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POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE USSR AND THE COMMUNIST WORLD

THE PROBLEM

To examine the political situation in the USSR and the world Communist movement, particularly in the light of the XXII Party Congress and developments in the Sino-Soviet dispute, and to estimate major trends.

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PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS

A. Within the USSR, Khrushchev remains the most powerful single leader, and we believe that his leadership is not in danger at present. His control over policy, however, is subject to restraints; conservative resistance has forced him to compromise or postpone his proposals on such matters as economic policy, military force structure, and the party's role in Soviet society.

B. Present trends suggest that, over the long term, popular aspirations are likely to acquire a larger influence in Soviet domestic politics. There are some prospects for further moderation of totalitarian controls; however, such a trend depends not only on social forces but also on external events and developments in top level politics.

C. Sino-Soviet relations are in a critical phase just short of an acknowledged and definitive split. There is no longer much chance of a fundamental resolution of differences. In our view, the chances that such a split can be avoided during 1962 are no better than even.¹

D. The Sino-Soviet rivalry will continue to have disrupting effects upon the international Communist movement, and these will greatly intensify if a definitive split occurs. Whatever the outcome of the present Sino-Soviet crisis, we believe that the pressures for national autonomy within the international Communist movement will present the Soviet leaders with increasing difficulties, and that their control over it is likely to be further diminished.

¹ The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that the chances of a definitive split during 1962 are much less than even.

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SUMMARY

1. The politics of the Communist world have continued in the past year to grow more complicated and more controversial. The intensity with which issues of policy and authority were posed at the XXII Congress has highlighted the contradictions which are emerging as Soviet internal development becomes more complex and as the world Communist movement becomes larger and more diverse. Adjustment to these changing conditions is made more difficult by the element of doctrinal rigidity in Communist theory and practice and by the legacy of Stalinism. (*Paras. 14-17*)

2. These problems do not weaken the growing material base of economic strength, scientific development, and military power which underlies the Soviet threat. Nor have they had a significant effect upon the Soviet view that the East-West conflict is a fundamental clash of systems, or upon their determination to press their aims in this conflict. Present Soviet moves toward a detente in East-West relations may owe something to Moscow's desire to contain tensions in this area while a crisis impends in its relations with Peiping. While we perceive no indication that the Soviets are abandoning their basic hostility toward the West, there has been a shift in their tactics toward relatively greater subtlety and flexibility in pursuing their foreign policy objectives.²

3. While basic attitudes toward the West are not in dispute among the Soviet leaders, Khrushchev's sponsorship of successive reforms in internal policy has generated conflict with various elements which resist his changes. In the past year, differences of opinion have become evident over the important question of the relative priority of welfare programs as against the traditionally favored sectors of heavy industry and defense. Some contention has also been apparent over other issues—the proper structure of the armed

² Soviet policies toward the non-Communist world will be examined in a forthcoming estimate due in March 1962. Chinese policies will be discussed in NIE 13-62, "Communist China," now scheduled for completion in April.

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forces, the role of the party apparatus in Soviet society, and the final disposition of the "antiparty group." Even the violent onslaught against Stalin at the Congress, which Khrushchev conceived as a means of weakening the opposition to his views, failed to resolve these problems. (*Paras. 18-21, 23-29*)

4. We continue to believe that Khrushchev remains the most powerful single leader in Soviet politics. Most top party leaders share his general outlook, and those who resist various of his innovations do not appear to form a coherent faction which is seeking his downfall. Indeed, the lineup among his colleagues probably changes from issue to issue. In addition to the difficulties of securing agreement at the top, Khrushchev in implementing his policies must rely primarily on a party bureaucracy schooled in conservatism and jealous of its traditions and privileges. In all these ways, he is subject to restraints which have the effect of slowing down the pace of his reforms. (*Paras. 22, 25, 30-32*)

5. The attitudes of the Soviet people, on the other hand, represent a form of largely silent pressure on the regime to proceed in the direction of further reforms of the system. The traditionally compliant attitude of the population has to some extent been upset in recent months by heightened anxiety over the possibility of war over Berlin and a related concern over the effects of international tensions on the already sagging rate of improvement in living standards. In addition, the revelations of the XXII Congress about the Stalin period and subsequent confusion within the party have led to openly expressed skepticism and to considerable ferment among intellectual circles. (*Paras. 33-34*)

6. We do not, however, foresee any sharp turning of the public mind toward radical solutions. Not only is the regime able to capitalize upon the strong sense of pride in national accomplishment, but the Soviet people are accustomed to authoritarian rule. Current trends suggest that, over the long term, popular aspirations are likely to acquire a larger influence, and we believe that there are some prospects for further moderation of totalitarian controls. But this will de-

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pend on external events and developments in top level politics as well as on the identifiable forces for change which are clearly now at work within Soviet society. (*Paras. 35-37*)

7. A far more critical question has been posed by the moves launched at the Congress against Communist China's challenge to Soviet policies and international authority. While the condemnations of Stalin and the "antiparty group" were also conceived as part of the rebuttal to China, the main vehicle is the unremitting campaign against Albania. This Soviet attack, and the unyielding Chinese response, have moved the Sino-Soviet dispute into a critical phase just short of an acknowledged break. While substantial differences on Communist strategy divide the two, these have now been transcended by the even more fundamental question of authority, in which the USSR's traditional leadership of the international Communist movement is at stake. (*Paras. 15, 38-39, 45*)

8. Considering the conflicting views and interests of the two parties, the record of attack and counterattack, the liabilities already incurred, and the uncompromising attitude of both, we believe that there is no longer much chance of a fundamental resolution of Sino-Soviet differences. Indeed, the question now is whether Moscow and Peiping will succeed in maintaining formal unity, or whether they will take those remaining steps—undisguised accusations of heresy and the formation of separate international movements—which would constitute a definitive split. (*Paras. 40-41, 46-47*)

9. The considerations of self-interest which argue against such an outcome must be fully evident to both parties. On the Chinese side, however, there are important contrary factors, particularly the belief that the USSR is turning away from revolutionary aims and that Soviet policy is running counter to Chinese interests and ambitions. These considerations, plus a certain xenophobic righteousness which persuades Peiping that its policies could best carry the Bloc to victory, have already led the Chinese to sacrifice many of the advantages of the former relationship. For the

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Soviet part, remaining in partnership with China involves the possibility of being drawn into riskier situations than they wish to contemplate, and the probability of a continuing struggle within the movement which could lay restraints on Soviet policy and enable China to acquire an increasing authority in that movement. Thus the Soviet leaders may now be considering whether, from the standpoint of their national interests, a smaller movement in which they enjoyed undiluted predominance would not be preferable to a larger movement which they could not control. (*Paras. 42-44*)

10. Predictions cannot be confident, particularly since, with tensions so high, the likelihood is increased that either the USSR or China could miscalculate the other's moves and reactions. In our view, however, the chances that a definitive split can be avoided during the current year are no better than even.³ If such a split should occur, diplomatic and economic ties between the USSR and China would be further reduced, though not necessarily severed. The military alliance, whether openly renounced or not, would be of doubtful value to either signatory, although each would still have a very heavy stake in the preservation of Communist power in the other. The international Communist movement would become a virtual battleground as both the Soviets and the Chinese competed for the allegiance of other parties, fostered splits in those non-Bloc parties not firmly committed to one side or the other, and used all the weapons of pressure and persuasion available to them to isolate their rival. (*Paras. 45, 47, 65, 75-76*)

11. If no definitive split occurs, we believe that the Sino-Soviet relationship will continue to be marked by tension and instability, increasing and declining as events may occasion. In these circumstances, the disruptive consequences for the international movement will continue to be felt, although in a less intense and more manageable form than under conditions of avowed rivalry. The present lineup finds Albania and the minor parties of Asia in the Chinese camp, important elements in the Indian, Indonesian, and Japanese

³See the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, footnote to paragraph C of Principal Conclusions.

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Parties sympathetic to Peiping, and the North Koreans and North Vietnamese seeking to maintain neutrality but edging closer to Chinese positions. Outside Asia, Soviet authority generally prevails, so far with little difficulty, against scattered pro-Chinese elements. (*Paras. 48, 60, 62-64, 66-72*)

12. The Chinese challenge, however, tends to undermine Soviet authority even among parties which are totally out of sympathy with Chinese views, just as Khrushchev's attacks on Stalin tend to becloud the legitimacy of Soviet leadership even among Communists who are not themselves Stalinists. As the international movement grows in size and diversity, as the Satellite regimes become preoccupied with national problems, as other parties acquire real prospects for sharing or even seizing state power under circumstances which have no parallel in Soviet experience, the virtue and necessity of following Soviet guidance is being increasingly questioned. In these circumstances, the Soviets are under considerable pressure to make concessions to national autonomy and to take increasing account of diverse national views in framing the general Communist line. (*Paras. 15, 52, 66, 73*)

13. Gradual adjustments in this direction might preserve for some time to come the essentials of Soviet leadership, were it not that China is simultaneously pressing rival policies and gaining adherents among other parties. China's defiance dramatizes the inability of the professedly internationalist Communist ideology to preserve the unity of a movement embracing powerful nationalist forces, once the traditional sources of Soviet authority had been weakened. No clear solution to this problem is in sight, and we believe that the management of the international Communist movement will present the Soviet leaders with increasing difficulties which are likely, in one way or another, to result in a further diminution of their control over it. (*Paras. 50, 74*)

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DISCUSSION

14. The politics of the Communist world have continued in the past year to grow more complicated and more controversial. The conflicts which are arising within and among Communist parties center around two major sets of issues. The first of these is the group of policy innovations authored by Khrushchev and covering the entire range of domestic, Bloc, and external problems. The sum total of these innovations is a substantial break with the past, especially the theories and practices associated with Stalin, but their success is, to date, unproven to the whole body of Communist opinion. Thus some Communists wish to limit these changes, others to undo them, and yet a third element to carry them even further.

15. The second set of problems concerns the proper relations among Communist parties, not only those holding state power but also those outside the Bloc. With the removal of Stalin's overwhelming ideological authority and subsequent changes in the USSR's intrabloc policies, scope was given to the ambition of those who, like China, Albania, and Yugoslavia, have been for various reasons less subject to direct Soviet control; also, many other parties, like the Polish and the Italian, began to acquire a stronger sense of national identity. The positions taken on new issues have therefore increasingly come to reflect the special interests of individual parties, and policy differences have inevitably resulted in challenges to the international authority of the Soviet Party. Indeed, this question of authority now transcends the policy differences from which it arose and has become today the crucial problem of Communist politics.

16. In all these matters the Communist movement is encountering a fundamental inner contradiction, one likely to become more acute with time. As a doctrinal movement, communism has always been marked intellectually by extreme rigidity and organizationally by authoritarian centralism. These qualities were a strength when the Soviet Party alone held state power, when its internal task was the imposition of a drastic revolution upon the people, and when the mission of revolutionary agitation abroad was uncomplicated by the expediencies of world power status and the dangers of nuclear war. But as Soviet society entered the modern industrial age, as the USSR's power and influence grew, and as other Communist parties became factors of power in their own right, with some of them achieving state control, all the issues of doctrine, policy, and organizational control became very much more complicated. Communism's rigid adherence to old doctrinal formulations and its monolithic tradition have made it ill-fitted to adjust readily to such changed conditions. It is a system whose history wars with its current need to adapt itself to change. New ideas and new methods, even though they masquerade under the title of "creative" Marxism-Leninism, clash with old doctrines which were held in their time to be absolute and universal truths, and in the name of which the party repeatedly killed heretics in its ranks.

17. Nothing illustrates this historical dilemma better than the persistent warfare of the present Soviet leadership with the apparently indestructible ghost of Stalin. He and the system he nurtured remain too awesome an influence to be ignored; Communists, in forming their opinions, are

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heavily influenced by formulations sanctified by Stalin's authority and by their own drives and responses formed in the Stalin era. They thus are continually forced to make judgments, and frequently devious rationalizations, about the man and therefore about the entire history of the Communist movement. The Stalin image can be used in many ways, even opposing ones; Khrushchev, despite his own involvement in Stalin's crimes, can bid for support as their expositor and rectifier, while Mao, ignoring his own disregard for Stalin's advice while the dictator yet lived, can pose as the protector of his truths. But a political position, if it is to have force in modern Communist politics, must somehow come to grips with the complex of contradictory emotions and beliefs which still surround the name of Stalin.

I. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE USSR

The Leadership

18. Khrushchev's policy concepts, and perhaps also the expediencies of the post-Stalin struggle for personal power, have carried him to the pole of anti-Stalinism. The fundamental factor in his outlook has been his conviction of the superiority of the Soviet system. He evidently believes, as Stalin apparently did not, that its virtues are strong enough to draw the Soviet population into genuine cooperation with the party, just as he believes that Soviet achievements can exert a powerfully attractive and eventually decisive influence in the world at large. His reforms are based on the premise that Stalin's obsession with absolute control had prevented the development of these advantages, had bred divisions where identities of interest could have been cultivated, and had alienated those who should have been natural allies

19. The fact that Khrushchev has chosen a reformist course is evidence of the strength of forces pressing for change in the USSR; he is responding to social and economic forces as well as leading them. These forces are in the main unorganized and inarticulate, although their views undoubtedly find expression at the top through intellectual and professional if not through party channels. Khrushchev took the leadership of those at the highest level of the party who were willing to attack the problems of the post-Stalin period in an imaginative way. His reforms have inevitably whetted appetites for further change and have led to sporadic though persistent conflict with such groups as creative intellectuals, scientists, and students. These problems have in turn generated counterpressures on Khrushchev from those in the leadership who regard some of his innovations as dubious and are concerned that social discipline is being jeopardized. At present, since Khrushchev continues to move on a reformist course, the sharpest point of political conflict is with those elements of the party resisting change.

20. Khrushchev has for some time attempted to rouse and recast the Soviet Party to assure its survival as the leading force in an increasingly complex and sophisticated society no longer ruled by terror. At the same time, he has tried to invigorate and alter a variety of domestic policies in order to guarantee rapid economic progress and to gain the firm support of the Soviet people, and has contrived to amend and extend doctrine so as to justify his initiatives. He has worked to insure and strengthen his own political and doctrinal pre-eminence within the CPSU, in part through the maintenance of a momentum sustained by continual change and innovation. And, finally, he has sought in all these ways to alter permanently the image and the direction of Soviet communism so that his mark will

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remain a decisive one long after his own departure from the Soviet scene.

21. Such beliefs and efforts have made Khrushchev a radical in the eyes of some Soviet Communists. While the party has almost certainly been universally relieved at the commitment to abstain from physical terror, some have retained strong doubts about Khrushchev's leadership in other respects. His vigorous anti-Stalin line has deeply troubled those in the party who fear the consequences of such exposures and who remain emotionally attached to the Stalin era. His effort to bring the party and the people closer together has been viewed by some as an infringement on the party's special and privileged role in society and as a threat to the party's militancy and esprit. Further, some Communists fear that his emphasis on welfare programs will lead to the neglect of the traditional priorities accorded to heavy industry and defense. His avowed intention in 1960 to emphasize advanced weapons and to reduce the traditionally large standing forces has also apparently generated considerable professional concern among the military. Similarly, aspects of his "peaceful coexistence" policies, including aid to such leaders as Nasser and Nehru who strongly oppose domestic communism, visits to the Western capitalist countries, and the occasional attribution of good intentions to certain "imperialist" leaders, have been regarded with some suspicion. Finally, the very style of Khrushchev's leadership probably seems unnecessarily impetuous, unpredictable, and undignified to some elements in the party.

22. In seeking to cope with resistance of this nature, Khrushchev has imaginatively adapted his political tactics to the new political ground rules which emerged in the period after Stalin's death. He has stressed that party opponents will no longer be exposed to terror and physical retaliation. He does not ex-

ercise, and apparently does not choose to exercise, the absolute authority wielded by Stalin. He has relied instead on the force and vigor of his own personality, his powers of persuasion and his demagogic appeal, his ability to outmaneuver and anticipate the moves of his opponents, and the sheer momentum and force of his policy innovations. In addition to his own skills, Khrushchev relies on his occupancy of the top posts of both party and state—and thus his influence over the selection of leading administrators and cadres—to maintain his pre-eminent position. Further, while he is faced with resistance from those who disapprove of the pace of his programs or dislike some of his specific proposals, most top party leaders share his general views and value his political talents and vigorous leadership. They also probably doubt the feasibility of an attempt to oust him and fear the possible consequences should such a move succeed. Nevertheless, this method of leadership precludes his exercise of a completely commanding authority and compels him to seek visible successes in order to maintain support.

23. Khrushchev's political vulnerability may have increased since about mid-1960 as a consequence of what must have appeared to many Communists to have been a series of policy setbacks. By October 1961, at the time of the Party Congress, for example, it probably seemed that his peaceful coexistence policies vis-a-vis the US had neither produced the promised detente nor achieved notable successes, especially on the crucial issue of Berlin. His program to reduce military manpower had to be suspended in the face of growing international tensions. His efforts to preserve the unity of the Bloc had also faltered in 1960-1961. Finally, his promises concerning domestic economic development in the two fields most closely identified with him—agriculture and the standard of living—had fallen far short of fulfillment. Indeed, estimated grain production in 1961 totaled only around 115 million tons (compared to about 130 million

tons in 1958), and housing construction for the year fell some 17 percent short of goals. The harvest in the Virgin Lands was poor and his heavily publicized promise to surpass the US in the per capita production of meat and milk by 1960-1961, or earlier, had to be forgotten.

24. Khrushchev's moves at the XXII Party Congress directed toward the domestic scene (many of which were also of great significance for the Bloc) suggested some concern over the possible effects of these problems on his political position. Thus he attacked the ideological underpinnings of the "dogmatists" who oppose his "creative" programs and resorted to shock tactics in order to stigmatize all those who had resisted him in the past or might be tempted to do so in the future. He sought to break the lingering attachment in the party to Stalin and to destroy any prestige still enjoyed by the antiparty group. In addition, through a new set of party statutes, a new party program (the first since 1919), and various practical and doctrinal formulations contained in these documents, he labored to bring the party into harmony with the changing times. The party program's edict, for example, that the "dictatorship of the proletariat" is no longer necessary in the USSR because all internal "class enemies" have been eliminated, sanctified Khrushchev's belief that the old methods of dealing with the people as a race apart must give way to a new system of persuasion and party-public alignment.

25. When viewed in the light of these motives, Khrushchev's actions at the Congress appear to have met with only a qualified success. Despite evident failures of policy, he was able in this way to place his stamp on the present era and, largely by tearing down the image of Stalin, to assert his own claims to be in the true line of Lenin's succession. Further, he again revealed his hold on policy initiative by maintaining his general emphasis on reform. At the same time, however, he

seemed to pitch his approach to party problems in a somewhat more cautious key, apparently lost some ground on the vital question of welfare policy, and appeared unable to accomplish the prompt expulsion from the party of Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich.

26. More specifically, Khrushchev's campaign during 1960 and 1961 to channel greater resources into the consumption sector of the Soviet economy evidently ran into stiff resistance from "conservative" elements in the party and the military establishment. These elements apparently saw in his approach a "revisionist" deviation from established doctrine concerning the primacy of heavy industry, and feared the international implications of a policy which might weaken the Soviet power position. Opposition to Khrushchev's policies was frequently expressed in the press, particularly during the spring and summer months of 1961. In a thinly veiled propaganda battle, he denounced "comrades" who had an "excessive appetite for metal" and attacked "dogmatists" who could not perceive that since the imperialist threat had been blunted by Soviet strength, it was no longer necessary to deny the people a greater share of the national wealth.

27. But it was evident that by July his campaign had stalled; a number of serious economic problems at home, coupled with an apparently unanticipated crisis abroad, challenged both the feasibility and the desirability of proceeding with Khrushchev's shift in the internal line. Speeches at the Party Congress in October suggested that a compromise between contending forces had been reached; Khrushchev appeared to have given in to some extent concerning doctrine and planning but kept the way open for an eventual return to more consumer-oriented policies.

28. Controversy within the top leadership has also been suggested by the failure of the regime to resolve the question of the antiparty group. Despite the vigor of the attacks

on the members of the group at the XXII Congress, the charges of criminality levied against them by Khrushchev, and the many demands for their expulsion from the party, the current status of these men remains in doubt. The equivocal statement of the Congress concerning their status and, more recently, the enigmatic handling of Molotov's case have compounded the confusion. Implied opposition to the group's expulsion, apparent in the speeches of several of the top leaders at the Congress, and continued irresolution on this issue since the Congress suggest high-level political disagreement and promote appearances and reactions the regime would prefer to avoid; it fosters uncertainty and probably debate among Communists already unsettled by de-Stalinization and Bloc discord. Those who appear, at a minimum, to be urging caution in this matter are probably concerned about the ill-effects of a witch-hunt in the party and are reluctant to see Khrushchev's power further aggrandized; some may also fear formal proceedings against the antiparty group because they themselves are vulnerable to charges of criminal acts performed in the service of Stalin.

29. While there were thus signs during the past year or so that Khrushchev had encountered some resistance to his policies, while personal power politics are always at work in the Soviet Party, and while there were extensive changes made in the top party organs at the Party Congress, there were no clear indications during this period that particular factional interests were being served. The career of Frol Kozlov, however, seemed to receive a particular boost when he was designated de facto number two man on the Secretariat. The fortunes of Kozlov's presumed followers, the so-called "Leningrad group," also appeared to be prospering. Strengthening the heir-apparent could ease the succession problem after Khrushchev's disappearance, but it could also stimulate countering moves by rival aspirants to power.

Further, it could make Kozlov more of a present power in his own right than would be compatible with Khrushchev's view of his own interests.

30. Generally within the party, Khrushchev in seeking to remold the system in his image may be faced with a more amorphous, though in some ways more formidable, problem than he encounters at the top. The organization chiefly responsible for carrying out his reforms—the party machinery—is a far from satisfactory instrument for this purpose. The great majority of professional party functionaries were trained in the Stalinist period to execute mechanically orders from above and to regard the population at large as recalcitrant and untrustworthy subjects. Now they are being called upon to display initiative, elicit it from others, and draw the people into a positive identification with the regime and active support of its policies. Further, Khrushchev demands that local party bosses give a greater voice to the rank and file, submit to criticism from subordinates and to pressures from the public, permit the dilution of their elite corps through the use of unsalaried officials, and relax standards for admission to the party. Under these circumstances, we think that there is a general reluctance to implement Khrushchev's policies wholeheartedly.

31. Despite these signs of disagreement and discontent, it is our belief that Khrushchev remains the most powerful single leader of both party and state and that major policy changes are either initiated by him or require his approval. We do not believe that there is a coherent political opposition to him and we do not think that his colleagues are actively seeking his downfall. Nevertheless, limits are imposed on him by his own methods of leadership, the ability of other men to influence the course of policy, and the bureaucratic conservatism of the institution responsible for the implementation of his

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programs. Developments during the past year or so seemed to demonstrate with particular force that Khrushchev is, in fact, subject to restraints which have the effect of slowing down the pace of his reforms and perhaps of scaling down the magnitude of his goals as well.

32. While we thus think, on balance, that Khrushchev's position is secure, even if some of his policies are not, we make this judgment without complete confidence. We are unable to assess the full play of Soviet politics simply because there are no precedents and few norms for the Khrushchevian era, and we must view it from the outside. Further, our estimates cannot take into full account the effects on the internal scene of such crucial events as the de-Stalinization campaign, the Berlin crisis, and the Sino-Soviet struggle. Each of these matters could be expected to generate controversy within the USSR about tactics and perhaps long-term strategy as well. It thus may be that there is greater instability than we have been able to identify and that the explanation for the signs of disagreement and uncertainty, particularly in the period since the Party Congress, is more portentous than we now perceive.

Trends in Soviet Society

33. Although the bulk of the Soviet population remains politically compliant, recent developments on both the international and domestic scenes may have unsettled somewhat the traditional pattern of general acquiescence in party policies and interpretations. The foreign policy tactics of the leadership last summer and fall, for example, included for the first time since 1953 an admission that the world was perilously close to the brink of war. The public was unprepared for such an admission. Anxiety,

sharpened by the USSR's resumption of nuclear testing and concern over possible fallout hazards, was not translated into any direct pressures on the regime, but almost certainly represented a factor in policy calculations. While Soviet citizens for the most part seemed to accept the official view that the West was responsible for the increase in tensions, few could understand why the Berlin issue was a crucial one for either side. A decline in popular morale has also been evident because of the regime's failure to continue the high rate of increase in living standards promised repeatedly in the last few years, a development associated in the popular mind with the increased tensions in Soviet-Western relations. The favorable reaction to President Kennedy's interview with Adzhubei suggested that the public retains a relatively open mind about the US and is anxious to see an improvement in relations.

34. Among the more educated segments of the Soviet population, the revelations of the XXII Party Congress evidently stimulated new doubts about the party's traditional claims of unity and infallibility. Discussion of topics normally shunned, such as the question of Khrushchev's own personality cult and his complicity in the crimes of the Stalin era, was widespread and appeared to place party spokesmen on the ideological defensive. The Congress was also responsible for the renewal of efforts in intellectual circles to gain greater freedom of artistic expression. Though such "revisionist tendencies" have been censured by official spokesmen, some thaw and ferment remains apparent. These reactions, compounded by confusion within party ranks, seem to have created uncertainty at the highest levels as to how best to cope with the consequences of de-Stalinization.

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35. Trends already evident in the party's policies and in the public mood suggest that, over the long term, popular aspirations are likely to play a larger role in the development of Soviet society. Pressures for personal security and material improvement, whetted by the progress made so far, will probably grow and find expression in a press which no longer avoids all controversy and which is now able on occasion to suggest changes in the status quo. The regime's own efforts to gain greater public participation in the handling of local affairs, to ease tight controls over all forms of social and cultural activities, and to make the party more responsive to the people's aspirations in general will probably generate additional pressures on policy.

36. Finally, the present leadership's efforts to destroy the image of Stalin is likely to have a lasting effect on the popular attitude toward the ruling group. We would expect increasing skepticism and the growth of sentiments favoring the reduction of the powers and prerogatives of the party apparatus, which the nonparty public views as a self-serving clique rather than as an essential instrument of public policy. If antiparty attitudes should in the view of the leadership show any serious signs of getting out of hand, firm measures of repression would, of course, be taken, but a full reversion to Stalinist oppression is highly unlikely. At the same time, however, we do not foresee any sharp turning of the public mind toward radical solutions or overt moves against the regime; patriotism and even chauvinism will almost certainly remain a potent cohesive force among all levels of Soviet society.

37. These longer run trends in the interplay of public attitudes and Soviet party politics depend very greatly upon the course of external events and the tensions they

evoke. In recent months the relatively high degree of tension arising from the unresolved Berlin crisis and the Soviet resumption of testing contributed to the decline in public morale stemming from internal economic difficulties. The Sino-Soviet dispute has added to the appearance of strain and indecision in the party. Should these critical problems be eased, Soviet internal policy would probably move in the direction of greater concern for consumer welfare and perhaps a further moderation of controls over the population. However, the conservative forces in the Soviet Party which oppose such a direction of policy always gain strength from developments which heighten tensions. Nor is it clear how at a later stage, the succession problem will be resolved; public opinion might acquire a larger influence in Soviet politics at this juncture, particularly if the top leaders engaged in a protracted struggle, or conservative leaders might use the occasion to restore a greater discipline. We believe, however, that over the long run prospects for further moderation of Soviet totalitarianism are fairly good, but that this will depend upon external events and developments in top level politics as well as upon forces for change which are clearly now at work in Soviet society.

II. DEVELOPMENTS IN WORLD COMMUNISM

Sino-Soviet Relations

38. Important as it was for Soviet domestic politics, the political line developed at the XXII Congress probably has even greater significance for relations within the world Communist movement. For some years now Sino-Soviet relations have been beset by fundamental differences on a range of doctrinal and policy questions including the inevitability of war, tactics by which to extend communism, and even the wisdom of certain

Chinese internal program.⁴ Particularly sharpened after 1958 by Khrushchev's attempts to deal personally with the Western capitalist leaders, the dispute broke into the open in 1960. It then focused on the question of authority in the world Communist movement. At the November 1960 Moscow conference the disputed points were not resolved, but were merely papered over in an agreed statement of the Communist parties. Though the dispute simmered in subsequent months, it did not again become intense until the Soviet Party Congress in October.

39. Khrushchev's attack on Albania as the embodiment of latter day Stalinism was intended to lend force to the offensive against Communist China. In dishonoring Stalin and enshrining Soviet policies in a party program which pretends to universal validity, Khrushchev was asserting the right of the present Soviet leadership to define both the past and the future for Communists everywhere. Even more directly, in seeking to force the Chinese to join in the anathema against the Albanian Party or face isolation, he was insisting that Peiping renounce its efforts to compete with Moscow for leadership of the international movement. Peiping's response to date has been to make clear its complete support for Hoxha, to resume its thinly veiled public criticisms of Soviet policy, and to oppose Soviet positions vigorously at international front meetings.

40. We believe that the dispute has reached a point where there is no longer much chance of a fundamental resolution of Sino-Soviet differences. The record of the past two years reveals virtually no inclination on either side

⁴The differences which led to the Sino-Soviet dispute of 1960 are discussed in NIE 11-4-60, "Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1960-1965," dated 1 December 1960, paragraphs 122-130. A fuller account of the evolution of the alliance, and the basic sources of conflict within it was presented in NIE 100-3-60, "Sino-Soviet Relations," dated 9 August 1960.

to compromise; the Soviets contend that they are the final authority in matters of general Communist policy, while, the Chinese, in the face of severe pressures, continue to insist that world Communist policies be conducted according to their version of orthodoxy and to agitate for support among other parties.

41. Communist politics is, both in ideology and practice, exceptionally intolerant of dissent, and therefore ill-suited to contain conflicts of this magnitude. Historically, when differences among Communists become as intense as have those between the USSR and China, they normally have culminated in purge or open split, in which unity is publicly disavowed, party relations broken, and accusations of heresy exchanged. In following the worsening of Sino-Soviet relations over the last two years, we have generally felt it unlikely, however, that matters would reach such a point. We have considered that China would regard a full rupture as enormously damaging to its military posture and economic prospects, and that both sides would regard an open split as an historic setback to their political aspirations.

42. The dispute, however, has already moved beyond the limit which these considerations, rationally valid as they continue to be, would seem to dictate. The uncompromising positions now occupied by both sides suggest that each is prepared to contemplate an open break, although it calculates, perhaps mistakenly, that the other will in the last analysis make the concessions necessary to avoid this. For the Soviet part, remaining in partnership with China involves the possibility of being drawn into riskier situations than they wish to contemplate. These concerns are compounded by fears that, unless Chinese pretensions can be defeated now, the continuing struggle might lay restraints on Soviet policy and enable Peiping to acquire an increasing authority in the Communist movement. Thus the Soviets may now be

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considering whether, from the standpoint of their national interests, a smaller movement in which they enjoyed undiluted predominance would not be preferable to a larger movement which they could not control.

43. The Chinese, as the weaker partner, have perhaps even more to lose from a split. They have already proven willing, however, to forfeit valuable Soviet military and economic support, and their parlous internal situation has not diminished the vigor with which they prosecute their anti-Soviet offensive. China's deepest suspicion is that the USSR is in fact turning away from revolutionary aims, evolving internally in a bourgeois direction, and working externally for a genuine accommodation with the capitalist states which will frustrate Chinese ambitions, both national and revolutionary. Peiping may therefore believe that a split, painful as it would be, would be preferable to meeting Soviet terms.

44. The sense of doctrinal righteousness is another factor propelling both parties, and particularly the Chinese, in this direction. Each believes that history is working in its favor and that, in an outright struggle for supremacy, it could not only hold its present adherents in the world movement but even bring other parties across to its side. Each party regards the other's leadership as grossly misguided, and probably hopes that its present rivals will eventually give way to men who will correct their predecessors' errors. It is even possible that Moscow and Peiping might conclude that an open split would generate the internal pressures in the opposing camp necessary to accomplish this change of leadership.

45. In the light of these considerations, we believe that the chances of an open Sino-Soviet break during the next year or so have increased very substantially. Should this occur, the dynamics of Communist politics would impel each side to lay exclusive claim to doctrinal truth, to launch undisguised polemics

against the other, and to call upon the party ranks of the other side to overthrow its heretical leadership. State relations could not remain unaffected; diplomatic contacts would be considerably reduced, although not necessarily severed, and economic ties would be further curtailed. The military alliance, whether openly renounced or not, would be of doubtful value to either signatory, although each would still have a very heavy stake in the preservation of Communist power in the other. Military cooperation, already greatly reduced, would probably cease. With each side viewing its neighbor as at least potentially hostile, defenses would probably be strengthened along the common border, which is in dispute at several points, thus raising the possibility of military incidents.

46. In a sense, a split already exists in Sino-Soviet relations. Party relations are at the point when neither side appears willing to initiate discussion of differences with the other. During the dispute, each party has made clear its disapproval of the present leaders of the other. Trade continues, but at a substantial decrease in volume since 1960. Military and scientific aid have been at a low level since mid-1960, when Soviet technicians were recalled. Although these developments reveal that there is already a radical deterioration in relations, two further steps could be expected if a definitive break should occur. These would be for each side to name the other directly in its accusations, and for both sides to undertake an organizational separation. This would mean refusing to participate together in international Communist bodies, followed by attempts by both parties to create groupings under their own influence internationally and in various countries.

47. Should these steps be taken, it would mean an open schism between the two greatest powers in the Communist world, each of which would regard the other openly as a heretic outside the Communist "camp," and

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this would be a development of the greatest importance for the Communist world. Because the consequences of such an open break would be so far-reaching for the prospects of the Communist movement, we believe there is still an even chance that both parties will draw back from this dangerous brink.

48. If the dispute continues more or less in its present form, short of either major concessions from one side or an open break, each party will probably tend to expand the range of argument and to carry it into additional forums. The Albanians and Yugoslavs will continue to serve as proxy targets for charges of "dogmatism" and "revisionism." The USSR will maintain heavy pressures on the great majority of parties which it dominates to subscribe to its positions, while the Chinese will urge the traditionally pro-Soviet parties to endorse their views or at least to abstain. The struggle for influence will be particularly sharp in North Korea and North Vietnam, where a choice of alignment is extremely difficult for the local parties to make.

49. In these circumstances, international front organizations will acquire greater significance as arenas of Sino-Soviet lobbying. This tendency is already evident in the meetings of the World Federation of Trade Unions and the World Peace Council since the XXII Congress. The Chinese will probably press for an official meeting of all the parties in the movement as a means of demonstrating their continued defiance and the hope of winning additional adherents. They would expect at such a conference to face the Soviets with the choice between issuing a unanimously agreed statement—and thus in effect providing the Chinese with a veto over internationally valid doctrine—or taking the onus for a split. The Soviets, for their part, will probably concentrate upon the front organizations and the gatherings of delegates at congresses of various national parties; where they can mobilize impressive majorities but avoid the necessity

to produce official documents requiring Chinese assent.

50. It seems likely, although we have little direct evidence, that the strains of the Sino-Soviet dispute are reflected within the leaderships of both the Soviet and Chinese Parties. We cannot exclude the possibility that these strains might produce changes in the composition of these leading groups, or shifts in the balance of political forces within them, which would mitigate the present conflict. For the present, there is no evidence of substantial factions in either party on these issues. Similarly, a radical turn in the international situation, which raised an acute danger of war or resulted in major Communist successes or failures, could have an important bearing on the course of Sino-Soviet relations. In general, however, we believe that the present difficulties reflect national divergences too deep for permanent reconciliation, and that the Sino-Soviet relationship rests upon a foundation which is essentially unstable. Therefore, even if no definitive split occurs, it will continue to be marked by tension and instability of varying degrees of intensity as events may occasion.

The Dispute's Impact on Other Parties

51. In the competition for leadership of the Communist movement, the Soviet Party possesses very great initial advantages. For decades, Communists everywhere have seen the USSR as the homeland of the revolution, and the CPSU as its "vanguard" and unique fount of doctrinal authority. The achievement by the USSR of a position as one of two world states possessing all the means of modern power is seen as a sure guarantee of communism's eventual world triumph. The USSR's success in rising to the pinnacle of power gives the CPSU a prestige which the Chinese, now beset with internal difficulties, lack, and bolsters Soviet claims to remain the proper interpreter of Marxism-Leninism.

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Outside the Bloc, most party leaders have long and close ties with Moscow, and many owe their very positions to Soviet sponsorship; in France, for example, Thorez cannot seriously question Soviet authority without at the same time undermining his own. Many Western Communist leaders, schooled as they are in the Western rational-pragmatic tradition, despite their doctrinaire philosophy, are alienated and alarmed by the semireligious fanaticism of the Chinese. Lastly, Soviet positions on the major issues in dispute, such as the need to give highest priority to avoiding nuclear war, find much support among Communists.

52. China, however, is not without advantages and assets. It is able to pose as the champion of the independence of national parties, and thus to play upon the old grievances against Soviet dictation felt in many quarters. In this connection, Peiping has been careful not to demand slavish obedience from the parties where its influence is strong. At the same time, the Chinese use other aspects of Stalinism for their own ends. As Khrushchev undertakes successive revisions of the dead dictator's policies and further blackens his image, Peiping seeks to capitalize on the doubts and distresses felt by Communists the world over who were trained to regard Stalin as a demigod. Chinese propositions on the proper international strategy find considerable support among parties which see their only prospect in violent revolution or which find their internal position complicated by the expediencies of Soviet foreign policies. By and large, however, China's successes in encroaching upon Soviet authority have thus far been confined to the Far East, where its physical power is a considerable factor.

Albania

53. Albania's dramatic switch from Soviet to Chinese allegiance was to a large extent a consequence of Soviet policy toward Yugo-

slavia. The Hoxha leadership is obsessed with the fear that its neighbor, which has a large Albanian minority and under whose sponsorship the Albanian Communist Party was founded, will seek to re-establish its former tutelage. There is probably much truth in the current Albanian claims that both Tito and Khrushchev, partly incident to their various attempts at reconciliation since 1955, have actively intrigued within the Albanian Party in a way which threatened the position of the present leadership. Albanian politics are literally a life-and-death matter, and Hoxha was therefore disposed to align himself with China when Peiping showed itself willing to press the attack on Yugoslav revisionism more violently than the Soviets.

54. The Soviets have committed considerable prestige to the campaign to bring Hoxha down. Success in this endeavor would be a forceful object lesson in demonstrating the ineffectiveness of Chinese support. We believe, however, that Moscow's prospects are not good at present. Economic pressures may cripple industrial development, but they are not likely to starve the Albanians into submission, and Chinese aid will be an offsetting factor. Albania is presently seeking to expand its trade and other contacts outside the Bloc, and if necessary it would almost certainly apply for credits as well. A lengthy series of purges appears to have eliminated or neutralized Soviet and Yugoslav political assets, and therefore their potential for successful clandestine action within the country.

55. This leaves only military action, but the deterrents against an invasion of Albania are formidable. The Bloc has no common border with Albania, and such a campaign would be difficult to launch and probably even more difficult to conclude. It would gravely compromise the USSR's allegedly peaceful posture and the fiction that Bloc membership is voluntary, and would probably entail a complete rupture of relations with China. It would

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greatly alarm Albania's neighbors, and the USSR could not be certain that NATO forces might not somehow become involved. We consider that Soviet-Yugoslav military collaboration to bring down the Albanian leadership is also very unlikely. Since neither country desires the other to establish hegemony over Albania, we do not believe that sufficient trust or mutual interest exists between Moscow and Belgrade to permit joint operations against Albania.

The European Satellites

56. The XXII Soviet Party Congress once again revealed diverse trends among the countries of Eastern Europe, as well as the currents of contention which lie beneath the surface in the Satellite Communist Parties. In Poland and Hungary, where Stalinist factions were routed in 1956, the leaders have responded by reaffirming and extending their own moderate, Khrushchev-oriented, internal programs. Thus, Gomulka used the Congress to reinforce his unique, gradualist approach in Polish agriculture by going beyond the Soviet criticism of Stalin to identify forcible collectivization as the root cause of Stalinism. In Hungary, Kadar's response has been to reassert Hungarian autonomy in internal matters and to deny that the decisions of Soviet Congresses are mandatory for all parties. With increased confidence in his strength against the Stalinists in his party, he has expanded his moderate internal program, and encouraged the participation of non-Communists.

57. A somewhat different effect was apparent in Bulgaria and Rumania. In the latter, the old Stalinist Gheorghiu-Dej used the Congress as an excuse to rewrite Rumanian Party history, attempting to divest his regime of Stalinist taint and make the present party leadership more palatable to the populace by tying it to Rumanian na-

tionalism, with anti-Soviet overtones. Thus, he claimed that he had repulsed attempts by foreign (Soviet) agents in the party to introduce a course against Rumanian interests. In Bulgaria, party leader Zhivkov used the Soviet Congress to expel his influential rival, Chervenkov, from top echelons of party and government, and to take other actions to curb the strength of the still substantial Stalinist faction in the Bulgarian Party.

58. Still another effect was felt by those parties to which the Soviet Congress was not a boon, but a problem. In East Germany and Czechoslovakia, where the top party leaders were most vulnerable to charges of Stalinism, some uneasiness has been evident since the Congress—reflected in confusion in top party circles and clumsy attempts by these leaders to cleanse their past records. The most ludicrous example was in East Germany, where Ulbricht claimed not only to have been one of the original anti-Stalinists, but even attempted to harness the Congress in support of his militantly Stalinist internal program by implying that local opponents of such a course had been in league with Beria in wanting to liquidate Communist power in East Germany. In Czechoslovakia, an initial attempt at imitation of Moscow, by charging the late Klement Gottwald with Stalinist errors, was ill-considered and caused considerable bitterness in the party cadres.

59. In most of Eastern Europe, and especially in Poland and Hungary, the XXII Party Congress has given rise to a revival of ferment in intellectual circles. Literary and scholarly publications are again producing articles openly critical of various aspects of Communist development, and calling for greater internal liberalization. Moreover, the party leaders have given some cautious support to this trend, though they are now clearly determined not to let it get out of hand. In Hungary, Kadar's call for national reconcilia-

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tion and cooperation with non-Communists has encouraged liberal intellectual circles to be more outspoken in their publications. The ferment is most notable in Poland, where not only nonparty intellectuals but party activists in good standing have posed in acute theoretical terms the problem of an inherent conflict between communism and freedom. Nevertheless, we believe that the Satellite leaders are firmly in control of internal events, and that they will be able to keep disruptive reactions to the XXII Congress, which are far less than those produced by the XX Congress in 1956, within tolerable limits. The one possible exception is East Germany, where the mood of the populace, related to the Berlin crisis and internal shortages, could produce internal disorders despite the presence of strong Soviet forces.

60. We believe that the European Satellite regimes will continue to give strong support to the USSR in intra-Bloc disputes. Nevertheless, some of the Satellite leaders have begun to show a tendency to be less obsequious to Moscow than in the past, and to be more assertive in internal policy and intra-Bloc matters. Thus, Gomulka, Kadar, and Gheorghiu-Dej, each in his own way responded to the Soviet Congress by forthright, almost audacious behavior. Though their actions cannot be regarded as challenging Moscow's authority, and probably even have the approval of Khrushchev and the Soviet Party, they nevertheless suggest a trend toward greater national self-assertiveness which is likely increasingly to mark relations among the Bloc states. Moreover, the Chinese, by posing a direct challenge to Moscow's traditional claims of authority over other parties, have provided an important precedent in the evolution of the USSR's relations with other Bloc states. Nationalist-minded elements in the Communist parties of Eastern Europe will probably find occasion to turn this precedent to account in future conflicts of interest with the USSR.

61. An open split between Moscow and Peiping would have a very great impact on the East European parties. In countering popular opposition, these regimes rely on cultivating the belief that liberation is a vain hope because communism's world triumph is inevitable. They would fear that a Sino-Soviet split would rob this argument of much of its force, and might even reverse the spread of resignation and accommodation among the peoples of Eastern Europe. Apprehension on this score would produce, at least initially, a closing of party ranks and a tightening of internal controls and draw the Satellite parties even closer to Moscow. Over the longer run, an open Sino-Soviet split would tend to complicate Soviet efforts to contain those basic divisive forces which work against Soviet control in Eastern Europe.

The Asian Satellites

62. The Soviet success in getting the East European Satellites and Outer Mongolia to join in condemning Albania has not been repeated in the cases of North Korea and North Vietnam. These two tried to avoid committing themselves in the 1960 phase of the Sino-Soviet dispute, though by traditional standards, their very refusal to give full support to Moscow represented a serious breach in discipline. Since the XXII Congress they have generally avoided actions openly antagonistic to Moscow. However, they have maintained correct, if not cordial, state and party relations with Albania and have treated it as a full-fledged member of the socialist camp.

63. Since the Congress, there has been some shift in the behavior of North Korea towards more open support of the Chinese position. Kim Il-sung, in his report on the Congress, expressed his strong disagreement with Moscow's treatment of Albania and attitude toward intra-Bloc relations. Other than Albania, North Korea was the only Bloc country to express public approval of the Chinese

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stand in the latest border dispute with India, and it was also the only Bloc country to join Albania and China in opposing the Soviet stand at the recent meeting of the World Peace Council, one of the more important international front groups.

64. North Vietnam continues to follow a more cautious line. Ho Chi Minh apparently tried to mediate the Sino-Soviet-Albanian dispute in early November, in visits first to Moscow and then to Peiping. North Vietnam has been careful to maintain correct relations with both sides, though the party central committee statement on the Soviet Congress was effusive in the latter's praise, hailing the Soviet Party Program as an example for the internal development of North Vietnam. The Chinese, for their part, have been making considerable efforts to improve their position in North Vietnam, sending a high-level military mission to Hanoi at the end of December, probably to discuss an increase in Chinese military aid.

65. We believe that both North Korea and North Vietnam will continue their efforts to avoid committing themselves in the intra-Bloc dispute, and that Moscow and Peiping will continue their strenuous efforts to induce them to commit themselves. Both North Korea and North Vietnam, as divided countries very desirous of taking in their southern halves, are inclined to sympathize with Peiping's more aggressive line. At the same time, however, both regimes are fearful of falling under Chinese domination and are therefore anxious to preserve good relations with Moscow and to retain a Soviet presence. This feeling is probably especially strong in North Vietnam because of its geographical isolation from the USSR, and this may explain why Hanoi has not gone as far as Pyongyang in following the Chinese ideological line. North Vietnam may even find opportunities in this situation to increase the measure of independence it already enjoys.

66. In the event of an open break in Sino-Soviet relations, Soviet and Chinese pressures on these countries would sooner or later be greatly accentuated, making it increasingly difficult for them to stand aloof. In this case, we believe that neither country would be able for long to avoid making a firm commitment, and that Chinese influence would probably turn out to be decisive. Mongolia, as at present, would probably stay firmly in the Soviet camp.

The Non-Bloc Parties

67. The open Soviet attacks on Albania and on Stalin came as a surprise and a shock to the non-Bloc Communist parties. Disapproval of the tactics employed against the Albanians and the transfer of Stalin's remains was reflected, not only in the failure of a number of parties to endorse these moves, but even in some public expressions of disapproval. The Belgian Party sent greetings to the Albanians on their party anniversary, and the Scandinavian parties were noticeably reticent to join the Soviet assault on Albania. In the Italian Party, the Congress developments have led to a crisis of major proportions. In the months following the Congress, however, the Soviets were able to obtain open expressions of support from most of the parties of Western Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America, including those which had initially wavered. Such expressions of support, however, were not complete reflections of the situation inside the parties, where Congress developments have caused considerable ferment and are being debated extensively in party meetings.

68. As in the case of the Far Eastern Satellites, the Soviets were unable to get endorsements of their course by the non-Bloc Asian parties. The latter had already given some support to Chinese positions at the critical conference of parties in Moscow in November 1960, at which a standoff in the dispute oc-

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curred. Since the Soviet Party Congress, a number of these parties, especially those of Burma, Malaya, and Thailand, have committed themselves openly in support of Albania. In the largest Asian parties—those of India, Indonesia, and Japan—the Soviet Party Congress and conflicting pressures from the USSR and China have considerably enhanced factional divisions.

69. *Italy and France.* In the Italian Communist Party (PCI), the XXII Congress has evoked a strong reassertion by its leaders of tendencies toward greater autonomy and stimulated open, acrimonious debate within the party. Party leader Togliatti has revived the issue of polycentrism in the Communist movement which he had raised in 1956, and other party leaders have raised searching questions concerning the origins of Stalin's errors, relations among Communist parties, and freedom of debate within the PCI. A move for closer relations with the Yugoslav Party on grounds of doctrinal sympathy was undertaken. These calls for greater internal and international autonomy have caused displeasure in Moscow, but the Soviets have reacted cautiously, apparently wishing to avoid an open dispute at this time. This was not the case with the French Communist Party, which is engaged in open polemics with the Italian Party over these issues. The dispute points up the different tendencies in the two largest West European parties—the French: loyal to Moscow, but doctrinaire in outlook; the Italians: more forthright and pragmatic by tradition, and increasingly disposed to believe that the experience of the USSR in building "socialism" is not applicable to the parties of Western Europe, especially their own.

70. *India.* The Indian Communist Party has been deeply divided for a number of years over the issues raised in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Soviet tactics at the Congress on the issues of Albania and Stalin angered all fac-

tions of the party. Party leader Ghosh refrained from attacking Albania at the Congress, and only committed himself on the question belatedly, two months later. Soviet actions at the Congress aroused much greater disapproval from the leftist, Chinese-oriented faction, and one provincial party organization passed a resolution openly condemning the actions of the CPSU. The troubles of the Indian Party have been further compounded by the recent death of Ghosh, who had been a key figure in holding the factions together, and the revival of the Sino-Indian border dispute, on which the party is seriously divided. These problems raise the possibility that, when discussions are reopened after the February national elections, the pro-Chinese leftists will succeed in turning the party toward a more revolutionary course. A poor Communist showing in the elections would strengthen the arguments of those who believe, as do the Chinese, that the policy of restraint toward Nehru better serves the interests of Soviet foreign policy than those of Indian communism.

71. *Indonesia.* Moscow has reason for concern over the effects of the XXII Congress on the Indonesian Communist Party. Its leaders, who gave some support to Chinese efforts to dilute Soviet authority at the Moscow Conference of 1960, have now openly committed themselves on the Albanian issue on the Chinese side. Party leader Aidit, heretofore a Soviet adherent, made no secret after the Congress of his anger about unilateral Soviet handling of Albania and Stalin. After a protracted Central Committee session, he issued a public statement that such matters as the Albanian affair should be settled through private consultations between parties and that Stalin would continue to be appreciated in the Indonesian Party. Aidit's stand raises the question whether the Indonesian Party may fall under the predominant influence of Peiping and pursue a course contrary to present Soviet objectives in Indonesia.

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72. *Japan.* Since the Soviet Party Congress, Soviet and Chinese efforts to increase their respective influence on the Japanese Communist Party have been intense. Party leader Miyamoto, after attending the Congress in Moscow, stopped over in Peiping, as did the Indian and Indonesian Communist leaders. The Japanese Party, which until recently has been closely allied with Moscow, has a pro-Chinese faction and many sympathizers with Chinese views, even among the top leaders. It is also harassed by a splinter group which charges it with subservience to Peiping. The behavior of the party since the Congress suggests a gradual drift into closer alignment with the Chinese. Following a Central Committee plenum in December, the official party newspaper took a position on the Albanian issue similar to that of the Indonesian Party, recommending that disputes between parties be handled privately through bilateral and multilateral meetings, and upholding the Chinese view that the will of the majority cannot be imposed on the minority.

73. *Latin America.* The Chinese have long been active in seeking contacts with the Communist parties in Latin America, and have received Latin Americans in China for indoctrination and guerrilla training. They obviously believe that their own doctrines of revolutionary struggle are better suited to the area than the more indirect and cautious tactics favored by the Soviets. Although they have followers in the Latin American parties, and in one party, the Brazilian, a factional split has occurred over revolutionary tactics, the Soviets retain predominant influence. The Latin American parties generally supported the Soviets in the controversy at the Moscow conference of November 1960. The Castro regime, now the principal instrument of Communist action in Latin America, is strongly dependent on Moscow for economic-strategic support, and the Cuban Communists have behaved accordingly. Chinese efforts to establish a presence in Havana do not appear

to have given them any special influence there despite the fact that the Chinese and Cuban regimes have in common both a guerrilla warfare tradition and a strong hatred of the US.

Outlook for the Non-Bloc Parties

74. It seems certain that the CPSU will encounter increasing difficulties in attempting to maintain its leadership of the Communist parties outside the Bloc. The Chinese challenge has not been the only reason for the erosion of Soviet authority. As the international movement grew in size and diversity, as individual parties acquired real prospects for sharing state power or even seizing it under circumstances which had no parallel in Soviet experience, the virtue and necessity of following Soviet guidance was bound to be questioned. We believe that the recent signs of independence in several of these parties are symptomatic of a long-run general trend in the movement and that the Soviets, in seeking to retain the support of these parties, will have to relax further their disciplinary demands and to take increasing account of diverse national views in framing the general Communist line.

75. The non-Bloc parties are, of course, incomparably weaker than the CPSU, and these problems could probably be met by gradual adjustments which preserved the essentials of Soviet leadership were it not for Communist China. The competition from Peiping, however, increases the dangers, as seen from Moscow, of a gradual loosening of the international movement; many deviations which might be tolerable if Soviet primacy were assured now threaten to strengthen the Chinese challenge to that primacy. While the non-Bloc parties will need and seek external support, they will have two sources from which to obtain it. Appeals to them to give loyalty to one or the other seat of world communism will provide them with leverage over both. Many parties may use this opportunity

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to exercise greater autonomy and to cast their policies along more national lines.

76. In the event of an open Sino-Soviet split, the non-Bloc parties would quickly be subjected to intense pressures to declare their loyalty. We believe that a de facto division of the international movement into two camps would follow fairly soon thereafter, although these camps might not take on clear organizational forms. This split might be repeated within several national parties; such an outcome would be highly likely in, for example, the Indian Party. Thereafter, both Moscow and Peiping would pursue all opportunities for bringing additional parties across to their side or for organizing, in countries where the party was aligned with the rival grouping, competing Communist parties intended to capture the rank and file membership.

77. Such a split would, at the outset, find the Chinese with little support outside the Asian parties. The subsequent course of the competition would depend greatly upon the successes which each side could claim for its policies and the failures which it could charge to its opponent. The Chinese line, stressing the use of violence, the early initiation of revolutionary struggle, and the expendability of non-Communist allies, would probably increasingly appeal to the Communists of underdeveloped areas if the Soviet strategy of "peaceful coexistence" produced few concrete successes. Peiping might acquire new adherents as the older generation of Soviet-trained party leaders, many of whom regard opposition to Moscow as unthinkable, are replaced by younger men. Chinese internal success or failure would greatly affect Peiping's potential for making further inroads upon Soviet domains.

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