with a growth of only 4 percent, thereby creating a deficit in the trade account of \$160 million (see Table 4***). As in recent years, the drawing down of medium-term credits obtained from countries of the industrial West (approximately \$100 million in 1962, net of repayments on previous credits) contributed to the financing of the large increase in imports of machinery and equipment, which account for nearly half of Soviet imports from the industrial West.† These credits plus sales of gold were used to offset the deficit.

Although imports, particularly of capital goods, reached an all-time high in 1962, Soviet internal economic problems exerted a significant impact on the volume of new orders for Western machinery and equipment. Beginning in the latter part of 1961 and lasting until the late summer of 1962, there was a significant lull in the placement of orders for machinery and equipment. The large Soviet order for \$100 million in ships and marine equipment from Japan in August 1962 ended††

* P. 8, below.

** See IV, A, p. 19, below.

*** P. 9, below.

† See the tabulation on p. 23, below.

†† Text continued on p. 10.

Table 3

Soviet Trade with the Free World a/
1961-62

Million US \$

Area	1961				1962			
	Exports	Imports	Balance b/	Turnover c/	Exports	Imports	Balance b/	Turnover c/
Total	<u>1,677</u>	<u>1,681</u>	-4	<u>3,358</u>	<u>2,125</u>	<u>1,887</u>	<u>238</u>	<u>4,012</u>
Industrial West	1,060	1,088	-28	2,148	1,105	1,265	-160	2,370
Less developed countries	507	584	-77	1,092	568	614	-46	1,182
Unallocated d/	110	9	101	119	453	8	444	461

- a. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
- b. Exports minus imports. A positive balance is indicated by no sign, a negative balance by a minus sign.
- c. Exports plus imports.
- d. Unallocated geographically in the Soviet statistical handbooks.

Table 4

Soviet Trade with Selected Countries of the Industrial West ^{a/}
1961-62

Country	1961				1962					
	Million US \$		Percent of Total Soviet Trade	Turnover ^{c/}	Million US \$		Percent of Total Soviet Trade	Turnover ^{c/}		
Exports	Imports	Balance ^{b/}			Exports	Imports			Balance ^{b/}	
Total	1,060	1,088	-28	2,148	18.2	1,105	1,265	-160	2,370	17.6
Of which:										
Finland	137	142	-5	279	2.4	180	216	-36	395	2.9
France	79	120	-41	200	1.7	85	153	-68	238	1.8
Italy	130	96	34	226	1.9	131	99	33	230	1.7
Japan	113	67	46	180	1.5	113	146	-33	259	1.9
UK	227	128	99	355	3.0	213	116	97	330	2.4
West Germany	119	179	-61	298	2.5	134	204	-70	339	2.5

a. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.

b. Exports minus imports. A positive balance is indicated by no sign, a negative balance by a minus sign.

c. Exports plus imports.

the famine of new orders. The volume of new orders placed in the 12-month period from mid-1961 to mid-1962 amounted to only \$118 million as against \$247 million placed during the first half of 1961 alone and \$189 million in the last 6 months of 1962.*

About three-fourths of Soviet trade with the industrial West is concentrated in six countries: Finland, the UK, West Germany, France, Italy, and (more recently) Japan, whose trade with the USSR has risen to a level seven times that of 1958. It is these countries that furnish the USSR with most of the machinery and equipment imported from the industrial West, which aggregated \$596 million in 1962 -- an increase of \$126 million, or about three-fourths of the total increase in Soviet imports from this area. Imports of chemical equipment dropped by more than one-third, from \$132 million in 1961 to \$88 million. This decline appears to have been only temporary because such imports again will increase as a result of new orders placed in the past 2 years. Wood-processing equipment increased from \$42 million in 1961 to \$139 million in 1962. After a decline in 1961, imports of ships and marine equipment increased in 1962, reaching a level of \$144 million. Soviet imports of large-diameter steel pipe almost tripled in 1962, reaching about \$70 million. The NATO pipe embargo in November 1962 had no impact on trade in this commodity until 1963.

The relatively small increase of 4 percent in Soviet exports to the industrial West resulted from only minor changes in the export levels of the various commodities. The major exception was grain, exports of which fell by \$35 million in 1962. The major Soviet earners of foreign exchange in the industrial West, exports of petroleum and petroleum products, amounted to \$243 million, which represented a gain of 14 percent -- considerably less than the average annual increase of almost 30 percent for 1956-61.

B. With Less Developed Countries of the Free World

Although new extensions of Soviet economic assistance to the less developed countries of the Free World declined sharply in 1962, the drawings against earlier Soviet credits were a major factor in the modest growth that occurred in Soviet trade with these areas. Soviet commercial exchanges with the less developed countries rose to \$1,182 million in 1962, representing an increase of \$90 million. This growth is consistent with the average growth of 8 percent sustained annually since 1958 but is well below the average annual increase of 40 percent attained in the earlier years of the economic offensive, 1955-58.

Because of Soviet economic assistance to the less developed countries, Soviet exports increased from 1958 through 1962 more rapidly (46 percent) than imports (27 percent). The relationship

* Values represent minimum estimates.

between Soviet economic assistance to these countries and Soviet exports to them is shown in Table 5.

Table 5

Estimated Soviet Foreign Aid Deliveries to the Less Developed Countries
of the Free World
1958-62

Year	Million US \$		Foreign Aid Deliveries as a Percent of Exports	Million US \$	
	Total Soviet Exports to Less Developed Countries ^{a/}	Foreign Aid Deliveries		Soviet Commercial Exports	Soviet Imports
1958	389	97	24.9	292	482
1959	344	104	30.2	240	522
1960	346	128	37.0	218	575
1961	507	189	37.3	318	584
1962	568	269	47.4	299	614

a. Foreign aid deliveries plus commercial exports.

It is evident from Table 5 that although deliveries under Soviet credits have nearly tripled since 1958, commercial exports have shown almost no increase. Commodities imported as repayments on Soviet economic credits probably have accounted for less than 5 percent of the total imports since repayments began in 1959. Imports of goods sent as repayment for Soviet military credits might double the total, to about 10 percent.

Although the USSR repeatedly asserts that its trade and other economic ties with the less developed countries have increased rapidly, Soviet trade with these countries (other than a select few) has shown remarkably little growth. Three countries -- India, the United Arab Republic (UAR -- Egypt), and Malaysia -- have accounted for about one-half of the total since 1956 (see Table 6*). These three countries plus Afghanistan, Indonesia, and Brazil account for two-thirds of the total Soviet trade with the less developed countries.

Developments in Soviet trade with the less developed countries in 1962 underscored the recent trends in this trade. Exports increased more than imports (12 percent as against 5 percent) as credit-financed deliveries assumed almost half of the total. Exports moving on credit

* P. 12, below.

Table 6

Soviet Trade with Selected Less Developed Countries of the Free World a/
1961-62

Country	1961				1962					
	Million US \$				Million US \$					
	Exports	Imports	Balance b/	Turnover c/	Percent of Total Soviet Trade	Exports	Imports	Balance b/	Turnover c/	Percent of Total Soviet Trade
Total	507	584	-77	1,092	9.2	568	614	-46	1,182	8.8
Of which:										
Afghanistan	39	20	20	59	0.5	39	25	14	65	0.5
Brazil	18	24	-6	42	0.4	30	36	-6	66	0.5
India	95	67	29	162	1.4	125	72	53	196	1.5
Indonesia	31	34	-3	65	0.6	59	39	20	97	0.7
Malaysia	2	170	-168	172	1.5	2	161	-159	163	1.2
United Arab Republic	109	96	12	205	1.7	103	73	30	176	1.3

a. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.

b. Exports minus imports. A positive balance is indicated by no sign, a negative balance by a minus sign.

c. Exports plus imports.

to India played a large role in the increase of almost one-third in exports to that country. Significant increases occurred in exports to Iraq and Indonesia. Imports from the UAR declined substantially -- a direct result of a poor cotton crop in the UAR. A relatively large increase occurred in trade with Brazil.

There was a significant increase in exports of machinery and equipment, particularly equipment for complete plants. More than half of Soviet exports to the less developed countries in 1962 consisted of machinery and equipment. The major recipients were Indonesia, Iraq, India, and the UAR, which together took up more than three-fourths of the deliveries of Soviet machinery to the less developed countries.

Soviet deliveries of petroleum declined to about the level of 1960, about \$60 million. Reduced exports of petroleum to the UAR and Brazil accounted for most of the decline. The so-called petroleum offensive has not been apparent in recent Soviet trade with the less developed countries.

The commodity composition of Soviet imports from these countries showed mixed trends in 1962 -- imports of natural rubber decreased slightly from the level of 1961 while imports of such commodities as cocoa and rice increased moderately. Imports of cotton from the UAR declined sharply, but marginal suppliers made up part of the decline. A marked rise occurred in imports of rice from Burma, Thailand, and other countries.

III. Trade with Communist Countries

Soviet trade with the Communist countries, which had remained virtually stagnant in 1960 and 1961, registered a significant increase in 1962. Commercial exchanges were valued at almost \$9.5 billion in 1962 and represented an increase of more than \$1 billion above the level of 1961.

This increase, which amounted to 12 percent, reflected a rise of more than \$1.1 billion in Soviet trade with the European Satellites and a substantial growth in trade with Yugoslavia and with the Far Eastern Communist countries* other than Communist China. Moreover, Soviet-Chinese trade showed its smallest decline in 3 years. The stagnation in Soviet-Cuban trade and the elimination of trade with Albania had no appreciable effect on the growth of this trade.

A. With the European Satellites

The very large growth in Soviet trade with the Eastern European Communist countries in 1962 reinforced the role of the Satellites

* The term Far Eastern Communist countries as used in this report refers to Communist China, Mongolia, North Korea, and North Vietnam.

as the most prominent region in the trade of the USSR (see Table 7). In retrospect it is apparent that the significance of Soviet trade with the Satellites has been increasing in the past few years, and if the recent comprehensive bilateral cooperation agreements are any indication of Soviet intentions, continued rapid growth can be expected.

Increasing by about 17 percent in 1962, Soviet-Satellite trade accounted for two-thirds of the growth in total Soviet trade that year. Although Soviet trade with the Satellites grew somewhat more rapidly than total Soviet trade in both 1960 and 1961 (8.5 percent in both years), the increase in 1962 was the largest since 1959, when both this component and total trade grew in excess of 20 percent. The three most advanced Satellites -- East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland -- continued to dominate Soviet trade with the CEMA area and accounted for the bulk of the over-all growth in Soviet-Satellite trade in 1962. Among the lesser Satellite partners, however, trade with Bulgaria rose by nearly 23 percent, with Hungary by about 17 percent, and with Rumania by about 14 percent.*

The full extent of the rapid growth of Soviet trade with the Satellites during the past few years, although due largely to growth in Satellite needs for Soviet raw materials and in Soviet needs for Satellite capital goods, probably is related in some way to the precipitous decline of Sino-Soviet trade since 1959. Part of the shift of trade away from Communist China has been absorbed by the Satellites, although the rapid rise in trade with the Free World in this period also has been a significant development. In some earlier years, notably 1957 and 1958, spurts in the growth of Soviet-Satellite trade were associated with sizable new injections of Soviet credit; such was not the case in 1962, however, when drawings by the Satellites on Soviet credits were down to about \$240 million from about \$300 million in 1961. Only in the case of Soviet trade with East Germany, which received the bulk of Soviet aid to the Bloc in 1962, did drawings on credits significantly affect the growth of trade.

Although total Soviet imports from the European Satellites in 1962 increased by 18 percent, the machinery category of these imports

* The increasing importance of the USSR in the trade of individual Satellites is apparent. Rumania is the obvious exception, as shown in the following tabulation:

	<u>Percent</u>		
	<u>1955</u>	<u>1958</u>	<u>1962</u>
Bulgaria	49	53	53
Czechoslovakia	34	33	38
East Germany	38	43	52
Hungary	22	27	36
Poland	32	26	32
Rumania	54	51	41

Table 7
Soviet Trade with the European Satellites a/
1961-62

Country	1961				1962			
	Exports	Imports	Balance b/	Turnover c/	Exports	Imports	Balance b/	Turnover c/
Total	3,400	3,044	356	6,444	3,971	3,588	384	7,559
Bulgaria	356	326	30	682	448	389	59	837
Czechoslovakia	653	698	-45	1,350	771	825	-54	1,595
East Germany	1,209	876	333	2,085	1,373	1,073	300	2,445
Hungary	359	327	33	686	411	389	22	800
Poland	531	477	54	1,008	594	564	30	1,158
Rumania	292	341	-49	533	375	345	26	723
				Percent of Total Soviet Trade				Percent of Total Soviet Trade
				54.5				56.1
				5.8				6.2
				11.4				11.8
				17.6				18.1
				5.8				5.9
				8.5				8.6
				5.3				5.4

a. ~~Revenues of royalties, components may not add to the totals shown.~~
 b. Exports minus imports. A positive balance is indicated by no sign, a negative balance by a minus sign.
 c. Exports plus imports.

increased by 30 percent, or \$377 million, and rose as a share of total imports from the Satellites from 41 to 45 percent. Machinery supplied by the Satellites amounted to 72 percent of all Soviet imports of machinery and equipment in 1962. A significant part of the increase was contributed by East Germany and Czechoslovakia, the chief suppliers of machinery and equipment for the USSR. Notable increases occurred in imports of transportation equipment, electrical engineering equipment, rolling mill equipment, and light industrial equipment. The only other significant change in the commodity composition of Soviet imports from the European Satellites was in manufactured consumer goods, imports of which have increased about nine times since 1955. Consumer manufactures now account for almost one-fifth of Soviet imports from the European Satellites.

Machinery and equipment led the increase of nearly \$572 million in Soviet exports to the Satellites. The greatest increase was equipment for complete plants. Foodstuffs, including grain, meat, and dairy products, also played a large role in increased exports to the European Satellites.

B. With Communist China

Continuation of the Sino-Soviet dispute and of Chinese Communist domestic economic difficulties is reflected in the further decline in Soviet trade, especially exports, with China in 1962. Total trade fell by 18 percent, to \$750 million, compared with \$919 million in 1961 and \$2,055 million in 1959 (see Table 8). The decline in Sino-Soviet trade in 1962, however, unlike the precipitous drop in 1960 and 1961, had only a marginal effect on the growth and geographic distribution of total Soviet trade: Sino-Soviet trade fell to less than 6 percent of Soviet foreign trade in 1962 compared with about 8 percent in 1961 and 20 percent in 1959. Soviet imports declined by only 6 percent, to \$516 million, while exports dropped by more than one-third, to \$233 million, reflecting in part a decision on the part of China to hold down imports from the USSR and maintain export levels in order to pay off its debt to the USSR as rapidly as possible and in part the high import priority accorded by the Chinese to grain, fertilizer, and other materials that were available only in the Free World. The Soviet import surplus of \$283 million was used by the Chinese to make previously scheduled debt repayments of about \$170 million and an unprecedented prepayment of about \$100 million on debt not falling due until 1964-65.

The sharp reduction in Chinese Communist imports from the USSR in 1962 was achieved largely through a drastic cut in imports of machinery and equipment, which were reduced to \$27 million compared with \$108 million in 1961 and \$598 million in 1959. Chinese imports of Soviet equipment for complete plants in 1962 dropped to \$9 million -- an infinitesimal amount compared with the \$400 million in such goods shipped to China in 1959. Reductions also occurred in Chinese purchases

Table 8
Soviet Trade with Communist China a/
1959-62

Year	Million US \$				Percent of Total Soviet Trade
	Exports	Imports	Balance <u>b/</u>	Turnover <u>c/</u>	
1959	954	1,100	-146	2,055	19.5
1960	817	848	-31	1,665	14.9
1961	367	551	-184	919	7.8
1962	233	516	-283	750	5.6

a. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.

b. Exports minus imports. A negative balance is indicated by a minus sign.

c. Exports plus imports.

of petroleum products, which fell by about one-third in 1962. The decline in Soviet exports of foodstuffs to China in 1962 reflected the absence of about \$45 million worth of sugar shipped to China on credit in 1961.

Soviet imports from China declined by only \$35 million from the level of 1961, but, following sharp drops in 1960 and 1961 (particularly in food and other agricultural products), Soviet imports in 1962 were less than one-half of the level in 1959. Decreased Soviet imports of tungsten, tin, and other metals largely accounted for the decline in 1962; Chinese consumer goods, primarily the textile fabrics and readymade clothing that have been the mainstay of Chinese exports to the USSR in recent years, remained at approximately the same level as in 1961, accounting for two-thirds of total Soviet imports from China.

C. With Other Communist Countries

Soviet trade with the smaller Far Eastern Communist countries (Mongolia, North Korea, and North Vietnam) individually and as a group increased substantially in 1962 (see Table 9*). The same was true of Yugoslavia, but the increase in Soviet-Cuban trade was negligible. Soviet trade with Albania apparently dried up in 1962.

* P. 18, below.

Table 9
Soviet Trade with Other Communist Countries a/
1961-62

Million US \$

Country	1961				1962			
	Exports	Imports	Balance <u>b/</u>	Turnover <u>c/</u>	Exports	Imports	Balance <u>b/</u>	Turnover <u>c/</u>
Mongolia	92	58	34	151	126	60	66	187
North Korea	77	79	-2	156	81	88	-8	169
North Vietnam	41	26	16	67	55	30	24	85
Albania	20	22	-1	42	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Cuba	287	312	-25	599	371	234	137	605
Yugoslavia	36	55	-19	90	72	46	26	118

a. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
b. Exports minus imports. A positive balance is indicated by no sign, a negative balance by a minus sign.
c. Exports plus imports.

Increased Soviet exports of machinery and equipment, particularly equipment for complete plants, characterized Soviet exports to the smaller Far Eastern Communist countries. A considerable part of these exports was made on long-term credit. Soviet imports showed no significant changes except perhaps the large increase in imports of steel from North Korea.

Soviet trade with Yugoslavia in 1962 was a sharp reversal from the previous year as increased Soviet exports changed an import surplus into a substantial export surplus. Various engineering products and petroleum led the rise in exports. Imports fell somewhat below the level of 1961.

The apparent stagnation in the level of Soviet-Cuban trade turnover in 1962 was a reflection of sharply reduced imports offset by increased exports. Faced by a reduction of 30 percent in output of sugar and a modest reduction in output of other export industries, Cuban exports to the USSR declined by almost \$80 million. The USSR, on the other hand, sought to cushion the economic shock to Cuba through larger shipments of machinery and equipment, petroleum, and foodstuffs.

According to Soviet statistics, the Soviet trade embargo against Communist China's ally, Albania, was complete in 1962.

IV. Soviet International Payments Position

A. With the Free World

A first glance at the over-all Soviet trade balance with relation to the Free World suggests a striking improvement in the Soviet balance of payments since 1960 (see Table 10*), but a closer review of the numbers indicates that there was an improvement in 1961 followed by a deterioration in 1962. Moreover, the official Soviet statistics mask the fact that unrequited exports (goods exported on credits and grants) comprise a substantial part of total Soviet exports, particularly in 1962. Finally, the Soviet statistics do not clearly indicate the deterioration in the Soviet convertible foreign exchange position in 1962.

The value of exports moving to the less developed countries under economic credits and grants as well as imports from these countries in repayment assumed a greater weight in 1961 and 1962,** as indicated below in the following estimates:

* P. 21, below.

** Soviet official statistics include commodities moving under economic credits and credit repayments but exclude those moving under grants.

	<u>Million US \$</u>		
	<u>1960</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1962</u>
Drawings on credits	112	180	233
Drawings on grants	16	18	40
Total drawings	<u>128</u>	<u>198</u>	<u>273</u>
Less repayments	-20	-21	-25
Net drawings	108	177	248

It has been stated by Soviet officials that military shipments are not included in the Soviet statistical handbooks. Drawings on Soviet military credits have increased sharply and are estimated to have reached \$482 million in 1962, an increase of \$300 million above the level of 1961. However, to add the estimated value of military exports to exports listed in the Soviet foreign trade handbooks does not appear to be necessary. Most of the exports that are not allocated geographically may in fact have been military exports. The unallocated category increased sharply in 1962, to \$453 million, although never before had it exceeded \$118 million. Military deliveries also jumped sharply in 1962, as noted above, and by a remarkably similar order of magnitude; moreover, estimates of Soviet military exports for 1955-62 approximate \$900 million, and unallocated Soviet exports for the same period were valued at \$1,100 million; the remaining \$200 million could represent unlisted countries and exports on consignment.

It is estimated that drawings on Soviet military credits and grants and repayments on military credits were as follows:

	<u>Million US \$</u>		
	<u>1960</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1962</u>
Drawings on credits	86	173	472
Drawings on grants	3	10	10
Total drawings	<u>89</u>	<u>183</u>	<u>482</u>
Less repayments*	-30	-65	-75
Net drawings	59	118	407

* Only part of the repayments on Soviet military credits are made in commodities and thus are included in the official Soviet trade statistics -- for example, Egyptian cotton. The remainder is in convertible foreign exchange.

Table 10
Soviet Trade with the Free World a/
1960-62

Area	1960			1961			1962			
	Exports	Imports	Balance b/	Exports	Imports	Balance b/	Exports	Imports	Balance b/	
Total	1,354	1,650	-296	1,677	1,681	-4	2,125	1,887	238	
Industrial West	973	1,069	-97	2,042	1,060	1,088	1,105	1,265	-160	
Less developed countries	346	575	-229	921	507	584	568	614	-46	
Unallocated d/	36	6	30	42	110	9	453	8	444	
				Turn-over c/	Turn-over c/	Turn-over c/	Turn-over c/	Turn-over c/	Turn-over c/	
				3,004	1,677	1,681	3,358	2,125	1,887	4,012
				2,042	1,060	1,088	2,148	1,105	1,265	2,370
				921	507	584	1,092	568	614	1,182
				42	110	9	119	453	8	461

Million US \$

- a. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
- b. Exports minus imports. A positive balance is indicated by no sign, a negative balance by a minus sign.
- c. Exports plus imports.
- d. Unallocated geographically in the Soviet statistical handbooks.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

Considerable stimulus also has been given to Soviet imports from the industrial West by the large-scale importation of industrial and transportation equipment. A substantial and increasing proportion of these imports has been on medium-term credit, and, in spite of increasingly large repayments on previous credits, the USSR remained a net recipient of Western credit in 1962, as shown below:

	<u>Million US \$</u>		
	<u>1960</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1962</u>
Drawings	225	250	300
Less repayments*	-57	-115	-183
Net drawings	168	135	117

Other Soviet repayments on a Swedish loan of 1946 plus miscellaneous payments (mainly interest) for lend-lease debts to the UK and the US are estimated to have reduced net drawings of Western credit to \$140 million in 1960, \$117 million in 1961, and \$92 million in 1962.

The total of the above diverse drawings and repayments on credits and drawings on grants yields the following capital flows:

	<u>Million US \$</u>		
	<u>Capital Inflow</u>	<u>Capital Outflow</u>	<u>Net Capital Outflow</u>
1960	276	-283	-7
1961	343	-486	-143
1962	418	-916	-498

Other elements of the Soviet payments position include services (especially transportation and tourism) and transfer payments (such as Austrian reparations payments and Soviet contributions to the UN), both of which on a net basis result in a small net outlay.**

Because of the direct impact on the Soviet financial reserves, the most important aspect of the USSR's current international payments

* Most, if not all, repayments take place in convertible foreign exchange.

** For a more detailed explanation of the Soviet balance of payments with relation to the Free World, see CIA/RR EM 64-13, The Soviet Balance of Payments with the Free World, June 1964, SECRET

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

problem is the deterioration of the Soviet convertible currency position.* This deterioration has caused the USSR to make more frequent raids on its gold stock. Sales of Soviet gold during 1960-62 were estimated as follows: 1960, \$149 million; 1961, \$310 million; and 1962, \$239 million. As a result of convertible currency deficits, the Soviet gold stock was depleted by approximately \$800 million during the decade 1953-62, and since the beginning of the Soviet Seven Year Plan in 1959 with rising imports from the industrial West the rate of withdrawal has accelerated. By the end of 1962, it is estimated, the Soviet gold stock was \$2.2 billion.

The need for gold to offset the convertible currency deficit has been somewhat mitigated as a result of the availability of medium-term credits from the industrial Western countries in connection with Soviet purchases of machinery and equipment. The correlation between Soviet convertible currency deficits on the one hand and sales of gold, together with imports on credit, on the other is apparent in the following tabulation of Soviet convertible currency deficits and the means of financing them**:

	<u>Million US \$</u>			
	<u>1960</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>Total</u>
Convertible currency deficit	-300	-250	-350	-900
Net credits from the industrial West	140	117	92	349
Sales of gold	149	310	239	698

There need be no exact correlation between the estimated deficits and the means for financing them. Carryovers of foreign exchange holdings and short-term financing shift the burden from year to year.

B. With Communist Countries

Information on elements in the Soviet balance of payments with relation to the Communist world other than that contained in the official Soviet foreign trade handbooks is largely limited to Soviet credit

* An increase in liabilities, or, more importantly, the necessity of paying off liabilities under clearing account arrangements, seldom entails the expenditure of convertible foreign exchange.

** Including drawings and repayments of medium-term credits as well as repayments on other loans.

relations with other Communist countries. Soviet largesse in recent years appears to have been largely confined to a select few countries. All Communist countries shared at one time or another in the estimated credit of \$7.5 billion doled out by the USSR since 1945, but although Communist China received a sugar credit of \$45 million as late as 1961 and although North Vietnam obtained an additional extension of Soviet assistance as late as 1962, the overwhelming part of Soviet economic credits went for the limping economy of East Germany; to the staunch Soviet ally, Bulgaria; and to Mongolia and Cuba (see Table 11).

Table 11
Soviet Extensions of Credit to Communist Countries
1960-62

	Million US \$		
	<u>1960</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1962</u>
Total	<u>968</u>	<u>776</u>	<u>302</u>
Communist China	320	45	0
Mongolia	186	135	0
North Korea	0	N.A. <u>a/</u>	0
North Vietnam	200	4	N.A. <u>a/</u>
Bulgaria	162	0	0
East Germany	0	475	0
Cuba	100	117	302

a. Credits of unknown value were extended.

Drawings on Soviet credits have been substantial, as indicated by the following estimated drawings and repayments in 1960-62:

	Million US \$		
	<u>1960</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1962</u>
Extensions	968	776	302
Drawings*	546	474	583
Repayments*	337	321	465

* These estimates are less certain than those for countries of the Free World and should be regarded as orders of magnitude.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

The persistent Soviet export surplus with most of the Communist countries (with the major exception of Communist China) supports the conclusion above that drawings on Soviet credits have continued to outpace repayments by Communist countries. This situation is expected to persist for some years, inasmuch as repayments for many of these credits are not scheduled to begin for many years.

V. Recent Developments

In 1963 the slowdown in Soviet domestic economic activity was accompanied by a decline in the growth of Soviet foreign trade. Preliminary data for 1963 indicate that Soviet foreign trade increased 6.3 percent in 1963 and amounted to \$14,331 million, representing an increase of about \$850 million above the level of 1962. The greater part of the gain resulted from increased trade with the Communist partners of the USSR. The amount by which Soviet trade with the European Satellites increased is uncertain because of two apparently conflicting statements concerning the growth of Soviet trade with CEMA countries, but the level of Soviet-Satellite trade in 1963 was \$8.1 billion to \$8.3 billion, or 7 to 10 percent above the level of 1962. In the meantime, Soviet trade with the industrial West increased approximately 8 percent (imports of wheat in 1963 could have accounted for the entire increase), and trade with the less developed countries increased on the order of 20 percent, reflecting a continuing high level of Soviet assistance to these countries. Soviet trade with Cuba reportedly declined from the level of \$600 million in 1962, and it is highly probable that Soviet trade with Communist China declined in 1963 as well.

Without detailed data on Soviet trade it is difficult to determine the extent of the Soviet convertible currency deficit in 1963. There are indications that Soviet exports increased somewhat more than imports in 1963 before the beginning of the wheat shipments, to the extent that there was an improvement of about \$100 million in the Soviet convertible currency payments position. In other words, as opposed to the deficit of \$350 million in 1962, it appeared that the deficit would be only about \$250 million in 1963. Inasmuch as outlays for wheat in 1963 approximated \$150 million, it is quite conceivable that the convertible currency deficit may have been no more than \$400 million. Sales of gold of more than \$500 million are not inconsistent with this deficit. The implied carryover of about \$100 million in convertible currency helped to finance Soviet imports until the middle of March 1964, when new Soviet offerings of gold on the international bullion markets were made.

Drawings by the less developed countries of the Free World on Soviet economic and military credits remained at about the same level in 1963 as in 1962 -- that is, about \$800 million. Repayments appear to have increased in 1963, up about \$60 million to more than \$160 million. However, the benefits derived by the USSR from the medium-term

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

credits from the industrial West are believed to have diminished in 1963 as Soviet repayments on earlier credits probably came close to offsetting new drawings. It is because of this as well as the rapid depletion of Soviet gold holdings that the problem of obtaining additional and longer term credits to finance imports from the industrial West and to mitigate convertible currency deficits is becoming a crucial one.

The most dramatic event in Soviet foreign economic relations in 1963 was the large-scale purchase of wheat from the non-Communist world. As a result of a sharp reduction in its grain harvest in 1963, the USSR undertook to purchase about 11 million tons of wheat for delivery through July 1964. The bill of approximately \$800 million for this wheat will have to be paid in convertible currency. The USSR sold more than \$500 million in gold in 1963, more than \$350 million of it following the announcement of the first wheat purchases in September. As a result of the extraordinary sales of gold, Soviet holdings of gold are estimated to have dropped to \$1.8 billion by the end of 1963. Approximately \$500 million in Soviet gold was sold into the international bullion market in the first half of 1964. Inasmuch as only about \$150 million in wheat was delivered to the USSR in 1963, it must be assumed that most, if not all, of the remaining \$650 million will have to be paid in 1964. The proceeds from sales of gold in 1963 and thus far in 1964 will be used for this purpose, but additional sales of gold may be necessary in 1964 to meet the USSR's normal convertible currency deficits.

The large-scale wheat purchases had an impact on the placement of new orders for Western machinery and equipment reminiscent of the fall of 1961, when new orders suddenly dried up. In 1961 the decline in new orders stemmed largely from problems relating to domestic investment and resource allocation. In 1963 the balance of payments crisis resulting from the impending raids on the treasury to pay for Western wheat was the dominant factor, although a reappraisal of the domestic investment program, particularly in the chemical industry, has played and is continuing to play a role in the present hesitation in placing new orders for equipment. The Soviet search for longer term credits from Western suppliers was an additional factor in late 1963. No doubt aware of the diminishing returns of the present level of credit from the West, Soviet officials up to the highest level pressed for more and longer term credits in order to help finance the purchases of equipment and plants to make the chemical industry and other investment programs a success. Although the British Board of Trade has offered the USSR up to \$280 million in long-term (15-year) credits over and above the normal medium-term credit facilities now available from the British Export Credit Guarantee Department, no new Soviet orders for the UK have been announced. Nor have any other Western countries announced that they would follow the example of the UK in extending long-term credit to the USSR. No doubt the placement of orders will depend partly on the credit facilities

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

that are made available, but in the absence of better credit terms, superior technology or quicker delivery dates also will be crucial.

The impact of the reduced Soviet grain harvest of 1962 on Soviet commitments to Eastern Europe is not clear. It is evident, however, that the centrifugal effects of Satellite nationalism -- aggravated by Rumania's display of economic nationalism -- have put off for some time Moscow's plan of establishing a central planning organ for the CEMA countries in order to manipulate and presumably rationalize their economic activities. At the end of 1963 and the beginning of 1964 the USSR reemphasized its policy of bilateralism by signing agreements for scientific and technical cooperation with Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria.

Nor is it clear just how much the increasingly bitter polemics between the USSR and Communist China affected Soviet economic relations with China in the past year. It is probably safe to assume that the desire of China to free itself from debt to the USSR as quickly as possible prevented any substantial decline in Soviet imports from China, but the level of Soviet exports to China in 1963 is much less certain.

Credits continued to play a major role in Soviet economic relations with the Communist countries in the past year, but new credit extensions totaling \$443 million were confined to four countries. Bulgaria received a credit of \$144 million; Mongolia, \$10 million; Cuba, \$255 million; and Yugoslavia, \$33 million. In the meantime it was announced that the USSR itself was to be the recipient of a Polish credit of \$78 million for Poland's part in a joint investment project to be shared with other European Satellites to increase production of raw materials for fertilizer in the USSR. The output of raw materials for fertilizer will be expanded at Soligorsk, Kingisepp, and on the Kola Peninsula, partly from an injection of Satellite funds, so as to provide new sources of fertilizer for these countries as well as the USSR. The value of the credits (if any) from other Satellites is not known.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

APPENDIX

STATISTICAL TABLES

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

[n.28 blank]

Table 12
Geographic Distribution of Soviet Foreign Trade
1955-62

Million US \$

Area	1955		1956		1957		1958		1959		1960		1961		1962	
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
Total foreign trade	<u>3,426.6</u>	<u>3,060.5</u>	<u>3,615.0</u>	<u>3,612.6</u>	<u>4,381.4</u>	<u>3,937.8</u>	<u>4,297.5</u>	<u>4,349.5</u>	<u>5,440.7</u>	<u>5,073.2</u>	<u>5,561.6</u>	<u>5,628.9</u>	<u>5,998.2</u>	<u>5,827.6</u>	<u>7,034.7</u>	<u>6,449.7</u>
Communist countries	<u>2,722.9</u>	<u>2,418.3</u>	<u>2,729.3</u>	<u>2,735.7</u>	<u>3,304.5</u>	<u>2,825.7</u>	<u>3,136.3</u>	<u>3,242.0</u>	<u>4,123.9</u>	<u>3,789.5</u>	<u>4,207.5</u>	<u>3,978.5</u>	<u>4,321.0</u>	<u>4,146.7</u>	<u>4,909.3</u>	<u>4,562.6</u>
European Satellites	1,792.1	1,662.8	1,767.7	1,815.0	2,549.9	1,914.8	2,320.2	2,205.6	2,950.5	2,519.3	3,117.7	2,819.4	3,399.7	3,044.1	3,971.2	3,587.5
Communist China	748.3	643.5	733.0	764.2	944.1	738.1	634.0	881.2	954.5	1,100.3	817.1	848.1	367.3	551.4	233.4	516.3
Other Far Eastern Communist countries a/	166.1	94.6	159.5	106.8	137.4	115.9	131.0	104.2	172.7	116.8	146.8	154.1	210.8	163.0	261.6	178.8
Other Communist countries b/	16.4	17.4	69.1	49.7	73.1	56.9	51.1	50.9	46.2	53.1	125.9	156.9	343.2	388.2	443.1	280.0
Free World	<u>703.7</u>	<u>642.2</u>	<u>885.7</u>	<u>876.9</u>	<u>1,076.9</u>	<u>1,112.1</u>	<u>1,161.2</u>	<u>1,107.5</u>	<u>1,316.8</u>	<u>1,283.7</u>	<u>1,354.1</u>	<u>1,650.4</u>	<u>1,677.1</u>	<u>1,660.9</u>	<u>2,125.4</u>	<u>1,887.1</u>
Industrial West	543.7	430.6	597.2	578.8	690.1	672.5	669.6	622.2	855.5	756.5	972.6	1,069.4	1,060.0	1,087.7	1,105.1	1,264.6
Less developed countries	112.3	210.4	179.5	296.5	282.8	435.3	389.3	481.6	343.5	522.2	345.8	574.9	507.4	584.3	567.7	614.0
Unallocated c/	47.7	1.2	109.0	1.6	104.0	4.3	102.3	3.7	117.8	5.0	35.7	6.1	109.7	8.9	452.6	8.5

a. Mongolia, North Korea, and North Vietnam.
 b. Albania, 1961-62; Yugoslavia, 1955-62; and Cuba, 1960-62. Albania before 1961 is included in the European Satellites, and Cuba before 1960 is included in the less developed countries of the Free World.
 c. Unallocated geographically in the Soviet statistical handbooks.

[p. 30 blank]

Table 13
Commodity Composition of Soviet Exports a/
1955-62

Commodity	1955		1956		1957		1958		1959		1960		1961		1962	
	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total
Total exports	3,426.6	100.0	3,615.0	100.0	4,381.4	100.0	4,297.5	100.0	5,440.7	100.0	5,561.6	100.0	5,998.2	100.0	7,034.7	100.0
Machinery and equipment	599.0	17.5	624.4	17.3	652.1	14.9	794.8	18.5	1,168.1	21.5	1,141.2	20.5	964.6	16.1	1,168.6	16.6
Complete plants	276.8	8.1	299.6	8.3	321.9	7.3	339.9	7.9	569.1	10.5	568.5	10.2	355.8	5.9	413.9	5.9
Fuels, lubricants, and related materials	329.0	9.6	428.2	11.8	648.3	14.8	651.2	15.2	797.8	14.7	902.5	16.2	1,044.8	17.4	1,156.5	16.4
Coal and coke	97.8	2.9	142.8	4.0	249.5	5.7	219.8	5.1	229.1	4.2	242.1	4.4	284.9	4.7	346.4	4.9
Petroleum and petroleum products ^b	230.1	6.7	284.4	7.9	397.6	9.1	429.9	10.0	567.0	10.4	657.9	11.8	757.8	12.6	807.8	11.5
Ores and concentrates	115.4	3.4	130.0	3.6	183.9	4.2	190.0	4.4	215.8	4.0	242.9	4.4	252.6	4.2	273.6	3.9
Iron ore	81.6	2.4	86.5	2.4	124.9	2.8	137.4	3.2	154.3	2.8	175.0	3.1	187.8	3.1	215.7	3.1
Base metals and manufactures	431.8	12.6	543.0	15.0	642.5	14.7	692.1	16.1	743.1	13.7	837.2	15.1	922.9	15.4	1,009.8	14.4
Ferrous metals	321.0	9.4	385.7	10.7	439.6	10.0	494.5	11.5	547.2	10.1	642.3	11.5	711.7	11.9	792.3	11.3
Rolled ferrous metals	192.2	5.6	233.6	6.5	267.9	6.1	329.9	7.7	366.2	6.7	428.8	7.7	478.2	8.0	540.3	7.7
Nonferrous metals	110.7	3.2	157.3	4.4	202.9	4.6	197.6	4.6	195.9	3.6	194.9	3.5	211.1	3.5	217.5	3.1
Aluminum	25.9	0.8	38.3	1.1	51.1	1.2	63.7	1.5	49.6	0.9	44.7	0.8	58.2	1.0	77.6	1.1
Tin	6.3	0.2	7.1	0.2	37.6	0.8	44.5	1.0	38.4	0.7	24.6	0.4	12.2	0.2	1.1	0.0
Chemicals	72.4	2.1	82.1	2.3	97.6	2.2	113.8	2.6	122.3	2.2	139.0	2.5	173.9	2.9	176.9	2.5
Wood and wood products	174.5	5.1	161.7	4.5	231.1	5.3	240.9	5.6	259.9	4.8	305.1	5.5	361.7	6.0	430.4	6.1
Lumber	94.3	2.8	86.0	2.4	135.1	3.1	136.9	3.2	150.4	2.8	182.8	3.3	206.6	3.4	221.3	3.1
Textile raw materials and semimanufactures	346.7	10.1	329.2	9.1	305.0	7.0	293.8	6.8	308.0	5.7	358.6	6.4	364.9	6.1	341.5	4.9
Cotton fibers	297.9	8.7	272.4	7.5	255.5	5.8	238.6	5.6	248.1	4.6	288.7	5.2	283.8	4.7	259.6	3.7
Consumer goods	497.8	14.5	476.8	13.2	217.7	5.0	665.4	15.5	953.5	17.5	902.2	16.2	1,006.5	16.8	1,112.5	15.8
Food	386.4	11.2	369.2	10.2	773.6	17.6	507.7	11.8	795.9	14.6	699.0	12.6	790.4	13.2	899.0	12.8
Grain	283.5	8.3	226.7	6.3	566.0	12.9	358.8	8.3	487.2	9.0	467.8	8.4	473.8	7.9	529.4	7.5
Other consumer goods	111.4	3.3	107.6	3.0	144.1	3.3	157.7	3.7	157.7	2.9	203.2	3.7	216.1	3.6	213.5	3.0
Other merchandise	164.8	4.8	179.3	5.0	178.5	4.1	177.2	4.1	224.7	4.1	204.4	3.7	219.2	3.7	225.8	3.2
Unspecified	695.1	20.3	660.2	18.3	524.5	12.0	478.1	11.2	647.4	11.9	528.5	9.5	687.1	11.5	1,192.2	16.3

a. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.

Table 14

Commodity Composition of Soviet Imports 2/
1955-62

Commodity	1955		1956		1957		1958		1959		1960		1961		1962	
	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total
Total imports	3,060.5	100.0	3,612.6	100.0	3,937.8	100.0	4,349.5	100.0	5,073.2	100.0	5,628.9	100.0	5,827.6	100.0	6,449.7	100.0
Machinery and equipment	925.3	30.2	895.3	24.8	940.4	23.9	1,064.6	24.5	1,351.9	26.6	1,675.2	29.8	1,734.5	29.8	2,239.8	34.7
Transportation equipment	386.3	12.5	424.2	11.6	407.3	10.3	427.2	9.8	542.4	10.7	658.1	11.7	534.3	9.2	745.8	11.6
Fuels, lubricants, and related materials	250.0	8.2	266.4	7.1	208.1	5.3	212.2	4.9	231.3	4.6	237.3	4.2	217.0	3.7	198.3	3.1
Coal and coke	126.9	4.1	118.8	3.3	88.7	2.3	77.0	1.8	85.7	1.7	93.5	1.7	93.6	1.6	95.3	1.5
Petroleum and petroleum products	123.1	4.0	137.5	3.8	119.4	3.0	135.2	3.1	145.6	2.9	143.7	2.6	123.4	2.1	103.0	1.6
Orbs and concentrates	251.3	8.2	374.6	10.4	453.3	11.5	403.5	9.3	331.0	6.5	314.0	5.6	291.4	5.0	297.8	4.6
Base metals and manufactures	204.1	6.7	283.3	8.0	291.1	7.1	283.4	6.5	316.0	6.2	345.9	6.1	348.4	6.0	427.0	6.6
Ferrous metals	71.0	2.3	145.2	4.0	163.5	4.2	183.4	4.2	265.2	5.2	373.9	6.6	348.4	6.0	427.0	6.6
Nonferrous metals	16.1	0.5	88.4	2.4	119.5	3.0	127.8	2.9	122.0	2.4	178.8	3.2	160.4	2.8	192.7	3.0
Tin	133.1	4.3	143.1	4.0	127.6	3.2	133.1	3.1	169.9	3.3	172.0	3.1	145.9	2.5	136.4	2.1
Copper	47.9	1.5	32.4	0.9	45.5	1.2	39.5	0.9	41.8	0.8	34.8	0.6	22.5	0.4	20.5	0.3
Zinc	43.5	1.4	46.2	1.3	44.2	1.1	54.5	1.3	74.3	1.5	71.9	1.3	53.0	0.9	68.7	1.1
Chemicals	52.1	1.7	77.1	2.1	76.5	1.9	99.8	2.3	110.3	2.2	141.3	2.5	137.7	2.4	212.0	3.3
Rubber and rubber products	41.4	1.4	124.8	3.5	127.7	3.2	182.2	4.2	195.5	3.9	196.2	3.5	273.5	4.7	251.8	3.9
Wood and wood products	22.7	0.7	107.7	3.0	120.2	3.1	104.0	2.4	24.0	0.5	104.5	1.9	124.3	2.1	118.5	1.8
Textile raw materials and manufactures	156.4	5.1	216.3	6.0	317.8	8.1	309.3	7.1	329.7	6.5	364.4	6.5	303.4	5.2	282.8	4.4
Cotton fibers	20.1	0.7	54.0	1.5	122.9	3.1	135.2	3.1	163.9	3.2	179.9	3.2	130.1	2.2	118.6	1.8
Wool fibers	89.7	2.9	90.0	2.5	127.7	3.2	107.7	2.5	100.8	2.0	118.0	2.1	103.8	1.8	93.4	1.4
Consumer goods	461.9	15.1	824.3	22.8	913.9	23.2	1,161.3	26.7	1,436.5	28.3	1,577.3	28.0	1,782.6	30.6	1,822.6	28.3
Food	517.1	16.9	487.5	13.5	480.4	12.2	559.9	12.9	542.7	10.7	611.8	10.9	776.0	13.3	712.8	11.1
Other consumer goods	144.8	4.7	336.8	9.3	433.5	11.0	601.5	13.8	893.8	17.6	965.6	17.2	1,006.6	17.3	1,109.8	17.2
Other merchandise specifically	308.6	10.1	355.8	10.1	399.2	10.1	397.6	9.1	450.7	8.9	278.8	4.9	341.3	5.9	333.8	5.2
	109.2	3.4	21.4	0.6	69.4	1.8	97.7	2.2	107.2	2.1	93.7	1.7	127.6	2.2	108.9	1.7

4. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.

Table 15

Commodity Composition of Soviet Exports to the European Satellites a/
1955-62

Commodity	1955		1956		1957		1958		1959		1960		1961		1962	
	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total
Total exports	1,792.1	100.0	1,767.1	100.0	2,549.9	100.0	2,320.2	100.0	2,990.5	100.0	3,117.7	100.0	3,399.7	100.0	3,971.2	100.0
Machinery and equipment	304.4	17.0	218.1	12.3	220.5	8.6	248.4	10.7	368.5	12.3	414.2	13.3	450.0	13.2	606.6	15.3
Complete plants	129.7	7.2	65.4	3.7	50.4	2.0	51.5	2.2	87.5	3.0	108.6	3.5	108.0	3.2	141.9	3.6
Fuels, lubricants, and related materials	120.4	6.7	163.9	9.3	313.7	12.3	301.8	13.0	351.3	11.7	413.7	13.3	485.6	14.3	583.4	14.7
Coal and coke	64.3	3.6	90.1	5.1	176.8	6.9	153.9	6.6	162.5	5.5	171.2	5.5	204.0	6.0	252.5	6.4
Petroleum and petroleum products	55.1	3.1	72.8	4.1	135.6	5.3	146.3	6.3	187.1	6.3	240.7	7.7	279.5	8.2	328.4	8.3
Ores and concentrates	102.3	5.7	106.7	6.0	153.2	6.0	163.9	7.1	187.0	6.3	206.6	6.6	218.4	6.4	245.8	6.2
Iron ore	81.6	4.6	86.5	4.9	124.9	4.9	135.2	5.8	151.3	5.1	170.8	5.5	184.1	5.4	211.0	5.3
Base metals and manufactures	249.6	13.9	302.2	17.1	425.2	16.3	452.2	19.6	520.5	17.6	584.1	18.7	651.6	19.2	727.1	18.3
Ferrous metals	164.3	9.2	193.0	10.9	273.4	10.7	245.8	10.6	392.3	13.3	451.7	14.5	506.2	14.9	574.2	14.5
Rolled ferrous metals	97.0	5.4	118.2	6.7	173.1	6.8	239.7	10.3	280.8	9.5	328.2	10.5	373.5	11.0	422.3	10.6
Nonferrous metals	85.3	4.8	109.2	6.2	141.9	5.6	109.4	4.7	128.2	4.3	132.4	4.2	145.4	4.3	152.8	3.8
Aluminum	13.3	0.7	13.7	0.8	25.0	1.0	24.4	1.1	21.7	0.7	30.6	1.0	42.5	1.3	36.6	0.9
Tin	5.9	0.3	4.5	0.3	13.5	0.5	8.1	0.3	8.8	0.3	6.3	0.2	7.8	0.2	0.6	Negl.
Chemicals	36.1	2.0	39.7	2.2	48.1	1.9	52.8	2.3	58.3	2.0	63.2	2.0	74.5	2.2	83.4	2.1
Wood and wood products	20.2	1.1	22.6	1.3	34.7	1.4	32.2	1.4	37.7	1.3	38.7	1.2	43.2	1.3	48.1	1.2
Lumber	4.0	0.2	14.3	0.8	43.9	1.7	46.7	2.0	49.6	1.7	58.6	1.9	68.8	2.0	75.2	1.9
Textile raw materials and semimanufactures	264.3	14.7	262.2	14.8	248.7	9.8	243.9	10.5	241.8	8.2	283.2	9.1	293.0	8.6	273.3	6.9
Cotton fibers	233.8	13.0	229.7	13.0	215.0	8.4	208.3	9.0	204.1	6.9	234.0	7.5	231.0	6.8	215.2	5.4
Consumer goods	285.7	15.9	241.2	13.6	667.9	26.2	423.8	18.3	660.2	22.4	575.7	18.5	507.0	14.9	643.5	16.2
Food	262.3	14.6	207.1	11.7	597.6	23.4	349.2	15.1	586.4	19.9	497.7	16.0	424.5	12.5	552.0	13.9
Grain	230.4	12.9	121.9	6.9	457.0	17.9	269.8	11.6	353.7	12.0	352.6	11.3	275.0	8.1	347.5	8.8
Other consumer goods	23.4	1.3	34.1	1.9	70.2	2.8	74.7	3.2	73.8	2.5	78.0	2.5	82.5	2.4	91.5	2.3
Other merchandise	68.0	3.8	82.1	4.6	81.1	3.2	66.1	2.8	87.0	2.9	94.4	3.0	113.1	3.3	107.9	2.7
Unspecified	340.9	19.0	316.0	17.9	316.8	12.4	281.3	12.1	388.2	13.0	363.9	11.7	489.7	14.4	552.3	13.9

a. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.

Table 16
Commodity Composition of Soviet Imports from the European Satellites a/
1955-62

Commodity	1955		1956		1957		1958		1959		1960		1961		1962	
	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total
Total imports	1,662.8	100.0	1,815.0	100.0	1,914.8	100.0	2,205.6	100.0	2,519.3	100.0	2,819.4	100.0	3,044.1	100.0	3,587.5	100.0
Machinery and equipment	733.6	44.1	655.9	36.1	713.9	37.3	861.6	39.1	1,040.0	41.3	1,208.6	42.9	1,245.2	40.9	1,621.5	45.2
Transportation equipment	274.6	16.5	269.3	14.8	302.8	15.8	339.7	15.4	422.3	16.8	532.2	18.9	450.6	14.8	577.1	16.1
Fuels, lubricants, and related materials	233.9	14.1	227.8	12.6	184.6	9.6	190.1	8.6	209.0	8.3	215.7	7.7	192.0	6.3	182.1	5.1
Coal and coke	121.4	7.3	116.6	6.4	86.4	4.5	74.1	3.4	83.0	3.3	90.9	3.2	91.2	3.0	91.9	2.6
Petroleum and petroleum products	112.6	6.8	111.2	6.1	98.1	5.1	116.0	5.3	126.1	5.0	124.8	4.4	100.8	3.3	90.2	2.5
Iron and concentrates	152.9	9.2	152.5	8.4	140.7	7.3	160.8	7.3	122.0	4.8	102.4	3.6	91.9	3.0	86.9	2.4
Base metals and manufactures	27.2	1.6	29.6	1.6	30.4	1.6	32.1	1.4	26.2	1.0	24.8	0.9	27.7	1.0	122.9	3.4
Ferrous metals	11.0	0.7	13.2	0.7	17.4	0.9	25.6	1.2	44.8	1.8	80.3	3.2	109.7	3.6	131.4	3.7
Nonferrous metals	4.8	0.3	5.9	0.3	11.2	0.6	10.1	0.5	9.6	0.4	21.8	0.8	35.2	1.2	41.6	1.2
Roller ferrous metals	26.3	1.6	26.4	1.5	13.0	0.7	9.4	0.4	11.4	0.5	14.6	0.5	16.4	0.5	11.5	0.3
Copper	0.3	Negl.	0.2	Negl.	0.1	Negl.	0.2	Negl.	0.2	Negl.	0.1	Negl.	-- b/	--	--	--
Chemicals	36.7	2.2	40.5	2.2	34.8	1.8	43.8	1.9	52.8	2.1	69.8	2.5	95.6	3.2	130.2	3.6
Rubber and rubber products	14.2	0.9	14.0	0.8	17.4	0.9	19.6	0.9	19.6	0.8	21.9	0.8	24.2	0.9	22.2	0.6
Wood and wood products	26.2	1.6	29.5	1.6	17.5	0.9	35.9	1.6	37.0	1.5	45.2	1.6	48.8	1.6	48.4	1.4
Textile raw materials and semifinufactures	6.5	0.4	12.5	0.7	11.0	0.6	2.5	0.1	7.0	0.3	8.3	0.3	10.4	0.3	11.5	0.3
Cotton fibers	--	--	0.4	Negl.	0.3	Negl.	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Consumer goods	185.8	11.2	299.7	16.5	325.4	17.0	445.0	20.2	541.2	21.5	668.5	23.7	797.1	26.2	885.9	24.7
Food	111.6	6.7	95.1	4.7	77.7	4.1	122.5	5.6	122.4	4.9	169.8	6.0	250.3	8.2	218.0	6.1
Other consumer goods	74.2	4.5	214.6	11.8	247.7	12.9	322.5	14.6	418.8	16.6	498.7	17.7	546.8	18.0	667.8	18.6
Other merchandise	88.3	5.3	110.0	6.1	110.4	5.8	111.9	5.1	134.6	5.3	127.0	4.5	131.7	4.3	132.4	3.7
Unspecified	137.2	8.2	222.1	12.2	308.7	16.1	294.1	13.3	299.9	11.9	257.2	9.1	281.1	9.2	231.5	6.5

a. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
b. A dash (--) indicates that no separate account is reported in the Soviet statistical handbooks.

Table 17

Commodity Composition of Soviet Exports to Communist China a/
1955-62

Commodity	1955		1956		1957		1958		1959		1960		1961		1962	
	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total
Total exports	748.3	100.0	733.0	100.0	544.1	100.0	634.0	100.0	924.5	100.0	817.1	100.0	367.3	100.0	233.4	100.0
Machinery and equipment	229.6	30.7	304.7	41.6	272.6	49.9	318.0	50.2	597.5	62.6	503.9	61.7	108.1	29.4	27.3	11.7
Complete plants	141.5	18.9	216.9	29.6	209.0	38.4	166.2	26.2	399.8	41.9	373.8	45.7	78.9	21.5	8.8	3.8
Fuels, lubricants, and related materials	79.0	10.6	86.0	11.7	90.4	16.6	92.4	14.6	117.7	12.3	113.1	13.8	120.7	32.9	80.5	34.5
Petroleum and petroleum products	79.0	10.6	86.0	11.7	90.4	16.6	92.4	14.6	117.7	12.3	113.1	13.8	120.7	32.9	80.5	34.5
Ores and concentrates	0.2	Negl.	0.2	Negl.	0.2	Negl.	1.2	0.2	1.3	0.1	1.2	0.1	2.0	0.5	1.0	0.4
Base metals and manufactures	85.2	11.8	78.4	10.7	40.8	7.5	75.7	12.1	54.5	5.7	69.8	8.5	41.2	11.2	33.8	14.5
Ferrous metals	75.7	10.1	60.5	8.3	32.4	6.0	60.9	9.6	48.0	5.0	59.3	7.3	34.7	9.4	28.2	12.1
Rolled ferrous metals	53.7	7.2	43.7	6.0	21.4	3.9	36.8	5.8	29.4	3.1	39.2	4.8	19.3	5.3	17.9	7.7
Nonferrous metals	12.8	1.7	17.9	2.4	8.4	1.5	15.8	2.5	6.4	0.7	10.5	1.3	6.5	1.8	5.6	2.4
Aluminum	0.1	Negl.	0.1	Negl.	Negl.	Negl.	9.2	1.5	0.2	Negl.	2.6	0.3	1.6	0.4	1.2	0.5
Chemicals	4.8	0.6	2.1	0.3	3.2	0.6	3.9	0.6	3.9	0.4	9.7	1.2	2.7	0.7	4.3	1.8
Wood and wood products	12.2	1.6	10.8	1.5	7.0	1.1	11.1	1.7	0.6	0.1	0.8	0.1	2.9	0.8	10.4	4.4
Consumer goods	6.3	0.8	5.0	0.7	7.7	1.4	9.2	1.2	6.5	0.7	4.7	0.6	57.5	18.1	31.0	13.3
Food	1.0	0.1	0.7	0.1	0.9	0.2	1.1	0.2	0.5	0.1	Negl.	Negl.	63.8	17.4	20.8	8.9
Other consumer goods	5.3	0.7	5.3	0.7	6.8	1.2	8.1	1.3	6.1	0.6	4.7	0.6	3.8	1.0	10.2	4.4
Other merchandise	5.3	0.7	5.7	0.8	3.6	0.7	11.2	1.8	6.9	0.7	6.9	0.8	2.0	0.5	1.0	0.4
Unspecified	322.4	43.1	239.1	32.6	120.6	22.2	120.9	19.1	157.2	17.3	107.0	13.1	19.1	5.2	45.2	19.4

a. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.

b. A dash (--) indicates that no separate account is reported in the Soviet statistical handbooks.

Table 18

Commodity Composition of Soviet Imports from Communist China a/
1955-62

Commodity	1955		1956		1957		1958		1959		1960		1961		1962	
	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total
Total imports	643.5	100.0	764.2	100.0	738.1	100.0	881.2	100.0	1,100.3	100.0	848.1	100.0	551.4	100.0	516.3	100.0
Machinery and equipment	10.3	1.6	9.2	1.2	6.4	0.9	4.3	0.5	12.4	1.1	0.7	0.1	0.3	0.1	8.7	1.7
Transportation equipment	10.3	1.6	9.2	1.2	6.4	0.9	4.3	0.5	12.1	1.1	b/	--	--	--	--	--
Fuels, lubricants, and related materials	5.0	0.8	2.1	0.3	1.9	0.3	2.0	0.3	2.8	0.3	2.6	0.3	2.4	0.4	2.7	0.5
Coal and coke	5.0	0.8	2.1	0.3	1.9	0.3	2.8	0.3	2.7	0.2	2.6	0.3	2.4	0.4	2.7	0.5
Petroleum and petroleum products	--	--	Negl.	Negl.	--	--	0.2	Negl.	0.1	Negl.	--	--	--	--	--	--
Ores and concentrates	62.2	9.7	75.5	9.9	89.0	12.2	74.0	8.4	73.3	6.7	61.2	7.2	48.3	8.8	35.3	6.8
Base metals and manufactures	82.5	12.8	77.7	10.2	58.5	7.9	80.1	9.1	68.2	6.2	67.7	7.9	42.9	7.8	32.5	6.3
Ferrous metals	26.3	4.1	27.3	3.6	6.8	0.9	19.2	2.2	7.6	0.7	12.8	1.5	8.7	1.6	6.6	1.3
Roller ferrous metals	--	--	4.7	0.6	2.1	0.3	8.3	0.9	0.3	Negl.	--	--	--	--	--	--
Nonferrous metals	56.2	8.7	50.4	6.6	51.7	7.0	48.9	5.5	54.9	5.0	46.9	5.8	34.2	6.2	25.9	5.0
Tin	47.9	7.4	32.4	4.2	45.5	6.2	39.3	4.5	41.7	3.8	34.8	4.1	22.4	4.1	17.5	3.4
Chemicals	7.7	1.2	20.5	2.7	14.0	1.9	17.3	2.0	10.5	1.0	13.0	1.5	7.9	1.4	5.5	1.1
Wood and wood products	0.4	Negl.	0.3	Negl.	0.5	Negl.	1.0	0.1	0.7	0.1	0.7	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.1
Rubber and rubber products	0.7	0.1	12.9	1.7	37.2	5.0	28.1	3.2	23.1	2.1	11.6	1.4	2.1	0.2	1.2	0.2
Textile raw materials and semi-manufactures	59.5	9.2	58.6	7.7	49.0	6.6	37.5	4.3	91.6	8.3	65.3	7.7	22.9	4.2	13.9	2.7
Cotton fibers	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	52.3	4.8	33.9	4.0	8.0	1.5	5.9	1.1
Wool fibers	23.6	3.7	21.4	3.8	23.9	3.2	21.2	2.4	21.9	2.0	19.4	2.3	10.4	1.9	7.9	1.5
Consumer goods	245.0	38.1	316.5	41.4	294.8	39.9	481.3	54.6	643.1	58.4	516.9	60.9	361.2	65.5	382.3	74.0
Food	183.5	28.5	209.5	27.4	137.9	18.7	230.1	26.1	219.1	19.9	127.9	15.1	17.4	3.2	38.1	7.4
Other consumer goods	61.5	9.6	107.0	14.0	156.9	21.3	251.2	28.5	424.0	38.5	389.0	45.9	343.8	62.4	344.2	66.7
Other merchandise unspecified	170.1	26.4	190.2	25.0	184.3	25.0	162.5	18.4	172.9	15.7	174.3	20.5	20.5	5.7	26.6	5.2
	0.1	Negl.	0.1	Negl.	1.6	0.2	4.1	0.5	7.1	0.6	16.8	2.0	20.5	2.5	3.2	0.7

a. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
 b. A dash (--) indicates that no separate account is reported in the Soviet statistical handbooks.

Table 19
Commodity Composition of Soviet Exports to the Industrial West a/
1955-62

Commodity	1955		1956		1957		1958		1959		1960		1961		1962	
	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total
Total exports	543.7	100.0	597.2	100.0	690.1	100.0	669.6	100.0	855.5	100.0	972.6	100.0	1,060.0	100.0	1,105.1	100.0
Fuels, lubricants, and related materials	72.3	13.3	101.8	17.0	145.1	21.0	143.7	21.5	207.7	24.3	245.8	25.3	279.1	26.3	320.9	29.0
Coal and coke	27.2	5.0	39.0	6.5	49.1	7.1	53.3	8.0	55.0	6.4	57.1	5.9	65.1	6.1	77.7	7.0
Petroleum and petroleum products	45.1	8.3	62.8	10.6	9.0	13.9	90.4	13.5	152.7	17.9	188.7	19.4	214.0	20.2	243.3	22.0
Ores and concentrates	12.8	2.4	22.4	3.8	28.6	4.1	23.9	3.6	25.6	3.0	33.1	3.4	31.4	3.0	23.1	2.3
Manganese ore	7.7	1.4	16.2	2.7	21.7	3.1	16.2	2.4	14.6	1.7	14.9	1.5	13.3	1.3	9.1	0.8
Base metals and manufactures	22.2	4.1	90.4	15.1	112.9	16.4	92.3	14.2	95.5	11.2	111.3	11.5	119.9	11.3	118.2	10.7
Iron	42.2	7.8	63.9	10.7	65.8	9.5	33.1	4.9	47.0	5.5	70.9	7.3	80.9	7.6	84.0	7.6
Nonferrous metals	24.8	4.6	34.7	5.8	30.3	4.4	12.4	1.9	23.8	2.8	34.7	3.6	40.6	3.8	46.0	4.2
Pig iron	7.9	1.5	13.4	2.2	17.8	2.6	10.3	1.5	11.8	1.4	18.9	1.9	24.0	2.3	24.0	2.2
Rolled ferrous metals	10.0	1.8	26.5	4.4	47.1	6.8	62.3	9.3	48.5	5.7	40.3	4.1	39.0	3.7	34.2	3.1
Tin	-- b/	--	1.0	0.2	21.9	3.2	32.2	4.8	23.7	2.8	13.1	1.3	1.8	0.2	--	--
Aluminum	2.8	0.5	17.2	2.9	14.5	2.1	20.8	3.1	15.2	1.8	7.3	0.8	7.2	0.7	14.7	1.3
Wood and wood products	112.4	20.7	95.3	16.0	115.8	16.8	122.9	18.4	129.4	15.1	157.5	16.2	177.3	16.7	200.9	18.2
Lumber	73.2	13.5	63.7	10.7	79.5	11.5	75.1	11.2	83.8	9.8	99.3	10.2	106.7	10.1	109.6	9.9
Textile raw materials and semimanufactures	65.4	12.0	58.7	9.8	42.0	6.1	39.3	5.9	60.5	7.1	70.4	7.2	52.1	4.9	52.6	4.8
Cotton fibers	47.4	8.7	34.5	5.8	26.6	3.9	22.0	3.3	39.2	4.6	50.3	5.2	34.7	3.3	28.8	2.6
Consumer goods	107.8	19.8	117.0	19.6	135.9	19.7	123.4	18.4	171.7	20.1	168.2	17.3	206.6	19.5	183.8	16.6
Food	70.0	12.9	77.4	13.0	96.1	13.9	85.0	12.7	126.4	14.8	117.4	12.1	158.2	14.9	130.1	11.8
Grain	47.5	8.8	54.1	9.1	68.2	9.9	63.1	9.4	99.1	11.6	85.3	8.8	128.2	12.1	93.2	8.4
Other consumer goods	37.8	7.0	39.6	6.7	39.8	5.8	38.4	5.7	45.3	5.3	50.8	5.2	48.4	4.6	53.7	4.9
Furs and pelts	35.6	6.6	36.2	6.1	35.7	5.2	34.1	5.1	39.9	4.7	44.3	4.5	41.4	3.9	46.2	4.2
Other merchandise	68.4	12.6	75.8	12.7	83.1	12.0	93.4	13.9	120.1	14.0	147.5	15.2	130.0	12.3	122.0	11.0
Unspecified	22.4	4.1	25.8	4.3	26.9	3.9	27.6	4.1	35.2	4.1	38.8	4.0	53.7	5.0	51.6	4.7

a. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
b. A dash (--) indicates that no separate account is reported in the Soviet statistical handbooks.

1955-1962

Table 20

Commodity Composition of Soviet Imports from the Industrial West a/
1955-62

Commodity	1955		1956		1957		1958		1959		1960		1961		1962	
	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total
Total imports	430.6	100.0	578.8	100.0	672.5	100.0	622.2	100.0	756.5	100.0	1,069.4	100.0	1,087.7	100.0	1,264.6	100.0
Machinery and equipment	181.5	42.1	229.2	39.6	217.3	32.3	194.1	31.2	293.9	38.8	455.9	42.6	469.8	43.2	596.0	47.1
Chemical equipment	-- b/	--	0.3	0.1	7.4	1.1	19.5	3.1	77.8	10.3	135.4	12.7	132.0	12.1	88.4	7.0
Transport equipment	101.4	23.5	145.7	25.2	97.3	14.5	76.7	12.3	91.6	12.1	121.1	11.3	89.1	6.3	149.9	11.8
Base metals and manufactures	53.4	12.4	123.0	21.3	146.3	21.8	161.9	26.0	219.1	29.0	303.2	28.4	241.9	22.2	294.9	23.3
Ferrous metals	12.3	2.9	74.0	12.8	104.2	15.5	106.3	17.1	175.9	23.3	252.1	23.6	192.9	17.7	242.7	19.2
Rolled ferrous metals	8.1	1.9	65.9	11.4	88.8	13.2	97.6	15.7	94.4	12.5	135.7	12.7	96.5	8.9	109.9	8.7
Pipes	1.3	0.3	2.6	0.4	5.3	0.8	1.1	0.2	68.9	9.1	101.9	9.5	80.7	7.4	119.6	9.5
Nonferrous metals	41.1	9.5	49.1	8.5	42.1	6.3	55.6	8.9	43.3	5.7	51.1	4.8	49.0	4.5	52.2	4.1
Copper	40.2	9.3	45.9	7.9	40.5	6.0	54.1	8.7	35.7	4.7	38.2	3.6	32.0	2.9	44.9	3.6
Wood and wood products	48.9	11.4	63.5	11.0	77.4	11.5	63.4	10.2	49.2	6.5	52.2	4.9	70.1	6.4	64.5	5.1
Textile raw materials and semifinancures	29.6	6.9	40.7	7.0	61.2	9.1	90.7	14.6	43.3	5.7	79.5	7.4	83.8	7.7	77.3	6.1
Wool fibers	18.4	4.3	20.2	3.5	34.4	5.1	17.1	2.7	10.2	1.3	48.1	4.5	37.1	3.4	29.5	2.3
Synthetic fibers	7.3	1.7	15.4	2.7	15.0	2.2	16.9	3.0	20.1	2.7	12.9	1.2	28.7	2.6	20.9	1.6
Consumer goods of other manufacture	43.1	10.0	64.3	11.1	64.6	9.6	71.5	11.5	56.8	7.5	44.1	4.1	73.5	6.8	59.2	4.7
Dispersed	28.7	6.7	24.2	4.2	67.9	10.1	70.0	11.3	85.4	11.3	118.0	11.0	126.2	11.6	127.2	10.0
	47.5	10.6	32.9	5.7	37.8	5.6	10.6	1.7	8.8	1.2	16.7	1.6	22.1	2.0	24.8	2.0

a. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
b. A dash (-) indicates that no separate account is reported in the Soviet statistical handbooks.

Table 21

Commodity Composition of Soviet Exports to Less Developed Countries a/
1955-62

Commodity	1955		1956		1957		1958		1959		1960		1961		1962	
	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total
Total exports	112.3	100.0	179.5	100.0	282.8	100.0	389.3	100.0	343.5	100.0	345.8	100.0	507.4	100.0	567.7	100.0
Machinery and equipment	5.4	4.8	23.4	13.0	87.7	31.0	160.5	41.2	112.8	32.8	125.7	36.4	236.1	46.5	285.9	50.4
Complete plants	1.1	1.0	7.6	4.2	47.2	16.7	112.3	28.8	69.3	20.2	68.6	19.8	138.8	27.4	184.9	32.6
Petroleum and petroleum products	31.9	28.4	39.3	21.9	49.9	17.6	78.2	20.1	80.2	23.3	61.3	17.7	67.4	13.3	62.2	11.0
Rolled ferrous metals	16.2	14.4	43.5	24.2	45.6	16.1	33.4	8.6	29.2	8.5	24.3	7.0	23.5	4.6	31.7	5.6
Wood and wood products	15.3	13.6	16.4	9.1	21.0	7.4	30.5	7.8	30.5	8.9	38.8	11.2	38.1	7.5	34.0	6.0
Food	10.5	9.4	25.0	13.9	40.0	14.1	45.6	11.7	45.2	13.2	39.3	11.4	47.6	9.4	68.7	12.1
Other merchandise	28.8	25.7	31.7	17.7	36.4	12.9	38.1	9.8	40.8	11.9	50.2	14.5	56.5	11.1	64.9	11.4
Unspecified	4.1	3.7	0.2	0.1	2.3	0.8	2.9	0.7	4.9	1.4	6.2	1.8	38.2	7.5	20.3	3.6

a. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.

Table 22

Commodity Composition of Soviet Imports from Less Developed Countries a/
1955-62

Commodity	1955		1956		1957		1958		1959		1960		1961		1962	
	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total	Value (Million US \$)	Percent of Total
Total imports	210.4	100.0	296.5	100.0	435.3	100.0	481.6	100.0	522.2	100.0	574.9	100.0	584.3	100.0	614.0	100.0
Cotton fibers	18.9	9.0	53.5	18.0	122.6	28.2	135.2	28.1	111.6	21.4	139.4	24.3	122.0	20.9	112.0	18.2
Natural rubber	25.5	12.1	96.8	32.6	67.6	15.5	131.4	27.3	144.0	27.6	151.8	26.4	224.8	38.5	205.9	33.5
Food	95.8	45.6	80.4	27.1	143.0	32.8	91.9	19.1	106.8	20.5	123.3	21.4	99.1	17.0	140.3	22.8
Nonferrous metals	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.2	Negl.	-- b/	--	33.9	6.5	33.3	5.8	19.9	3.4	20.4	3.3
Other merchandise	47.8	22.7	65.4	22.1	100.9	23.2	121.8	25.3	124.4	23.8	126.5	22.0	115.5	19.8	128.7	21.0
Unspecified	22.1	10.5	0.1	Negl.	1.1	0.3	1.2	0.2	1.5	0.3	0.7	0.1	3.0	0.5	6.6	1.1

a. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
b. A dash (--) indicates that no separate account is reported in the Soviet statistical handbooks.