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CIA Briefing

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18 JANUARY 1988

BRIEFING ON INF MONITORING

OPENING REMARKS

BRIEFING COVERS OVERVIEW OF INF MONITORING, INCLUDING:

- COOPERATIVE MEASURES AND THEIR IMPACT ON MONITORING;
- OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE SOVIET DEPLOYMENT DATA;
- MONITORING STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES IN INF;
- POTENTIAL CHEATING;
- CONCERNS AND UNCERTAINTIES;
- OVERALL EFFECT OF MONITORING REGIME

VG 1

INTRODUCTION

THE INF TREATY CALLS FOR THE ELIMINATION OF ALL GROUND-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC AND CRUISE MISSILES (AND THEIR LAUNCHERS) WITH RANGES BETWEEN 500 AND 5500 KM, AND SPECIFIED ASSOCIATED SUPPORT STRUCTURES AND EQUIPMENT. THE TREATY INCLUDES A BROAD SET OF COOPERATIVE MEASURES, INCLUDING:

- ON-SITE INSPECTIONS;
- DATA EXCHANGES;
- NOTIFICATIONS;
- DESIGNATED DEPLOYMENT AREAS; AND, MEASURES TO ENHANCE VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

I CALL YOUR ATTENTION TO THE NATURE OF THE MONITORING JUDGMENTS I WILL BE DESCRIBING. THEY ARE BASED ON THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S CAPABILITIES OF CURRENT AND PROGRAMMED COLLECTION SYSTEMS AND ACTIVITIES. THESE JUDGMENTS ARE NOT BASED ON RIGOROUS STATISTICAL ANALYSIS BUT ARE SUBJECTIVE IN NATURE, AND USUALLY DERIVED FROM EXPERIENCE IN ANALYZING SOVIET FORCES OVER THE YEARS.

THE INCLUSION OF EXTENSIVE ON-SITE INSPECTION (OSI) IN THE INF TREATY PRESENTS US WITH A NEW REGIME. OSI IS AN IMPORTANT AND USEFUL CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURE, BUT IT IS NOT A PANACEA. WE RELY ON NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS TO SERVE AS THE FOUNDATION FOR ASSESSING OUR OVERALL MONITORING CAPABILITIES, PARTICULARLY DURING THE PERIOD WHEN WE ARE LOOKING FOR ANY ILLEGAL PRODUCTION, TESTING, STORAGE, OR DEPLOYMENT OF MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS. WE SHOULD KEEP IN MIND THAT THE SOVIETS COULD REINTRODUCE MISSILES AND TELS OR CONDUCT PROHIBITED ACTIVITY AFTER THE INSPECTORS HAVE LEFT. OSI WILL WORK TO REDUCE SOVIET CONFIDENCE IN THE GAINS THEY MIGHT DERIVE FROM A COVERT FORCE AND WILL INCREASE THE SOVIET COST OF CHEATING.

VG 2 TREATY-LIMITED ITEMS SUBJECT TO ELIMINATION

UNDER THE TERMS OF THE TREATY, SOVIET SYSTEMS AND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT SUBJECT TO ELIMINATION ARE:

-- SYSTEMS:

- O SS-4, SS-5, SS-20 INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES
- O SS-12, SS-23 SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES
- O NOT PICTURED IN THIS VUGRAPH, BUT ALSO SUBJECT TO ELIMINATION, IS THE SCC-X-4 GLCM

-- EQUIPMENT:

- O MISSILES
- O LAUNCHERS
- O MISSILE CANISTERS
- O OTHER SPECIFIED SUPPORT EQUIPMENT

OF THE SYSTEMS LIMITED BY THE TREATY, THE SS-5 IS AN OBSOLETE SYSTEM, AND ALL LAUNCH SITES HAD BEEN DEACTIVATED OR CONVERTED TO OTHER PURPOSES BY 1984; DISMANTLEMENT OF SS-5 AIRFRAMES CONTINUED UP TO MID-1987. THE SSC-X-4 GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE IS A NEW SYSTEM WHICH WE ASSESS HAD NOT BECOME OPERATIONAL.

76 -- SUPPORT STRUCTURES:

- O "FIXED STRUCTURE FOR A LAUNCHER" (SS-20 SINGLE-BAY GARAGE)

THIS VUGRAPH IS A PICTURE OF 1 OF 48 OPERATIONAL SS-20 BASES.

- O NINE SINGLE-BAY GARAGES PER BASE
- O MISSILES AND TELS ARE HOUSED IN THEM WHILE UNIT IS AT THE BASE
- O ROOF SLIDES OPEN FOR LAUNCHING, IF NECESSARY
- O ALL SINGLE-BAY GARAGES AND FOUNDATIONS WILL BE DISMANTLED

MAJOR MONITORING TASKS

THE TREATY CAN BE DIVIDED INTO THREE GENERAL AND POTENTIALLY OVERLAPPING PHASES:

- PHASE I; ESTABLISHING THE BASELINE. IN THIS PHASE, WE WILL COMPARE THE NUMBER AND LOCATION OF SOVIET-DECLARED FORCES WITH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ESTIMATES. THIS HAS ALREADY BEEN DONE FOR THE FIRST EXCHANGE OF DATA, AND WE WILL BE WATCHING FOR ANY CHANGES IN THE COMPOSITION OF SOVIET FORCES OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS.

- PHASE II; REDUCTIONS AND ELIMINATION OF TREATY-LIMITED ITEMS. DURING THIS PHASE, WE WILL MONITOR THE DRAWDOWN OF THE INF FORCE AND THE ELIMINATION OF SPECIFIED EQUIPMENT AND STRUCTURES.

- PHASE III; MONITORING A GLOBAL BAN ON INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES, SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES AND GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES. ONCE THE DECLARED FORCE HAS BEEN ELIMINATED, WE WILL LOOK FOR ANY COVERT PRODUCTION, STORAGE OR DEPLOYMENT OF TREATY-LIMITED ITEMS. WE WILL ALSO BE LOOKING FOR THE TESTING OF ANY MISSILES TO RANGES WITHIN 500 AND 5500 KILOMETERS.

VG 5 AS PART OF OUR ROBUST MONITORING REGIME, THE COOPERATIVE MEASURES INCLUDED IN THE INF TREATY WILL ENHANCE OUR ABILITIES TO MONITOR SOVIET ACTIVITIES.


-- DATA EXCHANGES:

- O INCLUDING UPDATES OF THE ORIGINAL DATA AFTER TREATY ENTRY INTO FORCE.

-- ON-SITE INSPECTIONS:

- O BASELINE INSPECTIONS OF DECLARED FACILITIES WILL CONFIRM THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING DATA.
- O CLOSE-OUT INSPECTIONS OF DECLARED OPERATING BASES AND SUPPORT FACILITIES WILL VERIFY THAT TREATY-LIMITED ITEMS HAVE BEEN ELIMINATED OR REMOVED.
- O SHORT-NOTICE INSPECTIONS OF DECLARED FACILITIES FOR 13 YEARS WILL ACT AS A DETERRENT TO CHEATING.
- O ON-SITE INSPECTION OF ELIMINATION PROCEDURES FOR MISSILES, LAUNCHERS, AND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT.
- O CONTINUOUS ON-SITE MONITORING OF THE PORTALS OF THE VOTKINSK MACHINE BUILDING PLANT, WHICH IS THE FINAL ASSEMBLY FACILITY FOR THE SS-20, SS-25, AND POSSIBLY THE SS-12 AND SS-23.

VG 6



OTHER COOPERATIVE MEASURES INCLUDE:

-- NOTIFICATIONS:

- O INCLUDING THE INITIATION OF ELIMINATION OF TREATY-LIMITED ITEMS.
- O THE TIME AND ROUTES OF MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS IN TRANSIT TO ELIMINATION FACILITIES.

-- MEASURES TO ENHANCE MONITORING BY NTM:

- O SEVERAL TIMES A YEAR (6), AND ON SHORT NOTICE, THE US CAN REQUEST THAT THE SOVIETS DISPLAY, AT ANY SS-25 MISSILE BASE, ALL SS-25 TELS WITH CANISTERS AND OPEN THE ROOFS OF ALL SINGLE-BAY GARAGES. THIS IS INTENDED TO HELP TO ENSURE THAT SS-20S ARE NOT BEING ILLEGALLY MAINTAINED AT SS-25 BASES.

VG 8 OVERVIEW OF MONITORING JUDGMENTS

HOW WELL THEN ARE WE ABLE TO MONITOR THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE INF TREATY? LET US BEGIN BY FIRST ANSWERING THE QUESTION, "WHAT IS THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S ASSESSMENT OF THE DEPLOYMENT DATA PROVIDED BY THE SOVIETS IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING?"

FIRST OF ALL, THE DATA PROVIDED BY THE SOVIETS INCLUDES SOME 115 FACILITIES WHICH ARE SCATTERED THROUGHOUT THE SOVIET UNION.

-- EXCEPT FOR DIFFERENCES IN AGENCY VIEWS ON THE NUMBER OF NON-DEPLOYED SS-20S, THE NUMBER OF DEPLOYED AND NON-DEPLOYED FORCES ARE CLOSE TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ESTIMATES. [REDACTED]

VG 9

-- AS THIS NEXT CHART SHOWS, THE SOVIET NON-DEPLOYED SS-20 FIGURE IS CLOSE TO, BUT SLIGHTLY EXCEEDS, THE ESTIMATES OF CIA AND INR. IT IS WELL BELOW THE DIA ESTIMATE. [REDACTED]

-- ALTHOUGH THE DATA ARE WITHIN REASON, WE CANNOT DETERMINE IF THE SOVIETS DECLARED THEIR TOTAL INVENTORY OF MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS, SINCE ONLY DECLARED FACILITIES WILL BE SUBJECT TO INSPECTIONS TO VERIFY THE DATA.

-- ONE OF THE DIFFICULTIES IN OUR ESTABLISHING A BASELINE ESTIMATE OF MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS IS THAT THE SOVIETS DID NOT DECLARE SEVERAL FACILITIES HISTORICALLY ASSOCIATED WITH TREATY-LIMITED ITEMS. [REDACTED]

VG 10

[REDACTED]

WE NOTE THAT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE POTENTIAL NUMBER OF NON-DEPLOYED SS-20S FORM
THE BASIS FOR MANY OF OUR CHEATING SCENARIOS.

VG 11

WHAT ARE THE TASKS THAT RESULT FROM THE TREATY WE CAN MONITOR WELL WITH
NTM AND THE COOPERATIVE MEASURES OF THE TREATY? THEY ARE THE FOLLOWING:

- DETERMINE THE NUMBER OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES AND THEIR LAUNCHERS
DEPLOYED AT MISSILE-OPERATING BASES.

- DETERMINE THE NUMBER AND LOCATION OF DEPLOYED SS-12S AND THEIR
LAUNCHERS.

- DETERMINE WHETHER ANY BALLISTIC MISSILES HAVE BEEN TESTED TO RANGES
WITHIN 500 AND 5500 KMS.

VG 12


- CONFIRM THE ELIMINATION OF TREATY-LIMITED ITEMS.

- CONFIRM THAT TREATY-LIMITED ITEMS ARE NO LONGER PRESENT AT MISSILE
OPERATING BASES, AND SUPPORT FACILITIES.

- CONFIRM THAT PRODUCTION OF MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS AT DECLARED
FACILITIES HAS CEASED.

VG 13

[REDACTED]




AG 14

NOW, WHAT ABOUT CHEATING BY THE SOVIETS? OUR ABILITY TO DETECT AND IDENTIFY ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES DEPEND ON A NUMBER OF FACTORS, SUCH AS:

- THE SIZE OF AN ILLEGAL FORCE;
- ITS READINESS;
- WHETHER THE SS-25 ICBM AND SS-N-21 SLCM ARE BANNED, LIMITED, OR UNCONSTRAINED IN START.

IN GENERAL, WE COULD PROBABLY DETECT AND CORRECTLY INTERPRET ACTIVITY INVOLVING THE ILLEGAL DEPLOYMENT OF LARGE NUMBERS OF MISSILES (100-200) IN HIGH STATES OF READINESS; ESPECIALLY IF SS-25S ARE CONSTRAINED OR ELIMINATED BY START. WE DEFINE HIGH READINESS AS THOSE MISSILES WHICH ARE CAPABLE OF BEING LAUNCHED WITHIN HOURS OR SEVERAL DAYS.

VG 15



VG 16 REMAINING UNCERTAINTIES AND CONCERNS

BASED ON THESE MONITORING JUDGMENTS, WHAT ARE THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S MAJOR REMAINING UNCERTAINTIES AND CONCERNS? THEY ARE BASICALLY TWO:

-- FIRST, NON-DEPLOYED MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS. [REDACTED]



[REDACTED] ANY UNDECLARED OR NEWLY-PRODUCED MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS COULD BE AVAILABLE TO THE SOVIETS IN CRISIS OR WARTIME.

-- SECONDLY, THE INFRASTRUCTURE FOR MOBILE MISSILES. THE TREATY ELIMINATES ONLY A SMALL PART OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE FOR INF SYSTEMS, THAT IS, LAUNCH CRITICAL ELEMENTS. THIS DOES NOT REDUCE OUR OVERALL ABILITY TO DETECT SOVIET CHEATING, BUT IT DOES MAKE IT EASIER FOR THE SOVIETS TO MAINTAIN AND OPERATE MANY SUPPORT ELEMENTS OF AN ILLEGAL FORCE IN PEACETIME SO THEY COULD FIELD SUCH A FORCE IN CRISIS OR WARTIME.

-- ALSO, ALLOWING CONTINUED DEPLOYMENT OF THE SS-25 IN START COULD CREATE OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE SOVIETS TO HIDE SS-20S, BECAUSE OF THE SIMILARITIES OF FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT.

VG 17 IMPACT OF THE TREATY'S COOPERATIVE MEASURES

WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF THE TREATY'S COOPERATIVE MEASURES?

IN PHASE I, OSI AT FACILITIES AND BASES SPECIFIED IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WILL ALLOW US TO RELIABLY ACCOUNT FOR THE SOVIET INVENTORY AT DECLARED LOCATIONS. OSI WILL INCREASE OUR CONFIDENCE THAT PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES ARE NOT OCCURRING AT THESE LOCATIONS.

CLOSE-OUT INSPECTIONS WILL ALLOW US TO CONFIRM THAT ALL TREATY-LIMITED ITEMS HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM BASES THAT ARE DECLARED TO NO LONGER HAVE AN ASSOCIATION WITH INF SYSTEMS.


VG 18 IN PHASE II,

-- COOPERATIVE MEASURES WILL BE MOST USEFUL FOR MONITORING THE ELIMINATION OF TREATY-LIMITED ITEMS AND SUPPORT STRUCTURES.


THEY WILL ALLOW US TO ACCURATELY DETERMINE THAT THE DECLARED NUMBERS OF TREATY-LIMITED ITEMS ARE BEING ELIMINATED IN THE AGREED MANNER.

VG 19 IN PHASE III,

-- PORTAL MONITORING AT VOTKINSK WILL ALLOW US TO CONFIRM THAT NO PROHIBITED MISSILES ARE BEING SHIPPED FROM THAT FACILITY.



3 20 OVERALL EFFECT OF MONITORING REGIME

 WE BELIEVE THAT THE TOTAL EFFECT OF THE INF TREATY'S MONITORING REGIME--WHICH PROHIBITS THE PRODUCTION AND TESTING OF TREATY-LIMITED ITEMS--WOULD WORK TO REDUCE SOVIET CONFIDENCE IN THE GAINS THEY MIGHT DERIVE FROM A COVERT FORCE AND INCREASE THE COSTS OF CHEATING.

- PRODUCING AND TESTING MODERN WEAPONS IS DIFFICULT ENOUGH EVEN UNDER IDEAL CONDITIONS; THE NEED FOR COVERTNESS MAKES SUCH ACTIVITIES CONSIDERABLY HARDER.

- THE SOVIETS WOULD QUESTION THE MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS OF MISSILES PRODUCED COVERTLY OR NO LONGER FLIGHT-TESTED.

- AND FINALLY, THE BAN ON INF WEAPON SYSTEMS WILL PRODUCE GREAT OPERATIONAL UNCERTAINTY FOR COVERT FORCES, SINCE MUCH OF THE NORMAL TROOP TRAINING WITH THE MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED.