



Director of  
Central  
Intelligence

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# The Soviet Approach to Arms Control: Implications for START and INF

National Intelligence Estimate

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


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~~8 March 1983~~

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NIE 11-16-83

THE SOVIET APPROACH TO  
ARMS CONTROL: IMPLICATIONS  
FOR START AND INF

Information available as of 8 March 1983 was  
used in the preparation of this Estimate.

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THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.

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## INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Fifteen years ago, when the Intelligence Community addressed the Soviet approach to arms control in SNIE 11-16-68, it was estimated the Soviets would seriously enter into arms control negotiations because Moscow might:

- See a slowdown in the strategic competition as the best means of preserving the improved relative position of the USSR.
- See strategic arms control as a way of relieving the strain in their economy.
- Approach arms control from the perspective of having their right to equality recognized and be willing to work at the problem of equivalence by considering trade-offs between different weapon systems of the two sides.

Since then, intelligence assessments of Soviet practices and military programs show that the Soviet approach has differed from what it was judged to be in 1968. These differences have been noted over the years in support of the ongoing arms control negotiating process. This Estimate is the first national estimate of the overall Soviet approach to arms control since 1968. It should be read in conjunction with the recently published NIE 11-3/8-82, *Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict, 1982-92*, which documents and assesses the vigorous Soviet strategic arms buildup, and NIE 4/11-83, *US Capabilities To Monitor Soviet Strategic Offensive Force Limitations*, which describes our ability to monitor Soviet strategic offensive force limitations.

In this Estimate we have distilled what we consider to be the main elements of the Soviet approach—drawn largely from our experience in strategic arms negotiations, from our assessment of Soviet weapon developments, and from Soviet strategic perceptions and objectives—and have attempted to think through how the Soviets are likely to approach the INF and START negotiations.

We have not attempted a net assessment of the arms control process or its agreements. The United States has had its own purposes in

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the arms control process, but it is not our role in this Estimate to pronounce on that perspective and dimension.

The gains the Soviets have made in their strategic nuclear posture vis-a-vis the United States have resulted primarily from their own military efforts and the fact that the United States did not make a commitment to strategic force improvements comparable to that demonstrated by the magnitude and vigor of Soviet programs. The arms control process was a contributing factor, and the provisions of the arms control agreements were of lesser importance. The Soviets have accomplished their steady military buildup during the past decade within the agreed terms of SALT I and SALT II. There have been instances of ambiguous Soviet behavior under these provisions, but these instances have not contributed in any significant degree to what the Soviets have been able to accomplish in their military buildup of the past decade.

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## KEY JUDGMENTS

1. On the basis of the Soviet approach to arms control negotiations during the past 20 years, our analysis of current Soviet military programs, and our understanding of Soviet strategic and political objectives, we expect the USSR to continue to seek strategic advantages through the arms control process and to weigh this more heavily than any concerns about the arms race, its cost, or its contribution to instability.

2. As in past strategic arms control negotiations, the Soviets' strategy in START is designed to protect military capabilities and programs under development that are required by their doctrine and strategy. Currently under development are new and modified ICBMs, including mobile systems, improved bombers, improved sea-based ballistic missile forces, and cruise missiles of various types. However, the Soviets will also be motivated in START by a strong desire to curtail US programs because of their concern that prospective US weapon systems—particularly the combination of MX, D-5, Pershing II (P-II), and cruise missiles—will undercut their strategy and shift the nuclear balance, or the perception of the balance, toward the United States. The Soviets recognize that these systems will give the United States a significantly strengthened and more survivable hard-target capability and improved operational flexibility. They are also concerned that US improvements in bombers and cruise missiles could outpace improvements to their strategic defenses.

3. As in 1970 with antiballistic missile (ABM) defenses, the Soviets again face a situation that their approach to arms control was designed to prevent: the marrying of American technology with the increased determination to use it to advantage in the strategic competition. The Soviets must be concerned that *if* the planned US strategic programs go forward there will be an erosion of the gains they have made during the past 10 years, even if they deploy new systems of their own. Thus, in assessing the trade-offs in negotiations between protecting their own strategic weapons and curtailing those of the United States, the Soviets may shift gears to put more emphasis in INF and START than they did in SALT on stopping US programs. The key to Soviet tactics on this will be the degree to which they believe the United States will proceed with its programs.



4. The Soviets obviously hope that one or more of these US programs will be derailed without Moscow having to give up anything in return. Indeed, they have undertaken a broad program of overt and covert activities, for example, in INF, to ensure such an outcome. If this does not work, the Soviets' START proposals suggest that they believe they may be able to trade bans or limits on some future systems, while retaining their lead in ICBM warheads and throw weight, as well as considerable freedom for force improvement to enhance their offensive force effectiveness and to mitigate the vulnerability of their ICBMs.

5. Although large missile throw weight gives the Soviets options to increase the number of warheads in their missile force, we believe that their desire for flexibility in missile payloads is an important reason for Soviet interest in retaining their throw-weight advantage and in making throw-weight improvements. Large throw weight enables the Soviets to deploy different numbers and sizes of warheads on the same type of missile and gives them room for "extras" like penetration aids. The latter would become important to the Soviets if they were confronted with a US ABM system in the future. The Soviets show every indication of planning to retain a force structure that includes substantial numbers of large missiles, such as the SS-18 and SS-19, which in fact have high throw weight, while adding new missiles to the force to replace older, smaller missiles such as the SS-11 and SS-17. They also believe that large missiles confer a perception of Soviet superiority.

6. For these reasons the Soviets undoubtedly want to retain their substantial advantage in missile throw weight. However, to limit US programs threatening their strategic gains, the Soviets might accede to modest reductions in their numbers of medium and heavy ICBMs (preferably older SS-17s, SS-18s, and SS-19s) in an agreement that imposed bans or tight restrictions on MX, Trident D-5, and cruise missiles.

7. The Soviets are not likely to deal with ICBM vulnerability by moving a significantly greater proportion of their force structure to sea, where they consider themselves to be at a disadvantage. The Soviet sea-based force will continue to operate largely as the principal part of the USSR's total reserve force. The Soviets do not see it as a principal element in counterforce strikes; that role will remain with the ICBM force, well into the 1990s. They are developing land-mobile systems and will want to preserve the right to deploy them in order to maintain survivability of their ICBM force.

8. The Soviets are very concerned about the capabilities of US cruise missiles, including the prospect of a new generation employing Stealth technology. One of their principal goals in both START and INF is to ban, or at least constrain, long-range cruise missiles. They hope to constrain the numbers of air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) and types of platform, as they did in the SALT II Treaty, and thereby make their strategic air defense problem more manageable. They would prefer to ban GLCMs (ground-launched) or SLCMs (sea-launched). They might, however, consider trading cruise missiles on a type-for-type basis; for example, GLCMs for GLCMs over a certain range.

9. We doubt the Soviets feel themselves under time pressure in START; they probably believe an agreement is unlikely before the next US Presidential election.

10. In INF, Moscow hopes to achieve its top foreign policy objective for 1983: stopping US deployment of P-II missiles and GLCMs in Europe. At the same time, the Soviets seek to protect their own existing force of SS-20s. The Soviets are deeply concerned about the military potential of the P-IIs and GLCMs and the coupling of US strategic forces to the defense of Western Europe. Their interest in stopping US deployment is also motivated by the recognition that they have a historic opportunity to weaken the political cohesion of the Atlantic alliance through the INF issue. The Soviets are intent on making the most of it.

11. We are uncertain whether the Soviets will accept an INF agreement that sanctions some NATO deployments if it becomes clear to them—presumably late in 1983—that such deployments will go forward. Moscow may see its objective of undermining Western cohesion as paramount and will thus be unwilling to reach an agreement that sanctions any US INF deployment. However, it may also be that Moscow's concern about the military threat of the P-IIs and the GLCMs will lead it to seek a deal that puts a cap on US deployments. It is not clear at this time if the Soviets have determined what they will do in the event of US deployment.

12. The Soviet campaign against INF would not end after an initial deployment. It would continue as long as Moscow believed it had a chance to force withdrawal of those missiles already deployed or to forestall full deployment. Political actions, including continued negotiations and "active measures," would be complemented by military moves (so-called analogous responses).<sup>1</sup> The Soviets have implied they will leave the INF talks if deployment goes forward, but we doubt Moscow has made that decision at this time.

<sup>1</sup> See SNIE 11/20-3-82, *INF: The Prospects for West European Deployment and the USSR's Reactions*.

13. While the Soviets have used the third-country issue for negotiating leverage in both START and INF, they are genuinely concerned about the strategic nuclear threat from third countries, particularly China, but also Britain and France. Their concern is greater than in the past because of the prospect of a substantial increase in third-country warheads. For this reason, we believe the Soviets will continue to demand some compensation for third-country systems.

14. The Soviets have broad strategic force goals they will want to pursue, irrespective of any START or INF agreement. Thus, their negotiating strategy will be designed to protect these goals. For instance, they are not likely to accept any limitation that would slow their broad-based research and development efforts, and they will not agree to a treaty worded so tightly as to prevent them from a significant level of continued force modernization. Whatever comes out of the START and INF negotiations, we expect that the Soviets will:

- Continue to rely on silo-based ICBMs as a key element of their strategic forces.
- Develop and probably deploy mobile ICBMs to ensure a survivable element in their land-based missile force.
- Significantly improve their SSBN/SLBM capability.
- Deploy a modern intercontinental bomber force.
- Put great emphasis on defensive systems, including development of improved ABM and air defense capabilities.

The Soviets will also devote considerable effort to nonacoustic antisubmarine warfare and directed-energy weapons for multiple applications. A breakthrough in either of these strategic defensive areas could have profound effects on the strategic balance.

15. The SALT record indicates the Soviets have abided by the agreed provisions of strategic arms accords that are specific and detailed, policed by strong US monitoring capabilities, and include arrangements for addressing compliance issues. We think it unlikely the Soviets would sign a strategic arms limitation agreement if they knew they would have to violate it to meet their strategic requirements. In fact, the SALT experience suggests that in the negotiating process the Soviets will protect programs essential to their military requirements even at the risk of not reaching an agreement. During the period of an agreement, the Soviets' incentives to cheat would increase if unforeseen changes in the strategic environment altered their military requirements or if their view of the political value of strategic arms limitation

agreements diminished. These incentives would be stronger if a ratified agreement lacked precision, effective verification provisions, and bilateral mechanisms for resolving questions of compliance and if the Soviets believed they could evade the agreement for military benefit with a low risk of detection or US reaction. At the same time, Soviet behavior with respect to chemical and biological warfare agreements demonstrates that the USSR may violate arms control agreements that have lower political and military value in an East-West context, that lack clearly defined limitations, or that are not supported by effective US monitoring capabilities.

16. The Soviets will avail themselves whenever possible of the flexibility inherent in ambiguous treaty text and asymmetries in information in order to protect their own future development and deployment options and to hamper US monitoring capabilities.<sup>2</sup> We cannot predict how the Soviets might exploit the verification problems associated with the INF and START agreements proposed by both sides, but we can expect that they will work to create loopholes and exploit them. Moreover, the Soviets feel no obligation to comply with US unilateral statements or interpretations, or with what others may regard as the "spirit" of an agreement.

17. A companion Estimate, NIE 4/11-83, *US Capabilities To Monitor Soviet Strategic Offensive Force Limitations*, concludes that we will have serious problems in accounting for nondeployed Soviet missile inventories and deployed mobile systems and in monitoring many aspects of cruise missiles. [ ] high level of Soviet telemetry encryption continues [ ]

[ ] If pressed hard enough, the Soviets may prove more flexible than in the past with respect to cooperative measures including monitoring on Soviet soil. Such cooperative measures will not appreciably raise our confidence in being able to monitor Soviet compliance in certain key proposed limitations. They would, however, complicate a Soviet cheating effort and might have a deterrent effect, even if they did not assure us of a high monitoring confidence. We expect the Soviets to resist on-site inspection. They might ultimately agree to some limited-access schemes, but only if they viewed them as posing minimal risk to the security of their military programs and necessary to securing an agreement.

18. These projections of Soviet behavior in current negotiations are supported by the conclusions of a review of 20 years of Soviet efforts in

<sup>2</sup> See NIE 4/11-83, *US Capabilities To Monitor Soviet Strategic Offensive Force Limitations*.

arms control. For the Soviets, arms control is part of a broad effort to gain political and military advantage over the West. The Soviets have sought to use the arms control process to lead Western nations to unilaterally slow their military programs while protecting their own military programs, to promote detente, to gain recognition as a superpower, to foster divisions in NATO and erode confidence in the US nuclear umbrella, and to blunt Western technological superiority. Not unlike the United States, the Soviets have sought to preserve advantages they already have and to protect their force programs and options. The Soviets have also shared some arms control objectives with the United States, such as reducing the risks of nuclear war and nuclear proliferation, fostering a more predictable basis for military planning, and a more predictable US-Soviet relationship.<sup>3</sup>

19. The Soviets have certain advantages in negotiating agreements with the United States. They have a highly integrated political-military decisionmaking structure, with continuity of policy and personnel. They are able to affect and exploit the Western political process, while their own is all but immune from outside influence. A key factor in the US-Soviet negotiating process is the inherent asymmetry of information each side has about the other's programs and intentions. They use secrecy and concealment, and sometimes deception, to considerable effect.

20. Thus far, economic considerations have not been a determining factor in Soviet arms control policy. The USSR's growing economic problems may make the leadership more inclined than before to see the value of establishing a more predictable environment for the utilization of resources. However, significant cost savings would not accrue to the Soviets even if Moscow concluded INF and START agreements that considerably reduced their strategic nuclear forces. The USSR's strategic forces represent only about 15 percent of their total military costs. Moreover, although the USSR's economic problems are severe, we see no signs that the Soviets feel compelled to forgo important military programs or that they will be under great economic pressure to make substantial concessions at the negotiating table.

<sup>3</sup> Following is a view of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force; and the Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps: US and Soviet arms control objectives are fundamentally opposed. The Soviets seek to use arms control as a tool for shifting the "correlation of forces" in their favor and for facilitating the attainment of superiority over the West, although they do seek to gain their objectives without a nuclear war. In the interim, the United States and the USSR may have some similar tactical goals, derived, however, from different strategic motivations.

## DISCUSSION

### I. Main Features of the Soviet Approach

1. Moscow believes that arms control—both the process and any agreements flowing from it—must first and foremost protect and enhance the capabilities of Soviet military forces relative to their opponents'. The Soviets attempt to use the arms control process to impair the West's political will and its ability to counter Soviet military power. Moscow also has used the process to further its foreign policy goals. The integration of political and military objectives is the hallmark of the Soviet approach to arms control.

2. Soviet leaders have stated that nuclear war with the United States would be a catastrophe and that they do not regard such a conflict as inevitable. They have been willing to negotiate restraints on force improvements and deployments when it serves their interests. Nevertheless, a tenet in their strategic thinking holds that the better prepared the USSR is to fight in various contingencies, the more likely it is that potential enemies will be deterred from initiating attacks on the Soviet Union and its allies and will be hesitant to counter Soviet political and military actions. The Soviets do not accept that there is a stability in the nuclear relationship that can be upset by their deployment of weapons that threaten the war-making potential of the United States. Thus, the Soviets have resisted US efforts to modify, through arms control negotiations and agreements, the USSR's military strategy.

3. The United States and the Soviet Union have been meeting at the arms control negotiating table for more than two decades, in more than a dozen different negotiations. The Soviets have faced different issues and different trade-offs between military and political objectives. Yet, there are consistent elements in their approach. Not unlike the United States, the Soviets have sought to preserve advantages they already have and to protect their force programs and

options. The Soviets have also tried to use the arms control process to:

- Create a climate conducive to the slowing of US and Western military programs, through the process of arms control negotiations as well as by reaching specific agreements (SALT I and II).
- Protect the weapon development programs and mix of forces necessary to meet the requirements of their military strategy (most notably including large, MIRVed ICBMs in SALT and START).
- Eliminate or constrain Western military programs that undermine key aspects of Soviet military strategy (ABM defense of US ICBMs in SALT I, unsuccessful effort to ban cruise missiles in SALT II, and US/NATO force modernization programs in START and INF).
- Curtail US options to translate technological prowess into deployed military hardware (ABM in SALT I; B-1, Trident, and cruise missiles in SALT II; MX, Trident D-5, and cruise missiles in START).
- Gain recognition as a superpower (all bilateral US-Soviet negotiations and especially SALT I).
- Promote detente with an eye to its attendant benefits in trade, economic development, and technology acquisition (process in general and especially SALT I).
- Formalize the World War II division of Europe and prevent the reemergence of a German military threat to the USSR (CSCE and MBFR).
- Divide the United States from its West European allies (INF).
- Erode confidence in the US nuclear umbrella (INF and SALT).
- Isolate and constrain China (SALT, Limited Test Ban Treaty, chemical warfare, and MBFR).

4. Some Soviet arms control goals have been shared with those of the West: <sup>1</sup>

- To reduce the risk of nuclear war and of uncontrolled incidents or accidents that could lead to nuclear war (Hot Line, Incidents at Sea, and SALT II).
- To foster a more predictable future for military planning and a more predictable US-Soviet relationship (SALT and the arms control process in general).
- To reduce environmental dangers from nuclear testing (LTBT).
- To limit nuclear proliferation (Non-Proliferation Treaty).
- To foreclose future weapons deployment in certain geographic areas (Outer Space Treaty, Antarctica Treaty, Latin America Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty, and Seabed Treaty).
- To foreclose potential types of future weapons development (Environmental Modification Convention, Radiological Warfare negotiations, and Seabed Treaty).

5. In pursuing their goals through arms control, the Soviets have certain advantages in negotiating and managing agreements. Because these arise from inherent differences between Soviet and Western societies and systems of government, they will persist. The Soviets have:

- A highly integrated political-military structure for arms control decisionmaking, with great continuity of policy and personnel. The military establishment provides the principal arms control staff support for Politburo leaders and has a near monopoly on detailed classified information on

<sup>1</sup> Following is a view of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force; and the Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps: US and Soviet arms control objectives are fundamentally opposed. The Soviets seek to use arms control as a tool for shifting the "correlation of forces" in their favor and for facilitating the attainment of superiority over the West, although they do seek to gain their objectives without a nuclear war. In the interim, the United States and the USSR may have some similar tactical goals, derived, however, from different strategic motivations.

Soviet and US weapons programs. These characteristics give the Soviet approach a purposefulness and discipline that are great strengths in negotiations and essentially ensure that proposals and agreements will be consistent with military perceptions of Soviet strategic needs.

- Little or no susceptibility to the influence of Allies, public opinion, or political opposition.
- The capacity to maintain secrecy, which enables them to hide important aspects of their military programs from US negotiators, while they have good information on US programs.

## II. Soviet Strategy and Tactics

### A. Protecting Military Objectives

6. The key elements of Soviet strategy in the event of nuclear war are counterforce strikes against enemy nuclear forces and damage limitation. To protect this two-pronged strategy, the primary goal of the Soviets in the SALT I negotiations was to ensure their freedom to achieve a mix of quantitative and qualitative offensive ballistic missile capabilities equal, if not superior, to those of the United States and to limit US ABM deployment.

7. In negotiating the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the Soviets agreed not to deploy a widespread ABM defense of their territory in exchange for the United States forgoing planned widespread ABM protection of its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force. Because the Soviets had previously attached great importance to active defense as a means of limiting damage to the USSR, it was widely held in the United States at the time that accession to the ABM Treaty signified the Soviets' acceptance of vulnerability to retaliation as the basis for a long-term relationship of mutual deterrence.

8. However, by denying themselves the near-term option of widespread ABM defense, the Soviets did not abandon a damage-limiting strategy. Indeed, the Soviets expected the ABM Treaty to enhance Soviet counterforce capabilities by preventing the United States from deploying an extensive ballistic missile defense of Minuteman ICBMs. They probably also concluded that their own ABM systems then under development would be unable to protect critical targets from US missile attacks at least through the 1970s.

Aware that their ABM technology was considerably inferior to that of the United States, the Soviets hoped to continue their ABM development programs while inducing the United States to slow down. Indeed, since 1972 they have not only made considerable efforts to improve their air defenses, but they have worked hard on ABM technology, perhaps with the intention of future widespread ABM deployment. It is also now clear that the Soviets had no intention of abandoning a counterforce strategy. Within a year of ratification, it was evident the Soviets were continuing strategic force improvements of major proportion.

9. Toward the end of the SALT I negotiations, Moscow's desire to protect its plans for new, more capable ICBMs took precedence over its almost equally strong desire to halt US ABM deployments and to buttress its detente policy by reaching an agreement. Indeed, the record of both SALT I and SALT II negotiations suggests that for the Soviets, if it comes to a choice between satisfying important military needs and reaching an agreement, military needs usually win out.

10. The record also suggests that when competing military objectives arise in the course of negotiations between protecting their own weapon programs and limiting those of the United States, the Soviets' bias is for protecting their own programs. Their primary reason is to ensure that their forces are sufficient to meet their military requirements. Moreover, the Soviets know that their weapon procurement decisions are not subject to the vagaries of the Western political process. They believe that they will have opportunities to influence Western perceptions and policies and that there is always a good chance that some planned Western systems may be substantially delayed, reduced, or never actually deployed.

11. Along with diplomatic moves, the Soviets actively promote the Western "peace movement" through aggressive propaganda and covert activities. They have focused their recent efforts primarily on those countries scheduled to base new NATO missiles, with the chief emphasis on West Germany. Their campaign covers a whole spectrum of activities—from overt efforts to create a fear of nuclear war to covert measures, including forgeries and disinformation, to put NATO governments in the worst possible light.

12. In SALT II and START the Soviets have generally sought to forestall future US weapons, while the United States has generally sought to modify the existing (or soon-to-be existing) Soviet force structure. The Soviets have strongly resisted US efforts to alter the composition of their forces. In SALT II, for example, the Soviets from time to time proposed to trade bans on follow-on systems, including new types of ICBMs, intercontinental bombers, and ballistic missile submarines. However, they never proposed to reduce any current Soviet force component of special concern to the United States, like large ICBMs with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), in exchange for a ban on any prospective US system that concerned them.

13. One objective of the Soviets in negotiating the SALT I Interim Agreement was to minimize the impact of any agreed limits on their planned programs. The Soviets had the capability to build and deploy more ICBM and SLBM (submarine-launched ballistic missiles) launchers than they actually were allowed under SALT I. However, evidence obtained and analyzed subsequent to the signing of SALT I suggests the Soviets achieved an agreement essentially compatible with their previously planned strategic offensive programs. SALT I thus appears to have had at most a marginal inhibiting effect on previous Soviet intentions for production and deployment of strategic offensive weapons.

14. At several crucial points in the SALT I negotiations the Soviets faced a possible choice between their programs and an agreement. The evidence suggests they were determined to protect their programs, above all else. In the end they both achieved an agreement and protected their programs. The Soviets accomplished this by taking advantage of US uncertainties about their plans, by refusing to accept US proposals for treaty language and provisions that would have been more restrictive, and by agreeing to reduce their older ICBM and SLBM forces.

15. *The SSBN/SLBM Issue.* The Soviets' approach to SSBN/SLBM ceilings was to attempt to protect the construction program they evidently had already scheduled. At the time the agreement was signed in May 1972, the United States did not know exactly how many nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines



(SSBNs) the Soviets were planning to build. In negotiating the baseline for existing submarines and SLBMs and those under construction, the Soviets maximized the number of submarines and SLBM launchers that would be counted under construction in 1972. Their purpose was to minimize the number of old launchers they would have to deactivate to reach the SLBM ceiling. As it turned out, the numerical ceilings that were agreed to were lower than the Soviet capabilities to build SSBNs during the period of the agreement.

16. Moreover, in negotiating SLBM ceilings the Soviets were careful not to reveal the planned extension in the range of their new SLBM, the SS-N-8. To do so would have undermined the "geographical asymmetries" argument they used to justify Soviet SLBM ceilings higher than those allowed the United States. The other argument they advanced for this higher ceiling was their need for compensation to offset British and French nuclear forces.

17. *The Missile/Silo Size Issue.* During the SALT I negotiations the Soviets protected their plans to replace many of their light SS-11 ICBMs with a heavier and much more capable follow-on, the MIRVed SS-19. By the time SALT I was signed, the SS-19 had not been flight-tested, and, although the United States had sufficient evidence to indicate that it was going to be larger than the SS-11, we could not judge how much larger. In the negotiations the United States made clear its concern with the threat posed by new large Soviet missiles, particularly if they replaced the many SS-11s. The Soviets refused to agree that any follow-on ICBM larger than the SS-11 should be considered a heavy ICBM and, therefore, subject to the agreed prohibition on deployment of additional heavy missiles. The Soviets insisted that the agreement limit only increases in silo dimensions, which they knew would allow their scheduled SS-19s to replace SS-11s.

18. *Deployment of Heavy Missiles.* We are uncertain to what extent Soviet plans for deployment of heavy ICBMs were affected by SALT I. We believe the Soviets deployed fewer SS-18s than they had once intended, although the extent of the cutbacks, or nondeployments, is in dispute. While some evidence suggests the reduction was slight, other evidence suggests it could have been as high as 35 percent. In any event, improved performance characteristics of fol-

low-on medium and heavy ICBMs more than offset any cutback in launcher deployment.

19. *SALT II.* A principal objective of the Soviets in SALT II was to protect their previous strategic gains and to preserve their options for the future. Throughout the SALT II negotiations, the Soviets rejected US proposals that would have impaired Soviet capabilities to pursue a damage-limiting strategy through offensive counterforce means. The Soviets regarded both the Interim Agreement and 1974 Vladivostok Accord as having sanctioned a continuing Soviet advantage both in total ICBM launchers and in heavy ICBM launchers, purchased by what they described as the major concession of accepting continued US deployment of forward-based systems (FBS) in Europe and elsewhere within range of Soviet territory. They refused to accept any reduction specifically aimed at numbers of ICBMs or ICBM throw weight. While they accepted important limits on modernization—such as only one new type of ICBM—the Soviets managed to protect their ability to increase overall ICBM and SLBM capabilities significantly in that they could replace some of their older systems with missiles having more warheads and greater accuracy.

#### B. Asymmetry of Information, Concealment and Deception, and the Use of Treaty Language

20. A key factor in the US-Soviet negotiating process is the inherent asymmetry of the information each side has about the other's programs and intentions. As illustrated above, the Soviets have sought to exploit US uncertainties about Soviet military programs during negotiations. They have also attempted to play on these uncertainties once an agreement has been reached. This asymmetry in information derives from the Soviets' longstanding obsession with secrecy, particularly when military information is involved.

21. The Soviets' secretiveness has been evident throughout arms control negotiations. In the early days of SALT, Soviet military representatives not only refused to provide the United States with information on Soviet weapon systems but asked US counterparts not to provide such information to civilian members of the Soviet delegation. In essence, SALT I was negotiated on the basis of information on Soviet systems furnished almost exclusively by the US side. The

Soviets usually did not even point out where US information was in error. Since the signing of SALT I, the Soviets have gradually recognized the necessity for some exchange of information and have permitted their negotiators to provide some information on their systems:

- In the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), the Soviets have provided technical information necessary to conclude agreements on procedures for dismantling and destruction of strategic offensive and defensive systems and have in at least some instances been forthcoming in providing information concerning activities of concern to the United States from a compliance standpoint.
- In SALT II, in addition to quantitative holdings in the agreed data base, the Soviets have provided information on their weapons programs when such information was required to reach agreement on individual issues.

The information provided was usually the minimum required to resolve the issues involved, was provided reluctantly, and by no means portends a general relaxation in the Soviet attitude toward the guarding of military information.

22. Experience in MBFR, moreover, shows that when it serves their interest the Soviets are fully prepared to provide the West with false data and then give misleading answers to followup questions to sustain the erroneous information. The Soviets sought to use the false data to sustain their position that there was rough parity in numbers of troops on the two sides. They presumably believed the West could not effectively challenge the validity of the official Soviet figures on the actual size of the Warsaw Pact forces in question.

23. In addition to being reluctant to volunteer information, the Soviets work hard to keep the United States from deriving an accurate picture of Soviet military operations and capabilities. One manifestation is their nationally directed program for concealment and deception in all defense-related programs and in the conduct of military operations. This program includes camouflage; the use of dummies, mockups, and various covering devices; the dissemination of disinformation; and the denial of telemetry. The Soviets have increased the variety and extent of their

concealment measures since the mid-1970s. These measures have [

] in some cases hampered our ability to monitor arms control agreements.

24. *Treaty Language: The Light/Heavy ICBM Issue.* A good example of the care with which the Soviets negotiate treaty language to protect their military programs occurred during SALT I and concerned the issue of light/heavy missiles, discussed earlier in this paper. As we have noted, to protect the already scheduled deployment of the SS-19 under SALT, the Soviets refused to agree to a definition of a heavy missile, arguing that such a definition was unnecessary because both sides already knew, through national technical means (NTM), which missiles were heavy. The Soviets finally agreed to a maximum increase in silo dimensions of 15 percent, which they knew would be sufficient to allow SS-19s to replace SS-11s. In the face of adamant Soviet refusal to agree to a definition of heavy ICBMs, the United States made a unilateral statement on the subject. The Soviets subsequently made it clear they did not consider themselves bound in any way by US statements to which they had not agreed.

25. *Telemetry Encryption.* In 1974 the Soviets began to encrypt some of the telemetry on their ICBMs being flight-tested. The United States subsequently pressed the Soviets on the importance of flight test data for verifying compliance and discussed a ban on telemetry encryption. The Soviets adamantly opposed any such blanket prohibition. After years of negotiations, the final language in the SALT II Treaty permitted encryption, provided that verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty was not impeded. Under this ambiguous formulation, it was left to each side to determine what level of its telemetry to encrypt without impeding verification, and the Soviets are exploiting this ambiguity.

26. Since mid-1978 we have noted an expanding pattern of encryption and other practices of telemetry denial. The new SS-X-24 Soviet ICBM is being flight-tested with the most extensive level of telemetry encryption we have ever observed on any ICBM or SLBM test. [

C. Considerations Bearing on Soviet Compliance

27. *SALT I and SALT II.* As a reflection of the political importance the Soviets attach to the strategic arms control process, they have remained within the numerical limits imposed by SALT I and have not exceeded the levels that existed at the time of the signing of the unratified SALT II Treaty (reductions are not required until after entry into force). Indeed, violating these numerical limits, which are at the heart of the accords, would most likely signal the end of a process to which the Soviets have attached a high priority.

28. There have been a number of instances of Soviet activity under the SALT I accords and the unratified SALT II Treaty that have resulted in US concerns being raised in the SCC about Soviet compliance with the accords. Recently, they have included the possibility that SS-16 mobile ICBMs were deployed at the Plesetsk Missile Test Range, the concurrent testing of components of ABM and air defense systems at the Saryshagan test range, and the telemetry encryption level on the new SS-X-24 ICBM. In none of these instances, however, has the evidence been such to cause the United States to charge the Soviets with violation of the SALT agreements. (Likewise, although the Soviets have raised issues in the SCC about US compliance, they have not charged the United States with violation of the SALT accords.)

29. The SALT record indicates the Soviets have abided by quantitative limits and agreed provisions that are specific and detailed, such as the dismantling and destruction procedures of SALT I—even though in this case the United States had to raise issues in the

<sup>3</sup> See NIE 4/11-83, *US Capabilities To Monitor Soviet Strategic Force Limitations.*

SCC of reporting and strict adherence. On the other hand, the Soviets obviously feel no obligation to comply with US unilateral statements or interpretations of an agreement, or with the "spirit" of an agreement. Indeed, they have demonstrated that they will take advantage of ambiguities in arms control agreements, US sensitivities notwithstanding. A case in point is Soviet practice with respect to the provision of SALT II addressing telemetry denial, discussed previously.

30. *Chemical and Biological Warfare.* The Soviet Union is a signatory to the Biological Weapons Convention. Under the terms of the Convention, a signatory undertakes not to develop, produce, stockpile, or acquire biological agents or toxins "of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, and other peaceful purposes," or to develop weapons and means of delivery for biological agents or toxins.

31. In early 1980 the Intelligence Community received detailed information concerning a severe outbreak of anthrax that had resulted in a significant number of fatalities in Sverdlovsk in 1979. The Intelligence Community's assessment of this incident concluded that:

- The Soviet explanation of the incident (as a natural anthrax outbreak of limited scope) appears to be inconsistent in a number of respects with the information available to the US Government.
- The number of deaths and the medical information indicate inhalation anthrax as the probable cause of the incident.
- For various reasons, an identified biological warfare facility in the Sverdlovsk area appears to be the probable source of the infection.
- US calculations of the concentration of anthrax spores necessary to produce the number of deaths reported suggest that the Soviets are maintaining quantities of anthrax spores beyond those retained in the United States for purposes permitted by the Biological Weapons Convention.

32. The production or possession of toxins for use as weapons in armed conflict is not permitted under the Biological Weapons Convention, regardless of the quantities involved or the method of production. Use

of chemical weapons in war violates the Geneva Protocol and customary international law. Furthermore, the Convention prohibits the direct transfer of toxins to any recipient or any assistance to any country in acquiring or manufacturing them. The Intelligence Community has concluded that:

- Lao and Vietnamese forces, assisted by Soviet logistics and supervision, have used lethal chemical agents against H'Mong resistance forces and villages since at least 1976, and trichothecene toxins have been positively identified as one of the classes of agents used as well as types of chemical agents, including nerve agents.
- Vietnamese forces have used trichothecene toxins and a variety of chemical agents against Kampuchean troops and Khmer villages since at least 1978.
- The only hypothesis consistent with all the evidence is that the trichothecene toxins were developed in the Soviet Union, provided to the Lao and Vietnamese, either directly or through transmission of technical know-how, and made into weapons with Soviet assistance in Laos, Vietnam, and Kampuchea. It is highly probable that the USSR also provided other chemical warfare agents.
- Soviet forces in Afghanistan have used lethal and casualty-producing agents on Mujahedin resistance forces and Afghan villages since the Soviet invasion in December 1979. Evidence of the use of mycotoxins has been obtained through sample analysis.

33. Thus, the Soviets have shown themselves willing to engage in activities prohibited by the Biological Weapons Convention and the Geneva Protocol on chemical weapons. Soviet use of and complicity in the use of toxins and a variety of chemical agents in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan suggest two conclusions: .

- In deciding on the use of these weapons, the Soviets apparently concluded that the military benefits outweighed the political value they attached to the Convention and the Protocol. They also probably judged that the risk of exposure and resultant international condemnation would be low because these weapons were being used in remote areas.

- Moscow is prepared to risk violating arms control agreements like the Biological Weapons Convention that have lower political and military value in an East-West context, that are not supported by strong US monitoring capabilities, that lack clearly defined limitations and agreed procedures to aid verification, and that lack forums for addressing compliance issues.

### III. Implications for START and INF

#### A. Andropov: Will the New Leadership Change Course?

34. The death of Brezhnev raises the question about the possibility of change in the Soviet approach to arms control. Brezhnev's track record on arms control is clear: he sought to use it in combination with the Soviet military buildup to gain political and military advantage over the United States, and he allowed the Soviet military establishment to have a major voice in the making of Moscow's arms control policy.

35. Andropov and the Politburo would like to make detente work for them again. Andropov probably is more sympathetic than Brezhnev was to new ideas and policy adjustments and is well aware of the Soviet Union's growing economic problems and what some have called its crisis of spirit. In his early months as leader, Andropov has attempted to play on Western, especially European, hopes that he represents a more flexible and innovative leader, more inclined to smooth the rough edges of Soviet policy in the interests of a better East-West relationship. He has moved quickly and adroitly to keep Moscow's "peace offensive" moving. However, the evidence so far suggests that the Andropov-led Politburo is unwilling to make important changes in its international policies to facilitate an easing of the atmosphere in relations with the United States. The continuing misgivings about the very modest changes in Poland, the implementation of an earlier decision to send SA-5s to Syria, and the attempts to scuttle President Reagan's Middle East initiative are evidence of a basic continuity in Soviet foreign policy. Andropov is also likely to be highly sympathetic to the objectives and the interests of the Soviet military establishment, and, especially while he consolidates his power, he will probably try to avoid antagonizing it.

36. There is also little reason to believe that Andropov will be more inclined than Brezhnev to weaken

the Soviet military's enormous influence over Soviet arms control policy. Indeed, Andropov came to power with the apparent support of Defense Minister Ustinov. At one time Andropov had a close professional and personal relationship with Ustinov, and that connection does not appear to have weakened.

37. *The Economic Motivation.* The 1968 Estimate on the Soviet approach to arms control projected that the Soviet Union would have economic problems in the 1970s and that these problems would cause Moscow to want to restrain the buildup of US and Soviet forces. Growth in the Soviet economy did slow progressively in the 1960s and 1970s. The slowing of economic growth, however, did not reduce the Soviet commitment to their military buildup. On the contrary, Soviet spending for defense increased each year through the 1970s.

38. Until late in the 1970s official Soviet economic forecasts were optimistic. The signs of the approaching economic distress were evident but were obscured by the progress that had been made and by the prospect of significant inputs into the economy coming from the West as a benefit of detente. This is no longer the case.

39. Soviet economic growth has fallen from nearly 4 percent per year during most of the 1970s to about 1 to 2 percent per year since 1978. Stagnation in the production of key industrial materials has constrained growth in machinery output. Oil production is flat and the output of high-quality coal and steel is falling. Declining world oil prices and flat demand for Soviet arms are limiting Moscow's hard currency earnings. Four consecutive poor grain harvests have contributed to persistent food shortages, disrupted the USSR's livestock program, and worsened its hard currency payments position.

40. We expect the USSR's economic problems to continue through much of the 1980s, as the cost and difficulties of obtaining industrial raw materials and fuels rise and the increments to labor and capital fall. Economic growth will be only 1 to 2 percent per year through the mid-1980s and will hover near the 1-percent level through the latter part of the decade. Under these conditions, maintaining historical rates of growth in defense spending will be economically more difficult. The particulars of these economic problems are well understood by Andropov and the Politburo, even if the solutions are not.

41. However, the potential direct savings to the Soviet economy, even if the Soviets had accepted the US START and INF proposals in their entirety, would have been relatively small. We estimate that, if the US arms proposals were accepted and were not offset by shifting resources to other military programs, cumulative Soviet expenditures for strategic attack forces during the next 10 years would be about 10-20 billion rubles less than we would otherwise expect. A savings of 1-2 billion rubles per year would alter the defense share of GNP by only a few tenths of a percent and would have a negligible impact on the overall economy. This is because production resources consumed by strategic attack forces are small in relation to overall Soviet investment requirements; they are also highly specialized and not easily transferable to civilian uses.

42. The Soviets will continue to be motivated in their attitude toward arms control by a desire to provide a more predictable environment for military resource planning. Their bleak economic prospects may make this a somewhat more important factor than in the past, but military requirements will continue to predominate in their decisionmaking. Moreover, although the economic problems they are facing are severe, we see no signs that the Soviets feel compelled to forgo important military programs or that they will be under great economic pressure to make substantial concessions at the negotiating table.

#### B. Long-Term Soviet Military Objectives

43. The Soviets have certain broad strategic force goals they will want to implement, irrespective of a START agreement. They will not let any agreement slow their research and development (R&D) efforts, and they will not agree to a treaty worded so tightly as to prevent them from a significant level of continued force modernization. They will try to accomplish several major objectives during the next 10 years, including development and probably deployment of a mobile ICBM force, deployment of a modernized intercontinental bomber force, and deployment of a much improved sea-based ballistic missile force.

44. The present Soviet START position is designed to protect their current and planned programs, or at least the most important of them. As in SALT II, the

\* For more detailed information, see NIE 11-3/8-82, *Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict, 1982-92.*

Soviets propose an overall aggregate ceiling on delivery vehicles, along with a MIRV launcher subceiling and unspecified limits on total warheads. They have hinted they would consider subceilings on ICBMs, but they have refused thus far to be specific. They propose to reduce the aggregate ceiling for strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to 1,800 by 1990 (the Backfire bomber is not included), contingent on US agreement to forgo Pershing II (P-II) and GLCM deployment, and not to increase any other US forward-based systems. This would mean a reduction in launchers of more than 25 percent for the USSR and somewhat less for the United States. Under their proposal, the Soviets would probably minimize the disruption to ongoing modernization by dismantling mainly older components of their strategic forces, like the Yankee submarines and SS-11s. There would be a ban on long-range cruise missiles of all types, limits on new-class SSBNs, and constraints on new and modernized ICBMs similar to those constraints found in the SALT II Treaty; but the Soviets have implied in the negotiations that mobile ICBMs would be permitted. The Soviets have held out the prospect of reducing warheads; but, as it now stands, their START position would permit the deployment of over 9,000 warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs, more than the 7,300 in their current missile force. However, under their proposal, the Soviets will be unable to modernize the missiles in all 1,398 of their ICBM silos, which we believe they would do in the absence of arms control constraints. They would have to reduce or forgo deploying hundreds of SS-19s and silo-based SS-X-24 missiles, in order to deploy the several hundred mobile ICBMs we believe they intend to have. They would also have to limit the deployment of Typhoon SSBNs.

45. If the Soviets were unconstrained by a new START or INF agreement but continued to abide by SALT I and SALT II, we believe they would also:

- Replace the SS-17 ICBMs with four reentry vehicles (RVs) with the new 10-RV SS-X-24 ICBM beginning in 1985.
- Deploy additional D-III and Typhoon SSBNs equipped with MIRVed SLBMs and modernize the missiles on existing D-IIIs while dismantling older SLBM launchers. If the Soviets were to maintain 818 MIRVed ICBM launchers, their SLBM programs would not bring them to the maximum SALT-allowed total of 1,200 MIRVed ICBM and SLBM launchers until 1985 or 1986.

- Deploy additional SS-20s, up to 450 to 540, as well as long-range GLCMs and SLCMs beginning as early as late 1983.
- Deploy some long-range ALCMs as early as 1984. If 1,200 MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs were deployed, up to 120 bombers (Bears, Blackjacks, and perhaps Backfires) carrying long-range ALCMs would be permitted.

46. Even without a START agreement, the Soviets may want to extend certain SALT II limits beyond the 1985 expiration date. There would be some precedent for this, as in the case of their willingness to observe SALT I after it expired in 1977. They might see an advantage in preserving the arms control process and some degree of predictability about US force levels, while pressing ahead with their own advanced weapons development, even though it would restrain some of their deployments.

47. However, if the Soviets decided to expand their forces beyond SALT II limits, we believe they would:

- Increase the number of MIRVed ICBM launchers by deploying additional MIRVed SS-19 ICBMs and hundreds of new additional MIRVed ICBMs to replace SS-11, SS-13, and SS-17 ICBMs.
- Deploy additional ICBM launchers by fielding land-mobile ICBMs.
- Increase the number of reentry vehicles on existing ICBMs, including the SS-18 heavy ICBM.
- Increase the number of SLBM launchers by not dismantling older SSBNs as new ones are deployed.
- Possibly replace single-RV SLBMs on older D-class submarines with new MIRVed SLBMs.

48. *Concerns Beyond START.* The Soviets would maintain strong capabilities to attack the United States, even under the constraints of a START agreement along the lines of the US START proposal. The Soviets would have 5,000 ICBM and SLBM reentry vehicles by 1990, up to 2,500 of them on ICBMs. This would probably be enough to cover US strategic force targets and US command, control, communications, and intelligence facilities in the absence of MX deployment in a new basing mode. However, it would significantly reduce the Soviets' ability to cover other key military and industrial targets. Constraints on

Soviet cruise missiles would do little to reduce US vulnerability to Soviet bombers and cruise missiles, given the absence of any effective air defense for the continental United States.

49. Whether we and the Soviets reach an agreement on START, several possible Soviet future weapon system initiatives need to be considered. The potential would remain for the Soviets to deploy widespread ABM defenses by the late 1980s or early 1990s. By the mid-1980s they will deploy an advanced tactical surface-to-air missile (SAM) that could have some capability against some strategic reentry vehicles. START will not impose constraints on Soviet air defenses, which will continue to be improved. The Soviets will also devote considerable effort to technologies for directed-energy weapons, with potential application to strategic defense, and to nonacoustic antisubmarine warfare (ASW). A breakthrough in either of these strategic defensive areas could have profound effects on the strategic balance.

#### C. Undermining US Modernization Programs

50. The Soviets have a large number of strategic weapons under development.<sup>5</sup> Moscow's willingness to accept constraints on these systems—via START or INF—depends on their strategic requirements and on the degree to which they are concerned about, and hope to limit, US systems under development, and their desire to gain political benefits.

51. The new programs now under way or planned by the United States and NATO will pose major challenges to Soviet political and military strategy in the middle and late 1980s. Moscow must be concerned about the implications of US determination to counter Soviet strategy and force improvement through unilateral action and about the implications for NATO cohesion if P-II and GLCM deployments go forward. From the Soviet perspective, if the planned US strategic force programs go forward, there will be an erosion of the gains they have made during the past 10 years, even if they were to deploy new systems of their own. Specific Soviet concerns about current US/NATO force modernization plans probably include:

In the near term:

- The potential threat from P-II and GLCMs to some ICBM launch facilities and to some hardened national-level command and control sites.

<sup>5</sup> See NIE 11-3/8-82, *Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict, 1982-92*.

- The capability of B-1 bombers and cruise missiles to penetrate improved Soviet air defenses.
- The widely dispersed sea-based nuclear capability permitted by Tomahawk SLCMs.

In the long term (late 1980s and beyond):

- The additional threat posed to Soviet hard targets from MX and Trident D-5 missiles.
- The ability of US Stealth technology on aircraft and cruise missiles to render Soviet air defenses much less effective and to force development of more capable Soviet defensive systems.
- The improved survivability of most of these systems, including MX if deployed in a new basing mode.
- The substantial increase in US/NATO flexibility—nonnuclear and nuclear—if all of these systems are deployed in combination.

52. The Soviets obviously hope the new US weapon systems will not go forward, without their having to give up anything in return. They have suggested trading off bans on some specific new systems on both sides, including the improved SS-NX-20 for Trident D-5 and cruise missiles for cruise missiles. They seem also to be laying the groundwork to trade the new SS-X-24 medium solid ICBM for MX. These trade-offs are in keeping with past Soviet proposals to trade future systems for future systems. They would enable the Soviets to proceed with most of their own programs, while stopping the major US modernization programs, especially those designed to improve counterforce capabilities. The Soviets probably calculate that these proposals will not be acceptable to the United States. For this reason, the Soviets may propose some trade-offs designed to be more attractive to the United States if they believe they have no other way to constrain US strategic improvements. The Soviets' attitude toward throw weight, their ICBM vulnerability, and cruise missiles will be an important factor in their position on trade-offs.

#### D. Throw Weight

53. The Soviets are committed to retaining a substantial force of medium and heavy ICBMs. This commitment is clear from what we know about their current programs and follow-on systems; further, they

seem to be committed to technical programs to improve missile throw weight. Although there is potential for further warhead fractionation, we believe an important reason for Soviet interest in throw-weight improvements is the flexibility they provide in missile payloads. Large throw weight enables the Soviets to deploy different numbers and sizes of warheads on the same type of missile and gives them room for "extras" like penetration aids. The latter would become important to the Soviets if they were confronted with a US ABM system in the future.

54. The Soviets undoubtedly want to retain their substantial advantage in missile throw weight:

— Their large missiles are an integral part of a force structure that has existed for years. The Soviets have carefully built these forces, and we believe they are determined to retain large numbers of their SS-18 and SS-19 liquid-propellant missiles, which in fact have high throw weight. The smaller solid-propellant missiles that are now being tested will add to this force, as well as replacing their smaller SS-11 and SS-17 liquid-propellant missiles. However, for the Soviets to restructure their forces on the basis of fewer or smaller missiles, a substantial redirection would be required.

— High throw-weight missiles have political as well as military significance. The Soviets almost certainly believe that their existing large missiles contribute to the perception held by many in the West that having the largest missiles equates to strategic superiority.

55. The disparity is the result of major differences between US and Soviet force structures, stemming from choices made years ago. If that imbalance were to be significantly narrowed, the Soviets would have to make substantial reductions in their medium and heavy ICBM forces, which we think is unlikely. However, to limit US programs threatening their strategic gains, the Soviets might accede to modest reductions in their numbers of medium and heavy ICBMs in an agreement that imposed bans or tight restrictions on US systems of particular concern to them, such as MX, Trident D-5, and cruise missiles. If so, the Soviets would calculate that restrictions on the United States, in conjunction with improved follow-on systems of their own, would work to their net strategic

advantage. In any event, the Soviets would try to keep any reduction in their medium and heavy ICBM forces as small as possible and would seek to reduce only their older SS-17s, SS-18s, and SS-19s.

#### E. Soviet ICBM Vulnerability

56. Although they are clearly concerned about the future vulnerability of their land-based ICBMs, we do not think the Soviets are likely to respond by making a wholesale move to sea with their strategic forces. They will continue to place heavy emphasis on hardened silo-based forces. To mitigate their ICBM vulnerability problem, however, they will probably add land-mobile ICBMs to their force as well as improve their SLBM force. Although their SLBM force is improving in size and capability, it is not as capable as their silo-based force, being neither accurate enough nor reliable enough to fulfill the missions now assigned to the land-based forces. The Soviets also are wary of US ASW capabilities and are not confident of the survivability of their SSBNs.

57. Although the Soviets are increasing the number of warheads based at sea, the proportion of Soviet sea-based warheads to land-based warheads is not projected to change significantly. The Soviet sea-based force will continue to operate largely as the principal part of the USSR's total reserve force. The Soviets do not see it as a principal element in counterforce strikes; that role will remain with the ICBM force, well into the 1990s. They are likely to resist pressures to go to sea, preferring to work in START for constraints on US systems that threaten Soviet ICBMs.

#### F. Cruise Missiles

58. The Soviets are very concerned about US cruise missiles. While the Soviets are in the process of developing a full range of cruise missile systems, and we now believe they are only a year or two behind the United States in deployment dates, they are concerned about the quantity and quality of US cruise missiles and the serious problems they will pose for Soviet air defenses. The Soviets have technical problems associated with detecting, tracking, and intercepting such small-size targets, with the limitations of their own equipment, and with the diversity of systems and attack options with which they must contend. They are developing new responses to help them meet that threat. In addition, the Soviets worry about future



improvements in US cruise missiles, in particular the application of Stealth technology to ALCMs, which would further complicate their strategic defensive problems.

59. One of their principal goals in both START and INF is to ban long-range cruise missiles, and, failing that, to significantly constrain them. Realistically, the Soviets do not expect to succeed in banning ALCMs in START. They hope, however, to be able to constrain the numbers of these systems and the types of platforms, as they did in the SALT II Treaty, and thereby make their strategic defense problems more manageable. They also would prefer to see deployment of GLCMs and SLCMs banned, as they were in the SALT II Protocol. They might, however, consider trading cruise missiles on a type-for-type basis. This does not mean that Soviet cruise missile programs are simply bargaining chips; although they will be used in bargaining, they could also be deployed, and, if so, would have military utility to the Soviets.

#### G. Monitoring and Verification Implications <sup>6</sup>

60. The Soviet approach to the verification of START and INF will be generally consistent with the attitudes expressed during SALT I and SALT II and with the precedents established in those agreements. In SALT I the Soviets insisted on dealing with verification through reliance on national technical means, and they strongly resisted on-site inspection. In SALT II neither side raised on-site inspection, but the Soviets accepted some passive cooperative measures to supplement NTM.

61. The Soviets probably recognize that the United States will not be satisfied with NTM alone to monitor compliance with future agreements. At the inception of the current negotiations, the Soviets suggested some degree of receptivity to on-site inspection. Our experience in the nuclear test ban negotiations in the mid-1970s indicates that the Soviets are not in principle opposed to passive and active cooperative measures under carefully controlled conditions. In the context of the current negotiations, we would expect the Soviets to resist on-site inspection at first, but they might ultimately be willing to agree in principle to some limited types of inspection schemes if they viewed

<sup>6</sup> See NIE 4/11-83, *US Capabilities To Monitor Soviet Strategic Offensive Force Limitations*.

such schemes as posing minimal risk to the security of their military programs and as necessary to securing an agreement. However, we would expect them to seek to defer the negotiation of inspection procedures until an agreement entered into force, and then to agree only to various forms of limited-access schemes.

62. A key indicator of Soviet willingness to meet US concerns on verification would be a change in their treatment of the issue of telemetry encryption. Other keys to the Soviets' attitude on verification will be their handling of such issues as the exchange of data about weapon systems, the drafting of adequate confidence-building measures, and, perhaps more critical for US monitoring, the acceptance of cooperative measures in Soviet territory (including both technical sensors and inspection teams).

63. The ability of the Intelligence Community during the 1980s to monitor the types of limitations the United States has proposed for START and INF agreements could be lower than was the case for most of the provisions of the SALT I and SALT II accords. While the proposed limitations involve a number of tasks for which our monitoring capabilities are strong, they also encompass several areas that historically have posed significant problems for US intelligence collection and analysis. These include accounting for nondeployed Soviet missile inventories and for deployed mobile missile systems and distinguishing among cruise missiles on the basis of launcher, payload, and range capability. [

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64. Cooperative measures that supplemented or facilitated our intelligence collection would increase our confidence in monitoring some types of limitations. Unimpeded access to Soviet flight test data and on-site inspection would raise our confidence in monitoring the characteristics of Soviet weapons and in accounting for numerically limited systems in designated facilities and areas. Cooperative measures, however, would not appreciably raise our confidence in being able to detect Soviet actions to stockpile missiles beyond allowed inventories, to deploy mobile missiles in facilities and areas where they are not permitted, or to produce and deploy prohibited cruise missile types.

65. Soviet noncompliance with a strategic arms limitation agreement could take a variety of forms,

and all acts of noncompliance would be important from a monitoring perspective, even though a particular activity conferred no apparent military advantage. Some of the limitations under consideration for START and INF agreements, however, would provide the Soviets with opportunities for military gain with a low probability of being detected.

66. Despite these opportunities, we think it unlikely that the Soviets would sign an arms control agreement if they knew they had to violate it to meet their strategic requirements. During the period of an agreement, the Soviets' incentives to cheat would increase if changes in the strategic environment altered their military requirements or if their view of the political value of strategic arms limitation agreements diminished. These incentives would be stronger if an agreement lacked precision, effective verification provisions, and bilateral mechanisms for resolving questions of compliance and if the Soviets believed they could evade the agreement for military benefit with low risk of detection or US reaction.

#### H. The Soviet Approach to Third-Country Systems

67. Viewed from Moscow, the strategic nuclear forces of China, France, and the United Kingdom further complicate the strategic environment. Although small in number, British and French forces could devastate many major Soviet cities and unhardened military installations, and they are scheduled to increase substantially during the next 10 years. The Soviets apparently believe the British would most likely use their strategic forces only in unison with a US nuclear attack. They are less certain about potential French nuclear employment.

68. The Soviets recognize that Chinese strategic nuclear capabilities are vastly inferior to their own. Nevertheless, the Soviets are probably not confident they could destroy all Chinese capabilities in an initial strike and are aware that ongoing improvements will enhance the retaliatory capability of China's nuclear forces. Soviet leaders are concerned that China might take advantage of a NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation.

69. While the Soviets have used the third-country issue for negotiating leverage, they are genuinely concerned about the threat from third countries. This reflects not only the current military realities, but also

the longstanding tenet of Soviet military doctrine that the USSR must have forces superior to those of *all* the potentially hostile powers on the Eurasian periphery. The Soviets have made third-country systems a central issue to successful negotiation of an INF agreement. All their proposals thus far have been premised on the need for compensation for British and French IRBMs, SLBMs, and "medium-range" aircraft. Soviet concern is greater than in the past because of the prospect of a substantial increase in French and British warheads. For both military and political reasons, we believe the Soviets will continue to demand some compensation for French and British systems in INF or, lacking an agreement there, in START.

70. The Soviets also argue that their SS-20s in the eastern USSR are intended to counter Chinese and other nuclear assets in that region and thus are irrelevant to a negotiation on "medium-range nuclear systems in Europe," as they describe the INF talks. Their position on SS-20 reductions suggests the reductions would be accomplished mostly by withdrawal to the eastern USSR. Those withdrawn would be available to attack targets in China, Japan, and elsewhere. They would also be available for redeployment to the western USSR.

71. Finally, the Soviets have indicated they are concerned about the potential proliferation of cruise missile technology. They have argued that this relatively inexpensive technology could be within the reach of almost any state. They may hope an agreement with the United States to curtail long-range cruise missiles would be a step toward containing the proliferation of the technology to third countries.

#### I. The START-INF Connection: The Soviet Game Plan

72. The Soviets have directly connected INF and START. At Geneva they have repeatedly stated that their proposal to reduce strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) to a level of 1,800 for each side by the year 1990 is contingent on an agreement that there be no buildup in FBS (including P-II and GLCM) capable of striking the Soviet Union. They have also said that, if US forward-based aircraft were to be reduced, the 1,800 SNDV limit could conceivably be lowered.

73. For the Soviets, this reflects a long-held position that the FBS threat to Soviet territory represents an

asymmetry in the overall strategic balance that favors the United States. At Vladivostok in 1974 the Soviets dropped their insistence on limiting FBS in SALT II. At the same time the United States agreed to carry over into SALT II the SALT I limits on heavy ICBMs that allowed the Soviets such missiles. The Soviets could reasonably have expected that the US START position would include some effort to reduce or eliminate their advantage in heavy ICBMs. Consequently, one reason they have returned to the FBS question may be to protect their heavy ICBMs.

74. The Soviets consider the Pershing II and GLCMs scheduled to be deployed in Western Europe as strategic systems. If an INF agreement were negotiated allowing some deployment of Pershing II and GLCM, the initial Soviet reaction would probably also be an increase in the 1,800 SNDV level in their START proposal. Assuming they would eventually agree to lower numbers of SNDVs, they would probably continue to use the FBS issue to defend their right to continue to deploy heavy missiles.

75. Developments in INF will affect START, both the politics and the nature of the negotiations. If there is a cancellation—or even a delay—in INF deployments, then the Soviets are likely to see themselves in a much stronger negotiating position in START. We doubt the Soviets believe they are under time pressure in START; they probably believe an agreement is unlikely before the next US Presidential election. They probably would increase the public pressure on START, not necessarily in the expectation of an agreement in 1984, but with the political purpose of affecting the American election dialogue on the strategic competition and the future of US-Soviet relations.

76. During the next year or two the Soviet plan for the major arms control negotiations will center on INF, and the positions the Soviets take in START are related to developments in INF. The goal of the Soviets in INF is to stop US deployments. They are deeply concerned about the military potential of the P-IIIs and GLCMs, as well as their impact on the coupling of US central strategic forces to the defense of Western Europe. Their interest in stopping deployment is also motivated by the political dividends this outcome would pay Moscow. The Soviets are building on the legacy of ill feeling generated by the "neutron bomb" deployment episode in the late 1970s, a controversy they sought to exploit at the time. Moscow views the INF deployment issue as a way of using West

European public opinion to influence the US-Soviet strategic dialogue. The Soviets recognize they have a historic opportunity to weaken the political cohesion of the Atlantic alliance through the INF issue, and they are trying to make the most of it, despite recent setbacks in the West German elections.

77. We are uncertain whether the Soviets will accept an INF agreement that sanctions some NATO deployments if it becomes clear to them—presumably late in 1983—that such deployments will go forward. Moscow may see its objective of undermining Western cohesion as paramount and will thus be unwilling to reach an agreement that sanctions any US INF deployment. However, it may also be that Moscow's concern about the military threat of the P-IIIs and the GLCMs will lead it to conclude a deal that puts a cap on US deployments. It is not clear that the Soviets have determined what they will do in the event of US deployment.

78. The Soviet campaign against INF would not end after an initial deployment. It would continue as long as Moscow believed it had a chance to force withdrawal of those missiles already deployed or to forestall full deployment.

79. Throughout Western Europe the Soviets will intensify their public campaign against US INF deployment. These efforts are likely to include:

- Stepping up contact with a broad spectrum of European politicians, media representatives, church leaders, and student groups, with the intention of purveying as widely as possible an image of Soviet reasonableness and a commitment to a negotiated INF solution.
- Employing propaganda to arouse public alarm over alleged US intentions of making Europe the "nuclear battlefield" of a US-Soviet conflict.
- Introducing new "peace" initiatives, such as the Soviets' latest proposal for a tactical nuclear-free zone in Central Europe.

80. Political actions, including continued negotiations and "active measures," would be complemented by military moves (so-called analogous responses).<sup>7</sup> The Soviets have implied they would leave the INF talks if deployment goes forward, but we doubt that Moscow has made that decision at this time.

<sup>7</sup> See SNIE 11/20-3-82 INF: *The Prospects for West European Deployment and the USSR's Reactions.*

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