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**ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE POTENTIAL
IN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC**

**CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL**

Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

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Concurred in by the
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on 4 March 1958. Concurring were The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

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ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC

THE PROBLEM

To appraise the intensity and scope of dissidence and resistance in the Sino-Soviet Bloc, and to estimate the resistance potential in times of peace and war.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Like its predecessor,¹ this estimate is a brief appraisal of the causes, nature, and extent of anti-regime dissidence and resistance within the Sino-Soviet Bloc. It is based upon eleven country studies prepared by the inter-agency Resistance Intelligence Committee established by the IAC. These studies, which analyze dissidence and resistance in each country of the Bloc, have been noted but not individually approved by the IAC; they are appended as annexes to the estimate itself.

In the estimate and the annexes, the following terminology is used:

Dissidence — a state of mind involving discontent or disaffection with the regime.

Resistance — dissidence translated into action.

Organized resistance — resistance which is carried out by a group of individuals who have accepted a common

purpose, agreed upon leadership, and worked out a communications system.

Unorganized resistance — resistance carried out by individuals or loosely associated groups which may have been formed spontaneously for certain limited objectives, without over-all plan or strategy.

Passive resistance — resistance, organized or unorganized, which is conducted within the framework of the resister's normal life and duties, and involves deliberate nonperformance or malperformance of acts which would benefit the regime, or deliberate nonconformity with standards of conduct established by the regime.

Active resistance — resistance, organized or unorganized, which expresses itself in positive acts against the regime. It may or may not involve violence, and may be conducted openly or clandestinely. It may take such forms as intelligence collection, psychological warfare, sabotage, guerrilla warfare, assistance in

¹ NIE 10-55, "Anti-Communist Resistance Potential in the Sino-Soviet Bloc," 12 April 1955.

escape and evasion, open defiance of authority, or preparatory activity for any of the above.

With the progressive consolidation of Communist control, however, active resistance has in general tended to take less the forms mentioned above, and to be

expressed more in such forms as strikes, demonstrations, and open manifestations of intellectual and other dissent. While in many cases these activities are not wholly motivated by anti-regime attitudes, they nevertheless have anti-regime connotations.

ESTIMATE

Scope and Intensity of Dissidence and Resistance

1. Dissidence continues to be widespread in the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Improvements in living standards and such relaxation of regime controls as took place during the last three years have been, except perhaps in the USSR, insufficient to reduce substantially general discontent. Save in semi-independent Poland, nationalist anti-regime feelings in Eastern Europe are as strong as ever. In addition to common grievances, various population elements harbor special resentments, such as those of peasants towards collectivization, workers towards Communist labor discipline, intellectuals and students towards enforced ideological conformity, believers towards anti-religious measures.

2. The scope and intensity of dissidence, however, varies widely from country to country. One of the most important distinctions in both peacetime and wartime resistance potential is whether or not the regime is viewed as representing the national rather than an alien interest. Except among certain of its own national minorities, the Soviet regime has succeeded in identifying itself among its own population as a legitimate national government. But Communist regimes in the Far East have made somewhat less progress in this respect, and those in Eastern Europe, again excepting Poland, have failed almost completely. In the divided countries, the existence of a functioning alternative government exercises some attraction which operates to increase dissidence, but this appears to be a major factor only in East

Germany. Other variations in resistance potential arise from differences in national character, in historical traditions, in economic conditions, and in religious attitudes.

3. In the last few years most Bloc regimes have sought to reduce popular discontent and to narrow the rifts between the regimes and their peoples. The leashing of the Soviet secret police, the decollectivization of Polish agriculture, and efforts to improve living standards are cases in point. These policies have had some success. On the other hand, the very trend toward relaxation of controls and resulting confusion as to regime policies have given greater scope to overt manifestations of discontent. Sharp criticism arose, for example, among Moscow writers and Chinese intellectuals when the regimes experimented with a looser application of controls. In Hungary and Poland, inhibitions upon the use of police terror and serious splits within the Communist parties permitted dissidence to swell into active resistance, in Hungary on a mass scale. In reaction, the Bloc regimes have tightened their controls, and in Hungary after the bloody suppression of the revolt the regime reverted to harsh repression. The Bloc leaders have striven to insure party unity, to circumscribe the range of permissible criticism, and to provide various reminders of their physical power. As a result, organized active resistance is negligible in the Bloc at the present time.

Resistance Potential in Peacetime

4. During the next few years, conditions of life probably will not improve sufficiently to

reduce dissidence significantly in most countries of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. This dissidence will probably continue to be expressed primarily in various forms of passive resistance — noncompliance with regime orders, economic malingering, other low-risk ways of expressing individual opposition. So long as the regimes do not revert to all-out repression, there is also likely to be some continuation of those forms of active resistance — strikes, demonstrations, open expressions of intellectual dissent — which have characterized the past few years. In particular, such manifestations are likely in parts of Eastern Europe. In Communist China, some disturbances by peasants and ethnic minorities are also likely.

5. Moreover, many Bloc regimes recognize that the cultivation of popular support and the eliciting of broader initiative would require not only economic betterment but some degree of liberalization of controls. However, they also recognize that such steps increase the difficulty of maintaining party unity and complete control over the populace. Thus they will probably accede to popular pressures only in those cases in which they regard it as relatively safe to do so. But any relaxation of controls will tend to give dissident elements opportunities to press their grievances in indirect ways.

6. Further, each regime's problems may be increased and complicated by developments elsewhere in the Bloc and influences from the Free World. The repercussions of the USSR's de-Stalinization campaign and the events in Hungary and Poland have agitated dissidents throughout the Bloc, in some cases to the point of stimulating various forms of resistance. Intra-Bloc variations in ideology and policy have contributed to dissatisfaction and ferment among intellectuals and students. As contacts with non-Bloc countries increase, unfavorable comparisons will arise. In consequence, campaigns against dissidence, while primarily concerned with its domestic sources, must also contend with unsettling influences from abroad.

7. The difficulties of dealing with dissidence, various forms of resistance, and foreign influences may lead to policy vacillations between

“hard” and “soft” lines or to intra-party disputes. These developments might evoke greater resistance activity. This activity, however, would tend to be directed towards the elimination of specific grievances rather than to the overthrow of the existing regimes, since the latter course would seem highly unpromising unless there were a serious prior weakening of party and police.

8. For these reasons we regard major outbreaks of active resistance as unlikely, although these cannot be excluded in certain volatile situations in Eastern Europe. Sporadic local outbreaks will probably recur, but they will almost certainly be within the capabilities of security forces to repress. The regime's counter-weapons — primarily the monopoly of physical force (coupled with an evident willingness to use it) and a near-monopoly of means of communication — will remain formidable. In Poland the regime has shown less reliance on these weapons, but a primary safeguard against violent resistance is the widespread recognition, to which the Catholic Church lends important support, that it would provoke Soviet intervention. Here, as elsewhere in Eastern Europe, Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt and the absence of Western assistance have underlined the futility of violent resistance.

9. Emigré organizations of former Bloc nationals have, in general, lost effective contact with their homelands and are little known to Bloc populations. Virtually all of them have suffered from internal bickering, and many have been penetrated by Communist agents. Emigré groups do not significantly contribute to resistance potential, and with rare exceptions their leaders would not be welcomed to positions of power after liberation.

Resistance Potential in Event of General War

10. At the outset of a general war, patriotism would act to diminish sharply the resistance potential in most of the USSR and to some extent in Communist China, though in the latter case this would depend more on the nature of the conflict. In the Far Eastern satellites, any increase in resistance potential

probably would be only marginal. But in the satellite states of Eastern Europe, as well as in certain minority areas of the USSR and Communist China (e.g. the Baltic States, Georgia, Western Ukraine, Tibet), the outbreak of war would rekindle hopes of liberation and immediately increase the resistance potential. This potential probably would be highest in Poland, Hungary, and East Germany. We believe, however, that unless the tide of war ran sharply against the Bloc and its military and security forces were significantly weakened, resistance activities of a para-military nature could be prevented or at least confined to manageable proportions.

11. While we conclude that resistance activities probably would not be a major factor so long as the outcome of the main conflict remained dubious, resistance activity probably could be expected, especially in Eastern Europe, in the form of intelligence collection and transmission, aid to Western personnel in escape and evasion operations, and minor sabotage. The level of such activity would vary considerably, because of differences in resistance potential, and also as a result of the amount of outside assistance available and the location of battle lines.

12. Only conjectures can be made concerning the impact on resistance activity of the use of nuclear weapons. Much would depend on such factors as the extent and locale of the attacks, the types of weapons used, the damage caused, the extent to which regime controls were disrupted, etc. Among population

groups suffering direct losses, survivors probably would first be stunned, then concentrate their energies exclusively on problems of personal survival. In areas sufficiently distant from attack to be largely unaffected, resistance might increase as dissident elements found that Communist controls had been weakened; on the other hand, they might conclude that nuclear weapons were so decisive that extensive resistance was irrelevant or unnecessary. Groups outside the attack area but sufficiently close to be caught in the resulting chaos would be subject to all these effects. It is possible that, in certain cases, attacks against selected targets might weaken the regime's anti-resistance capabilities more than they impaired resistance potential.

13. The question of responsibility for the initiation of general war probably would not substantially affect the will to resist the regimes in the Bloc countries. Nor would the nationality of attacking forces be likely, in the majority of cases, to have great bearing upon the cooperation offered by resistance elements. Exceptions would be cases in which long-standing national antipathies might conflict to an important degree with anti-regime feelings, e.g. (a) German forces in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the USSR; (b) Yugoslav, Greek, and Turkish forces in Bulgaria; (c) Greek, Italian, and Yugoslav forces in Albania; and (d) Japanese forces in North Korea and Communist China. On the other hand, in the divided countries anti-regime resistance might increase if military forces of the non-Communist government were used.

COUNTRY ANNEXES

- A. ALBANIA
- B. BULGARIA
- C. COMMUNIST CHINA
- D. CZECHOSLOVAKIA
- E. EAST GERMANY
- F. HUNGARY
- G. NORTH KOREA
- H. NORTH VIETNAM
- I. POLAND
- J. RUMANIA
- K. USSR

These Annexes were prepared by the Resistance Intelligence Committee of the IAC. They have been noted but not approved by the IAC. The cut-off date of the information contained in these Annexes is 1 January 1958.

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ANNEX A—ALBANIA

BASIC FACTORS OF DISSIDENCE

1. The continuing low standard of living in Albania since the Communist take-over in 1944 has been a major factor in the general dissidence prevalent among the great majority of the population. The Communist take-over in Albania was greatly facilitated by the promises made by the Communist-dominated National Liberation Front during World War II of basic economic and political reforms which would grant the people "freedom, bread, and land." The program for political independence from foreign rule and for improvement of social and economic conditions had a dynamic appeal, particularly among the intellectuals, youths, and poor peasants in central and southern Albania where living conditions were wretchedly poor and systematic exploitation by the local feudal landowners was the rule. But after 13 years of rule the Communist regime not only has failed to fulfill its promises of providing the Albanians with a decent standard of living but has imposed an economic system of regimentation, oppression, and exploitation that was unheard of even in the period of the Ottoman Empire. The government has repeatedly admitted that attempts to improve the availability of foodstuffs have met with little, if any, success, and that during certain periods of the year the food situation becomes very critical.

2. Politically, there are two basic factors which account for the widespread hostility the great majority of Albanians bear toward the present regime. First, the Communist ideology has for nearly all Albanians a definite Slavic connotation and is therefore considered wholly alien. It is, moreover, regarded as merely another instrument through which the Slavs can dominate the country. Just as the Ottoman Empire was resisted for five centuries because of its alien traditions and

political and social institutions, so today the Communist regime is opposed as equally alien even though its leaders are native Albanians.

3. The second factor is the ancient traditions of and beliefs in individual freedom and the hatred of central authority. No past government in Albania, either foreign or native, has been so ruthless as the present one in imposing its will on the mountaineers in the north and the peasantry in central and southern areas. Individual freedom has been completely suppressed; the closely knit family pattern has been virtually destroyed; and village life, around which most social and political activities have evolved in the past, has now been placed under the control of local Communist functionaries whose chief task is not to serve the villagers but to carry out the unpopular program and policies of the regime. The greatest opposition to the regime has originated among mountaineers and villagers, who resent the inroads into their economic and family life by the central authorities.

4. Religion does not seem to have played a major role in the dissidence that has developed against the regime. There are two basic reasons for this situation. First, religion in Albania has found it difficult to offer a united front to Communism because the population is divided into three denominations: Moslem, comprising about 70 percent of the population; Orthodox Christians, about 20 percent; and Roman Catholics, about 10 percent. The regime has fostered and exploited this division. Second, aside from the Catholic element, the Albanians as a whole are not devoutly religious. Their religious sentiments are expressed primarily in ancient traditions and tribal customs representing something essentially Albanian, whereas the three existing denominations have often been associated with spheres of foreign influence: the Ottoman Empire, the Greek Church (which dominated the

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Albanian Orthodox Church until 1922), and the Italian influence through the Roman Catholic Church. The regime had little difficulty to convert the Moslem and Orthodox Churches into instruments of Communist rule. The Roman Catholics, however, having expressed somewhat deeper religious sentiments and strong opposition to Communism, have been subject to severe persecution. In fact, the regime has destroyed the Catholic Church as an independent institution.

5. While the regime was able to eliminate or subdue the three principal religious institutions in Albania, it has not been able to eradicate the religious feelings, beliefs, and customs of the Albanian people. Despite anti-religious propaganda and repressive measures, the Albanians continue to attend church services and maintain their customs and beliefs. The Albanian peasants in particular, comprising nearly 80 percent of the country's 1,400,000 population, not only refuse to work on religious holidays or wedding days, but have been known to slaughter hundreds of rams to be consumed on such holidays in violation of government restrictions. In some sections of the country where threats and pressure have failed, the regime has used force against what it considers an ancient practice damaging to the present economy.

MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS

6. Dissidence toward the regime apparently remains strong among all classes. With the possible exception of the higher governmental and Party bureaucracy, the ranking army officers, and a limited number of intellectuals there is no group which derives real benefit from the regime. The denigration of Stalin has had hardly any effect on the Albanian Communist leaders who continue their repressive rule without the benefits of "relaxation." Large numbers of the population are still in jails and labor camps.

7. *The Peasantry.* Albania is basically a country of peasants and villagers, who as a group comprise the largest and most formidable anti-Communist element in the country. As stated above, during the war the Commu-

nist movement found considerable support in the south among the poor and landless peasants. This group profited by the so-called agrarian reforms of 1945-46 but shortly thereafter became thoroughly disillusioned and disaffected. The principal reasons for its disaffection, as well as for that of nearly all the country's peasants, were the crushing taxes, the heavy obligatory delivery quotas, and the low prices paid by the government for agricultural products; the seizure of livestock; the imposition of "voluntary" (forced) labor; the imposition of the agricultural collective system; and the oppression and terror practiced by the Communist security police. The Albanian peasant is a fierce individualist, proud of his past independence; he knows nothing of, and cares less for, the subtleties of the Communist ideology. However, despite their opposition to the regime, the peasants have been unable to stem the tide of total collectivization of agriculture that is presently being conducted by the regime. This deep peasant discontent accounts for much of the resistance potential in the armed forces, among the youth in the countryside, among peasants who have been drafted for work in industrial projects and mining, and among other groups of peasant origin still having contact with friends and relatives on the land.

8. *Youth.* Albanian youth, both rural and urban, began resisting the Italian occupiers immediately after the latter invaded the country in 1939. Later the Communists, camouflaging themselves in the National Liberation Front and using patriotic slogans, deceived large sections of the country's youth and drew them under its banner. Thus the youth became the backbone of the Communist movement in Albania during the war. However, disillusionment began to set in soon after the Communists took over the country and revealed their true political, social, and economic aims. By 1950 Communist propaganda had ceased to be effective among the great majority of the youth, especially in the countryside, because of first-hand experience with "voluntary" labor and because of widespread economic want and inequality which youth saw in the villages.

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9. *Industrial Workers and Civil Servants.*

Aside from a relatively small number of workers who have risen from the ranks to managerial positions in the nationalized industries, the laboring class in Albania has gained nothing under the Communist regime. Wages are low; prices are generally high; and non-rationed goods are either in short supply or prohibitively expensive. There is constant pressure to meet the high work norms based on achievements of shockworkers and stakhanovites; there are stringent restrictions on changing jobs and heavy penalties for tardiness or breaking of work discipline; some "voluntary" (forced) work must be performed by all laborers; frequent political meetings after work are compulsory; various deductions for Communist publications and contributions are made, etc. Like most other Albanians, the workers have shown signs of disaffection and are looking forward to the day of liberation from the Communist regime. Among this class may be included the low-level office workers and civil servants, all of whom are subject to the same general restrictions and heavy obligations as the laboring class.

10. *Intelligentsia and Clergy.* The intelligentsia of pre-Communist Albania consisted of older elements who since the beginning of the century had worked for the creation of an independent country, and of younger people who were brought up during the period of national revival after World War I and were imbued with Western culture and ideas. Some of the younger intellectuals, mostly school teachers, government officials, army officers, and journalists, who in the period 1925-39 were disgusted with the behavior of King Zog and his ruling group and with the feudal landowners, gradually tended to the left. During World War II they became the backbone of the national liberation movement through which the Communists managed to seize control of the country. Other intellectuals, however, opposed the rise of Communism and a number of them fought actively against the Communist-controlled Partisan formations. *Balli Kombetar* (National Front), the strongest anti-Communist organization during the war, was founded by nationalist democratic elements among intellectuals, both old and

young, who had the vision to foresee the catastrophe that would befall the country in the event of a Communist success. Although a large number of anti-Communist intellectuals were either driven out of the country or imprisoned or executed when the Communists assumed control, there are still strong elements among those remaining who are thoroughly dissatisfied with the regime and who look toward liberation. There is only a handful of intellectuals in Albania today who could be relied upon completely by the regime.

11. As noted above, the Moslem and Orthodox clergymen have been cowed into submission by the Tirana regime and the Catholic clergy almost completely eliminated. However, smouldering hatred exists among most of the remaining clergymen, particularly the Catholic, and they represent a definite resistance potential.

12. *Armed Forces.* Morale in the Albanian Armed Forces is low and the majority of the men probably feel hostile toward the present Albanian regime. This hostility arises primarily from basic dislike of the present regime and from resistance of individual Albanian conscripts to military control. Moreover, the ranks in the armed forces derive chiefly from peasant families and as such have the same antagonism toward the regime as their elders in the villages. For this reason the army ranks appear to be considered by the regime as unreliable. This is indicated by the fact that units of the armed forces have never been employed to stamp out guerrilla bands. Most of the permanent commissioned and noncommissioned officers, comprising perhaps one-third of the total armed forces strength, were selected because of their apparent loyalty to the regime. Nevertheless, during the past two years, there has been evidence of some dissidence among high-ranking officers, some of whom were dismissed. The demobilization late in 1955 and early in 1956 of a considerable number of officers considered unreliable by the regime not only embittered those affected but also had a demoralizing effect on others still in the service. This substantial dissidence potential, however, is not organized and has not been focused on a uniform objective.

INTENSITY OF DISSIDENCE

13. Reliable reports on the people's attitudes in Albania indicate that more than 90 percent of the country's population is disaffected with the Communist regime. The intensity of the anti-regime feeling ranges from a rather mild, chronic irritation on the part of disillusioned Communists and Party sympathizers to a violent hatred on the part of those persons or groups who have been directly harmed by the regime. With the exception of the national and most local Party leaders, some members of the top bureaucracy, and the security forces, there is at present no group, including the Party rank-and-file, which escapes the police terror of the regime or derives material or other benefits from it. Nor does the population have hopes for a better future under Communist rule. There are many hidden enemies of the regime, despite the constant efforts of the secret police to root them out. The suppression of certain groups, which are considered by the regime as past redemption, and their internment in labor or concentration camps, only adds to the widespread ill feeling.

14. Although there are signs of hostility toward the Soviet military and civilian experts in Albania, derived from their preferential treatment and higher wages, there is no evidence that the population holds the Soviet Union, whose armed forces played no part in imposing the Communist regime on them, primarily responsible for their present plight. Hostility appears to be directed chiefly against the native Communists. Even the more educated people hold the central authorities responsible for imposing an alien ideology on the country. There appear to be comparatively few Albanians who are fully aware of controls and pressures exerted on the regime by the Kremlin. In the countryside hostility is directed almost wholly against local Communist and governmental functionaries who implement the regime's policies. It is significant that the vast majority of escapees from Albania are villagers, not former members of the bourgeois class or of the bureaucracy. The village escapees know little if anything about Communist ideology.

TRENDS OF DISSIDENCE SINCE 1953

15. The Soviet-Yugoslav declaration of June 2, 1955 recognizing the existence of "different roads to socialism" and the denigration of Stalin in the spring of 1956 gave rise to serious frictions within the Albanian Party's top leadership, but there is no evidence that the population at large was affected in any measurable way by these events. The Soviet-Yugoslav declaration encouraged nationalist-minded members of the Party's Central Committee to request that the Party follow a more independent policy vis-a-vis Moscow and to advocate the liberalization and democratization of Party life and the establishment of friendly relations with the West as well as the East. These men were at once deprived of their army ranks and dismissed from their Party and government posts.

16. The denigration of Stalin also had serious repercussions in the Albanian Party and resulted in further purges in April-May 1956. In April a number of Party intellectuals, officials, and army officers at a meeting of the Party Committee of Tirana pressed for the rehabilitation of all Party groups who had been purged prior to Stalin's death, requested that relations with Yugoslavia be normalized as soon as possible, attacked the top Party leadership for its rigid Stalinist views, belittled the economic "successes" of the regime, and asked that measures be taken at once to democratize and liberalize Party and state life. Prompt and severe measures were taken against all dissenters, but difficulties within and outside the Party continued.

17. The anti-regime sentiments of intellectuals, both Communist and non-Communist, appear to have been fanned by the Soviet-Yugoslav *rapprochement*, the Polish rebellion and the Hungarian revolution. These events probably had some positive effects on the Albanian resistance potential. But the defeat of the insurgents in Hungary resulted in disappointment among the Albanian nationalists and strengthened Communist morale, as the Free World, in the Albanian view, did not dare to oppose Soviet power.

RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES TO DATE

18. Although no general unrest and disturbance were reported in Albania immediately after the death of Stalin, special security measures were taken by the regime. Security pursuit battalions continued their punitive expeditions against those regions suspected of giving aid and comfort to resistance bands. The activities of the small, scattered, poorly-organized-and-equipped bands in the mountainous north began to diminish in 1953 and by 1955 had become virtually nonexistent. However, there have been reports of small, isolated guerrilla bands in areas near Tirana which in the past year have attacked headquarters of local People's Councils and killed Party, government, and police officials.

19. No organized resistance group is known to exist today in Albania. Activities reported from time to time, such as assassinating local Party leaders and governmental officials, ambushing army and state transport trucks and security units, setting fire to cooperative warehouses and state depots and factories, and committing sabotage, are probably actions of local individuals or of persons temporarily infiltrated from abroad.

20. There are signs that some unorganized resistance, both active and passive, continues throughout the country. Open hostility toward the regime has been manifested chiefly in complaints about the cost of living and shortages of food. Riots reportedly occurred late in 1956 and early in 1957 in a number of cities protesting against economic deprivations, but these were easily suppressed by the security forces. In certain areas in the north the people are said to have pillaged grain depots of the cooperatives; workers at various mines and factories staged token demonstrations against shortages of food and low wages; students at some high schools distributed tracts against the top rulers, and anti-Communist slogans and caricatures of Soviet and Albanian leaders were written or drawn on school walls. Workers show no interest in raising productivity. Peasants' resistance to collectivization consists mainly of failure to comply with the regime's measures to increase agricultural output or to meet quotas. All

classes fail to pay, or try to avoid paying, taxes. Youth has largely resisted Communist indoctrination, and the people defiantly continue to practice religion. The stagnation of the Albanian economy probably stems in part from this attitude of passive resistance.

ROLE OF EMIGRÉS

21. Efforts by emigré groups to organize resistance within Albania have failed. No known lines of communication exist between these groups and the Albanian people. Political jealousies and bickering have weakened the various emigré parties and organizations. The aims of the National Committee for a Free Albania had been to guide and encourage resistance to Communist tyranny and to organize Albanians abroad to give effective aid to the resistance. The committee, however, was dissolved in April 1956 as a result of its disunity and ineffectiveness. A new emigré organization, the Free Albania Committee, formed under the sponsorship of the Free Europe Committee, shows no promise of greater effectiveness. However, there are definite signs that Greece and Yugoslavia, especially the latter, continue to infiltrate agents into Albania for purposes of subversion. There may also be some substance to the Albanian charges that in the spring and summer of 1956 the Yugoslavs recruited former influential Communists for the purpose of overthrowing the present Albanian leadership and replacing it with pro-Yugoslav Communists. A plot of this kind was exposed by the Albanian authorities in September 1956.

REGIME MEASURES AGAINST RESISTANCE

22. The Albanian Army has a strength of 30,000 and in addition, the regime has at its disposal 10,000 militarized security troops. Frontier Troop elements, distributed fairly uniformly along the Greek, Yugoslav, and coastal borders, constitute 6,000 of this figure. An estimated 4,000 men are organized into Interior Troop units which are stationed throughout the country, with the largest single concentration in the Tirana area. In addition to these militarized forces, the Com-

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Communist Government controls an overt and covert policing apparatus totaling an additional 10,000 men. Thus, the Albanian regime has a control ratio of one soldier, policeman, or agent (in addition to countless informants) for every 29 Albanian citizens. In addition, the regime has instituted the standard police controls used in all Communist countries: identity cards for all citizens over 15 years of age, travel permits along border areas, as well as work and residence cards. Through these measures the regime has succeeded in cowering the people and instilling in them a sense of insecurity and total fear. The effectiveness of these measures is attested by the fact that open organized resistance has been practically wiped out in the past few years and that passive resistance during the same period has been reduced. Albania, unlike most of the other satellites, took no measures in the post-Stalin era to reduce police terror or relax internal tensions. To counteract any attempts from outside the country to foster dissidence among the people, severe penalties are imposed on anyone implicated in aiding and abetting diversionists. These penalties also apply to anyone found listening to anti-regime radio broadcasts or possessing propaganda material received from outside the country.

CAPABILITY TO SUPPRESS REVOLT

23. There is no likelihood, at present, of any spontaneous uprising in Albania such as occurred in Poland and Hungary in 1956. The Stalinist regime has taken rigid measures to nip in the bud any manifestations of factionalism within the Party or of deviationism among intellectuals, students, or other groups. Moreover, Albania, unlike some of the other European satellites, has not tinkered with its security apparatus, which still follows the standard Stalinist methods of complete repression. However, should a revolt break out, the regime's security forces could probably suppress it, unless the population secured arms and the uprising spread generally throughout rural areas. The Albanian Army would be of doubtful loyalty in such a crisis, and a widespread popular revolt actively supported by the army could not be suppressed

without active military assistance from the Soviet Bloc countries. :
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RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS OF PEACE

24. Under present conditions, dissidence has no capability of developing into successful organized resistance. Should an attempt be made to establish organized resistance, the regime would take the severest countermeasures, and control over the whole country would be even more repressive. However, a number of external and internal developments could increase the level of the current unorganized resistance and dissidence. Economic and political successes in Yugoslavia and Poland could have a telling effect on certain groups in Albania, especially intellectuals, professionals, some managerial elements, and students. Internally, the continuing economic deprivations and the acceleration of agricultural collectivization could increase the disaffection of the workers and peasants, especially of the latter who are potentially the greatest threat to the Communist regime.

25. There were signs that resistance and dissidence in Albania decreased after the Geneva summit conference of 1955, but an upward swing was noted after the Hungarian revolt of 1956. Moreover, the denigration of Stalin and the Soviet-Polish difficulties encouraged certain factions within the Party to attack the Albanian Stalinist leadership and to demand liberalization of Party and government life. Such deviations were, however, quickly liquidated by the Tirana rulers.

26. A substantial improvement of the people's living conditions, which at present is not in sight, could lessen the will to resist among certain elements, especially the working class and the civil servants. Conversely, disaffection could be expected to increase should the present very low living standards deteriorate further.

27. There are at present no signs of any relaxation of security controls in Albania; in fact, the regime is calling for increased strengthening and perfecting of the security police apparatus in order to stamp out what little

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resistance is left in the country. In the unlikely event of a relaxation of security controls and police terror, the people could be expected to seize the opportunity to give vent to their smouldering, pent-up hatred and might even attempt to organize open resistance against the regime. In the countryside, in particular, the peasants would begin at once to defy the local officials and refuse to fulfill quota obligations.

28. Any external assistance to potential resistance groups in Albania could be expected to increase their ranks and ability to fight, and to widen their popular support. Resistance bands in the country, particularly in the north, were strong in the period 1949-53 when moral and some material support were given them by neighboring Yugoslavia and other countries. Once this stopped, the bands' activities came to a virtual standstill.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR

29. All evidence indicates that the Albanians expect liberation only through the outbreak of a general war. Therefore, should such a war break out and internal controls be weakened, dissidence and unorganized resistance could be expected to increase, especially if resistance elements could be organized and received material support and tactical assistance from the West. The peasantry in particular could be expected to become more recalcitrant about obeying the government's economic orders.

30. In the event of general war, the possibility of sporadic, but ineffectual, military action on the part of resistance elements exists. However, effective military action could be undertaken only if substantial arms and direction were supplied from abroad and if substantial elements of the armed forces defected and took to the mountains. Without such assistance from abroad, any sustained military activities by organized resistance groups could not be expected to continue for long. However, because of the terrain and the tradition of Albanians for guerrilla warfare, small bands could manage for an indefinite period to conduct sabotage and harassing activities. Al-

though poor communications and difficulties in coordinating activities of resistance bands would seriously impede large-scale escape and evasion operations, possibilities do exist for assisting individual and small group escapes. Also, intelligence collection could be arranged through the infiltration of small groups of well-trained officers to work closely with the guerrilla bands.

31. The reaction of Albanians to an invasion of their country by Western armies would almost certainly depend upon the composition of these armies. Invasion by Italian, Greek, or Yugoslav armies would probably be met with general hostility because in the past such armies have destroyed Albania's independence. However, the Albanian people probably would offer all possible assistance to invading forces under NATO command even if these forces included some nationals from traditional enemy nations. In the event of such an invasion, it is likely that there would be considerable defection to the invading army from the Albanian Army (although probably not from the security forces) including officers. Moreover, assurance from the West of the preservation of Albania's independence and territorial integrity could, in the event of an open East-West conflict, unite the vast majority of the people against the present Communist regime as they have never been united before. Only the hard-core Communists would be likely to offer stiff resistance, especially in guerrilla warfare, in which they are pre-eminently qualified by their temperament and wartime experience in rugged terrain.

32. The effect on Albanian resistance potential of the use of nuclear weapons by attacking forces would depend on which side employed them and the manner in which they are used. It is conceivable that a nuclear attack limited to Soviet shore bases, to tactical use during actual operations, and to the seats of power could be so designed as to eliminate the major military resources and control centers of the regime without incurring popular hatred or destroying resistance potential. Such an attack could produce an opportunity for indigenous resistance groups to take over

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control of the country if outside help were available.¹

33. If non-Bloc forces sponsored lenient occupation policies in Albania, the people would cooperate with the occupiers — especially if

¹The representative of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, U. S. Army, does not believe that the effect on resistance potential of the use of nuclear weapons in Albania would differ substantially from the effect on Bulgarian resistance potential of a nuclear attack on that country. (See Annex B, para. 37.) Army would substitute for this paragraph: "If Albania were the target of a nuclear attack, resistance potential probably would be adversely affected. The destruction and demoralization resulting from such an attack probably would be such that the people would concentrate on survival."

control were gradually turned over to local officials. As word of such liberal occupation policies spread to remote unoccupied areas, some Albanian tribal chieftains would organize cooperation with the occupiers and harassment of Bloc forces. If supplied with arms and explosives, these bands could interfere significantly with the activities of Bloc troops. They could also collect some intelligence for non-Bloc forces and assist them in evasion and escape.

34. Aspirations of individual factions for post-war leadership would probably not adversely affect resistance activities during the war and might indeed intensify them. But clashes among factions and leaders would almost certainly develop after hostilities had ended.

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ANNEX B—BULGARIA

BASIC FACTORS OF DISSIDENCE

1. Bulgaria has been traditionally more closely linked to Russia than any other Eastern European state, and consequently anti-Russian feeling — as distinguished from anti-Soviet — is not as widespread and intense as elsewhere. Although much of the legacy of goodwill deriving from the Russian liberation of Bulgaria from Ottoman rule in 1878 and from German control in 1944 has been dissipated as a result of Soviet domination since World War II, traditional ties with Russia have tended to check the development of hatred of Russia and of its culture as such. This contrasts with the situation in nations such as Poland and Hungary, where national antagonism toward Russia has been traditional. Moreover, there are no Soviet troops in Bulgaria to irritate national pride. Antagonism created by Soviet military and other advisors who are present is probably limited to the relatively few Bulgarian functionaries with whom they come into direct contact. Soviet advisors reportedly keep to themselves and do not associate with Bulgarians. Soviet military personnel wear civilian clothes. Nevertheless, the regime's economic policies and programs are regarded by the majority of the population as furthering the interests of the USSR rather than those of Bulgaria.

2. Serious economic problems have developed since Stalin's death. In September 1957 the regime admitted the existence of urban unemployment, estimated at 150–180,000 persons or some 15–18 percent of the nonagricultural labor force. An urban housing shortage has also become acute. Agricultural production, which remains the mainstay of the economy, is still below prewar levels, as evidenced by the fact that temporary bread rationing and a Soviet wheat loan were necessary to tide the Bulgarians over a bad harvest in 1956. The regime revealed in December 1956 that national

income had declined and that planned investments in 1957 would be considerably less than in 1956.

3. The population as a whole, however, appears disposed to suffer the currently depressed standard of living and tends openly to express its dissatisfaction only when economic conditions become acutely unbearable. Realizing this, the regime has moved to allay economic discontent through a series of limited economic relief measures: family wage allowances have been tripled; compulsory deliveries of certain agricultural items have been abolished; and wage increases ranging from eight to 20 percent have been granted to industrial workers. In order to relieve urban unemployment a series of make-work projects have been introduced with Soviet assistance, and about 15,000 young people have been sent to work in the USSR and Czechoslovakia. Recent reports by Western observers in Sofia claim that the regime's economic concessions resulted in a slight improvement in living standards and an alleviation of economic discontent in the summer of 1957. Living conditions, however, are still below prewar levels and economic discontent remains a major source of dissidence.

4. Politically, dissatisfaction with totalitarian Communist rule is widespread. The population resents Communist control and regulation of all phases of life through the so-called "mass" social and cultural organizations. Bulgarians have long been accustomed to tyrannical rule but never has such rule been so oppressive as under the present regime. The regime lacks popular support and maintains itself in power through police state methods and the ever-present threat of Soviet military intervention.

5. Although organized religion is a potential instrument for resistance, it is not, at this

time, an important source of dissidence in Bulgaria. Although regime efforts to convert younger people to atheism have embittered parents, the regime has refrained from any intensive religious persecution. Harassment of religious leaders has been limited to non-Orthodox faiths (Catholic and Protestant), which represent an insignificant proportion of the population, and has been directed against alleged subversive ties of religious leaders with Western countries rather than against profession of religious faith. On the other hand, the regime has openly endorsed Eastern Orthodoxy — to which some 90 percent of the population belongs — as the national faith. The regime was instrumental in healing the schism between the Bulgarian Exarchate and the Patriarch of Constantinople in 1945 and later raised the status of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church to the patriarchal level. Moreover, the hierarchy of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church completely cooperates with the regime. Members of the lower clergy, although believed to be largely anti-Communist, have resigned themselves to Communist rule and refrain from making anti-regime statements. Currently Jewish, Moslem, Catholic, and Protestant religious leaders also cooperate with the regime.

6. Traditional hostility toward Yugoslavia has served to check the spread of Titoism in Bulgaria. Bulgarians would not welcome Tito as a liberator, in view of traditional suspicion of Yugoslav motives. Tito's national brand of Communism and other ideological innovations have had little influence among Bulgarian Communists. The regime's policy of close ties with Moscow enjoys the support of anti-Yugoslav elements in the Party who fear that rapprochement with Yugoslavia would result in territorial encroachments. Bulgarian Communists have not forgotten Yugoslav efforts, prior to the Tito-Cominform break, to secure control of Bulgarian Pirin Macedonia by incorporating it into the Yugoslav federal republic of Macedonia.

MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS

7. *Peasants.* Bulgarian peasants, steeped in a tradition of individual farming, resent the regime's collectivization program. Compris-

ing some 75 percent of the total population, the peasants are numerically an important dissident group and traditionally a source of political opposition. In 1951 a collectivization drive culminated in local outbreaks of armed peasant resistance. The regime's latest collectivization drive began in 1955 and aims at virtually complete collectivization in a few years (87 percent of total arable land is currently in the socialized sector). Although there has been no open peasant resistance as in 1951, discontent in the countryside is still widespread.

8. In recent years the regime has gone to great lengths to persuade former agrarian opposition leaders to renounce their ties with the late Nikola Petkov, agrarian leader executed in 1947 for treason. It has had little success, however, and Dimitur Gichev, a former right-wing agrarian leader, has especially inspired the peasantry with his stubborn refusal to renounce his past opposition activities. Nevertheless, it remains a fact that the agrarian character of Bulgarian society serves to militate against the organization of dissidence into an effective resistance movement. Resistance is difficult to organize among a population thinly distributed throughout the countryside. The absence of large urban centers is also an important consideration, inasmuch as resistance has been traditionally organized by urban intellectuals and workers rather than by peasants.

9. *Youth.* The disillusionment and antipathy of young people probably represent the most serious failure of the regime to eliminate potential sources of resistance, since Communism admittedly relies upon the indoctrination of the younger generation to assure the eventual stability of its regime. Significantly, there is considerable dissatisfaction among students with courses on Marxism-Leninism. However, the government made it clear that it will resolutely oppose student demands for the abolition of these courses. Party and youth leaders were urged to re-educate young people who had come under the influence of bourgeois ideology and propaganda.

10. *Intellectuals.* Ferment among intellectuals, especially among writers and artists,

has been evident since Stalin's death. In December 1955, some two months prior to the denigration of Stalin, Stalinist leader Vulko Chervenkov severely castigated certain writers for attempting to undermine Party control over literature and urged that deviations from the Party literary line be "strangled in the embryonic stage." Bulgarian writers who began openly to advocate removal of Party controls immediately following the 20th CPSU Congress were quickly rebuffed. In September 1956, Bulgarian writers, attracted by an earlier version of Mao's "100 flowers" theory, were told that Communist Chinese ideologists did not mean that "weeds and noxious plants" would be allowed to bloom among the "flowers" of socialist realism. However, despite repressive measures and warnings by the regime, restiveness among writers has continued.

11. *Party Members.* There is evidence of dissidence among the Party rank and file, who apparently have been disillusioned by the regime's failure to democratize Party life. Dissidence among lower-echelon Party members is admitted by the Bulgarian press, which complains that disunity has existed in some lower Party organizations since the Hungarian revolt. In early 1957 the regime launched a campaign to cleanse Party ranks of "careerist and alien" elements. Dissidence in the higher echelons of Party leadership (at the Politburo and Central Committee levels) takes the form of rivalry for power. The purge of a Politburo member and two Central Committee members in July 1957, for example, was indicative of such rivalry. Thus far, however, top leaders have subordinated their differences for the sake of unity.

12. *Armed Forces.* Although in the summer of 1956 some 200 officers reportedly were purged from the army, apparently for national-Communist tendencies, dissidence, at this time, is believed virtually nonexistent within the Bulgarian armed forces. Military personnel, as a whole, are less prone to dissident attitudes than is the general population. The permanent cadre, constituting some 25 percent of the total military strength, consists of commissioned and noncommissioned officers

who have demonstrated their reliability; many of these are Communist Party-members. The conscripts, 35,000 of whom are inducted into the Army annually, reflect the attitudes of Bulgarian youth generally, although persons of demonstrated antipathy toward the regime are screened out or consigned to the labor troops. Once they are inducted, military discipline and persistent political indoctrination militate against the intensification and spread of dissidence. The conditions of service life in Bulgaria, while extremely poor by Western standards, are in general acceptable to the typical recruit.

13. *Industrial Workers.* Industrial workers, officially the favored class of the regime, are disillusioned with low wages and poor working conditions. It is unlikely that recent wage increases have significantly offset this attitude. Urban unemployment has further aggravated their discontent. Bulgarian workers resent political and economic regimentation by Communist-dominated trade unions, whose primary function is to enforce labor discipline rather than represent the interests of the workers. Frequent criticism in the Bulgarian press of the failure of trade unions to maintain close ties with the workers is indicative of the hostile attitude of workers toward Communist trade union officials. A trade union congress scheduled for the fall of 1956 was reportedly postponed because of demands by workers that they be allowed to elect their own union officials.

INTENSITY OF DISSIDENCE SINCE 1953

14. Dissidence in Bulgaria has not significantly increased since Stalin's death. Rank and file Party members, writers and students openly expressed their discontent after the 20th CPSU Party Congress, but repressive measures by the regime effectively curbed such manifestations. During the Hungarian revolt some student demonstrations reportedly occurred but apparently failed to arouse other elements of the population. All available evidence indicates that the majority of the population still feels that armed rebellion against an efficient police state, backed up by Soviet military force, would be futile without effective mili-

tary support from outside. Unquestionably, the failure of the Hungarian revolt has served to strengthen this attitude. Only a significant worsening of economic conditions, accompanied by a break-down of the authority of the central Party leadership and its security apparatus, could precipitate a general uprising. If localized disturbances arising out of economic conditions assumed larger proportions and resulted in bloodshed, the current attitude of popular passivity could change to that of active resistance. Much would depend on the ability of the regime to curb initial disturbances without exacerbating the hatred of the population.

15. The regime's relatively stable leadership has been instrumental in checking the spread of dissidence. No Bulgarian leader has shown any tendency to champion greater autonomy from Moscow — as Gomulka did — and top leaders appear agreed that essential internal controls should be maintained. Elements dissatisfied with the regime's failure to liberalize internal life following the denigration of Stalin were unable to find a spokesman for their cause among the leaders. Certain journalists and writers who openly called for more drastic destalinization were sternly rebuked.

16. Nevertheless, the ordinary citizen reportedly began to enjoy relatively greater freedom. Arrests for minor political offenses ceased and Bulgarians became less afraid of expressing anti-regime opinions in public. Minor political offenders were released and forced labor camps began to close. In September 1956 a Central Committee decision promised expanded powers and responsibility for local governmental organs, more effective curbs on police abuses, and debate in the national parliament. The Central Committee decision also rehabilitated individuals previously purged from high places for Titoism.

17. The Polish and Hungarian upheavals, however, reversed this trend and the police state atmosphere of the Stalin era was reintroduced. In early November 1956, shortly after the suppression of the Hungarian rebels, the regime carried out precautionary arrests of unreliable elements and began to reopen forced labor camps. The regime urged the

population to report persons making anti-regime statements to the authorities, and police patrols in Sofia and other cities increased. By July 1957 some 5,000 persons reportedly had been expelled from Sofia.

18. Popular dissidence in Bulgaria is directed toward both the native regime and Soviet domination. There is little likelihood that Bulgarians distinguish between Soviet domination and local Communist rule. Bulgarian Communist leaders, who prior to World War II spent many years of their adult life in the Soviet Union and even acquired Soviet citizenship, are regarded as more Soviet than Bulgarian. Bulgarians appear to attribute their depressed standard of living both to Soviet domination and to the policies of the regime. Dissidence is also equally directed at Communism *per se*, since it is associated with the regime and Soviet domination. While some Party members and members of the intellectual class may feel that Soviet practice is a perversion of true Communism, the majority of Bulgarians are opposed to Communism in general.

RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES TO DATE

19. Generally, active resistance activities have declined since the death of Stalin even though there are indications of some increase of dissidence among the Party elite. There is no present available evidence of any organized resistance against the regime, either on a national or on a local scale. Reports alleging activities of such organizations have remained unconfirmed. Whatever resistance there is, appears to be entirely limited to the passive and unorganized variety.

20. Passive resistance is found among the peasantry, workers, intellectuals, and youth. The clergy and members of the former middle class do not figure prominently in passive resistance. Peasant resistance is displayed by failure to meet agricultural delivery quotas set by the regime and neglect of collective farm machinery. Malfeasance by collective farm officials indicates an attitude of indifference, if not opposition. Occasional active resistance in the form of sabotage has been reported but such reports are difficult to

verify. Whatever sabotage there is appears to be spontaneous and not the work of any organized group.

21. In industry, workers resort to slowdowns and absenteeism, are careless with maintenance and handling of equipment, and fail to meet norms. While it is difficult to determine whether such acts are due to inefficiency or are manifestations of passive resistance, the frequency with which the Bulgarian press discusses such matters would indicate the latter.

22. Passive resistance among youth is manifested by complete lack of interest in the activities of the Communist-sponsored Dimitrov youth organization, deliberate failure of courses in universities in order to avoid work assignments to unpleasant areas or jobs, and failure to attend Party meetings and other youth activities of the Fatherland Front. Young people also, on occasion, manifest religious devoutness.

23. Bulgarian writers and journalists have been accused by the regime of deliberately avoiding writing about contemporary life in order to eschew political controversy. Writers occasionally get articles and short stories critical of the regime published in the press. Judging from discussions of literary activities in the press, heated debates and differences of views take place at meetings of the Bulgarian Writers' Union.

ROLE OF EMIGRES

24. Although Bulgarian emigre organizations have numerous contacts with persons in the homeland, there is no evidence that they are in a position to organize resistance activities. The Bulgarian emigre movement is divided by jealousies and opportunism, which have served to reduce its potential to inspire resistance in Bulgaria. There is a general feeling that emigres have been abroad too long to keep in touch with conditions and current aspirations in Bulgaria and consequently cannot provide post-liberation leadership. Recent regime propaganda against the emigre movement, spread by voluntary returnees, has probably served to further lower Bulgarian estimation of emigre organizations.

25. Dr. Georgi M. Dimitrov, representing the left wing Agrarians in exile, is the only emigre leader known to have seriously attempted to maintain contacts inside Bulgaria. His activity, however, has been confined to keeping track of followers through sporadic refugee debriefings and personal correspondence. He has mounted about five cross-border operations, with the assistance of Western intelligence services, to contact local Agrarian leaders, asking them to start organizing against the day when the Communist regime collapses. The Dimitrov organizational activity is oriented toward eventual assumption of power by his party rather than toward present or eventual resistance to the Communists. He has condemned the operations of other groups and intelligence agencies aimed at organizing internal resistance.

REGIME MEASURES AGAINST RESISTANCE

26. Following the 20th CPSU Congress, the Bulgarian regime refused to grant any significant concessions. Voicing its allegiance to the principle of "socialist legality," it resumed preventive and arbitrary arrest and deportations. While calling for a new spirit in art, it insisted on conformance to "socialist realism." Requesting constructive criticism by Party members, it silenced or expelled all but the most platitudinous critics. Stalinist type oppression will probably continue to be effective even though it will exacerbate already existing grievances.

27. The powers of the police have not been significantly restricted. During the suppression of the Hungarian revolt, the regime openly appealed to the population to inform on individuals guilty of anti-regime statements and activities. Since March 1957, unreliable elements from Sofia and other large towns were expelled. Sofia citizens, marked for expulsion to the countryside, were visited by the police after midnight and given two to four hours to leave the capital. Even Party functionaries and other persons formerly considered reliable by the regime were among those expelled.

CAPABILITY OF REGIME TO SUPPRESS REVOLT

28. The regime could successfully suppress any localized revolt. The Bulgarian militarized security forces consist of 30,000 well-trained, loyal men, evenly divided between Frontier Troops and Interior Troops. The overt and covert police organizations bring the total strength of the security apparatus, exclusive of the armed forces, to 80,000-100,000 persons. This figure gives a control ratio of one trained operative, policeman, or militarized security force man to every 77 to 96 Bulgarian citizens, not taking into account the informer network. The efficiency and quality of the police system appears good and there is no indication of disloyalty in the police forces. Although certain elements of the ordinary police (such as the traffic police) were placed under local control in July 1957, there has been no major reform of the Bulgarian internal security apparatus which might lessen its effectiveness in suppressing local resistance. Frontier and Interior Troop strength is believed to have been cut, but these reductions are not believed to have seriously affected the efficiency of the state security apparatus. Moreover, the Bulgarian police system has not been discredited by admittance of past "errors" as in the case of some other satellites. Following the April 1956 Plenum's restoration of "socialist legality," and the quiet repudiation of the 1949-1952 Party purge, the security apparatus suffered only a minimal loss of efficiency resulting from confusion over the new line and the eclipse of a number of security officers implicated in the earlier extortion of false confessions and other malpractices.

29. In the highly unlikely event of a national uprising, however, the Bulgarian security apparatus would need the support of the Bulgarian Army and, if the conflict threatened to prolong itself, the support of Soviet forces. Top Bulgarian Army officers and commanders would remain loyal to the regime, and lower ranking officers and enlisted men would generally maintain discipline and seek to suppress the rebels unless they were convinced that the latter truly represented a nationwide popular

movement. In the event that rebel efforts promised some success and some lower ranking officers and men turned over their arms or joined the revolt, Soviet intervention in force would be inevitable.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS OF PEACE

30. Assuming conditions of peace and barring widespread revolts in the Bloc, there is little real potential among any elements in Bulgaria for effective organized resistance to the regime. Unorganized and passive resistance will probably continue to manifest itself, but under present conditions the population will increasingly feel that their position is hopeless and that aid from the United States or any other Western power is unlikely. Local outbreaks of resistance born of desperation with economic conditions, particularly among the peasants, might occur from time to time, but a general spontaneous revolt such as occurred in Hungary is unlikely, given present conditions and the temper of the population.

31. Whether or not passive and unorganized resistance activity will increase depends on the ability of the regime to cope with economic problems. Thus far it has shown a willingness to grant limited economic concessions, and the Soviet Union has shown itself ready to render assistance for the solution of economic problems, which would make it appear unlikely that the economic situation will deteriorate sufficiently to bring about a marked increase in this type of resistance.

32. There seems to be little possibility of increase or change in resistance activity by the general population under foreseeable conditions of peace if no Party upheaval occurs. The principal opportunity for maintaining at least some resistance potential is through Western propaganda, transmitting a feeling of hope and a sense of direction among the people. This may prevent complete apathy and cynicism and encourage the expression of grievances and demands by every semi-legal method, so that a spirit of resistance can be maintained and molded into the strongest possible instrument of pressure upon the Communist regime.

33. Although any marked increase in East-West tensions would have the effect of raising hopes of eventual liberation from the outside, Bulgarians would still not be disposed to undertake liberation by themselves. Ideological and factional disputes, whether in the Bulgarian leadership or in other Communist regimes, have had little impact on resistance in Bulgaria. Bulgarians undoubtedly envy the greater freedom of Poland from Moscow's domination but have shown no disposition to emulate that country. Possibly Bulgarians are still doubtful of the permanence of Poland's status of greater autonomy.

34. To a certain degree, the easing of security measures would act as a safety valve. A sudden relaxation of essential internal controls, however, might create a precarious situation unless it were accompanied by measures to remedy the basic causes of dissidence. It would be particularly dangerous, if, at the same time, an alternative political leader or faction emerged as a "liberal" force. Pressures for the abolition of all oppressive controls would mount, and it is doubtful that, under such circumstances, a strongly pro-Soviet regime could maintain itself in power without Soviet military support.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR

35. Under conditions of general warfare the resistance potential of the Bulgarian population would increase considerably. The ruling Communist minority would be under unceasing pressure from the antagonistic majority of Bulgarians, a situation which would probably result in more forthright action on the part of elements now passive and would threaten the political stability of the government. Such instability would give rise to considerable doubts on the part of many individuals in the Party and state apparatus about the future of Communism, especially if Soviet defeat became apparent. Political opportunists would emerge, with the result that the potential for widespread effective action would be sharply enhanced. Nevertheless, anti-regime resistance activities could not be intensified initially. Only if Western forces appeared to be winning, would the Bulgarians engage

in espionage, sabotage, and other harassing activities — but not to the extent that might be expected by the people of other satellites under similar circumstances.

36. During any type of war in the Balkan area, there would be almost no possibility of independent military action by anti-regime elements.¹ As in World War II, resistance groups — if supplied with arms and explosives from the outside — could tie down some Bloc forces through sabotage of rail lines and industrial plants. Bands of guerrilla fighters might be developed, but they would be entirely dependent upon outside support. If enemy forces consisted of such traditional enemies as Turks and Greeks, the Bulgarians would do very little to assist them. If the war were being fought by Western forces on, or adjacent to Bulgarian territory, the Bulgarians might aid enemy forces by supplying intelligence, by destroying lines of communication, and by sabotaging Soviet Bloc supplies and installations. As indicated above, the extent of such activities would depend on the nationality of the enemy and upon logistic support from outside. However, the populace would probably not participate in evasion and escape activities until enemy forces were close to Bulgaria, and even then would weigh the risks involved very carefully. If military action were taking place within Bulgaria or an area within the Bloc, Bulgarian resistance capabilities would be increased, and if the West appeared to be winning, there would be more anti-regime activities. If the Bloc countries appeared to be winning, the Bulgarians would have less capability and less inclination to help the West.

37. Use of tactical nuclear weapons would probably have little effect on Bulgarian re-

¹The representative of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF would add the following: It is possible that resistance groups could carry out limited independent military operations if the following three conditions prevailed: (a) disruption or diversion of the regime's means of internal control; (b) development in resistance groups of effective leadership and coordination, and receipt of outside material support; and (c) assurance of early direct military support and relief.

sistance, unless Bulgaria was to be a target for a major nuclear attack. The human and material destruction and social dislocation resulting from a nuclear attack on Bulgaria would eliminate the population's potential for resistance.²

38. Resistance elements would make little effort to assist Greek, Turkish, or Yugoslav military forces even if they were identified with the West, unless these nationals constituted only a minority of a force under United

²The representative of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF would add the following: It is conceivable that an air attack could be so designed as to eliminate the major sources of the military and control strength of the regime without incurring popular hatred or destroying resistance potential. Such an air attack could produce an opportunity for indigenous resistance groups to take over control of the country.

States or other Western command. Furthermore, assurance that forces of countries other than Bulgaria's traditional enemies would be assigned occupation duties in the country would be necessary.

39. Occupation policies of the attacking forces would have a crucial effect on all resistance capabilities. To be effective these policies would have to reflect the aspirations of the Bulgarian people for national sovereignty and the overthrow of communism. The aims of individual resistance factions for post-war leadership in Bulgaria probably would not seriously impede intelligence, evasion and escape, and military capabilities. However, political ambitions of some resistance leaders could affect political warfare operations, if the resistance leaders were supported by an influential following.

ANNEX C—COMMUNIST CHINA

PREAMBLE

In the years following the Communist take-over in mainland China, the regime suppressed organized resistance. During this period, the regime failed to gain the positive support of large segments of the population and created widespread apathy and dissatisfaction. In the course of the past two years this situation has been aggravated. The volume and intensity of dissidence has increased significantly, particularly among the peasantry, the intellectuals, and some youth, most of whom were formerly inclined to accept the regime at least passively. Despite this increase, however, there has been no significant organized resistance or active resistance on other than a purely local level, with the important exception of Tibet, where dissidence flared into armed rebellion in 1956, forcing important shifts in the Communist time-table for this area.

BASIC FACTORS OF DISSIDENCE

2. Among the most important causes of dissidence are economic grievances. The regime's policies of rapid industrialization, military modernization, and socialization have required the diversion of substantial resources, which have been secured through demanding increased productivity while greatly restricting the benefits accruing to the people. In consequence, workers and peasants have been frustrated in failing to achieve promised levels of real income and well-being, while landowners and businessmen resent the loss of their properties to the state and the reduction in their income. Politically, the system of rigid regimentation and tight control over every aspect of life is generally resented, although in varying degrees among different groups. Finally, Communist efforts to change age-old social concepts, such as that of the family hierarchy, have created considerable

ill will. In contrast to Eastern European satellites, however, resentment of close ties with the USSR is not a nation-wide factor although it does affect the attitude of some groups.

3. The Communist regime is now engaged in a gigantic effort to remake China's ancient society and create a modern, industrial state. This has involved a series of sweeping political, social, and economic changes, including attempts to reshape education and to revamp organizational media for controlling and indoctrinating the populace. The innumerable pressures brought to bear by the regime and the disruption of traditional social patterns have produced a widespread tension and insecurity. Not all these "strains and stresses" are the result of, or can be attributed to, the Communist system. Large segments of the population have remained indifferent, however; many others have adopted a wait-and-see attitude; still others are willing to accept the regime because they believe its accomplishments and policies have improved their personal position or prospects. Considerable elements of the population feel they have gained rather than lost since the defeat of the Kuomintang. Thus anti-regime attitudes vary with differing conditions and among differing groups as they are affected by specific programs.

MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS

4. *Peasantry.* The land reform of 1950-1952 liquidated the landlords and redistributed land among the tenant, poor, and some middle-income peasants. These beneficiaries constitute 75 percent of the total peasant population which, in turn, constitutes the bulk of Communist China's population. Many of these peasants probably believed that they benefited from reform, and dissidence did not appear to be widespread except at times of

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agricultural crisis, such as the crop failure of 1954. The regime's sudden rush into agricultural socialization, following Mao's speech in July 1955, was largely completed in 1956. During this process, there were only few reports of rural opposition, but by the end of 1956, peasant dissatisfaction was again developing. The peasants resented the bureaucratic and inefficient management of the co-operatives and/or collectives. They disliked having to increase their labor for the state, since this seriously affected the sideline occupations that traditionally contributed to their income. They were disillusioned because the regime did not fulfill its promise of an immediate rise in income.

5. Reports on Chinese peasant dissidence are relatively convincing. Peiping has admitted widespread peasant withdrawals from collectives in some areas, and has reported minor peasant uprisings in several provinces. However, an increase of peasant discontent will depend largely on whether the harvests are good or bad and on the willingness of the regime to let the peasants enjoy more of the fruits of their labor. There is no uniformity in the pattern of discontent, and regional conditions will continue to vary.

6. *Intellectuals.* At the time of its establishment, the regime enjoyed passive acceptance by, and in some cases the active support of, many of the country's intellectuals. However, despite continuous efforts to "reform" the intellectuals, their attitude toward the regime has steadily deteriorated, except during a brief period in 1956-57 when the regime tolerated some degree of intellectual diversity. However, the effect of the "Hundred Flowers" policy has recently been negated by the "anti-rightist struggle," which has been directed more at the intellectuals than at any other group. Disaffection among intellectuals has centered on lack of freedom to undertake original research or creative activity not approved by the regime, on the Communist Party's domination of all significant aspects of public activity, and on inadequate material incentives and inappropriate employment.

7. Dissidence among the intellectuals is particularly significant because their skills and

experience are badly needed by the regime. Many of those who have been attacked as "rightists" have achieved relatively high — if often nominal — positions in such fields as government administration and education. The vehemence of the regime's attack against intellectuals during the latter half of 1957 testifies to the Communists' concern over the implications of opposition in this group. How successful the regime will be in its efforts to "reform" and "educate" the intellectuals is still uncertain. Recent events have probably increased the level of dissidence among them. Of equal importance is the probability that these same events, by bringing about a strengthening of controls over the intellectuals and curbing their influence, will greatly reduce their inclination and opportunities to translate dissidence into resistance.

8. *Youth.* Initially, youth, and especially students, included some of the most ardent supporters of the regime and it appeared that dissidence among them was minor. However, a definite decline in enthusiasm for the regime seems to have occurred. This is the result mainly of the regimentation, prosaic tasks and living conditions which face most youths during the present period of industrialization in contrast to the expectations created by the establishment of a "New China," the Korean hostilities, the spread of Chinese Communist influence in the Asian-African area, and the socialization period of 1955-56. Dissatisfaction with their strictly controlled curriculum and their prospects for further education and for suitable employment has been evident. Generally being sensitive to ideological matters, youth was also influenced to some extent by de-Stalinization and the Hungarian uprising. Such disaffection has in several cases erupted into student riots. Although dissidence among youth may not be widespread at present, it remains a serious problem because it opens to question the fundamental Communist emphasis on the early molding of opinion.

9. *Former Businessmen.* When the bulk of remaining private commerce and industry was socialized in 1956, there was virtually no overtly expressed opposition from the former

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proprietors. However, it was clear in the "anti-rightist struggle" that the regime did not consider the "bourgeoisie" resigned to current conditions. Except in certain industrial-commercial centers such as Shanghai, and except for connections with other groups such as the intellectuals, the "bourgeoisie" now has negligible political or economic power. Dissidence among former private businessmen, while widespread, is thus significant only to the extent that it limits the regime's ability to utilize their technical and managerial skills. Former businessmen possess talents which cannot yet be matched by a new Communist trained generation, and their dissatisfaction with the regime, and the consequent distrust of them by the regime will be an adverse factor of some but not crucial importance in the economic development of the country.

10. *Armed Forces.* In the active Chinese Communist military service there is virtually no dissidence and no likelihood of resistance. This is reflected in current low desertion rates and is the result of close Party control of all levels, careful selection of personnel for military service, constant indoctrination and surveillance of all military personnel, highly preferential treatment of military personnel, constant attention to officer-enlisted civilian relationships, and prompt action to ease or eradicate tensions and other problems. Ex-Nationalist defectors and other disloyal personnel have been eliminated from the service; equipment, food, clothing, and shelter are available in generally satisfactory quantities by Chinese standards; the pay and leave situation is improved; and terms of service are set by law. There is a close relationship between armed forces and the civilian component of the Peiping regime. The top military commanders are all Party veterans and concurrently hold high Party posts. The majority of the rank and file of the armed forces belong either to the Party or the Young Communist League.

11. *Militia.* There are several million members of the People's Militia — a heterogeneous group whose functions, training, equipment, and social standing vary throughout the country. It is probable that there are Militia members who are dissatisfied with their role

and resent having to give up their spare time to unrewarding work. The great majority of the Militia, however, probably are loyal to the regime. Dissidence among this group is more apt to reflect their status as peasants rather than their para-military position.

12. *Veterans.* The demobilization of over five million men from the armed forces since 1949 has created a sizable population group who face many problems. In at least one province demobilized servicemen have been blamed recently for trouble in rural areas. The veterans therefore constitute a group within which there are dissident feelings and within which there is probably a certain amount of potential resistance and possibly some actual resistance. Many veterans are disgruntled and unhappy because they have been forced to leave the comparative security and prestige of service life for the much more difficult life of a peasant. Additionally, numbers of them wanted to work in the cities after discharge but were forced to return to the rural areas where dissatisfaction has arisen over employment, housing, and acceptance given them by the villagers. At present, dissidence among veterans is not intense and is not likely to develop into a serious security threat. Nevertheless, the veterans, trained in the use of arms, experienced in guerrilla warfare, and bound together by a common background, constitute a potentially serious security problem.

13. *Communist Leadership.* The Chinese Communist Party and regime has demonstrated unusual cohesiveness and unity at its highest levels. With virtually the sole exception of the Kao-Jao affair in 1954-55, the regime has adjusted policy differences and other internal disputes without recourse to drastic purges and without evidencing dissidence among disgruntled leaders. When Mao dies or retires from active leadership, some diminution of party unity can be expected, with struggles for power among the senior party leaders who would probably collectively succeed Mao in his various functions. However, it seems unlikely that even Mao's death would cause a serious leadership crisis that would critically affect the party's cohesiveness and effectiveness.

14. At lower levels of the Communist Party there appears to be a certain amount of discontent, seldom intense enough to be called dissidence. Rural cadres are particularly susceptible to occasional misgivings. They are often forced to lead a peasant-level life; they miss the companionship and cultural activities available in urban centers. Blame for a failure of the regime's policies is often laid to them directly. They find themselves caught between the millstones of Peiping's policies and the realities of their immediate environment, and there is evidence that some of them occasionally identify themselves more directly with the peasants than with Party demands. Dissidence in the Party is likely to become significant only if the regime has major economic reverses or if dissidence within other major groups becomes acute.

15. *Government Bureaucracy.* While key positions in the bureaucracy are held by Party members, there are a substantial number of nonmembers in it who are rewarded less generously both in a material and psychological sense, and who accordingly are more prone to be dissatisfied with the regime. Criticisms of the regime by non-Party persons in mid-1957 revealed a considerable degree of resentment in the bureaucracy over the preferential position of Party members and the Party's unwillingness to grant authority to nonmembers. At the same time, many such persons have a vested interest in the regime which may partially negate any dissident tendencies. In the future, the level of dissidence in this group will be largely determined by the Party's willingness to improve its methods of working with the group.

16. *Religious Groups.* Organized religious groups have been significant sources of dissidence chiefly in minority-inhabited areas of Communist China, most notably in Tibet and in some Hui (Moslem) areas. In China proper organized religion is not of great numerical importance because the great majority of Chinese take an informal, eclectic view of religion, adopting elements of a number of religions without formal adherence to any. Despite their relatively small membership some of the organized religious groups in China proper are nevertheless significant as sources of dissi-

dence and passive resistance. In some cases the regime's moves against religious groups or adherents has aroused resentment. Members of a number of religious groups continue passive resistance against the regime despite concerted drives against some religious groups (particularly Catholics) and Communist efforts to organize religious adherents into front organizations that are susceptible to Communist control and that support the regime's program (fronts for Buddhists, Moslems, Protestants, Catholics, and Taoists have been organized).

17. *Superstitious Sects.* In addition to the above, certain semi-religious sects, including such secret societies as the I-kuan-tao, have figured in Communist admissions of unrest and local rebellion. These sects with an ideology based on elements of various religions and superstitions have been subjected to continuous Communist suppression efforts, but probably continue to exist on a local level in many rural parts of China, where they apparently succeed from time to time in organizing minor peasant rebellions through appeals to magic and superstition and through exploitation of various peasant grievances. None of these sects, however, appears to have retained an effective national or even regional organization or following.

18. *Minorities.* The ethnic minorities in China traditionally have resisted the expansionist tendencies of the predominant Han Chinese. In actual practice the Communist regime has continued the engulfment of the minorities by the Han Chinese. This presumably has led to dissatisfaction among the minorities which, in turn, has produced corrective efforts to curb "great Han chauvinism." Aside from Tibet — a special case where the dissidence has flared into active resistance — the extent of disaffection among minorities is not known, but the frequent reference to the regime's corrective for "great Han chauvinism" indicates that some exists.

19. *Former Overseas Chinese.* There are approximately 12,000,000 persons in mainland China, concentrated largely in Kwangtung and Fukien provinces, who are considered

"Overseas Chinese" by virtue of previous residence abroad or as "Overseas Chinese dependents" because they have relatives abroad. Members of this group have been treated with greater leniency than the rest of the population; they have received preferential rations, and have occasionally been excluded from some of the most onerous consequences of the 1955-56 socialist transformation. Nevertheless, some dissidence probably exists in this group; accustomed in the past to an above-average standard of living and more knowledgeable about the outside world, they probably resent various aspects of Chinese Communist policies.

20. *Urban Workers.* The urban workers are cultivated as the mass base of the regime. Despite preferential treatment since 1949, disaffection has developed among urban workers in some areas and, in several cases, has resulted in strikes. While many factory workers now have more job security and material rewards than in pre-Communist days, there is resentment of the psychological pressures, such as high work norms, and dissatisfaction that living standards have not improved more rapidly. However, dissidence among urban workers does not appear to be widespread nor intense. As in the case of youth, however, dissidence among workers is regarded with the utmost concern by the regime on ideological grounds.

21. *Former National Government Officials.* Of the National government officials who did not escape to Taiwan, a small number are collaborating with the Peiping regime, more are probably still in prison or in labor camps, and still more are retired or not fully active. The collaborators work for the regime either because of a timely shift of allegiance to the Communists before or when the regime was established or because their valuable technical skills have earned them a special position. Some of this group probably resent the domination of the Communist Party and may be dissatisfied with conditions. But they would be cautious about exposing their dissatisfaction because of their own past history. The noncollaborators in many cases have been branded as enemies of the regime from the beginning. They unquestionably are dissatis-

fied with their present condition, but to an even greater extent than the collaborating group, must suppress their feelings.

22. *Tibetans.* The Tibetans for centuries have used every means at their disposal to resist the imposition of political, military, economic, or cultural controls by whatever Chinese government has been in power. Probably a majority of them has continued to resist all efforts of the Chinese Communist regime to bring Tibet under the centralized control of Peiping. This has been true not only of the Tibetans living in what the Chinese Communists refer to as the "Tibet region," but equally so of the seminomadic Tibetan tribes who live in Tibetan areas now included in the provinces of Tsinghai, Kansu, and Szechwan. Among the causes of Tibetan resistance have been resentment at Chinese interference with Tibetan religious activities, Communist indoctrination of Tibetan youth, attempts to "reform" Tibetan society, food shortages and inflation, and Peiping's failure to honor a promise to release certain imprisoned Tibetan leaders.

INTENSITY OF DISSIDENCE

23. While it may be possible, on the basis of the preceding analyses, to make an assessment in general terms of the major sources and areas of ill will, the intensity of dissidence in Communist China and the degree to which it may be transformed into actual resistance remain largely matters of conjecture. It is logical to conclude that some degree of dissidence exists at almost every level of Communist Chinese society. However, this does not mean that such dissidence can develop into resistance unless the control capabilities of the regime were greatly weakened.

24. The regime's policies and practices, despite the "rectification campaign," have accentuated a number of factors causing ill will. At the same time, the regime has developed and exploited the growing pride of the Chinese people in their country's achievements, particularly their military strength and their new international prestige. As in the USSR, Communism was imposed on the people by indigenous elements in the face of seemingly

overwhelming odds rather than by a foreign power. These points are recognized, mainly by members of the "intelligentsia." The bulk of the people are illiterate peasants and know little of and care less about ideology and national policies. They are preoccupied with local affairs. They judge a regime by the extent to which it exploits them. However, in the vast majority of cases, dissidence is not translated into organized, active resistance. Sometimes it has led, and may lead in the future, to unorganized passive resistance which is more difficult to detect and to suppress but has far less potential than has the revolutionary mood in some Eastern European satellites.

TRENDS OF DISSIDENCE SINCE 1953

25. Events following Stalin's death and the uprisings in Poland and Hungary in 1956 had relatively little influence on the level of resistance in Communist China. Peiping's unique status in the Communist world, its geographic location, its different problems and the newness of its revolutionary experiment precluded any necessity to follow the Kremlin line. However, events since the Soviet 20th Party Congress in February 1956 did have some impact even though the Chinese Communists successfully minimized the shock of Stalin's denigration. Whatever confusion existed apparently contributed only slightly to dissidence or resistance and was to some extent alleviated by official explanations and by claims that the Chinese Communist leaders had avoided the pitfalls into which the USSR had slipped.

26. Between 1954 and 1957, there were two peaks of resistance activity in mainland China. The first, in late 1954 and early 1955, was occasioned primarily by the poor harvests of 1954 and led to the drive against "counter-revolutionaries" personally ordered by Mao Tse-tung in the spring of 1955. The drive did not reach the proportions of earlier similar drives, even though 360,000 cases of subversion and "economic sabotage" were admittedly dealt with in 1954 and early 1955. It was credited by the Communists with creating the preconditions necessary for popular accept-

ance of the wholesale collectivization and socialization campaign inaugurated by Mao Tse-tung in mid-1955. The second peak of resistance in 1956-57, was occasioned by poor crops, food shortages, and disappointing economic conditions following collectivization and socialization. It has not occasioned a formal drive against "counterrevolutionaries," but appears to be one of the underlying causes of the current "rectification" drive. In addition, the period was marked by considerable resistance activity by the Tibetans, culminating in serious but somewhat localized rebellion in 1956.

27. The upheavals in Poland and Hungary also had some effect, as the Peiping regime itself admitted. As a result, the Communist leaders, in order to forestall possible popular unrest, granted that "contradictions" existed and accelerated the "rectification" campaign. This experiment partially backfired and the Party was forced to revert to its long-used methods of controlling public opinion, which undoubtedly contributed to discontent in the minds of some non-Party people. Moreover, the shifting of policies may also have generated considerable disagreement among Party leaders. But the main significance of these recent developments on the question of dissidence and resistance lies in the probability that the Chinese Communist leaders now have a better appreciation of the extent of discontent and a strengthened determination to crush, by forceful means if necessary, any significant overt manifestations of this discontent.

RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES TO DATE

28. As already intimated, resistance in Communist China was not appreciably affected by the death of Stalin and subsequent events. Rather, the course of such resistance was determined by local conditions. Except among certain tribal minorities it is estimated that virtually no organized resistance of a significant scale existed in Communist China at the time of Stalin's death. In some areas organized groups may have survived from the time of the Communist takeover, but they were almost certainly few and small.

(a) Organized Resistance

29. A few incidents of active, organized resistance on a purely local basis have occurred. For example, it is probable that uprisings against local authorities occurred in Southwest Sinkiang in 1954 and 1956. Seemingly, there was considerable popular participation in these incidents, and arms were reportedly used against government authorities and troops. Additionally, during 1956 there were reliable reports, some of which were admitted by the Peiping regime, of revolts in western Szechwan, an area outside of Tibet, but populated by Tibetans. Persistent reports have also been received of the spread of these uprisings to Tibet proper, and of the use of military aircraft by the Communists to quell the disturbances. At least one revolt was reliably reported during 1956 in the Liangshan Yi Autonomous Chou, an area populated by the Yi minority rather than Tibetans, in what is now western Szechwan.

30. An organized resistance group in Tibet, the Mimang, presumably had its origin at the time of the Communist occupation in late 1951, but did not come to the fore until about 1956. The numerical strength of this group is not known. The Mimang probably does not engage in specific training, the effectiveness of the group depending on the natural inclination of these people towards guerrilla-type warfare. The group's appeal stems from the antipathy Tibetans feel toward Han Chinese and their loyalty to Lamaism which binds them together in opposition to both the Han and fellow Tibetans who have cooperated with the Communists. Except for supplies captured from the Chinese Communist military forces, the weapons of the Mimang are probably limited to ancient rifles and homemade weapons. They probably operate in fairly small groups largely against targets of convenience.

31. Another organized anti-Communist Chinese resistance group consists mainly of emigrés in Indian border towns. It is believed that the Dalai Lama's brother, Gyalo Thondup, is connected with the group. This group may be supporting some of the resistance activities in Tibet.

(b) Unorganized Resistance

32. Unorganized resistance on the China mainland has appeared sporadically but there is no indication of a definite pattern of such activities or of a concerted effort on the part of the population against the regime. Periodic, spontaneous acts of resistance have taken place but remain localized, limited to certain social, minority, and religious groups. They have never presented a serious threat to the regime although it has at times led the regime significantly to alter some of its policies.

33. Resentment of the peasants against the compulsory cooperative system has expressed itself in such forms of passive resistance as withholding taxes, refusing to participate in government-sponsored programs to increase agricultural and livestock production, and to withdrawals from cooperatives. In 1956, a considerable number of provinces failed to meet their tax quotas. During 1957, 307 cooperatives in Kiangsu Province alone distributed grain to their members without allotting any for the public tax.

34. General dissatisfaction among urban workers over unsatisfactory working conditions (such as the speed-up system and excessive required overtime) and against unsatisfactory living conditions (such as poor housing and lack of consumer goods) has taken the form of strikes and passive resistance, including slowdowns, absenteeism and extensive use of "sick-leave." Unorganized active resistance is illustrated in a *People's Daily* report of 23 July 1957 of 253 cases of sabotage or suspected sabotage in factories and enterprises in Canton.

35. Unorganized resistance among students has taken the form of sporadic strikes and riots. In the early autumn of 1956 only 40 out of 4,000 students at a Peiping University attended what was supposed to be a compulsory discussion of the "Political Current Events Report."

36. Dissidence among intellectuals was expressed by intensive criticism of the Communist regime during the "bloom and contend"

period (not classified as "counterrevolution" by the Communists), and by occasional defections to Hong Kong. Nevertheless, the intellectuals who make up the "democratic" minor parties that collaborate with the Peiping regime have in those parties unique instruments for maintaining contact with one another, even though they have no mass following and are limited to major cities. Some individual intellectuals have apparently utilized these parties and other contacts to build up small personal followings. However, it appears that in almost all cases, dissident intellectuals hoped to use such contacts not to overthrow the regime but to exercise a "moderating" or "restraining" influence on it.

37. One of the most persistent problems for the regime is resistance to the Communist program by many of the non-Han Chinese minorities, particularly in the border areas. In addition to resistance by the Tibetans, the Communists have admitted uprisings also among the Turki peoples of Sinkiang in December 1954 and in March 1956, and resistance among the Hui (Moslems) of Kansu at unspecified periods. Minority areas include some of the most remote and inaccessible parts of China, areas from which even rumors are slow to leak to the outside world. Peiping's concern with minority dissidence is reflected in the general moderation of Communist policies in minority areas, and in the continuing warnings in Chinese Communist propaganda against the error of "great Han chauvinism." The most significant fact concerning resistance in minority areas is not so much the occasional outburst of rebellion, but rather the fact that the Communists have established effective control in some areas which for centuries have been breeding grounds for rebellion against Chinese authority. In the past few years the traditionally troublesome area of Sinkiang has been exhibited regularly to visiting dignitaries from Moslem countries, indicating that whatever rebellious activity may persist is at most local in extent.

38. Except for the secret sects, the Hui (Moslems), and the Tibetan Buddhists, there has been no recent significant, active resistance to

the regime by religious groups. However, the basic divergence between Communism and religious adherence manifests itself in passive resistance by many of the religious communicants throughout mainland China, reflected in continuing arrests of religious figures and in the restrictions imposed on such groups as Catholics. The regime has attempted to deal with this passive resistance by organizing Communist-front organizations of Moslems, Buddhists, Protestants, and most recently, Catholics and Taoists. While these attempts have been partially successful, some passive resistance continues among these groups.

39. The "rectification" campaign which spread throughout China as a consequence of Mao Tse-tung's speech on contradictions in February 1957, indicates that the Communist Party has taken serious cognizance of the existence of widespread antagonism toward the regime although the Communist leaders appear to have initially underestimated this antagonism. Peiping is fully capable of maintaining internal security, however, and prospects for an uprising along the Hungarian lines are unlikely to develop in the foreseeable future. The fact that the regime has made minor concessions to counteract dissidence, such as the recent withdrawals of Chinese civilian cadres from Tibet and the relaxation of some policies in the face of peasant unrest, does not mean the regime is incapable of controlling the masses. In the overall picture, resistance in its various overt forms appears to be of minor significance — not accurately reflecting the large extent of underlying dissidence. That dissidence expresses itself in apathy and lack of positive response to the regime's programs however, and constitutes one of Peiping's chief problems. The principal significance of such dissidence and resistance as presently exist or is predictable in Communist China lies not in any revolutionary threat to the regime itself but rather in the evolutionary effect it may have on the regime's policies. Lack of popular cooperation may delay the achievement of some of the Chinese Communists' objectives, particularly in the economic field, and may force the leaders to modify some policies. In particular, peasant dissidence may reduce agricultural production

and hamper the regime's efforts to collect agricultural surplus. This in turn, by its effect on food supplies, would increase dissidence in urban groups.

ROLE OF EMIGRÉS

40. There is a small group of Tibetans, in Kalimpong, India, composed of persons who have fled from Tibet since 1951. Some members of this emigré group are former high-ranking officials, and others were members of the Dalai Lama's retinue on his trip to India in the winter of 1956-1957. This group has reportedly tried to obtain aid from the Indian government, both in removing the Chinese Communists from Tibet and in granting asylum to the Dalai Lama. These attempts have been unsuccessful, although there is a possibility that the recent Chinese Communist decision to postpone the socialization of Tibet may have been somewhat influenced by representations from India and other "neutral" countries.

41. The more than 12 million Overseas Chinese who inhabit the various countries of Southeast Asia do not seem to be playing a significant part in guiding or aiding resistance activities in the homeland. There is a continuing bond between the Overseas Chinese and their ancestral land, and undoubtedly they are proud of the emergence of China as a world power, even though they may be opposed to Communism. These Chinese abroad continue to send back regular monetary contributions to their families on the mainland, and until recently there was a substantial flow of young Chinese back to the mainland for their education. This flow has declined during 1957. There is no evidence of Overseas Chinese contact with, or aid to, any resistance group in Communist China.

CHINESE NATIONALIST ACTIVITIES

42. The Government of the Republic of China on Taiwan is the most important group of Chinese outside of the China Mainland and has a limited potential to guide and assist resistance groups on the mainland. They have well organized and equipped military

units numbering over 600,000 including all services. Although these forces pose no real threat to the existence of the Chinese Communist regime, they are able, with outside support, to maintain a certain amount of military pressure along the central east China coast. Although the Nationalists conduct small-scale ground actions, propaganda missions and other air operations, and harass the Communists by artillery and naval patrol activity, they are not capable under present circumstances of maintaining major military operations on the mainland or of providing significant military support to other dissident or resistance elements on the mainland.

43. The most persistent category of "counter-revolutionary" activity to appear in Communist news and propaganda is that of Nationalist subversion, infiltration, espionage, and sabotage. Most of this activity is reported to be concentrated in the coastal region of Communist China, particularly in the area opposite the Nationalist-held offshore islands. Communist charges concerning Nationalist activities almost invariably deal with single agents or small groups of a half dozen or less, who are usually said to have surrendered or been apprehended almost immediately after being landed. The Communists have avoided implying that a widespread Nationalist network may exist on the mainland or that the Nationalists have organizational or communications lines to resistance groups that may be active, and there is little information available to determine the extent of popular sympathy toward Nationalist efforts on the mainland.

44. In northern Burma, and also in Laos and Thailand, former Chinese Nationalist irregulars numbering approximately 4,000-6,000 continue to exist. Although Taiwan has officially severed all ties with these elements, it is believed that the Chinese Nationalists still maintain contact with and provide limited support for these units. While these ex-Nationalist troops possess limited capabilities and presently confine their activities to maintaining their existence, they must, nevertheless, be considered as a potential resistance group.

REGIME MEASURES AGAINST RESISTANCE

45. The characteristic response of the Peiping regime to dissidence has been to combat it with the propaganda and administrative resources of the vast interlocking state-party apparatus. It also has been characteristic to alternate pressure and relaxation and to make concessions when expedient. Resistance, on the other hand, almost invariably has been dealt with by uncompromising suppression by the machinery of the police state. In addition to an extensive police network and the armed forces, the repressive machinery of the regime has been extended into all spheres by a system of occupational organizations, urban residence committees, and rural collectives. The existence of this tremendous security apparatus, the incessant program of indoctrination and propaganda, the strictness of travel controls, the rigid control of press, publications and radio, and the unceasing regimentation of people in every walk of life, explain the disappearance of earlier resistance groups and the lack of present organized resistance.

CAPABILITY OF REGIME TO SUPPRESS REVOLT

46. Communist China is a police state, and it is difficult to draw clear distinctions between its military forces and its security forces. The powerful People's Liberation Army (PLA), numerically the largest army in the world, with an estimated strength of two and one half million men, has a strong political background dating back to the days when the army and the Party were one. The People's Armed Policy (PAP) numbers more than 500,000.

47. A part of the stated mission of the PLA is the maintenance of internal security. The nature of PLA organization, and the organization of the PAP under the Ministry of Public Security imply that the detection and suppression of dissidence and minor resistance activity is a function primarily of the PAP, while only major, well-organized resistance requiring relatively extensive military operations in the field would become a target for PLA activity. To accomplish such missions

the PLA has Public Security regiments and divisions as well as its regularly organized ground, air, and naval forces. The Public Security units are small, lightly armed versions of their regular counterparts and have served in regular military operations. They are, however, well suited for operations in the field against irregular forces such as might be organized by resistance movements. The effectiveness of the PLA in maintaining internal security in China has been outstanding.

48. In addition to the PLA and the PAP, the People's Militia appears to have an internal security role in rural areas. Its members are subject to part-time duty, and most are poorly armed and trained. The effectiveness of the militia in suppressing resistance activity is probably very low. However, it undoubtedly serves as a fairly useful group in maintaining surveillance over the peasantry and reporting possible dissidence or other suspicious activity to local Communist authorities.

49. Moreover, the security forces have a very close relationship with the mass organizations which link the formal government and Party agencies with the various social groups in the population. These organizations, with a membership of many millions, extend the government's control down to the lowliest local neighborhood organization in the towns and to the cooperative level in the rural areas. Street and Lane Committees function as extensions of the police apparatus in urban areas.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS OF PEACE

50. In peacetime, organized resistance to the Peiping regime has virtually no chance of developing on a significant scale. With the possible exception of the Tibetan revolts, resistance in Communist China in recent years arose in reaction to specific local grievances. Effective internal security controls will continue to prevent potential resistance elements from organizing. The same strict controls will confine unorganized resistance to certain limited types of action largely of a passive character.

51. Resistance activity is handicapped by a number of key factors. The Party, army, and police are loyal to the regime. Dissident elements, although widespread throughout the population, with few exceptions, lack organization or communication with one another and generally lack the necessary appreciation of each other's problems and grievances to cooperate in active resistance on a wider scale. There is thus no presently identifiable basis for an anti-Communist front known to exist in Communist China. Dissident students and intellectuals who might conceivably provide leadership for a resistance movement, as they have in past periods in Chinese history, are disillusioned and demoralized. The "Hundred Flowers" period probably brought forth the maximum effort and even that effort almost certainly cannot be repeated in view of stringent measures.

52. The main factor that might affect the resistance potential in China is the state of the economy. Improvements in economic conditions sufficient to permit more liberal economic incentives would decrease popular ill will, while a deterioration of economic conditions would increase resistance activity. A general economic crisis could conceivably create conditions under which organized resistance on a larger scale could develop and unorganized resistance be considerably intensified. Even in such a case, however, it could not be assumed that a revolt would be possible on more than limited local levels, where the regime could suppress it with dispatch. In the special case of Tibetan resistance there appears to have been at least some degree of organization, motivated not solely by local grievances but also by a revulsion against Communism and a hatred of the Chinese invaders.

53. If there is little potential for active resistance in Communist China at present, there is nevertheless a substantial potential for dissidence. The Communist program of maximum investment in heavy industry will continue to lead to a great measure of dissatisfaction and disillusionment throughout the population and particularly among the peasants. However, Communist countermeasures

and devices for persuasion and force are sufficiently well developed to enable Peiping, if it continues to demonstrate the flexibility of policy it has exhibited to date, to confine dissidence to manageable levels and to prevent outbreaks of resistance in other than isolated, local instances. Nevertheless, dissidence will probably continue to be a limiting factor for the regime's program. The significance of dissidence lies not in a revolutionary threat to the regime, but rather in the effect it may have on the evolution of the regime's policies and the country's future development.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR

54. The extent of resistance in Communist China would depend on the nature and fortunes of the war. If the regime's military operations were successful, or the Communists could make it appear that it was, Peiping probably could rally many dissident elements to its side by an appeal to Chinese nationalism and xenophobia. In this case, dissidence would probably remain inactive and covert, as it did during the Korean war. If the regime suffered military setbacks, it is still doubtful whether resistance forces would be capable of strong and effective independent guerrilla action, even with help from abroad, unless Peiping security controls and propaganda facilities were seriously weakened. Under circumstances of fairly impressive non-Communist military successes, anti-regime operations in Communist-controlled territory would probably still be difficult, with the population generally avoiding the risks involved in organizing for or engaging in outright rebellion, or in assisting non-Communist intelligence or escape and evasion efforts. If the tide seemed to be clearly turning against the Communists, major defections from the Communist cause might be expected, and isolated and individual resistance activities would increase. But even under these conditions most types of resistance activities behind the Communist lines requiring an organizational effort would probably be a minor factor at least initially because of the time required to organize and train the resistance elements. If the war were a pro-

longed one, passive peasant resistance might become particularly significant by affecting the regime's food supply.

55. If a situation develops in which resistance elements could emerge, they would face a number of basic difficulties in developing a capability to harass the regime through guerrilla and political warfare activities, including sabotage. To provide any resistance efforts of military significance, groups would require effective leadership, coordination and material support. Moreover, the effort to develop such an organization would take place in a country where the bulk of the population is not prone to political action but rather tends to adopt a "wait and see" policy. Because of this traditional attitude, it is believed that lodgements in such strength as to assure early direct military support and relief would be required. By the same token, however, the average Chinese does not want to offend those who may succeed in taking over control of his country, an attitude that may under some circumstances assist in escape and evasion operations and intelligence collection efforts.

56. The nationality of the attacking forces would make some difference; Chinese forces from Taiwan would probably meet with a fair amount of popular acceptance, while Japanese forces would probably arouse the traditional antipathy against Japan, particularly in those parts of China with a tradition of guerrilla resistance against the Japanese. American participation would enable the Communist regime to appeal for popular support on the basis of Chinese nationalism and xenophobia, but would not be likely to antagonize potential active resistance elements. Furthermore, US participation might create the impression that the attack is likely to be successful. The nationality of other Asian or non-Asian forces would not be of major psychological significance. The really decisive psychological factor would not be the nationality of the forces engaged, but the prospect of military success or failure.

57. The use of nuclear weapons in an attack against the Chinese mainland which severely crippled the regime's control mechanisms

would create an opportunity for some indigenuous resistance. Initially at least, as indicated earlier, resistance efforts would be handicapped by lack of organization, and in this case, the disruptive nature of the attack would almost ensure that any actions would be localized. Moreover, it seems probable that the regime's local control agencies will rally to maintain their position and will pose a threat to the establishment of a strong resistance organization. To the extent that nuclear weapons were used for more tactical purposes than total destruction of the regime's control mechanisms, the problems in organizing effective resistance described above would obtain.¹

58. Existence under stringent Communist control has created among the masses of Chinese a great tolerance to harsh authority. It is probable that a relatively strict occupation policy would, by comparison, seem preferable to regimentation under Communism so long as no heavy demands were placed on the local economy for food, clothing, and shelter. However, a liberal occupation policy, especially one which provided for the relief of the needy, would undoubtedly tend to foster increased resistance activities in unconquered areas.

59. It is doubtful that the attitudes and actions of either regimes or resistance groups in other Sino-Soviet Bloc countries, with the possible exception of Soviet actions, would have any strong effect on resistance potential. Basic contributing factors to this are the lack of an efficient resistance organization in China, the isolation of resistance groups

¹Since this study has repeatedly demonstrated the existence of widespread dissident elements throughout the population and because a vast reservoir of emergent resistance leadership probably exists among former business leaders, intellectuals, and elements of the 5,000,000 veterans discharged from the army since 1949, the representative of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes the conclusion is justified that the elimination of selected targets important to the military and control strengths of Communist China and the widespread resultant disruption would greatly promote effective action on the part of dissident elements rather than discourage such action.

within China, and the lack of communication with groups in other countries. In the case of European bloc nations, the isolation resulting from distance and terrain and racial and cultural differences add to the unlikelihood that cooperation of any sort would eventuate.

60. Responsibility for the initiation of hostilities would not materially affect, either at the outset of hostilities or subsequently, the attitudes and consequently the capabilities of individuals and groups willing to engage in resistance activities.

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ANNEX D—CZECHOSLOVAKIA

BASIC FACTORS OF DISSIDENCE

1. Even though the old Czechoslovak Republic had a more vigorous democratic tradition than any other Eastern European country and was strongly Western-oriented, Communist strength was greater in Czechoslovakia than in the other present satellites. In the last free elections in 1946, Communist candidates got 38 percent of the votes. Since the 1948 coup, however, the Communists' drastic reshaping of Czechoslovak political and economic life has alienated many one-time sympathizers and even many Party members. Today, despite a surface appearance of calm and stability, the Czechoslovak population harbors considerable — though suppressed — dissatisfaction with the regime and with the USSR of which the regime is one of the most faithful servants. This dissatisfaction has been accumulating and becoming more apparent since the death of Stalin in 1953.

2. Among the factors that have tended to create ill will are the following: The regime's subservience to the USSR and the resulting subordination of CSR interests to those of the USSR; the efforts of the regime to reshape CSR society in the Soviet image with the concomitant adulation and copying of everything Soviet, falsification of history, repudiation of native traditions and severing historic and cultural links with the West; the belief that the CSR is being economically exploited by the USSR even though the living standard is somewhat higher than in other satellite states; loss of civil liberties and excessive interference with the citizens' lives; the persecution of church leaders as well as the harassment of believers; the detention of large numbers of political prisoners in jails and forced labor camps; and the all-pervading atmosphere of coercion, lawlessness and hypocrisy which characterize the regime's activities.

3. The one significant non-Czech minority, the Slovaks, resent what seems to them an undue monopoly of power and privileges by the Czechs, especially the concentration of authority in Prague and the dispatch of Czech officials and technicians to Slovakia. Although this is a grievance of long standing, antedating the Communist era, the apparent failure of the regime to remedy this situation after the liquidation of the "bourgeois" government aggravated the already existing ill will on the part of the Slovaks. The Slovaks blame the Czechs for having allowed the Communists to seize power, and the Slovak Communists have always been weaker numerically and in actual influence in Slovakia than the Czech Communists.

MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS

4. *Intellectuals and students.* Writers, who have been restive under rigid Party controls on literary expression, are among the most dissatisfied of the social groups. They particularly resent the lack of liberalization after Stalin's death. Regime controls were openly challenged at the Writers' Congress in April 1956, and some writers, especially in Slovakia, have not capitulated to the Party's demand for conformity and obedience. University students drew up an extensive list of political demands in May 1956 which were ignored by the regime. While there has been no student trouble since that event, this group almost certainly harbors anti-regime views. Like many young people in Czechoslovakia, they resent the excessive regimentation of life under Communism, and may on occasion be disinclined to caution and passive acceptance of the Communist regime.

5. *Youth.* The average young person in Czechoslovakia has assumed a protective coloration which enables him to live relatively comfortably under the present regime and to

escape more than minimum interference in his daily life by the Communist authorities. There is, however, a sizeable element of young people who resist all efforts at regimentation and besides adopting exaggerated imitations of Western dress and other external signs of disaffection will on occasion engage in riots and scuffles with the police. The regime has recently cracked down on this group in what was probably a nervous reaction magnified by last year's Hungarian events. This restlessness and lack of discipline of youth resulting from the Stalinist system prevailing in Czechoslovakia has been a problem for years. These elements are made up of less educated young people and are essentially negative in their motivation. Although they would probably be quick to join in any disturbances such as clashes between student demonstrators and police as in Hungary in October 1956 or between strikers and police as at Poznan, they are not a primary danger to the regime.

6. *Professional people, managers.* Middle-ranking civil servants, professional men, economic managers and engineers, are dissatisfied not only with the working of the regime as it affects them in their careers but also with the general nature of the regime, particularly its subordination of national interests to those of the USSR, its bias in favor of political reliability rather than efficiency, its general crudity, dishonesty, and lawlessness. Though this dislike of the very nature of the regime is found in all segments of the population, the professional group seems to be most sensitive to it. Yet there is perhaps more willingness in this group than in most others (except industrial workers) to accept a Communist regime provided it were cleaned up at various levels, committed to a humane and national-minded socialist program, and acted more independently of the USSR. Since this is not the case, disillusionment increasingly engenders dissidence.

7. *Peasantry.* The farming population objects to compulsory delivery quotas. But its resistance is characterized by apathy in planting and a slowdown in the required deliveries. The accelerated tempo of collectivization over recent years is chiefly the result of increased regime pressure which has overcome peasant

resistance. This weakening resistance has been exacerbated by the rapid aging of the rural population. Very few young people are staying on the farms, drifting into industrial jobs instead.

8. *Industrial workers* complain about long work hours, low real wages, poor housing facilities, and shortage in and high prices of consumer goods. They dislike the stringent labor discipline. There have been reports of scattered strikes in heavy industry and mining but none apparently serious. Despite their complaints, industrial workers have not been openly rebellious and, under present circumstances, are not likely to engage in active resistance.

9. *Armed Forces.* The permanent cadre of commissioned and noncommissioned officers gives continuing support to the regime, some from conviction and others from opportunistic motives. The approximately 90,000 conscripts inducted annually represent a cross section of Czechoslovak youth and probably reflect the general popular dissatisfaction with Communist rule. However, obviously unreliable individuals are not inducted into the Armed Forces, and conditions of military life and stringent political controls prevent the expression and dissemination of disaffection among the troops. Personal dissatisfaction with military service may be expressed not only in terms of the soldier's usual grievances, but also by a dislike of Soviet type of training and political indoctrination. However, although this discontent seldom overrides the normal military obedience to authority and there are no known instances of group defiance of military orders, the reliability of the Armed Forces in case of emergency is open to question. The militarized security forces (Frontier and Interior Guard), because of their very close screening of recruits, probably constitute the most reliable elements of the Armed Forces. On balance, it is highly unlikely that military personnel would offer active resistance to the regime under present conditions.

10. *Religion.* Religious believers resent the regime's policy of interning church leaders and doing everything possible to hamper the

normal functioning of the churches, to impede religious education, and to harass the faithful. In itself, this resentment does not pose a serious threat to the regime, but in combination with other factors helps to keep dissidence at a high level, especially in Slovakia.

11. *Slovaks*, being predominantly Catholic, historically at odds with the more advanced Czechs, individualistic and nationalistic, have always represented a special problem to the Communist regime. Not only is there in Slovakia a stronger anti-Soviet sentiment but also there has remained the traditional anti-Czech feeling. As a result, Communism has had considerably less success establishing firm roots in Slovakia than in the Czech lands, and it continues to have difficulties in organizing loyal Communists on the grass roots level as well as in obtaining faithful adherence by Party members to central directives. Many of the unconfirmed but plausible reports of unorganized and modestly organized resistance relate to Slovakia. Thus, a considerable potential for resistance exists in Slovakia, but its apparent lack of organization and focus against the centers of Communist power restricts its actual effectiveness.

INTENSITY OF DISSIDENCE

12. Although dissidence is more pronounced in Slovakia than in Bohemia-Moravia, there is little evidence of active resistance in either area. Communist security controls have not changed significantly since the death of Stalin; they are still so pervasive that people are afraid to voice criticism of regime, let alone engage in open resistance. Moreover, the events in Hungary have only deepened the conviction that Soviet troops, while not at present stationed in Czechoslovakia, would come to the assistance of the regime to put down any revolt that could not be handled locally and that there is no hope of Western help. As a result, the population at no time was in the reckless revolutionary mood which characterized Poland and Hungary in 1956. Isolated expressions of dissidence found no active popular response. The regime has not wavered since in its firm attitude, and the population has refrained from overt expres-

sion of hostility other than grumbling about restrictive policies, extensive government control, and living conditions in general.

13. It is true that dissatisfaction with the regime is found in all segments of the Czechoslovak population, even among Party members. But dissidence is not translated into widespread strikes, riots and public disturbances, except for occasional trouble with young "hooligan" elements. It is confined largely to verbal criticism of the regime and fairly mild demand for change on the part of certain educated and articulate segments of the population, notably writers, university students, and some Party groups in government ministries. These dissident groups appear for the moment to be biding their time, waiting for more opportune external and internal conditions.

14. In general, the Czechoslovak population as a whole is not in a mood to defy the regime and press for revolutionary changes. There is a deep-seated fear of the risks involved in a change on the part of those who have lived through the upheavals caused by the German occupation and the imposition of the Communist regime in its place, and who have experienced the absence of Western intervention in Eastern Europe. These people fear not only the painful loss of life and property in a Hungarian-style uprising but also the possible loss of jobs and various social benefits, and another prolonged period of uncertainty and political upheaval.

TRENDS OF DISSIDENCE SINCE 1953

15. Despite the surface appearance of calm and stability, dissatisfaction of the Czechoslovak people has been accumulating and increasing since the death of Stalin, mainly because the regime did not move toward greater liberalization. There were a few concessions, such as a slight relaxation of police pressure and an improvement of the standard of living. But by mid-1956, it had become clear that the Communist leaders did not intend to grant any *basic* concessions, either internally by permitting greater freedom, or externally by moving towards a more independent position vis-a-vis the USSR. The population is dissatis-

fied with this unyielding attitude on the part of the regime, but appears unwilling to do anything about it. Some open expressions of dissidence in May 1956 were quickly countered, and, at the Party Conference in June 1956, it was firmly stated that no further concessions would be made in response to demands for political liberalization.

16. The regime has been able to cope successfully with dissidence largely because unrest has been confined to small groups and has been kept from spreading to broad segments of the population. There has been a closing of ranks under pressure of events among the leadership and hence no opening which could be exploited by dissident elements. Nor is there any weakening of the authority and effectiveness of Party and police controls of the kind which permitted similar beginnings of dissidence in Poland and Hungary to grow bolder, stronger and more widespread. So far as the Communist Party itself is concerned, the sustained campaign against "revisionism" and the efforts made to deny the applicability of Mao's theories on socialism to Czechoslovakia show that the leaders continue to have good reason to doubt the loyalty and orthodoxy of the mass of Party members. Thus the regime strives to maintain strict ideological orthodoxy as the official policy. This policy evidently receives full support from the hard core members of the Party apparatus, and hence the regime has been able to suppress the kind of deviationist thinking which cropped up immediately after the Twentieth Congress.

RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES TO DATE

17. There are no known organized resistance groups in Czechoslovakia, nor have there been any for many years. There is, however, a certain amount of passive, unorganized resistance, mostly in the form of attempts to evade labor discipline, non-attendance at political meetings, failure to pay dues to Communist organizations, and similar derelictions. The motives are not always political. There are occasional cases of active resistance by individuals, largely in the form of violent assault on and even murder of Communist function-

aries by one or more aggrieved individuals, and sometimes in the form of support by individuals for Western intelligence. :

ROLE OF EMIGRES

18. Since the death of Stalin, material support by emigres to internal Czechoslovakia resistance has been non-existent, as has that from any other external source. No regular channels exist at present for getting such support into Czechoslovakia. Emigre guidance for internal resistance has been equally lacking, except to the extent that one or another political grouping of the Czechoslovak emigration has succeeded in gaining acceptance for its views by some Western propaganda agency, which has then incorporated such a "line" into its efforts to reach the Czechoslovak population. A considerable body of evidence indicates that Western broadcasts are widely heard in Czechoslovakia and that propaganda in pamphlet form does receive some attention. There are also indications that Western broadcasts have both adherents and critics among the population.

REGIME MEASURES AGAINST RESISTANCE

19. The regime has maintained intact its comprehensive security controls. The threat of these organs to the people is being kept alive by repeated announcements of the arrest of "enemy agents," reminding would-be conspirators that their activities are doomed to failure. Apart from the regular armed forces, the regime's security apparatus consists of highly centralized units, all under the command of the Ministry of the Interior. Its total strength is estimated at from 110,000 to 140,000. This strength figure does not include some 160,000 to 200,000 personnel who serve part time in various civilian militia groups. In addition, many thousands of people assist as paid and unpaid agents and informers and as such make a considerable contribution to the mission of maintaining the security of the regime. Under the Ministry of Interior are the following major components: (1) The Frontier Guard (PS) and Interior Guard (VS), with a total strength of 45,000 men organized into military units; (2) the secret police (StB), with an estimated strength of

only 5,000 but controlling a widespread net of agents and informers; and, (3) the Public Security Corps (VB), with a strength of 60,000 to 90,000 which includes as its largest component the regular police. This apparatus is supplemented and supported by an elaborate system of population registration and documentary control.

20. The Czechoslovak regime conducts continuous propaganda by press, radio and personal agitation for the purposes of indoctrination, vilification of Western objectives, labeling faith in Western "promises" as futile self-delusion, etc. The regime eagerly exploits all evidence of refugee activity which may be construed as advocating that the only alternative to the post-war economic and social system is a return to conditions of 1938, conditions that may no longer be satisfactory to what is probably a majority of the population. Moreover, the regime plays up the continuing Czech dislike and fear of the Germans, claiming that the end of Communism in Czechoslovakia will mean the return of German domination. While exploitation of these themes falls far short of the regime's objectives of winning over the population to enthusiastic support, nevertheless they help to keep alive Czech disillusionment with the West and the painful period of German occupation and to this extent may contribute to the many other factors inhibiting resistance. Moreover, the people in Czechoslovakia are undoubtedly aware that their standard of living, while low, is higher than that of neighboring satellites.

CAPABILITY OF REGIME TO SUPPRESS REVOLT

21. The Czechoslovak security forces are fully capable of preventing an expansion or increase of resistance activity by any local anti-regime elements, organized or unorganized. But even if security controls were relaxed, and the people were less cautious in voicing their opinions of the regime, they probably would not increase their resistance activities, at least not in the Czech lands. Traditionally, the Czechs are a cautious people, and it is believed that they would be more inclined to wait for liberation by external powers than to fight

for it themselves. However, the Slovaks are of a different temperament, and it is possible that some of them would renew their partisan activities against the regime in the event of a security relaxation.

22. However, in the unlikely event of a widespread popular revolt, the regime would almost certainly be incapable of successful counter-action without Soviet help. In such a situation, the regular armed forces probably would not be considered reliable, and the regime would ask for help from the Soviet Army, substantial units of which are available in adjacent areas of the Soviet Union and in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS OF PEACE

23. So long as Soviet power remains unchanged, the regime's security controls unaltered, and the present standard of living unimpaired, organized resistance has virtually no potential. Unless a significant deterioration of internal controls occurred and possible Soviet intervention were precluded by a major internal crisis within the USSR or heavy Soviet involvement elsewhere, the prospects for organized resistance remain poor. The regime's effectiveness in eliminating all significant organized underground and partisan resistance groups, the prevailing view that liberation cannot be achieved without direct Western assistance, and the regime's pervasive controls serve to inhibit the evolution of a popular resistance movement.

24. Passive resistance along lines already indicated could assume greater proportions and extend to frequent acts of economic sabotage if the regime were forced to revise drastically downward its present level of efforts to increase housing, consumer goods, and food stocks. Further political or military crises in other Bloc countries might then act as a catalyst for spontaneous disturbances in Czechoslovakia. Unorganized passive resistance will probably continue but within rather narrow limits. Isolated instances of unrest, such as occurred in June 1953 and in May 1956, are possible but of no long-range significance. Neither are the limited capabilities of intel-

lectuals and students to pressure the regime for liberalization because the Communist leadership is quite able to suppress such activities or keep them within easily manageable proportions. There is a bare possibility that the intellectual ferment might affect the Communist Party bureaucracy, but the apparent lack of a leader of the Gomulka type will almost certainly leave Czechoslovak fortunes in the hands of the unrelenting "Stalinists." Thus present evidence does not provide a basis for expectation that unorganized resistance will become anything more than an irritant to the regime.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR

25. In the event of war between Bloc and non-Bloc states, the Czechoslovak regime would immediately intensify its security measures. This would initially restrict the populace from participating in resistance activities. It would also give them time to observe the progress of the struggle so that they could place themselves in a more favorable position with the prospective victor. It is not likely that resistance would develop if it were apparent that Soviet forces were generally gaining and would continue to control Czechoslovakia and the areas adjacent to it, and that there was no immediate prospect of the arrival of Western troops. It is likely that in case of war the Czechoslovak security police would immediately take drastic precautionary measures, probably interning or even deporting to the USSR thousands of known or suspected anti-Communists. In these circumstances only a small number of courageous people could be found who would be willing to risk serious resistance activity, such as sheltering Western airmen or escaped prisoners, mainly in rural areas and Slovakia.

26. On the other hand, were it apparent that Soviet forces were generally losing and that a retreat of Soviet power from Czechoslovakia and adjacent areas was imminent, there would be an increase in resistance activity accompanied by a breakdown of Communist police controls as Communists fled or simply failed to carry out orders. Resistance elements would engage in industrial and agricultural

sabotage activities; with outside help, they would undertake intelligence collection, escape and evasion operations and other activities that would be detrimental to the Bloc. At the same time, skeleton underground clandestine organizations and guerrilla bands might begin to operate. Good possibilities for guerrilla type operations appear to exist in the mountainous areas of Slovakia. In addition, there is a limited basis for cooperation between Slovak, Polish and Ukrainian anti-Communist groups by virtue of their common access to the Carpathian mountain ranges, past cooperation among them, and bonds of ethnic kinship. Since Soviet troops would be deployed in Czechoslovakia in the event of war, an effective partisan movement probably could not develop unless substantial Western assistance was made available, and their activities coordinated with Western military operations.

27. In case of a major breakdown of Soviet military power in the area, it is possible that elements of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces might switch sides, even undertaking guerrilla action against the retreating Soviet forces. More likely, however, would be a general breakdown of military organization as Communists and non-Communists fought each other, deserted or simply stood by idly till Western forces arrived.

28. The nationality of attacking forces would probably make little difference, provided it was made clear that Czechoslovakia would retain its present frontiers and be restored to full independence. The presence of a substantial number of Germans among the attacking forces is likely to have noticeable negative psychological effects at least in the Czech lands. Most of the people of Czechoslovakia probably would not be concerned with the responsibility for initiating hostilities because they look upon war as the only means of national liberation.

29. The extensive use of large nuclear weapons on Czechoslovak territory would greatly antagonize the people, and the survivors would concentrate their efforts on self-preservation rather than assisting either side in the struggle. Such adverse reactions might be reduced

but by no means eliminated if tactical nuclear attacks were limited primarily to military and government control targets, isolated from larger populated areas. In the latter case the will to resist might be increased since such attacks could diffuse and lessen the control strengths of the Czechoslovakian regime.

30. Occupation policies formulated by the advancing Western powers, designed to guarantee the territorial integrity and national inde-

pendence of Czechoslovakia, would almost certainly enlist Czechoslovak cooperation and stimulate resistance in areas still under Communist control.

31. No individual resistance factions for post-war leadership are known to exist in Czechoslovakia. Certain emigre groups may desire to establish leadership, but their unpopularity among their countrymen would make such a goal unattainable.

ANNEX E—EAST GERMANY

BASIC FACTORS OF DISSIDENCE

1. Popular opposition to the East German regime continues to be widespread. It is sustained by resentment of the regime's police state methods which, though changed in the employment of outright cruelty since the death of Stalin, have remained essentially the same in repressing political freedom. It is further aggravated by economic regimentation and the failure to raise the standard of living to a level comparable to that of West Germany. Most of all, dissidence is directed against a regime which is regarded as the tool of an alien power, representing the interests of the USSR and dependent on Soviet support for its continued existence. This was clearly demonstrated when only the intervention of Soviet occupation forces prevented the East German regime from disintegrating during the June 1953 uprisings.

2. The character of popular disaffection in the "German Democratic Republic" (GDR) is shaped, to a considerable extent, by the circumstance that contacts between the people of the GDR and those in the West are much more free and frequent than are contacts between the populations of other satellites and the West. Moreover, the East Germans are tied to West Germany by common bonds of national identity and by the hope that eventual unification will mean liberation from Soviet-Communist rule. As a result, nearly all East Germans do not identify themselves with the GDR as a separate country and do not look upon the GDR as permanent.

3. Soviet occupation of East Germany cannot be disguised. It underlines the puppet regime's complete dependence on the USSR and thus prevents it from permitting any modification of the system not approved by the Kremlin. Furthermore, traditional disdain of the Slavs, combined with experience of Soviet

brutality, tends to equate Communist methods — rather than Marxist philosophy — with Soviet overlordship. Meanwhile, the existence of a much larger prosperous West German state confronts the GDR regime with the obvious rebuttal to any claim of representing the interests of the German people as a whole. As a result, the leaders of the Communist SED (Socialist Unity Party) and the government are generally hated and detested.

4. Economic privations, even though lessened by concessions made after Stalin's death, continue to affect nearly every East German, with the exception of the Party elite, high government officials and leading intellectuals. These deprivations — in the face of West German abundance — are made particularly unpalatable by the regime's compulsory ideological indoctrination and by its attempts to orient German culture eastward. The East Germans consider themselves as belonging to the West and in fact believe their culture to be superior to that of the East. The regime's anti-Church activities have also contributed to popular dissatisfaction. =

5. In the wake of Soviet political gyrations, East German dissidence has fluctuated between resignation and the desire for revolutionary action. The events of 1956¹ caused considerable unrest, compelling the regime to take extensive precautionary measures. These measures, coupled with subsequent Soviet efforts to stabilize the position of the USSR and International Communism and the successes, real or apparent, of this campaign have probably cautioned East German resistance elements. Nevertheless, the potential remains very great, not only among the dis-

¹The 20th CPSU Congress, CPSU statements in June and October, the emergence of Gomulka in Poland, the Hungarian revolution, and the 29 December statement of the Chinese Communist Party.

affected groups listed below but also among many rank and file members of the Party and its mass organizations, the government bureaucracy, white collar workers and the intelligentsia. It has been estimated that not more than 10 percent of the population actually support the regime, and it is almost certain that such support is confined to people who have a personal stake in its continuation. Since late 1949, when the refugee registration program was initiated in West Germany and West Berlin, at least two million persons have fled to the West, about half of them under 25 years of age.

MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS

6. *Industrial Workers.* Disaffection and resistance in the GDR are endemic in the industrial centers. More than one-third of the wage and salary earners in the GDR are industrial workers. About 70 percent of them are employed in the nationalized industries. Soviet hopes that these workers would become the ideological and social foundation of Communist authority in the GDR have not materialized. After 1945, the sharp trend of German labor toward Communism during the Weimar Republic moved back toward the traditional social-democratic channels which are tied to strong but free trade unions. German social-democracy has been evolutionary (revisionist) rather than revolutionary and, therefore, has been traditionally the target of intense Bolshevik hostility. Since the tradition of free trade unionism is still very strong, the fact that under the GDR the unions have become instruments of government control has greatly contributed to the workers' disaffection. Furthermore, the workers are disgruntled over low wages, high work norms, substandard living conditions, insufficient food supplies, lack of consumer goods, ever-present ideological propaganda, forced attendance at political rallies, and imposition of alien Soviet labor methods.

7. *Youth,* from which the regime had expected to obtain strong support, has proved to be as disappointing as labor. More than one-third of the East German population, about seven million persons, are under 25

years of age, a generation disillusioned by Nazism and therefore thought to be ready for the acceptance of Communism. But there is evidence that the majority of youth is indifferent or hostile to the regime. The influence of parents, Church affiliations, older workers and non-Communist teachers, and the nearness of the West still militate against the success of the Communist youth program. Nevertheless, although the majority of East German youth almost certainly are not loyal to the Communist regime, they, like their elders, have been unable to organize their opposition to the regime. Youth has shown opposition primarily in individual actions, especially flight and nonconformity. Most outspoken in their opposition probably were students who demanded — in vain — the abolition of compulsory instruction in the Russian language and in Communist ideology, the right to organize freely, and easier access to the West. Whether there will eventually emerge a small leader group of more mature young people constituting a more effective resistance potential, or whether resistance will remain limited to passive expressions of discontent, will depend on the stability of Communist leadership.

8. *Armed Forces.* There is considerably less evidence of dissidence in the East German Army than in the population as a whole. Discontent is strongest among those who "volunteered" for service under any of the various forms of duress commonly employed by the regime. There is undoubtedly less disaffection in the permanent cadre of commissioned and non-commissioned officers — constituting some 20 percent of the 100,000-man force — than among the two-year "volunteers." Most of the latter, however, are former members of Communist youth organizations who have been specially selected by Party boards throughout the country because of their presumed reliability — or at least the absence of any evidence of disloyalty on their part. Military organization and discipline and constant surveillance make any spread of dissidence within the force difficult. Moreover, since the physical conditions of service life have improved, they no longer serve as primary sources of resentment toward the

present Communist government. In general, these same considerations apply to the militarized security forces (Border Police and Interior Troops). There is believed to be less dissidence in these forces than in the Army, however, because of more careful screening before induction.

9. No actual organized resistance has been noted within the Army or militarized security forces. Morale and discipline within the Army are only fair, however, and instances of inattention to duty and individual acts of insubordination are frequent. Forceful opposition to military and governmental authority probably would not occur on a significant scale except in extraordinary circumstances, such as widespread domestic revolt or a war in which Western forces (particularly if these included West German contingents) were about to invade East Germany. In less dramatic situations, such as local disorders, the East German Army probably would give no more than nominal support to the present regime.

10. *Businessmen.* From the outset of the Soviet occupation of East Germany, it has been Communist policy to eliminate the middle class as an independent political factor. This policy has been applied most ruthlessly to the economically stronger elements of the population; it has been considerably modified, however, when applied to those groups which the regime needed for political or technological reasons. Although there is still some private enterprise left,² businessmen almost certainly realize that they have only a temporary reprieve and will be eliminated in due time. While the outlook of these elements is necessarily anti-regime, they are almost certainly bound to remain cautious, inclined to passive resistance only if they see no risk.

11. *Professionals and Intellectuals.* With the exception of some artists and scientists who

²Private industry produced 11.6 percent of the East German total by the end of 1956. The turnover of private retail trade in the GDR amounted to a slightly less than 29 percent of total retail trade turnover in 1956. In the wholesale business, the share of private enterprise had sunk to less than 4 percent by the end of 1956.

have been offered and have accepted a highly favored social and economic position and who thus have a stake in the continuance of the regime, the vast majority of the intellectuals have remained anti-regime. Many of them have withdrawn from professional life and others have become noticeably less productive. Quite a few have escaped to the West, but others have remained in East Germany in an effort to maintain German cultural traditions without surrendering to the ideological demands of Communism. In view of the respect and influence which intellectuals and artists generally enjoy in Europe and particularly in Germany, their resistance potential is considerable though largely intangible. This does not mean that all those who oppose the regime are also anti-Communist; the case of Wolfgang Harich is representative of persons who hate the regime and detest Soviet overlordship although they would go along with a national Communist type of government. Nevertheless, in spite of the advantages offered to those intellectuals who are willing to collaborate with the regime, most of them will remain opposed to Communist methods and many will, as the occasion arises, express this opposition directly or indirectly through their media, or, alternatively, either by withdrawal ("inner emigration") or by flight.

12. *Churches.* Of the 17.6 million inhabitants of the Soviet Zone and the Soviet Sector of Berlin, about 15 million are Lutheran/Evangelical and two million Catholics. Both church groups have resisted Communist atheism and immorality, each according to its own institutions and its own traditional attitudes to the state and to governments. Generally speaking, however, the ideological and institutional struggle of the SED regime against the churches has not been as intense as that of the regimes in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. The SED regime has not wished to attack excessively the Lutheran/Evangelical churches in the Soviet Zone because of the impact such a policy of total persecution would have on their own coreligionists (24.5 millions) in the Federal Republic. Secondly, the Lutheran/Evangelical churches are administratively decentralized within the Soviet Zone and therefore do not present a cohesive

institutional challenge to the policies of the SED regime. This coincidence of SED policy goals and traditional Lutheran/Evangelical attitudes of cooperation with existing authority has resulted in a difficult but tolerable truce between the two in which each tries to erode rather than explode the powers of the other. For its part, the Catholic Church is too small to have much influence in the Soviet Zone.

13. *Party and Government Functionaries.* Although the regime has strenuously attempted to maintain ideological conformity among its supporters, there is evidence of a cleavage between the working level in government and Party and the central authorities. Particularly those persons who were more recently drawn into the Communist apparatus have had difficulties in adjusting themselves to the conflicting pressures imposed on the one hand by the rigorous demands of the central authorities and on the other hand by the popular rejection of the regime. This conflict has affected not only persons sensitive to popular feeling but also those influenced by idealistic elements in Marxist doctrine, who have become disillusioned or frustrated by the impossibility of achieving anything consistent with their concepts of the general welfare. Some dissatisfaction has appeared among the lower ranks of functionaries and others on whom the regime relies. This has been reflected in numerous defections of party officials, police, local government officers, and active as well as former members of the security and military forces who have fled to West Germany. However, the treatment accorded in Hungary to security officers and other Communist functionaries during the 1956 revolt by the populace has tended to make Communist functionaries in East Germany close ranks behind the regime.

INTENSITY OF DISSIDENCE

14. Despite the great extent of disaffection in the GDR, dissidence, with the single exception of the 17 June 1953 uprisings, has expressed itself only in defection, transmission of intelligence, passive resistance (without significant risk), and anti-regime propaganda activities. In the second half of 1956, initially under the growing impact of "de-Staliniza-

tion" and later as a response to developments in Poland and Hungary, considerable discontent manifested itself, especially among intellectuals, students, and workers in the larger industrial enterprises. This discontent reached its peak during the early successes of the Hungarian revolution. With the suppression of the Hungarian revolt, however, the intensity of discontent and of resistance became progressively dissipated until, by mid-1957, when communal elections were held throughout the GDR without major incidents, the regime had demonstrated again its hold over the population.

15. However, the ease of access to the GDR from West Berlin and West Germany has facilitated the organization of some resistance groups operating from these areas. These groups encourage cautious covert resistance; their main objects are anti-regime propaganda, keeping files of persons in Communist prisons and assisting families of the prisoners, keeping track of crimes committed by the Communists, keeping alive the spirit of resistance, and gathering as much information as possible. They discourage, however, overt active resistance which stands little chance of escaping harsh retaliation.

TRENDS OF DISSIDENCE SINCE STALIN'S DEATH

16. The only conspicuous resistance in East Germany since the death of Stalin was the June 1953 uprising. Although there does not appear to have been any central guidance to the uprisings, they followed the same pattern everywhere, thus showing the uniformity of anti-regime feeling and producing a solidarity of action among East Germans not observed previously or since. Caught unprepared by the extent of the disorder, the East German government could not contain the uprisings and was forced to call on Russian forces to quell them. The readiness of the Soviets to respond to the regime's call for help provided an object lesson which the East Germans took to heart. While there is no reason to believe that anti-regime feelings in East Germany has abated in the slightest since June 1953, the prevailing temper since that time has been one of restraint. The population is apparent-

ly resigned to the fact that the Communist regime is there for some time to come and that any active resistance to it is foolhardy as long as Russian troops remain in occupation. Consequently, except for individual acts of resistance, occasional small-scale strikes, and a few student demonstrations, resistance since 1953 has been limited to the passive variety, with flight to the West — still regarded by many as a measure of last resort — serving as an essential safety valve.

17. Some dissidence has arisen in university and Party intellectual circles since the 20th CPSU Congress and the ensuing de-Stalinization program. The temporary ideological disorientation and the anti-Party trends which resulted from the Stalin denigration caused confusion in Party thinking, an outbreak of "deviationism," and widespread ferment among intellectuals. SED spokesmen indicated that they were determined not to permit events in East Germany to proceed as they did in Poland or Hungary. Large-scale precautionary measures were taken to prevent any outbreaks. These measures were almost certainly helped by efforts in West Germany to stave off any hopeless revolt.

18. It is improbable that the intellectual opposition to Ulbricht and present SED policies holds any real danger for the regime as long as Ulbricht retains the support of the Soviet Union. It is to be noted, however, that despite the regime's measures, the intellectuals, though they may have been intimidated and silenced, have not been reconciled, as is evidenced by the flight to West Germany on 22 August 1957 of Professor Alfred Kantorowicz, a dedicated Communist since 1931 and one of the GDR's leading intellectual figures.

RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES TO DATE

19. No organized resistance groups of any significance are known to exist today in East Germany. Anti-Communist groups based in West Germany are active in the GDR and command the cooperation both of individuals and of small numbers of politically conscious East Germans who meet regularly to exchange news. But organized resistance groups of the type which that term usually

denotes — partisan or guerrilla bands — are believed entirely lacking.

20. There are indications from almost all areas of East Germany of unorganized resistance, largely passive in nature. While all segments of the population appear to manifest passive resistance in one form or another, the stimulus to resist appears to come primarily from student, intellectual and upper working class strata. Dissidence also has been noted within the Party and Party-affiliated groups, though on a lesser scale. At times of international unrest (e.g., the Hungarian revolt) and major policy changes (e.g., the advent of de-Stalinization), there is a definite and perceptible increase in widespread passive resistance, as well as an appearance of localized, sporadic overt opposition.

21. The present SED regime is universally detested by the East German population, of which it is estimated that less than 10 percent would vote Communist in a free election. The people generally resent the government's police state methods and high-pressure indoctrination, its economic regimentation and failure to sufficiently raise the standard of living, its alien character and subservience to the Soviet Union, and its position as a major obstacle to German reunification. One of the most obvious indications of the general dislike of the regime which exists among all categories of East Germans is the persistent flight of East Germans to West Germany and West Berlin. From 1949 until the end of 1957, it is estimated that 2,275,000 persons — equal to almost 13 percent of the present population of the GDR — have expressed their opposition by flight.

ROLE OF EMIGRÉS

22. Germany being a divided country, German emigré groups do not exist in the sense that they do in relation to other orbit countries. However, passive resistance in East Germany is stimulated, and to an extent guided, by anti-Communist groups based in West Germany or West Berlin, such as the Eastern Bureaus (Ostburo) of West German political parties, especially the Social Democratic Party, the Investigating Committee of

Free Jurists (*Untersuchungsausschuss Freier Juristen*), and the Fighting Group Against Inhumanity (*Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit*). In West Germany and West Berlin, their activities are largely based on direct contacts with individuals and involve providing information, advice and material support. Their activities in East Germany consist chiefly of large-scale clandestine distribution of various kinds of literature, including their own publications, and the collection of information on events in the GDR.

23. These organizations strive more to maintain the spirit of resistance than to sponsor acts of sabotage or other forms of active resistance. They generally take the line that active resistance at this time is futile although passive resistance is possible. This accords with official West German and NATO policy which forbids the incitement of the East German population to revolt. This policy was followed even during the height of earlier Hungarian successes in 1956 when these groups, the Bonn government and individual West Germans with contacts in the GDR warned that on no account should active resistance against the regime be undertaken since it would produce no useful results and could only bring renewed disaster to Germany.

24. There is no evidence of non-German groups or individuals offering guidance or material aid for resistance activity apart from the limited efforts of the ICFTU (working through West German trade unions) and several Russian emigré groups based in West Germany, such as NTS (National Solidarists) and TSOPE (Central Association of Political Immigrants from the USSR).

REGIME MEASURES AGAINST RESISTANCE

25. The East German security apparatus is directed by the Ministry for State Security (MfS) and the Ministry of Interior. The MfS controls the covert organization for combatting and negating resistance and dissidence, whether organized or unorganized. It maintains an extensive and elaborate system of informants and surveillance, and uses penetration and provocation as primary means for detecting, combatting, and forestalling anti-

regime activities. The MfS also conducts campaigns to discredit the West German anti-Communist organizations with East Germans and to harass them in West Germany. The MfS also attempts to penetrate these Western organizations and to subvert their members.

26. The role of the Ministry of Interior has varied as a result of the continuous reorganization of the East German security apparatus. Already in control of the civil police, it acquired further security responsibilities in February 1957, when the militarized security forces were subordinated to it. =

27. In addition to standard devices of censorship, travel controls and informer nets, the regime uses such measures as the employment of a special party militia to help suppress opposition in factories; discriminatory taxation; the transfer of suspect workers and employees; and the arbitrary classification of failures to meet assigned production quotas, regardless of cause, as economic sabotage. The occasional practice of imposing severe penalties for the most minor infractions is another effective means used by the regime.

28. The primary deterrents to uprisings in East Germany are approximately 400,000 Soviet armed forces, stationed throughout the country. The regime itself controls some 240,000 trained uniformed men, equally divided between military and police forces, whose very existence tends to inhibit resistance activities. In addition, the *Kampfgruppen* (Auxiliary Shop and Factory Guards), organized following the June 1953 riots to prevent such disturbances from recurring, is being strengthened and intensively trained. It has held ostentatious antiriot exercises in various cities, with the obvious intent of intimidating the people.

CAPABILITY OF REGIME TO SUPPRESS REVOLT

29. Although capable of suppressing uncoordinated local uprisings, the East German regime, without the aid of Soviet forces, would be unable to suppress a major revolt. While the government probably could depend on a dedicated minority in the MfS in case of trou-

ble, none of its military and police forces are considered completely reliable. Some members would probably be reluctant to fight against their own countrymen, and in case of widespread revolt, might well defect to the side of those in opposition to the regime, depending on the exact conditions which prevailed. However, the 22 Soviet line divisions stationed in East Germany would be available for swift intervention to suppress any large-scale revolt. But barring an unforeseen change in the temper of the East German population, which remembers the Soviet action in June 1953 and more recently in Hungary, no revolt is likely to occur as long as these Soviet forces remain in East Germany.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS OF PEACE

30. There are no known organized resistance groups in East Germany. However, unorganized resistance is still rampant. It expresses itself primarily through flight to the West, the eruptions from time to time of minor strikes and slowdowns, student demonstrations, or other incidents. Dissidence within the Party and intellectual circles may continue, but the regime's demonstrated intention of dealing vigorously with such deviations, as well as Ulbricht's firm control of the Party apparatus and his explicit Soviet backing, will probably prevent such intellectual ferment from becoming any real danger to the regime.

31. Capabilities of anti-Communist groups based in West Germany and West Berlin consist mainly of widespread distribution, either by balloon or by mail and hand-to-hand methods, of anti-Communist, anti-regime literature. Under given circumstances, appeals by these Western-based groups to the East German population calling for active resistance might be heeded. This, however, would presuppose a major change in Western strategy, for West German and NATO policy now forbids incitement of East Germans to violence, and these groups adhere rigidly to that policy.

32. In the absence of organized resistance groups, any increase or change in resistance

potential must come from the unorganized dissident elements in the population. The June 1953 uprisings showed what the East Germans are capable of when sufficiently aroused. But as long as the stability of the regime remains unshaken and Soviet troops remain in East Germany, any attempted new form of, or increase in, the level of resistance activity runs the grave risk of counteraction and suppression by the regime's security apparatus.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR

33. In case of warfare between Bloc and non-Bloc countries on East German territory, large numbers of Soviet troops would be required to retain control of the GDR, thereby tying down units which could otherwise be used against attacking forces. As a result, initially, there would be little change in resistance activities other than a probable increase in acts of sabotage and attacks on local Communist functionaries. There would probably also be attempts at espionage, subversion, factory slowdowns, failure to cooperate on agricultural projects and, in isolated cases where topography permitted, small guerrilla warfare against the Soviet Army. Nevertheless, it would take time, outside support and the emergence of strong leadership capable of organizing and directing a centrally coordinated resistance force before opposition groups could become effective. The formation of such groups would be a hazardous task while the Soviet Bloc remained in power. If and when the Communists appeared to be weakening, the East Germans would intensify their efforts to sabotage supplies and materiel, to disrupt lines of communications, and to collect and disseminate intelligence to the non-Bloc countries involved in the encounter. On the other hand, Western defeats would immediately lead to a reduction in East German resistance activities.

34. The nationality of attacking Western forces would be immaterial to the East Germans since these forces would be regarded as liberators. For example, the employment of French and Italian troops would not adversely affect resistance capabilities.

35. If the military action took place in East Germany, the attitudes and actions of regimes and resistance groups in other Bloc countries would be of little significance. If the military action took place elsewhere within the Bloc, the East Germans could expect little cooperation from resistance groups in other countries, chiefly because resistance groups of other satellites would probably be preoccupied with their own national objectives. Nevertheless, in spite of distrust or fear of the Germans, the possibility of some resistance cooperation between elements in East Germany and other Soviet satellite countries cannot be entirely discounted if liberation from the Soviet yoke is at stake.

36. East Germans probably would not favor nuclear weapon attacks even though their hatred for the Soviets and the regime is intense. If use were made of major nuclear weapons, the resulting mass destruction and dislocation would virtually eliminate any effective forms of resistance activity. On the other hand, if circumstances permit use of tactical nuclear weapons, East Germans probably would accept their effects on the population as an unavoidable cost of liberation. Under these conditions resistance capabilities outside of areas immediately involved would not necessarily be adversely affected, and, in-

*The representative of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, would add the following: "It is conceivable that a nuclear air attack could be so designed as to eliminate the major resources of the military and control strengths supporting the regime without incurring popular hatred or destroying resistance potential. Such an attack could produce an opportunity for the East Germans to take over control of the country."

deed, the opportunities for Western-assisted resistance groups to seize local control would be materially increased.^{3 4}

37. The Soviet occupation of East Germany has prejudiced the people permanently against the Soviets. More liberal occupation policies by the Soviets during a war would be regarded simply as an opportunity for resistance. However, occupation of some parts of East Germany by NATO forces would encourage anti-Soviet resistance activities in unliberated areas.

38. There is no information available on individual resistance factions in East Germany which might aspire to post-liberation leadership.

*The representative of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, US Army, notes the presence in East Germany of six Soviet armies, including 22 line divisions, whose neutralization would require extensive use of nuclear weapons, and therefore thinks this paragraph should read as follows: "The East Germans would not favor the use of nuclear weapons on targets in East Germany. Initially, after a nuclear attack of any scale, active and effective assistance to the West would not materialize because of the confusion and uncertainty of the populace and the absence of pre-organized, strongly disciplined local resistance groups. Subsequently, resistance potential would be determined by the intensity of the attack, the emergence of native resistance leadership and organizations, the extent of material support from the West, and the unpredictable ultimate reaction of the populace to the use of nuclear weapons. If demoralization and physical destruction were not widespread, and if resistance organizations could be developed and given substantial assistance by the West, an opportunity could arise for East German groups to engage in anti-Soviet activity."

ANNEX F—HUNGARY

BASIC FACTORS OF DISSIDENCE

1. The Hungarians have always considered themselves the last eastern outpost of the West and an integral part of Western civilization. Culturally, the eastern Hungarian ethnic frontier has been the traditional dividing line between German and Latin culture on the one hand and Slavic culture on the other. From the viewpoint of religion, Hungary represents the farthest outpost of Roman Catholicism in Southeast Europe. Politically, the organization of parliamentary assemblies under a constitution preceded by several centuries the establishment of similar Western-type governmental institutions and parties in Eastern Europe. Being non-Slavic, non-Orthodox, and highly individualistic, the Hungarians are predisposed to side with any adversary of Soviet power. This predisposition, firm even before World War II, became particularly intense in 1945 under the excesses of Soviet military occupation, and even more so after 1947-48, when a non-representative Hungarian Communist minority was imposed upon the anti-Communist masses and complete isolation from the West set in.

2. Among the factors which created, and will for an indefinite period of time continue to create, popular hostility toward the regime is a historically anti-Russian attitude stemming from 1848-49. At that time, Hungary's greatest self-liberating effort was frustrated by invading Russian armies. Significantly, many of the slogans of the 1956 revolt alluded to that earlier uprising, and many of the actions of the rebels were patterned after steps taken at that time. Still another element is rooted in the fact that for two decades preceding World War II, the climate of Hungarian opinion was dominated by a collective sense of frustration created by the huge losses which the country had suffered under the post-World War I peace treaty. It lost roughly 64 percent of its territory and 58 percent of

its population to Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. Hostility against neighboring beneficiaries of those losses continues to exist despite official Communist claims of close friendship among the People's Democracies.

3. Further contributing to the deep-rooted difficulties of the Communists are distasteful popular recollections of the country's earlier (1919) sanguinary Communist dictatorship, a fairly strong social democratic tradition among the working class, a persistent shortage of new leadership potential because of indifference toward Communist indoctrination on the part of youth and shaky military morale of conscripts of anti-Communist peasant parentage.

4. Of at least equal importance is the inadequate standard of living. Work norms are high, wages are low, housing is poor, and food is scarce. Soviet exploitation of the Hungarian economy was bitterly resented. Since the revolution shattered many segments of the Hungarian economy and since there are no real indications of economic liberalization, the economic factor of dissidence remains strong.

5. Thus the attitude of the overwhelming majority of the population — some 95 percent, if the recent general uprising is a guide — toward the regime ranges from hatred to apathy. The characteristics and attitudes cited above are buttressed by opposition to agricultural collectivization, stress on heavy industry to the detriment of consumers' goods production, cultural and psychological Sovietization, anti-religious policies, regimentation of workers and the use of forced or quasi-forced labor, and the thwarting of various aims of a nationalistic coloration. The Hungarian revolution of 1956 furnished a full-scale demonstration of the degree and kind of anti-Communist and anti-Soviet potential of the Hungarian people.

MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS

6. The majority of *industrial workers*, some of whom were among the few original supporters of Communism, constitute a major dissident element. They were foremost among the forces battling the Communist suppressors in the days of the revolution. Along with lack of national independence and personal freedom, they resent the limited attempts, if not the outright refusal on the part of the regime to satisfy the desire for more consumer goods and a higher living standard, the perversion of labor unions, the lack of safeguards against "speed-up" work without adequate incentives, unsafe and unsanitary working conditions, arbitrary penalties, activities of labor informers, harsh work discipline and exhausting work methods.
7. The *intellectuals* who have sparked the uprisings against the regime, continue to constitute a resistance potential out of proportion to their small numbers. They resent the suppression of freedom of expression, the isolation from the West to which they feel culturally bound, the intellectual deterioration behind a facade of educational and cultural pretensions, and the generally low level of Hungary's intellectual life within the imposed framework of an alien and inferior pattern.
8. *Youth*. One of the most conspicuous failures of the regime has been its inability to secure the support of youth. Communist youth organizations have been plagued for years by a general apathy toward Party work. The participation of numerous youths in the uprising was impressive; even teen-age children battled the Soviet forces with unbelievable heroism. Youth resents the Party-imposed discipline, the compulsion to absorb an alien philosophy (Marxism-Leninism) and to learn the Russian language and the impossibility of gaining access to the Western culture complex.
9. *The peasantry*, although probably as anti-Communist a group as any in Hungary, can hardly be counted on to furnish active organized resistance. The best key to the role they are likely to play in the future may be their behavior during the recent revolt, when peasants spontaneously supported the insurgents by delivering food supplies, but did not enter the fighting to any extent. While their sentiments are doubtless basically unchanged, and while their resentment of government interference continues, it is possible that some of the opposition has been blunted by regime concessions, such as the deemphasis of collectivization.
10. *Armed Forces*. Before the 1956 revolution, considerable resistance potential was believed to exist within the Hungarian armed forces. Indeed, the Hungarian armed forces all but disintegrated during the uprising. A considerable portion of the military, officers as well as enlisted personnel, either refused to take action against the rebels or sided with the anti-regime forces to whom they gave weapons and with whom they fought side by side. As a result, a careful screening of military personnel was initiated by the Kadar regime. Only those were to be retained who were considered unlikely to foment trouble and who were not known to have participated in the revolt against the Communists. The same criteria were applied to the new conscripts inducted in April 1957 (and undoubtedly to the additional class scheduled for induction in the fall of 1957) and to the Frontier Guard organization which has been newly created. Nevertheless, in spite of all precautions and the strictest surveillance, it would be impossible for the regime at this time to organize any forces that are free of dissidence even though, as a result of careful screening, there is probably now somewhat less disaffection in the military establishment than in other elements of the population.
11. *The clergy*, while it continues to exert considerable influence among the people, has been showing signs of decreasing willingness to sharpen, or even discuss, outstanding issues in the Church-State relationship. The Catholic Bench of Bishops, particularly adroit in pre-revolt times in applying between-the-lines techniques in sermons and statements, seems to have decided to exercise the utmost caution for the time being. The resistance potential on the Church leadership level generally, both Catholic and Protestant, appears to be at its lowest ebb in years.

INTENSITY OF DISSIDENCE

12. Even before the 1956 revolution, there was strong resentment against Soviet control and influence, but the effectiveness of the security system limited Hungarian resistance to passive, unorganized manifestations. Other factors, such as physically and psychologically exhausting work norms, material want, compulsory political activities and unfavorable topography further discouraged active resistance. On the other hand, passive resistance in Hungary appeared to have been more widespread than elsewhere in the satellites. The 1956 revolution was almost certainly a spontaneous explosion which was as unexpected, even by Hungarians, as it was unorganized. It demonstrated the intensity of anti-regime and anti-Soviet feeling in the face of overwhelming odds. But it cannot be regarded as a precedent. Its inevitable outcome served as a warning to active resisters everywhere that except under extraordinary conditions, such ventures are bound to end in disaster. It did show, however, the depth of hatred of Soviet and native Communist rule.

13. The regime's awareness of the continuing validity of the basic reasons for dissidence is indicated by the intensive drives of repression which it carries on with the announced intent of eliminating "all vestiges" of the revolt. In the violent and sanguinary uprising, the people showed themselves to be almost entirely united in their hatred of the Communist system, the Soviet overlordship, and its local representation. The Kremlin and the Hungarian regime are now, even more than before, facing a hostile population in Hungary, and the time when this hostility may subside is not in sight.

TRENDS OF DISSIDENCE SINCE 1953

14. Profoundly dissatisfied under the Communist regime during the Stalin era, the Hungarian people expected major improvements after Stalin's death. However, the liberalization program adopted in 1953, ameliorated only a few of the conditions at the root of the widespread dissidence. Relaxation of police terror and mitigation of peasant regimentation appeared to heighten popular demands

rather than reconcile the population to the regime.

15. Initially, liberalization seems to have had little effect on resistance. Passive resistance continued, as did isolated instances of individual active resistance. There was no evidence of anti-Communist organization and there were no instances of mass anti-regime action such as in East Germany and Czechoslovakia in 1953, in Poznan in the summer of 1956, or even the Czech student demonstrations in May 1956. However, there is abundant evidence that after the 20th Congress of the CPSU, parts of the population, especially workers, perhaps encouraged by the example of the "revolting" Party intellectuals, vigorously and uninhibitedly criticized Party leaders and local functionaries in group meetings at the local level. But there is no substantial evidence that violent resistance was then contemplated by any significant group.

16. A very important manifestation of dissidence on a mass scale, though unorganized, was the spontaneous turnout of many thousands of Hungarians on the occasion of Rajk's reinterment early in October, 1956. As a prelude to the nationwide uprising that took place some three weeks later, this demonstration was significant in that the Hungarian people, at least in Budapest, at one stroke became conscious that their sentiments were fundamentally the same. Years of suffering at the hands of undercover security police, agents provocateurs, and informers had fragmented the Hungarians so that no one felt he could trust any other individual. The demonstration made them aware that untold thousands of individuals shared the same sentiments upon which they were willing to act, even against the wishes of the regime.

17. Within certain sectors of the Party, the comparatively liberal policies of the Nagy regime in 1953 gave rise to a belief (expressed by the writers and other intellectuals) that modification of Communism toward greater freedom and humaneness was not only desirable but feasible. The Nagy experiment stimulated the beginning of organized opposition by the intellectuals in late 1954. This opposition became increasingly vocal and far-reach-

ing in its demands, especially after the 20th Congress. It is unclear to what extent the opposition of Communist intellectuals and their collaborators to the Rakosi-Gero regime can be construed as resistance against the Communist system. It is unlikely that any substantial group of these avowed Communists contemplated the overthrow of the regime or plotted violence. In fact, the intellectuals' maximum program had more in common with political concepts of Western social democracy than with Communism. Acceptance of their program would have meant the end of Hungarian Communism as a one-party dictatorship subservient to the Soviet Union. The fact that the intellectuals approved the prospects of a non-Communist Hungary while the revolution was successful, does not necessarily mean that they had consciously striven for these objectives in the preceding months. The evidence suggests rather that their original and more consistent aims were limited to freedom of creation, i.e. freedom from Party press censorship, and did not extend to the destruction of the Communist system.

18. This intellectual "revolt" established a unique link between an important body of the Communist Party and the population at large. For the first time people began to read the Communist press voluntarily and with genuine interest. The grievances and hopes of the writers struck a responsive chord within the population, and hope arose that changes for the better could take place, particularly since influential Party members were agitating for them.

19. Ferment within the Party, caused by the factionalism between Rakosi-Gero traditionalists and new liberalizers (adherents of the Nagy-type Communist program) can hardly be classified as resistance. Neither faction was anti-Communist in the sense that it envisaged the end of Marxist-Leninist system, though nationalistic impulses, explicitly or implicitly anti-Soviet, presumably motivated many of the liberals. However, as in the case of the dissension represented by the opposition of the intellectuals to the upper hierarchy, the split in the Politburo indirectly stimulated the popular resistance potential by the confusion it created. It must have been evident to the

population that the Party could no longer claim monolithic unity. The confusion which the vagueness and zig-zagging of the Party line bred throughout the lower levels of the Party emboldened ever larger sectors of the population to challenge and defy Party directives and to hope for and demand far-reaching changes in the direction of humaneness, internal freedom, independence, and improved living conditions.

POST-REVOLUTIONARY RESISTANCE

20. Even though its translatability into action is undoubtedly far more limited than before, resistance potential may well be considered to be nearly as high as it was in the months preceding the uprising. Popular distaste for the regime and the entire Communist system is evidenced in various ways. Workers engage in slowdowns, absenteeism, and poor quality production, despite the regime's application of incentives on the one hand and punitive measures on the other. Party and government functions are poorly attended, and the Party, now reduced to 400,000 members, has had to admit the prevalence of skepticism and indifference among its own members.

21. Reports of organized resistance have been received continually since the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt in November 1956. Some of the reports received shortly after the revolt, have been verified and can be taken as evidence of organized resistance in the early months of 1957. Since that time, however, reliable information has been replaced more and more by reports of dubious validity. The evidence suggests a decline in the extent of organized resistance. This decline is probably due to the increasing effectiveness of government countermeasures and, to some extent, to loss of hope for immediate success in these activities. Moreover, in the generally flat terrain of Hungary, major armed resistance could not long survive. Nevertheless, the hiding of arms, one of the major reasons given by the Kadar regime in justifying many arrests, has been reported by several sources who claimed that a considerable part of the small arms, given by Hungarian Army elements to revolutionary groups, were still missing.

22. Another form of organized post-revolt resistance was the general strike late in 1956. When workers finally returned to the factories, they continued a virtual sabotage in the form of an evidently well-planned display of inactivity. As late as February 1957, this organized opposition apparently circulated such slogans as "Long Live Free Hungary, Long Live Imre Nagy!"

23. During November, December and January, a strong organization of Workers' Councils was a major source of active opposition to the Kadar regime. Although the regime dissolved the central and regional councils in December 1956 and the local councils in November 1957, there was firm evidence during January 1957 that their spirit of resistance and a professional awareness of the importance of organization remained high. Members of these councils have volunteered the information that they were changing tactics from overt to covert opposition. Early in January, they claimed a hidden radio transmitter for use in emergencies, facilities for printing a newspaper, a cache of arms, and an underground network embracing the whole country. Later in the same month, they also claimed to be supported by a network of political parties and an organization of writers.

24. The majority of the writers, grouped in the Hungarian Writers' Federation, showed signs of organized opposition up to the spring of 1957, drafting resolutions and voicing demands on the Kadar government. This opposition forced the regime to "suspend" the Federation's activities on 18 January and to dissolve it on 21 April. Arrests of writers have been announced from time to time. Many of the leading writers appear to have gone on a "silence strike," refusing to write for the Communist-approved publications. Although in the autumn of 1957, this "strike" showed signs of weakening—such as the forced signing of the 13 September manifesto protesting the UN debate on Hungary—its base still warrants consideration as a factor of potential resistance.

25. Under these circumstances, considering the general exhaustion and frustration of the

people, as a result of the unsuccessful revolution and in view of the strong security measures of the Soviet-sponsored regime, no organized resistance can be expected in the near future. For the time being, at least, the simplest and safest method by which the citizen can resist is by carrying out his work in a superficial manner and only externally complying with regulations, consistent with self-preservation and personal security.

ROLE OF EMIGRÉS

26. The existence of a sizeable anti-Communist emigration has been a source of discomfort for Communist Hungary in the period since World War II. A vigorous repatriation campaign is being conducted to alleviate this situation. Emigré efforts to broadcast anti-Communist material from the West have found some response in Hungary and have assisted in strengthening the morale of the numerous dissidents there. In general, however, Hungarians have tended to ignore emigré activities or to be critical of their leaders. Although some insurgents in late October 1956 called for the return of certain emigré leaders, especially pre-Communist Premier Ferenc Nagy, their absence during long years of national plight was generally resented. The manifest inability of pre-revolutionary emigrés to exert any influence on the uprising has dealt a blow to their organizations in the Free World and it is not likely to be forgotten in their homeland.

27. The Hungarian Veterans Comradeship Society (Magyar Harcosok Bajtarsi Kozossege—MHBK) an emigré organization of Fascist leanings under General Andras Zako, was considered for some years as militantly favoring Hungarian liberation from Communist rule. That it gave actual assistance to resistance groups inside Hungary, however, is doubtful. In 1953, the MHBK was thought to be disintegrating. An attempt to activate the group by proposing to stage an invasion was made, by General Zako, soon after the October 1956 revolt, but the proposal was not taken seriously by the West. The MHBK is not believed to have adherents capable of staging a resistance effort inside Hungary today.

28. Pre- and post-revolutionary emigré groups, though acting mainly outside Hungary and not yet effectively united, have plans which may have the effect of strengthening the overall resistance potential in Hungary. Also, numerous individual members of the pre-revolutionary emigré group in the Hungarian National Council, as well as the newer emigrés in the Hungarian Freedom Federation, claim to maintain potentially useful contacts in Hungary. However, it remains doubtful that the present basic disposition of the Hungarian people toward resistance could be substantially influenced by emigré organizations.

29. Of the emigrés identified with Hungarian political parties, the Social Democrats, represented abroad by Anna Kethly, a member of Imre Nagy's coalition cabinet during the revolution, are believed to have the strongest political resistance assets in Hungary today. She probably has retained most of her large personal following as a respected political leader. It is also probable that late in 1956 the Social Democrats and other political parties, including the Smallholders, took steps to institute dual leadership at home and abroad to prepare for underground work.

REGIME MEASURES AGAINST RESISTANCE

30. In order to obliterate the liberal trends and nationalist spirit of 1956, the Kadar regime made a determined and apparently successful effort to eliminate all discernible focal points of resistance. Repression has proven effective, insofar as it has reduced or thwarted the danger of any renewal of overt resistance, but it has failed to eradicate passive resistance and recalcitrance. During the immediate post-revolt period, and again in July and August 1957, the regime resorted to domestic deportations. Until recently it has made special efforts to publicize the trials and the harsh sentences of a large number of "counterrevolutionaries" in order to impress the people with its strength. The old AVH (Secret Police) has been reconstituted; now called BACs (State Security Group), it operates ruthlessly and with apparent efficiency under the Ministry of Interior. The Central Workers' Council, almost the equivalent of a people's government during the early phase of the

uprising, was outlawed on December 9, 1956; the Writers' Union was banned in April 1957. By April, the leaders of the Protestant churches were forced to reaffirm their support of the Kadar regime; on May 24 the Hungarian Catholic Church not only announced its adherence to the regime by joining the National Peace Council but also formed an auxiliary peace movement ("Opus Pacis") within the Church itself, and on August 30 issued a purely political statement, first of its kind, in support of the regime (attacking the UN debate on the Hungarian uprising).

CAPABILITIES OF REGIME TO SUPPRESS REVOLT

31. The Armed Forces which disintegrated during the revolution, have been gradually reconstituted. They appear to remain, despite recurrent screenings, technically weak and of doubtful reliability. The present strength is estimated at 100,000. In addition, there are 35,000 militarized Security Forces, about 20,000 of whom are Frontier Guards. Morale of the armed forces is believed to be low but the Security Forces are probably somewhat less disaffected than the Army. Furthermore, in February 1957, a Party-directed Workers Guard, probably modelled after the East German *Kampfgruppen*, was formed in order to prevent outbreaks against the regime in the industrial establishments. It is not known how well organized or trained these elements are but it can be assumed that the regime has selected for this role only those it considers to be the least susceptible to dissidence.

32. The Hungarian security forces have made progress in re-establishing their pre-revolutionary efficiency and organization. However, it will undoubtedly take some time before these security forces approach the level of organization and training achieved before the revolt. And it will be a long time before the organization responsible for functions formerly assigned to the State Security Authority (AVH) achieves the reliability of that apparatus. The security police have had some difficulty in restoring its extensive informer system, which in fact probably hinders the attainment of its pre-revolutionary effective-

ness. They cannot be expected, and never were considered able, to suppress a revolt of any significant proportions, since this exceeds the normal function of the organization. The present regime could not suppress an outburst of any significant proportions with the indigenous machinery now available to it. The regime owes its continued existence to the major elements of six Soviet line divisions which are stationed in Hungary.

MODIFICATION IN THE SECURITY APPARATUS

33. As a result of the uprising, many agents were killed, many others left the country, and still others were unwilling to continue serving. At first two former AVH officers reconstituted the AVH as the "R Unit," and early in November 1956, three new officer regiments were reported as consisting largely of former AVH men in officer uniforms. That local armed forces were principally composed of former AVH members and Party functionaries was also reported in mid-December 1956. The organizing program seems to have proceeded rapidly in the following months with the reinstatement of policy-level personnel belonging to the Rakosi wing reported again in late May 1957. Also by May and probably earlier, the informer system, backbone of the AVH system, had been reorganized to some extent, and attempts were being made to recruit former rebels as spies and informers. The designation "R Unit" was not heard again. The new secret police, at first referred to as Interior Ministry Security Police, or Special Police Establishment, soon developed into the present BACs (State Security Group). The widespread and growing volume of arrests of "counter-revolutionaries" up to the summer of 1957, may indicate the increasing efficiency of the secret police.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS OF PEACE

34. Under peacetime conditions, passive resistance would undoubtedly increase if there were a substantial relaxation of police measures. Such circumstances might even render an eventual crystallization of some organized

resistance possible. However, no such relaxation appears likely in the foreseeable future. Even if it did occur, tangible developments would materialize only after an initial period of undeterminable length, during which the population could convince itself that the relaxation was not a tactical device camouflaging a trap. Strong police control, Soviet occupation, disillusionment over the lasting effectiveness of open resistance in the light of the recent experiences, and the absence of visible prospects of outside assistance will limit resistance efforts in Hungary, for the foreseeable future, to minor and sporadic acts of defiance and sabotage. The regime may be increasingly successful in neutralizing all focal points of organized resistance; in the absence of war, even without sizeable additions to its ranks, a Soviet-supported apparatus seems quite adequate to prevent the development and spread of any important organized resistance.

35. Nevertheless, there probably still exist some resistance nuclei which have been ingenious enough to evade detection. They may be able for some time to maintain contact security, and to cache arms and other equipment. Similarly, they could accomplish a small number of acts of sabotage and produce propaganda leaflets. Their possibilities for spearheading a renewed uprising seem remote, given the general attitude and psychological condition of the majority of the population and the systematic efforts on the part of the regime to destroy any remnants of expectation and hope which prevailed before the October uprising.

36. More difficult for the regime to cope with is the resistance potential of the intelligentsia. Evidence suggests the possibility of some form of organization among anti-regime students and intellectuals. The latter have displayed a form of passive resistance in that they do not produce for the regime's propaganda publications. Their capabilities probably do not extend beyond this form of resistance, since the regime-sponsored publications do not permit expression of their real views openly or by "Aesopian" devices which they used successfully before the revolution. Students will

probably continue to defy the regime by various ingenious nuisance devices. Neither group seems to have the opportunity, which existed before the revolution, to forge a link between their own aims and aspirations and those of the population at large.

37. Unorganized active resistance, possibly making use of arms hidden during and after the revolution, may occur from time to time but is unlikely to be of more than local significance. Unorganized passive resistance, however, will continue to be widespread. It is capable of sabotaging or slowing down industrial and agricultural production and, in covertly disregarding the regime's orders, it may remain a source of embarrassment for Hungarian as well as other Eastern European Communist leaders.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR

38. Under conditions of open warfare, a continuing lack of massive popular support would undoubtedly act as a great hindrance to the regime and to its Soviet mentors even in the performance of the relatively minor tasks the regime could expect to be assigned. In the initial stages of a war, the Hungarian regime would increase its security measures, and it would be difficult for the people to engage in effective resistance activities. The populace would attempt to slow down both industrial and agricultural production. It would try to disrupt transportation and communications, and would probably manage to publish propaganda against the Soviet war effort. Some men anticipating induction into the Armed Forces would hide in an attempt to avoid service. Most Hungarians would watch for opportunities to aid the forces opposing the Bloc more actively and many would bide their time, awaiting a chance to go over to the enemy. However, large-scale desertions and organized resistance activities would not take place until basic Soviet weaknesses in the field became manifest or at least one major military defeat was inflicted upon Soviet forces.

39. The regime has tried to recover all arms and other supplies hidden by Hungarians during and after the 1956 revolt, but there still remain considerable quantities of hidden

small arms scattered throughout the country. They are almost certainly insufficient, however, to permit large-scale or effective armed resistance. Thus, the capability of the Hungarians for anti-Bloc military activity and — to a large extent — for sabotage would be largely dependent upon supplies of arms, munitions, and explosives from outside.

40. In the initial stages of war, the major contribution of dissident elements of the Hungarian populace to the Bloc's enemies would be acts of sabotage and intelligence collection. There would probably be little opportunity to assist in evasion and escape measures, but if channels for transmission could be established, non-Bloc forces could expect to be supplied with complete descriptions of Soviet activities inside Hungary.

41. If actual fighting were taking place on or near Hungarian territory, Hungarian resistance elements would intensify their efforts. It would not matter to them which side appeared to be winning; their efforts would be concentrated on assistance to the enemies of the Soviets. As the actual conflict drew closer to Hungary, opportunities to assist in evasion and escape efforts would be multiplied. Familiarity with the topographic features of their own country and with Soviet search techniques would enable the Hungarians to facilitate the escape of enemy soldiers. Proximity to the scene of battle would make it easier to pass intelligence to the enemy. If supplied with radios, the Hungarians would probably provide intelligence information more rapidly than non-Bloc forces could exploit it. If supplied with arms and special equipment, the Hungarians could be expected to organize guerrilla bands which, through hit-and-run tactics, would be able to tie down significant numbers of Bloc troops and also deprive the USSR of some of its forward operations based in Hungary. In the event of substantial Soviet reverses in war, all major factors and forces of the recent revolt could be expected to come into play on a scale and with an intensity probably even larger than that of last fall's explosion. The validity of this assumption is made secure by the continuing existence of every major factor from which

popular opposition to Soviet occupation and Soviet-sponsored Communist rule stems in Hungary.

42. The nationality of attacking forces would not be a factor adversely influencing the degree and extent of resistance operations and capabilities. The attitudes and actions of resistance groups in other Bloc countries would probably strongly influence the Hungarians. Cooperation with resistance groups in other Bloc countries would develop after the initial uprising and particularly if other resistance groups could help supply the Hungarians with arms and equipment. Also, circumstances surrounding the initiation of hostilities would not affect resistance capabilities. The Hungarians probably would approve the initiation of hostilities since they regard a war as providing the best means of liberation.

43. Hungarian hatred of the Soviets is so intense that the people probably would accept the use of any instrument of war, including nuclear weapons, against Soviet forces in Hungary. However, the physical destruction and social dislocation resulting from a large scale nuclear attack on Hungary could be expected to virtually destroy Hungarian capabilities for resistance. If a nuclear air attack could be so designed as to eliminate the major resources of the governmental and political strengths of the regime, Hungarian resistance capabilities would not necessarily be adversely affected. Thus, an opportunity would emerge for Hungarian resistance groups to take over control of the country if the following additional conditions should prevail: (a) development of effective leadership and coordination

in resistance groups; (b) provision of material support; and (c) assurance of early direct military support.

44. Occupation policies of Western forces would not be a crucial factor affecting resistance potential and capabilities so long as these policies were pronounced to respect and aid in the accomplishment of Hungarian aspirations for freedom, independence and the end to Soviet domination. Thus, enlightened occupation by non-Bloc forces would intensify the Hungarian desire to be helpful. Hungarian capabilities for assisting the occupying power in areas of the country which were not yet taken would be enhanced by a cooperative attitude on the part of the occupier.

45. Questions of a future regime and of the specific character of agencies to be instrumental in the liberation are likely to be regarded by the people as secondary in relation to liberation itself. The question of German rearmament, a key item in Communist propaganda, is to be viewed in this light. Although many fundamental and even irreconcilable differences exist between the German and Hungarian mentality and character, the cultural affinities of the two peoples are based on a common Western heritage. Also, in contradistinction to the situation vis-a-vis Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia as referred to in paragraph 2, Hungary has no territorial claims against Germany. However, if armed units of countries toward which Hungarians are now hostile, participated in efforts to liberate Hungary, it may be assumed that such units would be welcomed.

ANNEX G—NORTH KOREA

BASIC FACTORS OF DISSIDENCE

1. The principal sources of ill-will in North Korea are the regime's drastic industrial reconstruction and expansion effort and the agricultural collectivization program, which, following the extreme suffering and demands made during the hostilities, have placed an extraordinarily heavy burden on the North Korean people. Additional factors tending to create or stimulate dissidence are: (1) the existence of a rival Korean government in the South offering an alternative focus of loyalty; (2) the continued presence of large numbers of foreign troops within the country; (3) past and potential future factional rivalries in the North Korean ruling hierarchy between the dominant pro-Soviet elements and the minority "Yenan" faction, and (4) the latent clash of interests and competition between the Soviet Union and Communist China for control of North Korea which these factional rivalries reflect. In most other respects the objectives, overall approach, and systems of control of the North Korean rulers are the same as those of Communist regimes elsewhere, and most of the specific factors creating ill-will are the same. However, because of the cultural and intellectual backwardness of the predominantly agricultural North Korean society, the North Koreans' extreme isolation from the outside world and their complete inexperience with free, modern, and independent government before 1945, their resistance, present and potential, to Communist domination is less intense than among the satellites with experience and contacts in the modern world.

2. A further important reason for dissidence has been the imposition by the regime of oppressive burdens on the populace, such as heavy taxes, forced contributions to political and social organizations, forced labor, direct or indirect pressures to turn farmers into industrial laborers, farm collectivization, shortages of consumer goods, high production

quotas for industrial and farm workers, and military conscription. During the hostilities, loss of life and property and other direct and indirect suffering brought the populace to a state of almost complete exhaustion. Though more than four years have passed since the hostilities ended and North Korea has received aid from the Sino-Soviet Bloc, the war damage, the reconstruction program, and the maintenance of a military force exceeding that at the beginning of the hostilities exacts heavier contributions from the reduced population than those required before the hostilities.

3. Another factor contributing to dissension in North Korea is the close supervision and control exercised by the regime over all facets of personal life. However, Stalinist-type persecution is no longer needed except for occasional purges of Party members and government functionaries. Agricultural landlords, Christians, middle class elements, and other anti-Communists who did not flee to South Korea in the early years of Communist control generally are being controlled through Communist-dominated "social" organizations and "punishment" is being meted out by discriminatory treatment and surveillance rather than through persecution. Also discriminated against and under close surveillance is the large minority of the population who collaborated with the UN forces during their occupation of North Korea, or who are closely related to members of any of these suspect groups.

4. The existence of a rival Korean government asserting jurisdiction and seeking control of the Korean peninsula also has a bearing on dissidence. The appeal of the ROK to North Koreans has been minimized to some extent by the antagonisms inevitably engendered by the war, by North Korean propaganda, vilifying the Republic and contrasting the situation in the north and south to the

disadvantage of the ROK, and by a lack of sympathy for the Rhee government. Nevertheless, there exists considerable sentiment for the ROK in North Korea even though few North Koreans in the present situation would be willing to assume the risks involved in actively supporting the ROK.

MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS

5. Dissidence, unhappiness and hopelessness exist to varying degrees in almost every element of North Korean society. However, the extent of such feelings in terms of resistance potential is difficult to estimate. It can almost certainly be presumed that dissidence is limited to relatively small numbers in the various social groups, a phenomenon which is partly attributable to the fact that more than two million persons who might have strengthened the resistance potential, have fled to South Korea since World War II.

6. Dissidence is intense among the small remnants of the Christian and former middle-class groups and in the suspect elements of the populace that are kept under surveillance and are treated in discriminatory fashion because of their relationship to anti-Communists. The farmers remain basically out of sympathy with the objectives of the regime. As recently as September 1957, the regime listed as one of its major tasks in the agricultural field the "socialist transformation" of the peasants' thinking, which it characterized as "lagging far behind their socialist environment." Two post-armistice policies are particularly important causes of ill-will among the farmers: wage increases and other preferential treatment granted to industrial laborers and the government's program of agricultural "cooperativization," now nearly completed. The industrial laborers, too, probably are generally unhappy and frustrated, but on a lesser scale than the farmers. They are treated as a privileged group in contrast to the farmers, but are subjected to oppressive labor requirements. Army morale is probably only fair despite indoctrination, though dissidence is probably mild in the Air Force and the Navy which are much smaller and more select services.

7. As industrialization proceeds the regime will become increasingly dependent on the middle ranks of the government bureaucracy and industrial technicians. Faced with a shortage of such personnel and without adequate facilities for training them at home, the regime has sent several thousand students to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe for further education. The inevitable comparisons made by these young people between conditions in North Korea and in other parts of the world based on personal observation and increased access to information have profoundly shocked some and have undoubtedly affected all. Several North Korean students who defected to the West commented that Eastern Europe appeared to be a paradise in comparison with their homeland. Korean students in Hungary joined the revolutionary forces in October and November 1956 and have since been returned to North Korea. These young technicians might also serve as a channel for introducing into North Korea the ideological ferment which has swept the Soviet bloc since the 20th Congress of the CPSU but which apparently has as yet had little effect on North Korea.

INTENSITY OF DISSIDENCE

8. Despite widespread dissidence the North Koreans are inclined toward hopelessness and apathy rather than active resistance. Moreover, as prospects for reestablishment of non-Communist control over the area have declined, the will to resist appears to have diminished. Dissidence is seldom voiced and even less frequently acted upon since the regime provides severe punishment for any infraction of its laws and regulations. Although there are geographic areas, particularly in the rugged, mountainous terrain of North-central Korea, in which dissidence could be manifested by guerrilla activity, there are no known guerrilla groups in existence. Presently, dissidence is of such a low intensity as to preclude a popular movement. Only if the Communist control apparatuses were weakened and the regime seemed on the verge of crumbling under outside pressures, would a substantial minority probably be willing to participate in resistance activities with any

prospect of success. But in the present situation actual resistance on any significant scale is unlikely and in fact virtually impossible.

9. Such resistance as does occur in North Korea is primarily directed not at Communism per se or at Soviet domination but at the North Korean regime itself. Ideological considerations are not a major contributing factor in creating dissension in North Korea, and, except for the small remnant of the Christian community in North Korea, apparently few people strongly oppose Communism as a system. Nor is there much opposition to Soviet domination which is exercised through an ostensibly "native Korean" regime. However, there is at least some opposition to those North Korean policies which appear to favor the USSR over the needs and desires of the North Koreans themselves. This opposition is almost certainly stimulated by the strong national consciousness of the Korean people and their long history of resistance to external domination. Although the presence of nearly 300,000 Chinese Communist troops in North Korea has undoubtedly aroused some resentment and nationalist sentiment, it does not appear to have caused widespread discontent among the population at large.

TRENDS OF DISSIDENCE SINCE 1953

10. North Korea does not appear to have been affected directly by the events which followed the death of Stalin. Rather, it has been struggling with its reconstruction program following the cessation of hostilities. Changes in the regime's policies were the result of internal rather than external developments. Even in relation to developments elsewhere in the Sino-Soviet Bloc, North Korea has remained surprisingly isolated.

11. The regime has not relaxed its rehabilitation and development programs and has not altered the policy of giving priority to the development of heavy industry. Neither the Soviet criticism of the "cult of personality" nor the Chinese Communist "hundred flowers" policy have been echoed in North Korea. The Hungarian revolt was not extensively reported in the North Korean press, and the

scale and character of the outbreak were minimized and distorted. Its effect on the possibility of rebellion in North Korea has probably been minimal, although the return of students sent to Eastern Europe may inject an intellectual ferment previously lacking.

RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES TO DATE

12. Guerrilla activity in North Korea, which was extensive in 1951 immediately following the withdrawal of UN forces from the area, steadily declined during the remainder of the hostilities as the battle line stabilized. At the time of Stalin's death, which preceded the signing of the Korean armistice by less than five months, virtually all guerrilla bands, which had been most numerous in central Hwanghae Province just north of the present demilitarized zone, had been driven onto the off-shore islands, where they presumably have since been liquidated. Guerrilla activity in the latter stages of the hostilities appears to have been sustained only where it was linked with the UN command; aside from such groups, resistance activities after the Communists regained control were minor.

13. Since the conclusion of the armistice, guerrilla and other resistance activity appears to have declined almost to the vanishing point. Some small guerrilla groups were reported to have been holding out in the mountainous areas of Hwanghae and North P'yongan Provinces as recently as early 1956, but their continued survival is doubtful. Active resistance appears to be limited to the occasional distribution of leaflets and mutilation of Communist posters, some intelligence collection, and rare instances of sabotage and assassination of members of the North Korean armed forces, apparently on an unorganized basis. No organized resistance groups are known to be in existence at the present time.

14. Unorganized passive resistance is probably fairly widespread in North Korea, particularly among the farmers, whose failure to identify themselves with the official policies and aims has been acknowledged by the regime. Such passive resistance, however, is probably characterized more by apathy and unwillingness to expend effort in accomplishing the tasks set

by the regime than by a deliberate effort to obstruct those tasks through a slowdown. Student elements probably retain the best resistance potential as do relatives of persons adversely affected by regime policies. Nevertheless, so long as the present regime remains in power, even unorganized resistance has only dim prospects.

ROLE OF REFUGEES

15. The presence in South Korea of large numbers of North Korean refugees constitutes a strong attraction for their compatriots still in the North and represents a potential source of leadership and guidance in the event that effective resistance in the North should become feasible. However, although there is some contact between the members of families split between the North and the South, this relationship appears to have little political significance. The ROK is known to have penetrations into North Korea, but there is no evidence that there has been contact with potential resistance groups in the North, much less any support to them.

REGIME MEASURES AGAINST RESISTANCE

16. The North Korean security apparatus, under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, comprises, in addition to its administrative personnel, political police, security guards, border and railroad constabulary police, and regular constabulary police. Through strict controls on speech, press and radio listening, and through constant local surveillance, the regime keeps alert to any indication of dissension. Travel controls are very thorough, especially in Kaesong and the rest of the area adjacent to the Demilitarized Zone. Relatives of persons who have gone to South Korea are particularly watched and discriminated against. There has been considerable relocation of persons resident in Kaesong and other areas of unrest. Families of medical students who participated in the Hungarian uprising are reported to have been imprisoned.

CAPABILITY OF THE REGIME TO SUPPRESS REVOLT

17. Although the majority of North Koreans probably dislike the regime and respond

apathetically to its demands and appeals, they are effectively controlled by the Soviet-trained security apparatus and by the omnipresent cadres of the Korean Labor Party. There is every reason to believe that the regime would be capable of suppressing opposition from any internal quarter without Soviet or Chinese Communist aid.

18. Security controls which had been intensified at the time of the Armistice in July 1953 were made more rigid at the time of the Hungarian revolt. The number of security guard forces has been sizably increased, particularly in the border and port areas, in the interests of even stricter travel control. No popular reaction has been reported, though there probably is a greater feeling of intimidation. In addition there has been an increase of marine patrolling of the coast during the last year.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS OF PEACE

19. Assuming continuation of the armistice, resistance in North Korea is unlikely to be of much significance. At best it may provide a limited source of intelligence. Organized resistance groups apparently have been unable to sustain operations against the regime and have little prospect of greater success in the future. Unorganized passive resistance may increase in the future if the economic burden on individual North Koreans increases or if security controls are relaxed. A substantial improvement in the standard of living throughout North Korea would probably reduce dissension significantly. Barring resumption of hostilities in Korea, however, dissension is generally unlikely to be translated into active resistance.

20. Prolonged and open unrest within the USSR, presaging a weakening in the Soviet system, would undoubtedly have a profound effect on North Korea, should such events become known by any sizeable number of people. Moreover, the existence of anti-Soviet, pro-Communist Chinese elements has been confirmed, and the historical evidence of Korean inclination toward China is strong enough to suggest that a switch from policies supporting the USSR to those favoring Com-

munist China might occur. Such an event however, would probably not mean a very marked departure from the present state of affairs and it is highly unlikely that any pro-ROK or US group would be able to exert any significant influence.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR

21. Under conditions of open war, North Korean resistance potential would probably increase somewhat but would still be limited to isolated instances of sabotage, some passive resistance defections, assistance to anti-Communist personnel in escape and evasion operations, and some intelligence collection. Military action by resistance elements without external support would be virtually impossible. Increased domestic security measures and external bloc support for the regime would make organized resistance highly unlikely except immediately in front of advancing non-Communist forces. Nor could North

Korean troops be counted on to defect since they are considered politically reliable.

22. The circumstances surrounding the initiation of hostilities would have little effect on resistance potential. The same is true of the use of tactical nuclear weapons against selected targets. However, if large-scale nuclear warfare were used, the possibilities of effective resistance would be negligible.

23. The nationality of any Free World forces would not matter provided that no Japanese forces were employed. If a US-type military government were instituted by occupation forces, staffed by ROK personnel and receiving Western support and guidance, most North Koreans would probably accept it and resistance in areas still under Communist control might be stimulated.

24. The aspirations of individual resistance factions for post-war leadership probably would not be of great significance.

ANNEX H—NORTH VIETNAM

BASIC FACTORS OF DISSIDENCE

1. Economic pressures are probably a major factor in creating dissidence in the Communist "Democratic Republic of Vietnam" (DRV, North Vietnam). The levies, regulations, and controls of the regime impose a heavy burden on the population, especially when compared with economic measures in South Vietnam. Agricultural taxes, principally a levy of about 40 percent of paddy yields, deprive peasants of almost all surplus output, while local merchants face stiff taxes calculated to prevent the accumulation of wealth. In addition, the dearth of trained technicians of all kinds, bureaucratic unwieldiness, and the disruption of normal trade channels have tended to hamper economic growth. Living standards although slightly improved since the signing of the Geneva Agreements are still low; rice yields are poor; and population pressures are great. Other important factors in the creation of resentment are the regime's rigid police-state restrictions; the bloodshed and personal hardships in the rural areas, caused by the regime's agrarian reform policies during the past three years; its continued use of terroristic methods; its persecution of certain socio-economic, minority, and religious groups; its disruption of the traditionally strong family ties of the Vietnamese; and the influence in the DRV of the Chinese, who have long been feared and disliked in Vietnam.

2. Generally, the popular appeal of the regime, following the military victory over the French and the 1954 Geneva Agreements, has diminished in recent years largely for the reasons mentioned above. The inherently repressive nature of the Communist regime has become increasingly clear to the Vietnamese public since Geneva, and this revelation probably has shaken the allegiance of many of its supporters. The steady consolidation of President Ngo Dinh Diem's anti-Communist government in South Vietnam, where levies, reg-

ulations, and controls are less stringent than in the North, has provided an irritating contrast to the North Vietnamese regime for the allegiance of its citizens. To combat this competition, the DRV seeks to direct popular resentment against Diem's government, which it portrays as an American puppet, and against the United States itself, which it claims has taken over France's colonialist aspirations in the area, is perpetuating the division of the country, and is responsible for most of the area's economic difficulties.

MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS

3. *Catholics.* The estimated 700,000 Catholics in the DRV (roughly six percent of the population) probably constitute the largest single concentration of actual or potential dissidents in the country. The general hostility of Vietnamese Catholics to Communist rule has been demonstrated on several occasions. Soon after the division of Vietnam in mid-1954, for example, about 700,000 Catholics from North Vietnam sought refuge in South Vietnam. More recently, the fact that the November 1956 uprisings in Nghe An Province occurred in primarily Catholic villages indicates that those who remained behind are far from reconciled to the DRV regime. Catholic dissatisfaction with the DRV's treatment of the church has been stimulated by the contrast with the favored position the church occupies in South Vietnam, where Diem and many other leaders are devout Catholics. Nevertheless, church leaders in the north have not encouraged overt resistance to the regime, evidently an effort to ensure the church's survival. Although they have resisted DRV encroachments upon the church's prerogatives, they apparently have sought to avoid openly hostile acts that presumably would result in even more stringent DRV control measures.

4. *Tribal Minorities.* The Vietnamese have traditionally disdained the tribal minorities who, for their part, fear and dislike the Vietnamese. Approximately 900,000 tribal minority peoples in North Vietnam are acknowledged by the regime to be a source of disaffection. Made up of a variety of groups such as the Tho, Nung, White and Black Thai, Muong, Meo, and Man, they are located chiefly in upland and mountainous regions in the northern part of North Vietnam and along the western boundary with Laos. DRV authorities have placed tight restrictions on entry into and egress from many of these areas, while they have sought to bring the tribes under control by a combination of force and persuasion. Communist cadres assigned to these areas have often increased tribal hostility, according to some reports, by disregarding tribal hierarchies and customs. The tribal peoples, however, are disunited, and lack modern weapons.

5. *The Peasantry.* Many of the peasants (who make up perhaps 90 percent of the population) feel dissatisfied with the regime, particularly as a result of the DRV's agrarian reform program during the past three years. Since mid-1956 there has been extensive criticism in DRV media of the agrarian reform cadres for arousing popular resentment, impairing the *Lao Dong* Communist Party's foundations, and causing tension in the countryside. Regime attempts to correct the mistakes have generally not been successful, however. While present resistance has occasionally taken the form of violence, apparently spontaneous and unorganized, in most cases rural dissidence seems to have been expressed by failure to respond to the regime's agrarian program or by general apathy. Fear and hopelessness appear to characterize the peasant's outlook, and deliberate efforts to sabotage DRV policies are rarely made.

6. *Intellectuals.* There are indications that some dissidence exists among intellectuals in North Vietnam, especially those who were French-educated and French oriented. During the latter half of 1956, the regime, copying the Soviet pattern of admitting errors and adopting a "liberalized" policy to correct the errors, somewhat relaxed its censorship and

allowed criticism of DRV policy in various newspapers. These papers, non-Party but still supporters of the regime, quickly exceeded the acceptable limits of criticism and were suspended in mid-December 1956. Nonetheless, the rapidity with which some intellectuals responded to this one opportunity to air their grievances is an indication that the regime's efforts to win over this group have not been wholly successful.

7. *Landlords and Merchants* constitute elements of dissidence on an individual basis, but they have not been nor are they likely to become leaders of effective resistance. Merchants, reportedly engaged in extensive hoarding, speculation, and tax evasion, are contributing to the regime's poor economic situation.

INTENSITY OF DISSIDENCE

8. Although there have been widespread indications of dissidence, the North Vietnamese generally do not seem to feel impelled to active resistance. Few have ever known anything other than marginal living standards, authoritarian government, and insecurity; they also are extremely war-weary following the years of fighting in the area. Accordingly they seem to possess a large capacity for enduring privation and repression, and many have become apathetic. Moreover, the strength of the regime's control apparatus and the general lack of a means for armed resistance presumably make potential resistance elements even more discreet. Outbreaks of violence that have occurred appear to have been localized, unpremeditated and unorganized flare-ups.

9. Most dissidence in North Vietnam seems directed primarily at the DRV regime itself. Catholic dissidence and resistance activity probably is directed at Communism *per se*, although the distinction between the regime and the ruling ideology probably is not sharply drawn. There have been no reports of any ill will directed specifically against Soviet or Chinese Communist influence, even though fear and dislike of the Chinese people probably provides a supplementary motivation for resistance.

10. There does not seem to have been any material change in the basis and intensity of dissidence in North Vietnam as a result of new Soviet policies adopted after Stalin's death. The 20th Soviet Party congress, the disorders in Poland and Hungary, and the appearance of ideological differences and factionalism within other Communist parties do not seem to have had any lasting impact on DRV Party and government circles.

RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES TO DATE

11. From the time of Stalin's death to the signing of the Geneva Agreements about 16 months later, most if not all organized resistance activity in North Vietnam involved groups associated with the French and Vietnamese forces engaged in hostilities with the Viet Minh. After the Geneva Agreements, however, most of these groups either withdrew from DRV territory or were rendered virtually impotent by DRV control measures. Fairly continuous but minor conflicts seem to have occurred between small groups of tribal minorities and DRV forces in the areas now known as the Thai-Meo Autonomous Zone, Viet Bac Autonomous Zone, and the North-east Zone. Vietnamese Catholics seem to have played a prominent role in numerous local anti-regime disturbances during the last half of 1956 and the first half of 1957. The most publicized and probably most severe outbreaks of resistance were those that occurred in Nghe An Province in November 1956. Although this uprising was followed later by scattered anti-regime disturbances in other localities, no general resistance movement evolved.

12. No reliable information is available concerning any organized resistance groups that may now be operating in North Vietnam. Presumably some members of Catholic lay organizations which existed in North and Central Vietnam prior to the Geneva Agreements have remained. These organizations, such as the Catholic Socialist Party (*Dang Xa Hoi Cong Giao*), the Youth Movement for Devotion to the Country (*Thanh Nien Phung Su Quoc Gia*), and the Catholic militia, which prior to 1954 included about 11,000 members, might constitute a structural basis for organized resistance activities among the Catholic

minority. It is possible also that small remnants of several anti-DRV political parties and labor groups — notably the Nationalist Party of Greater Vietnam (*Dai Viet Quoc Dan Dang*), the Vietnam Nationalist Party (*Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang*), and the Vietnamese Confederation of Christian Workers — which were active in North and north-central Vietnam before 1954 probably are still located in those regions, and retain some subversive potential.

13. Potential resistance groups constitute less than ten percent of the DRV's total population, and clearly lack the capacity to initiate successful, organized, active resistance. Most unorganized resistance is of a passive character extending from criticism of the regime by intellectuals to apathy and failure to actively support the regime by peasants. Passive resistance against the regime's agrarian policies will probably continue to impede Communist goals. There have been recent reports of expressions of discontent among industrial workers over low wages and excessively high work norms. Dissatisfaction also exists among all classes of the population with consumer goods shortages, the Communist economic control system, and the 30 days compulsory labor levy for all able bodied adults.

ROLE OF EMIGRÉS

14. Despite the border controls of the regime and its efforts to patrol a rugged and sparsely populated border area, considerable numbers of persons cross the borders, including some who are allowed to smuggle certain needed goods. A steady trickle of refugees continues to reach the South from the Catholic areas in North and northern Central Vietnam, and it may be assumed there is considerable contact between the Catholic refugees in South Vietnam and their families and compatriots in the North. There is no evidence, however, that guidance and assistance are at present being offered by Catholics in the South to any resistance groups in the North. There are known to be contacts by South Vietnamese government services with individuals in the denied areas in the North, but there is no evidence that aid or guidance is being given to resistance groups there.

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REGIME MEASURES AGAINST RESISTANCE

15. The DRV regime has foreseen most actual and potential centers of resistance, and has adjusted its counter-subversion tactics in order to meet the individual requirements of each resistance center. The "People's Army of Vietnam," one of the regime's major instruments for suppressing resistance, now consists of 268,000 well-organized and mobile regular troops. In addition, forces designed specifically for internal security, under the control of the regular army, include 38,000 regional forces responsible for provincial security, and a local militia, numbering 75,000 responsible for local security. Border security regiments of the regular army along the Laotian border and along the demilitarized zone above the 17th parallel are known to have security responsibilities.

16. The DRV maintains strict controls over travel, documentation, press, radio and other media of expression. Party penetration of all mass organizations, social, and religious groups enables the regime to keep informed of the acts and attitudes of Vietnamese on all levels of society. With respect to the ethnic minorities, the DRV utilizes the system of penetration by Communist cadres of the same ethnic stock and background. There is some evidence to indicate that the regime has made use of Chinese Communist cadre-training centers in the Kunming area in Communist China for its work among minority tribal groups. It has also established a large school in Hanoi for giving instruction and indoctrination to promising members of ethnic minorities. An over-all literacy program has been started, both in tribal dialects and in Vietnamese, which incidentally make propaganda and organization controls more effective.

CAPABILITY OF REGIME TO SUPPRESS REVOLT

17. As long as the regime's leadership remains united and determined to check dissidence, it will be extremely difficult for future resistance to become organized and to grow in force and importance. Insofar as is known, actual or potential resistance groups are not united and

have no background of common action against the Communists; their interests (except for their anti-regime outlook) do not coincide; and they have little power. Moreover, through its security and surveillance systems, the DRV is capable of effectively controlling whatever sporadic resistance activity arises in either Vietnamese or ethnic minority areas. Although some sympathy reportedly was shown by army troops to the resisting villagers at the time of the Nghe An uprising, the military forces are believed loyal to the regime.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS OF PEACE

18. At this time, it seems unlikely that organized or unorganized resistance to the regime will attain sufficient magnitude or intensity to impede seriously the realization of its foremost goals. The DRV has firm control of its security forces and can throttle any serious internal threat to its existence. Although some small and independent guerrilla bands may exist in the remote areas of North Vietnam where control is extremely difficult, there is little likelihood that an amalgamation of the various dissident groups could result.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR

19. If hostilities were taking place outside Vietnam, the resistance potential within the DRV will probably increase, but only by minor proportions. It would probably be limited to annoying acts of sabotage, intelligence collection, and assistance to anti-Communist personnel in various forms. Independent military action without external support would probably be suicidal for anti-regime elements unless the DRV security apparatus were greatly weakened.

20. In the event of hostilities within North Vietnamese territory, resistance activity would probably assume more serious proportions, especially if external assistance and encouragement were provided. Assistance to attacking forces would most likely take the form of sporadic uprisings which, however, would have little chance of becoming nationwide in scope because of the extremely poor communications. Aid in escape and evasion

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operations could be expected throughout most of rural Vietnam. Assistance would be greatest in the southern areas, among indigenous Catholic groups, and among other minorities, particularly the Meos. Resistance forces, although small and un-coordinated, would still be able to disrupt and reduce the over-all strength of the regime. The intensity of active local resistance generally would depend on the success of local military action by attacking forces.

21. The nationality of attacking forces would probably influence the willingness of resistance groups to act. Tribal groups which have been helped by the French for many years would be most receptive to French invaders. Vietnamese would prefer to aid other Vietnamese the most and the French the least. Participation of Nationalist Chinese might seriously jeopardize resistance and create antagonism toward the occupation.

22. A military government administered by Vietnamese in ethnic Vietnamese areas would probably have a salutary effect on resistance activities. A French occupation would be distrusted by the majority of the Vietnamese people, and would adversely affect anti-Communist partisan warfare. The occupation policies of the attacking forces would affect continued resistance capabilities. However, any occupation government of long duration, administered and controlled by other than Vietnamese, would probably be unpopular with the people of the occupied area.

23. The circumstances surrounding the initiation of hostilities would have little effect on resistance potential. The same is true of the use of tactical nuclear weapons against selected targets. However, in case of large-scale nuclear warfare, the possibilities of effective resistance would be negligible.

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ANNEX I—POLAND

PREAMBLE

1. Events of 1956 have made the pattern of dissidence and resistance in Poland far more complex than that in the other Eastern European satellite nations. There are anti-Communists who do not oppose Gomulka; within the Party there are Communists who do. The population is basically anti-Communist and anti-Russian, yet it tolerates Gomulka because other possibilities look even less attractive. The Roman Catholic Church is basically anti-Communist, but Cardinal Wyszynski supports Gomulka's appeals for sobriety, hard work, and the nationalist aspects of his policies. Stalinist elements within the Party are die-hard orthodox Communists, yet they use every means to tear Party control away from Gomulka. "Revisionists" within the Party swear fealty to Marxism, but they resist Gomulka's narrow definition of the "Polish road to Socialism." In short, Poland is a congeries of dissident elements held together by strong nationalist sentiments, bitter memories of Soviet destruction of Hungarian freedom, the Roman Catholic religion, and the strong personalities of Wladyslaw Gomulka and Cardinal Wyszynski.

BASIC FACTORS OF DISSIDENCE

2. Despite Gomulka's successes in eliminating many sources of dissidence, a number of factors still operate to build popular dissatisfaction. The most important of these is the failure of the regime to fulfill the hopes placed in it in October 1956. The population as a whole has been disappointed that there has been no automatic improvement in the standard of living. Workers especially have been shaken by the cold realities of the post-October economic situation, and the more politically minded among them are dissatisfied that workers' councils failed to become real instruments of worker control of industry.

Writers, journalists, intellectuals, and students have been disillusioned to find the permissible bounds of freedom of expression to be narrower than they had hoped.

3. The Gomulka regime's policies themselves have created additional sources of dissidence. The reduction of the governmental and Party bureaucracies has created a new source of dissidence among former bureaucrats who have been forced to make radical readjustments in their personal lives as a consequence of the loss of their economic and social position. Encouragement of private handicraft industries as part of the program designed to expand consumers' goods production and the encouragement of private shops in trade and services to supplement the existing socialist network have stimulated black marketing, profiteering, and speculation and corruption. This in turn has led to the growth of a class of "new rich," who have aroused the enmity of the authorities and of a considerable portion of the population. In the former German territories now under Polish control, regime suspicions toward and the previous regime's discrimination against the indigenous population have created a considerable degree of resentment among the people who resided in these areas before World War II, as well as among the remnants of the former German population.

4. Given the basically anti-Communist and anti-Soviet attitude of the population, dissidence is to be found in every element in Polish society. Although Gomulka has considerable personal popularity, he has been unable to transfer this popularity to the Party he heads and the system he represents.

MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS

5. *Peasants*, although appreciative of the gains they have made under Gomulka, remain hostile to the regime's long-term objective of

reconstructing agriculture on socialist lines, and also to the continuation of compulsory deliveries, no matter how low the delivery quotas. The influence of the Church is especially strong in the countryside and helps to deepen the peasants' distrust of Communist policies and objectives. The revival of anti-Communist influences within the ranks of the United Peasant Party (ZSL) has become a matter of major concern both to the leadership of the ZSL and that of the Polish United Workers' (Communist) Party (PZPR).

6. *Industrial workers* have expressed dissidence in a series of strikes and threats to strike which have been a feature of Polish life ever since Gomulka's return to power. Although none of these labor conflicts has had the political implications of the pre-Gomulka outbreak in Poznan, they do represent an open expression of dissatisfaction with the regime's wage policy. The outbreaks against civil authority which have become characteristic of Polish life since Gomulka's return, seem to draw considerable strength from the ranks of young unskilled or semiskilled workers. These people find that a tangle with the police affords them an opportunity to express their amorphous protests against the regime in general as well as a chance to express their contempt for the police. Special groups of workers who have suffered loss of employment or loss of status as the result of Gomulka policies are particularly agitated.

7. Among *intellectuals*, dissidence arises out of the regime's efforts to gradually but firmly reduce the limited freedom of expression which, for a short time, had been permitted to contribute materially to the 1956 changes in Polish politics. The increasing strictness of controls over the press has heightened dissatisfaction among the writers and journalists who played an important role in the upheaval of 1956 and their aftermath and whose strong opposition to the USSR and the Soviet system of pre-Gomulka days was matched only by the Hungarian intellectuals. But while the latter have been suppressed, the Polish intellectuals continue, within increasingly narrow confines, to militate against the imposition of increasing limits on the freedom of expression.

8. Closely associated with this group are the *students* who broke from the Communist fold in October 1956 and are especially resentful of any attempt to force them back into it. The inability of the Gomulka regime to create a viable successor to the Polish Youth Union, which folded up under the impact of the events of October 1956, is a striking commentary on the regime's failure to command the confidence of Polish youth. Likewise, the riots in Warsaw at the beginning of October 1957, which started as a student protest against the suppression of the influential student paper *Po Prostu*, indicated how tenuous are the ties of loyalty which bind the students to the regime.

9. In addition to the Gomulka faction, there are elements in the *Party* which aspire to an even greater degree of independence from the Soviet Union than Gomulka has achieved and others which desire a return to sterner and more far-reaching Party control over all phases of Polish life. The first group — the "revisionists" — for the most part are intellectuals, while the latter group — the "dogmatists" — for the most part are old-line Party workers of long experience. The "revisionists" have no real organizational base but find their strength in a communion of ideas with the larger group of intellectuals, journalists, and students. The "dogmatists," on the other hand, have no popular support, but find strength in the cohesion which springs from long-term service in and familiarity with the Party organization. For a time after the return of Gomulka they had the added material advantage (but popular disadvantage) of open Soviet support.

10. *The Roman Catholic Church*, although not a political organization, is entitled to consideration as the only organized anti-Communist resistance group in the country: its ideology and basic objectives are opposed to those espoused by the Party and it has broadly based popular support and a disciplined, trained organization. It is true that the *modus vivendi* of December 7, 1956 formally ended a long period of outright political warfare and intimidation directed by the Party against the Church. The Church has in common with the Party the aim of defending

Poland's national sovereignty and Poland's claim to former German territories now under its control. Nonetheless, Church-State relations have continued to be marked by conflicts of interest, though for the most part these have been kept within negotiable limits and have been threshed out by a joint Church-government commission which meets regularly.

11. *Armed Forces.* The army generally reflects the discontent pattern of the population, although on a lesser scale. The army's morale and loyalty to the regime considerably exceed those of the populace at large, and there is no evidence of any focus of anti-regime attitudes. On the other hand, there is in the Polish armed forces, as in any group of Poles, a significant potential for resistance. Under present conditions, this potential cannot be realized. In the first place, the military leaders are loyal to the regime; secondly, the original enthusiasm for Gomulka's "independence" from the Kremlin has not entirely dissipated. Further, the military rank and file are better housed, clothed, and fed than their civilian counterparts and are kept busy with disciplined activity. Polish troops would probably obey orders and a civil revolt against the present regime could not be expected to receive much support from the army if such a revolt remained localized. If Soviet forces sided with Gomulka in quelling any type of general hostilities, the army would probably not fight in an effective unified manner on the side of the Gomulka regime. On the other hand, were the Gomulka regime to oppose Soviet military forces on any issue, the Polish military would side with the regime against the Soviets as an effective unified army.

INTENSITY AND TARGETS OF DISSIDENCE

12. The high level of dissidence in Poland which gave rise to the Poznan riots of June 1956 and led to Gomulka's return to power in October has been considerably reduced by the regime's efforts to eliminate some of the principal sources of dissatisfaction, and by its ability to make common cause with dissident elements in appeals to Polish national feelings. In contrast to the pre-Gomulka period, when the dissidence of the Polish population

focused on the Communist regime, the ubiquitous symbols of Soviet oppression, and the hated secret police, there are no comparable focal points today. However, the poor economic conditions will probably persist in the foreseeable future and remain a source of deep-seated dissatisfaction which may give rise to acts of resistance. Unless the regime uses increasingly forceful measures of repression, the intensity of dissidence is not now sufficiently high to provide a favorable setting for resistance activity.

13. Given the absence of a broad popular setting for resistance activity in Poland, it is not strange that the most effective organized resistance operating there today takes a somewhat different form than that found elsewhere in Eastern Europe. The Roman Catholic Church expresses its resistance for the most part at the conference table of the joint Church-government commission. Its principal target is the regime, from which it seeks constantly to obtain more concessions or better performance on concessions already granted. In these negotiations the Church has consistently played an aggressive role while the government has been defending its positions. Within the Party, the most systematic organized resistance has been offered by the Stalinists ("dogmatists"), who have consistently opposed the Gomulka program. Their target is Gomulka and their objective is to obtain control of the Party in order to return to Stalinist policies once again. The "revisionists" in the Party are opposed to a return to repressive measures characteristic of the Stalinist era. Consequently, they oppose primarily the Stalinists in the Party but they also oppose all evidence of Stalinism which they see in the Gomulka program.

TRENDS OF DISSIDENCE SINCE 1953

14. The death of Stalin in 1953, the fall of Beriya and the reorganization of the Polish police system in 1954 signaled the beginning of the "thaw." From 1954 to October 1956, dissidence became most marked among intellectuals in general and Party intellectuals in particular. The regime's rigidity in cultural matters and the continued suppression of civil liberties became the specific targets of open

criticism. Moreover, the Party's "central active," consisting of more than 200 of the most active political workers in the Party apparatus, showed signs of dissidence. Growing relaxation in Polish life served to increase rather than diminish dissidence among intellectuals and Party apparatchiks. The reverberations of the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU further intensified dissidence within the Party, while a decrease of police terror permitted the open manifestation of popular opposition to regime policies in the Poznan uprisings of June 1956. The extent of dissidence by elements upon which the regime was supposedly based paralyzed its power of decision and prepared the ground for the fundamental changes within the regime which took place in October 1956.

15. During his first year in power, Gomulka succeeded in reducing both the basis for and the intensity of dissidence in Poland. He did this by: (1) eliminating terror as an instrument of public policy and substantially reducing the size and authority of the security police; (2) reducing the size of the government and Party bureaucracy; (3) ceasing political warfare against the Church and reaching a *modus vivendi* with it; (4) permitting the decollectivization of agriculture; (5) eliminating from political life those personalities like Marshal Rokossovsky who were the most glaring symbols of Soviet domination and reducing the influence of those Polish Communist leaders most subservient to the Soviet Union; (6) restoring to public life many persons who suffered from Soviet-imposed tyranny; (7) achieving Soviet recognition of Polish sovereignty and a degree of amelioration of Polish grievances; (8) recognizing the bankruptcy of the economic policy followed since 1950 and starting to rectify past errors.

RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES TO DATE

(a) Organized

16. Although the existence of small, isolated resistance groups is acknowledged by the regime from time to time, there have been no known significant anti-Communist organized political resistance groups operating in

Poland since the death of Stalin. In a number of cases such groups appear to be organized by people associated with World War II non-Communist and anti-Communist underground organizations. They are small and uncoordinated. While they have an anti-Communist orientation, their objectives cannot be precisely defined. Their activities appear to consist largely of the printing and distribution of anti-regime propaganda or the conducting of campaigns of intimidation directed against specific local Party functionaries. Many of these organizations appear to be on the borderline between organized and unorganized resistance and many are probably no more than just criminal gangs.

17. Within the Party itself the Stalinist faction has a sufficient degree of cohesiveness and community of purpose to be viewed as an organized resistance group in the sense that it is opposed to the Gomulka program. The revisionist "faction" has no organization, nor any clearly defined program, but it acts within the Party as a pressure group for further liberalization, currently opposing curtailment of liberties already conceded or granted. The basic conflict within the Party is not between these two extremes but rather between the Stalinists who favor subservience to the USSR and the rest of the Party which favors Polish sovereignty. Among the elements favoring national sovereignty, the revisionists are those least concerned with its realistic limits, while the elements surrounding Gomulka are most anxious not to exceed them. Gomulka's efforts to take this conflict out of the limelight — where it has been since the Central Committee's Seventh Plenum (July 1956) — first by appeals to Party unity and, more recently, by threats of expulsion, have so far failed.

18. Within the ranks of the regime-allied United Peasant Party (ZSL) there is a similar conflict between those who support the PZPR and those who wish the ZSL to pursue an independent course responsive to peasant wishes. It is not clear whether the dissidents have enough *organizational* strength to constitute an organized resistance group. The scanty evidence available indicates that they

do control the local organization in some localities; but their activity appears to be along the lines of unorganized resistance which operates to lower the efficiency of the ZSL in cooperating with the PZPR.

(b) Unorganized

19. There have been some manifestations of dissidence since Gomulka assumed power. Their significance in terms of resistance potential varies considerably. In most cases, it would be difficult to ascribe these disorders as indicators of political resistance. For example, the widespread existence in Poland of alcoholism, "hooliganism," bribery, stealing in industrial plants, and other forms of corruption is for the most part not politically motivated, and it is questionable whether they can be regarded as indicators of dissidence even though they might unintentionally spark new disturbances. Even the riots following the suspension of the newspaper *Po Prostu* in early October 1957, though politically motivated, were not an impressive showing of student dissidence: only 3-4,000 of the 28,000 Warsaw students participated the first two nights, leaving the field to the police and rowdies the following nights.

20. The relaxation of restrictions on travel to the West has given Poles some opportunity to engage in unorganized resistance by collecting and transmitting intelligence material or by defecting to the West. Defection, with subsequent cooperation with foreign intelligence organizations, has been the most common form of unorganized resistance utilized. Polish officials have seized the opportunity to defect while abroad on official business; Polish seamen and fishermen, air force members, and members of civilian flying clubs have utilized the opportunities open to them to defect; other Poles continue to leave Poland illegally by crossing into East Germany and thence into West Berlin; and, finally, slightly over one percent of Polish tourists who visited Western Europe during 1957 failed to return home.

21. General relaxation after years of police repression has served to increase greatly instances of localized, unorganized, and gener-

ally non-political attacks upon civil authorities. At the same time the marked improvement, mainly political in nature, on the Polish scene has decreased the intensity of dissidence and has deprived it of clear cut focuses with nationwide applicability. The surprising degree of realism recently shown by the Poles in judging their country's precarious position has served to blunt the stimulus for resistance.

ROLE OF EMIGRÉS

22. Emigré groups have played no significant role in guiding or assisting resistance activities in Poland. Although some emigré groups do encourage defection and resistance, there is no evidence by which their efficacy can be judged. Even prior to the reinstatement of Gomulka there was no known contact between Polish emigré elements in the West and Polish resistance groups in Poland. Moreover, then as now, Poles in Poland reportedly feel that the majority of emigrés are out of touch with them and neither know nor represent the true sentiment of the Polish people. Events since the Poznan uprising probably have reinforced this conviction. Even anti-Communists in Poland are believed to give little support to the idea of a future government composed of present Polish emigré leaders.

REGIME MEASURES AGAINST RESISTANCE

23. In the pre-Gomulka period the Communist regime in Poland relied mainly upon the use of repression and terror to prevent resistance. Since the advent of Gomulka, the regime has sought to inhibit resistance by eliminating or reducing some of the more important causes of dissidence and by handling grievances in such a way as to avoid provoking open political resistance. In handling civil disturbances, the regime has used whatever firmness has been necessary to maintain its authority without employing measures which would inflame the population. The security apparatus, although reduced in size and influence and deprived of its resort to terror, still functions to inhibit the development of resistance activities. It is estimated at 160,000, including the ordinary police, the militarized

security forces, and the military security police, as well as 65,000 internal security agents. These forces are considered to be quite efficient.

CAPABILITY OF REGIME TO SUPPRESS REVOLT

24. The regime has shown that it is capable of maintaining its authority in the face of civil disturbances uncomplicated by political overtones, or in the face of disturbances in which political considerations are relatively minor. It could probably suppress a revolt if it were localized and could be dealt with decisively within a few days. Moreover, with the two Soviet line divisions in Poland and many more posed along the frontiers, Soviet intervention may be expected if the regime seemed to be unable to cope with a large-scale uprising. This very fact, of which most Poles are aware, would act as a powerful deterrent so that only in extraordinary circumstances, such as cannot now be foreseen, would large-scale uprisings (throughout Poland) be expected.

MODIFICATION OF SECURITY APPARATUS

25. A general realignment of security functions started shortly after the period marked by Stalin's death, Beriia's execution, and the disclosures of Jozef Swiatlo, a former Deputy Director of Department X of the defunct Ministry of Public Security (MBP). Since Gomulka's return to power, the regime has made concessions to popular feelings through additional changes in organization, personnel, and nomenclature within the security apparatus. The MBP was dissolved in late 1954. In November of 1956 its successor, the Committee for Public Security (KBP), was also dissolved and its duties of protecting the state from espionage and terrorist activities were assigned to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MSW). Departments of the former secret police (UB) which had been responsible for foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and internal activities, were probably transferred to the MSW. Other UB departments were dissolved and many former UB employees were transferred to training programs designed to equip them for work in other fields. Local units of the People's Militia were given re-

sponsibility for the few remaining functions of the secret police.

26. The overhauling of the security apparatus following the events of October 1956 considerably increased the possibility for the expression of dissidence. Nevertheless, the arrest in 1957 of Poles serving as agents for British, French, and American intelligence indicates that the reformed security apparatus is active and efficient in its efforts to ferret out and apprehend individuals and groups seeking to take advantage of the new situation to engage in resistance activities. There is no evidence of any change in popular attitudes toward the police as a result of the reduction in size and authority of that arm of the regime.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS OF PEACE

27. So long as the regime continues its present policies, the power position of the USSR remains essentially unchanged, and the Polish-German frontier problem unsettled, the development of significant active organized resistance in Poland is unlikely. In the absence of a Stalinist-type of repression, dissidence is more likely to express itself in political indifference than in organized resistance. Moreover, the regime's current unwillingness to engage in open warfare with the Catholic Church or with its intra-Party opponents makes it likely that the resistance of these groups will be conducted on a level that would exclude massive retaliation by the regime. Thus, under existing circumstances, it seems unlikely that there will be any expansion of the types of organized resistance activity now existing. It also seems unlikely that there will be any significant increase in the level of resistance activity by organized resistance groups — i.e., the Church and Party factionalists — which are all operating within self-imposed limits.

28. The potential for unorganized resistance, active or passive, is considerably greater than it was prior to the substantial reduction in the forces of the security police and the curtailment of their authority. On the other hand, the incentives to engage in such resistance have been greatly reduced as the result of

Gomulka's reforms and by growing apolitism among all elements of the population. Unorganized resistance is not likely to take on new forms. Thus, if the regime remains unable to improve economic conditions, an increase in the level of intensity of unorganized resistance, in the form of strikes, poor work discipline, theft and corruption, and political non-conformism or apathy might be expected. If there were a further tightening of control measures, resistance activities would probably be impeded, but dissidence would rise. It should be noted, however, that current dissidence and the unorganized resistance potential it represents have circumscribed Gomulka's freedom of action in organizing Poland to serve Communist ends. The danger to the regime inherent in popular dissidence has prevented Gomulka from effectively stopping certain unorganized or informally organized resistance activities, such as strikes, demonstrations, passing of intelligence information to the West, and overt but discreet anti-Communist propaganda in the press and by the Church.

29. The effect of an increase in East-West tensions on resistance would depend on the nature of the tensions and the regime's response to them. If the tensions led to the regime's acceptance, real or apparent, of a diminution of Polish independence and a greater degree of Soviet domination, it is likely that resistance activities would increase, particularly if combined with an increase of repressive measures and a return to pre-Gomulka policies. If, however, the tensions were of such a nature that Poland's national existence would appear to depend upon loyalty to the regime, resistance activities would decline. A general increase in tensions would probably lead to increased activity on the part of the security forces, and, this, even without the imposition of repressive measures against the population as a whole, would probably result in a decline in active unorganized resistance. A marked decrease in tensions, on the other hand, achieved by mutual East-West accommodation, would probably give the regime greater opportunity to introduce more flexibility in its policies and afford greater opportunities for individual unorganized active resistance to the regime. At

the same time, if a substantial decrease in tensions were accompanied by increasing trade opportunities and greater ease in obtaining foreign credits, it could enable the regime to offer the population some material benefits to sustain their hopes for a better future. All these factors would serve to reduce dissidence and resistance.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR

30. The anti-regime resistance potential in Poland in time of war would depend upon the nature of the war. Polish involvement in a war on the side of the Soviet Union against the West would be unpopular and would raise the level of dissidence, especially if the Soviet Union commenced hostilities and if Polish interests were not directly involved in the conflict. However, if hostilities were not begun by the Soviet Union or if the war seemed to threaten Poland's independence, sovereignty, or territorial integrity, the level of dissidence would in all likelihood decrease, if not cease altogether. The inclusion of a large number of German troops in invading forces would help the regime in that it could reduce dissidence and rally support by equating the German forces with Hitler's armies.

31. At the inception of hostilities between Bloc and non-Bloc states, the regime would intensify its security controls, but anti-Communists would probably still be able to commit acts of sabotage. Later, if the USSR were suffering reverses, Polish guerrillas would tie down some Bloc troops, destroy supply dumps, disrupt lines of communications, and sabotage industrial and agricultural output. Efforts would also be made to assist the enemy in evasion and escape activities, and to collect intelligence which would be useful to non-Bloc planners. Without outside encouragement, guidance, and material support, however, they would constitute only a relatively minor nuisance to the regime.

32. Chances for organized anti-regime resistance would appear to be particularly favorable if military developments indicated the imminent collapse of Soviet power and the opportunity were offered for real Polish independence. Under those circumstances, organized resistance might consist of independent, local-

ized attempts to dislodge local Communist authorities. Efforts of this type would most likely be made first in villages and country towns where the authority of the Party is weakest, and in former German territories where Western forces might be looked upon as liberators by the indigenous population. Whether such resistance activities would lead to the appearance of a genuine liberation movement or whether they would merely result in the total breakdown of law and order would depend upon the circumstances at the time. Organized, centrally directed resistance involving military action along the lines of World War II's *Armia Krajowa (AK)* is hardly conceivable unless it were preceded by a complete breakdown of Polish authority and a Soviet occupation. Although the actual formation of a centrally directed resistance action would seem to be possible only under special circumstances, the tradition of the *AK* would probably continue to be strong in Polish minds. However, various forms of unorganized active or passive resistance would appear to be more likely than organized resistance. Given factors creating a high level of dissidence, a considerable amount of assistance to the West might be expected in the production and distribution of anti-regime propaganda, the harassment of some especially obnoxious local regime officials, help in evasion and escape operations and, to a lesser degree, in intelligence collection.

33. The Poles are sufficiently sophisticated militarily and politically to accept the use of nuclear weapons in future warfare as an inevitable reality. If Poland were involved in a nuclear attack, the people's first reaction would be determined self-preservation. If use were made of major nuclear weapons, the resulting mass destruction and dislocation would virtually eliminate any effective forms of resistance activity. On the other hand, if a nuclear attack were so designed as to eliminate the major resources of military and political control strengths, such an attack would probably be accepted as an unavoidable cost of liberation, would not necessarily destroy the will to resist, and could present anti-Communist Poles with an opportunity to take over control of the country.¹

34. Occupation policies of Western forces would not be a crucial factor affecting resistance potential and capabilities--so long as these policies were pronounced and implemented to respect and aid in the accomplishment of Polish aspirations for freedom, national independence, and the end of Soviet domination. Such enlightened occupation would intensify the Polish desire to be helpful and stimulate resistance activities in areas of the country still under Communist control.

35. Fear of Germany has traditionally played an important role in determining the attitudes of the Polish people. The Poles thus would be extremely apprehensive over the use of German forces in Polish territory, as well as over postwar territorial adjustments vis-a-vis Germany, and this factor might have a significant negative effect on the anti-Soviet resistance effort. However, this effect cannot be usefully measured at this time since it would depend on such presently unknown factors as the nature and degree of the German involvement, the announced war aims of the Western powers with respect to territorial settlements, and the over-all military situation. Otherwise, the nationality of attacking Free World forces would probably not influence the willingness of resistance groups to act, nor would the responsibility for initiation of hostilities greatly affect resistance potential.

¹The representative of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Army, would substitute the following:

"The Poles are sufficiently sophisticated militarily and politically so that they accept the use of nuclear weapons in future warfare as an inevitable reality. If Poland were involved in a nuclear attack, the people's first reaction would be determined self-preservation. As coordinated groups were developed, they probably would take all possible steps to strengthen their native government and to eliminate any Stalinist or authoritarian remnants. Conditioned by their bitter experience in the 1944 Warsaw uprising and the immediate postwar resistance period, however, the Poles probably would not attempt to initiate independent anti-Soviet military action until their forces had received substantial commitments (in terms of materiel and personnel as well as political support) from the West. The extent of their assistance in these circumstances probably would be dependent on the amount of damage suffered in the nuclear strike."

ANNEX J—RUMANIA

BASIC FACTORS OF DISSIDENCE

1. A basic cause underlying popular discontent in Rumania is the failure of the regime to improve the people's economic well being. Soviet economic exploitation in the postwar period, nationalization of industries, the destruction of private trade, economic regimentation, and inefficiency of the state economic enterprises have reduced large sections of Rumania to a low level of subsistence. The people, including workmen in supposedly prosperous towns, give every appearance of extreme poverty and gloom. A large part of the peasantry is dressed in rags. The population ascribes the shortages, particularly of food and fuel which before and even during World War II were in abundance, to exports required to meet obligations imposed by the Soviet Union and to poor planning by the government. Knowledge that food and fuel shortages in a country rich in oil, forests, and agriculture are due to government policy has further increased the people's resentment of both the regime and the Soviet Union.

2. The basic political factors in the anti-regime feelings of the Rumanians stem from their historical enmity toward Russia and Communism, their non-Slavic, traditionally Western orientation, and their disapproval of a governmental policy which seems counter to Rumanian aims of national independence, territorial integrity, and continuance of Western-oriented culture. Rumanians have not forgotten that the USSR, after World War II, re-annexed Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia, drove out the King, and delegated power to a puppet regime under absolute Soviet control. Regarding their country as a virtual Soviet colony, Rumanians have almost certainly identified Communism with their traditional fear of Russia. Moreover, individual liberties have been completely suppressed; the traditional family patterns have been destroyed;

and village life, around which most social and political activities evolved in the past, has now been placed under the control of local Communist functionaries whose chief task is not to serve the villagers but to carry out the unpopular program and policies of the regime. However, despite the strong anti-Communist feeling of the vast majority of the Rumanian people, they do not possess an active revolutionary tradition and are generally apathetic in the face of adversity.

3. The Rumanians have always been a devout people, considering religious institutions as playing a major role in their lives. The spiritual needs of the people were satisfied by a large number of churches and monasteries. The various religious organizations functioned primarily for the benefit of their followers rather than of any special political or racial groupings, and their secular activities were generally incidental to the fulfillment of their spiritual aims. Therefore, the transformation in 1947-48 by the Communist regime of religious organizations into instruments of support for its program was a great blow to the population. Subsequent measures, such as the complete destruction of the Uniate Church, and the reduction to virtual inactivity of the Roman Catholic Church by arresting nearly all its leading clergy, had a depressing effect on the people.

4. Prior to the advent of the Communist regime in 1945, Rumanian education and culture were oriented wholly toward the West. Speaking a predominantly Romance language and considering themselves modern representatives of Latin civilization, the Rumanians looked to the Western countries, particularly to France, for political, cultural, and social guidance; the French language, along with Rumanian, was until the end of World War II compulsory in the Rumanian schools. French schools, operated either directly by the

French Government or by private and religious institutions from France, were regarded as the best in the country. However, by 1948 the Rumanian Government had closed all French and other Western-operated schools and had taken stringent measures to eliminate Western culture from the country, substituting Soviet influences in their place. Through various measures the regime has transformed educational institutions into indoctrination centers, designed to eliminate Western cultural patterns and to suppress freedom of thought and expressions.

MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS

5. *Peasants.* Of all the groups in Rumania, the peasants, who compose over two-thirds of the country's population, constitute the greatest resistance potential. They have opposed the regime's agricultural policies, not only by widespread passive resistance, but on many occasions by hostile action as well. The bulk of the peasantry cannot reconcile its own interests with those of the regime and continues stubbornly to oppose the latter's agricultural policy. The traditional attachment of the peasant to the land, his deep-seated ambition to become a landowner and exercise a right which he regards as inalienable, his resentment over disruption of his simple way of life, and his traditional refusal to become organized are in opposition to the entire agricultural policy of the Communists. The peasant has been difficult to discipline, and he has often openly protested against policies designed to regiment him. The various non-collectivized rural groups, are suffering most at the hand of the regime. The collectivized peasants, who have been drawn into a tight controlled network, would run great risks in active resistance; they can, however, resist passively with relatively little danger of detection by the bureaucratic maze of collective administration.

6. *Industrial Workers.* In spite of the regime's past policy of favoring industry over agriculture, the industrial worker has not benefited much. In many ways his situation is inferior to that of the peasant who can at least evade deliveries to some extent and who

has a local food and fuel supply. The industrial worker suffers from a depressed standard of living, poor housing, food shortages, and a fear of possible unemployment. He is forced to work hard for low wages, often under primitive conditions. Most workers are probably aware of the fact that the products of their labor are often destined for shipment to the Soviet Union. Consequently even those who initially supported the Communist regime have become disillusioned. Worker dissatisfaction is manifested in reluctance to join the Party. The Communists in theory derive their chief support from the working class, but the Rumanian Worker's Party has had little success in improving its "social composition" by recruiting factory labor. The greatest discontent is to be found among the workers of the state railroad system; at one time these were the staunchest supporters of the Communists, furnishing the Party with such top leaders as Gheorghiu-Dej and Gheorghe Apostol, who were among the instigators of a bloody railroad strike in 1933.

7. *Youth.* Rumanian youth, particularly the 77,000 students of higher schools, are among the most outspoken opponents of the regime. Family tradition and the individualistic tendencies of youth have encouraged opposition to the regimentation enforced by Communist group control. Several important events — the 1953 Bucharest Youth Festival, the 1956 Polish uprising and the Hungarian revolt — have stirred young people to express open discontent, particularly the ethnic Hungarians. Their demonstrations against Communism in general and Marxist-Leninist instruction in particular brought comment even from Khrushchev. A number have defected from groups traveling abroad even though their political reliability had been strictly checked by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Party and its youth organization (Union of Working Youth) are seriously concerned over the continued interest of students in all things Western, and there is much criticism of youth in both agriculture and industry for absenteeism, thievery, immorality, laziness and failure to work toward the aims of the regime and the Communist ideology.

8. *Military.* Soviet authorities have become increasingly careful, in the past several years, to refrain from flaunting their military forces and advisors in Rumania. Although some Rumanian soldiers may resent their presence and authority, it is probable that professional military personnel are not averse to accepting the modern weapons and equipment being supplied by the Soviets, even though they hardly believe the Communist-nourished legend of the historical bond between Russians and Rumanians. Although Air Force personnel are presumably more carefully screened for political reliability than are Army personnel, dissident elements apparently still persist. Most military deserters have been Air Force officers, and these have reported general discontent in their service branch. There seems to be little dissidence in the Army's permanent cadre, which includes approximately 25,000 well-indoctrinated officers. Somewhat more dissatisfaction probably exists among noncommissioned officers and those enlisted men who are held over for an extra year of service. The two conscript classes of about 80,000 men each, largely deriving from the rural areas, are on the whole more disaffected than the rest of the Army, although the most obviously unreliable individuals in each age class are not taken into the Army.

9. Among the forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the state security police contain the most fanatical supporters of the regime. Personnel of other branches, such as the border guards, are for the most part not ardent Communists and are not devoted to the regime. Most of the members of these formations are conscripts and many of them, despite screening, share the anti-Communist feelings of the general population. Morale among the border guards is low. In the police force, attitudes ranging from tolerance of known anti-Communists to positive acts of disloyalty have been responsible for a series of purges. Nevertheless, while on the whole the loyalty of Rumanian armed forces is questionable, there has been no evidence of actual resistance within the Rumanian Army or the militarized security forces. Morale and discipline are not high. Apart from political

resentment of Soviet control, Rumanians are not militaristically inclined and they generally dislike the service as such.

10. *Minorities.* Ethnically Rumania is the most heterogeneous of the countries in the Satellite area, with minorities comprising 15 percent of the population. Groups of Hungarians, Germans, Jews, and others, who for the most part form sizeable islands within Rumania, look to other countries for political and cultural inspiration, thus constituting a potential fifth column. In its desire to integrate these minorities, the regime has contributed to their discontent by attempting to wipe out their distinctive cultures and by using minority institutions and languages as vehicles for the propagation of Communism. These minorities have probably become stronger in their ethnic group loyalty as a result of such inroads and of the anti-Communist attitudes manifested by their parent nationalities in West Germany, Hungary, and Israel.

11. *Intellectuals.* Rumanian intellectuals, particularly men of letters, have been restive under the Communist ideological yoke, but the Party has successfully stifled any open expression of opposition. The only major demonstration of open resistance to Party pressure — in May 1956 when latent discontent finally erupted at a series of writers' and Party meetings — was immediately suppressed. The intellectuals realize that they have little future unless they support the Communists or appear to do so. The lack of opportunity for advancement and creative freedom has motivated a number of engineers, professional men, artists, and dancers to defect on their visits to countries outside the Soviet Bloc. Other intellectuals, valuing prestige and material benefits, have accommodated themselves to the regime and have achieved leading positions, but for the most part they secretly harbor intense disaffection.

12. To a large extent, members of the government administration, factory officials, teachers, and engineers, who comprise the upper middle class, still retain a Western outlook. They are opposed to Communism but continue to work for the government in order to

exist. They pay lip service to the Party, even though they would prefer a liberal government and a renewal of contacts with the Western world. As in the past, they have been able to adapt themselves to political upheavals and internal changes. In view of the small size of the Party when it came to power in Rumania, the Communists have had to employ many non-Communist opportunists in positions of importance. Despite their high rank, officials holding technical positions in the state administration and economic enterprises, have little voice in policy and, for the present at least, are in no position to change the course of events in the country.

13. *Religious Groups.* The various religious organizations in Rumania do not at present engage in resistance but have been forced to cooperate with the regime in order to survive. Because of Rumania's history of foreign domination, many of the churches long ago adopted an attitude of accommodation to the civil authority in order to ensure the continuation of their activities. Religious faith in the country, however, is more vital than in the past. Churches of all denominations are heavily attended, and religious enthusiasm is markedly greater than before World War II, constituting a form of protest against the regime. People of all ages attend services, including even young men in military uniform.

14. *Rumanian Workers' Party.* The Rumanian Workers' (Communist) Party probably has a relatively small percentage of convinced Communists among its members. Only those working as professionals in the Party apparatus and a small number of workers in special categories are sincerely attached to the Party and to the regime. Despite the purge of nearly 200,000 members in 1949-50 and the expulsion of an equal number in 1950-55, the Party (total membership today is about 600,000, including both regular and candidate members) still contains a large proportion of opportunists who are interested only in personal profit and advancement or even mere subsistence. Nevertheless, the large percentage of opportunists in its midst in no way endangers the Party's stability at the present time. The expulsions of the past

years have even served in some measure to increase unity. There are no signs of national deviationism among the top leaders and the extent of factional maneuvering in the Politburo is not serious. Party chief Gheorghiu-Dej has maintained his position and influence through the period of Communist rule, and since the purge of top leaders Ana Pauker, Vasile Luca, and Teohari Georgescu in 1952 no one of sufficient stature or influence remains to endanger his position. A purge of the intellectual faction of the Politburo in July 1957 in no way affected the status of Gheorghiu-Dej.

INTENSITY OF DISSIDENCE

15. Of all the disaffected groups and classes in Rumania the peasantry is the most important. The Hungarian minority is potentially as dangerous to the regime, as are the students and intellectuals. Other groups with a subversive potential are the industrial workers, lower governmental officials and the "class enemies," that is, private tradesmen, former members of the professions, large landowners and industrialists. Together these comprise some 90 percent of Rumania's total population of 17.6 million. The regime has been able to limit their ability to resist, but it has failed to win their cooperation, and their passive resistance has been effective in retarding achievement of the domestic objectives of the government. The Rumanians possess a native facility for passive resistance. They have not been misled by the intense propaganda of the regime, and have shown themselves particularly adept at bribery, graft, and black marketing in accommodating themselves to conditions created by the Communists. The intensive hatred of the Soviet and of the native Communist regime is such that under certain circumstances, such as a breakdown of internal security, open strife within the top leadership, or general revolts and disorders in the other satellites, a setting for actual resistance activity could be created, provided the risk did not appear too great.

16. The vast majority of the Rumanian people tend to hold both the Russians and the native regime responsible for their present plight. The most intense hatred is directed

against the former, since Soviet influence and control of every facet of life are more complete and immediate than anything experienced before. The presence of Soviet armed forces in the country has served as an additional irritant.

TRENDS OF DISSIDENCE SINCE 1953

17. In the past several years, there has been a noticeable decrease in the number of isolated guerrilla actions in Rumania, owing chiefly to attrition, to the increased efficiency of the security forces, and to the disinclination of the country's rulers after Stalin's death to relax the stringent Stalinist controls. There are no known resistance groups in Rumania today, but partisan activity throughout the whole chain of the Carpathian Mountains continues to be reported. Some of the groups referred to as resistance elements are probably nothing more than roving bandit groups, composed of escaped criminals and lawless elements of the population. There are persistent reports, sometimes admitted by the regime, that security police and militia have been deployed against "terrorist bands" throughout the mountainous regions of Rumania. Other reports indicate that in some instances Soviet units in the area have been called upon for assistance. Nevertheless, there is evidence that partisan activity has been virtually wiped out during the past two years.

18. There has, however, been no noticeable decrease of unorganized and passive resistance expressed in the form of economic sabotage, occasional strikes, local disturbances, passive resistance against grain deliveries and general demands that the government provide improved living conditions. To some extent, the intellectual unrest of satellite neighbors has affected the Rumanian intelligentsia but never to the same degree as in Poland or even East Germany.

19. There is evidence that Stalin's denigration engendered widespread confusion in the higher ranks of the Rumanian Party, including the Politburo. But First Secretary Gheorghiu-Dej and his close followers have from time to time intimidated individual Party functionaries, thus checking any effective resistance to the leadership.

20. The failure of the Hungarian revolt continues to have a depressing influence on large segments of the Rumanian people. The feeling seems to have been created that the Communist regime is there to stay and that a fate similar to that of the Hungarians would befall Rumanians if they revolted. The people's hope for liberation seems to be at the lowest ebb. It is not, however, completely extinguished, as continued passive resistance demonstrates. Students continue passive resistance through such means as displaying intense interest in things Western and preferring Western to Eastern or even native writers. Students and intellectuals devoted considerable attention to the theories of Chinese Communist leader Mao Tse-tung, but probably no longer regard him as a mentor in the quest for a greater measure of autonomy.

RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES TO DATE

21. Active resistance since Stalin's death has been confined to a few isolated cases of workers demonstrations for higher wages and better living conditions and to student manifestations in several universities during the Hungarian revolt. The general pattern of these manifestations was uniform: inspired by news from Hungary, students demanded economic improvements and abolition or reduction of compulsory courses in Russian and Marxism-Leninism. When more basic anti-regime feelings were revealed in meetings between students and university Party officials, troops and police were summoned and some youths were arrested and subsequently tried. Isolated examples of tension among workers at this time were also evident. There appears to have been unrest among railroad workers in Bucharest, who reportedly passed a resolution of sympathy for the Hungarian workers.

22. In recent years less and less has been heard of guerrilla activities even in the most inaccessible areas of the country, although elements of the former National Peasant Party and Iron Guard may still exist. Resistance activities are now largely limited to disorganized, small-scale, virtually futile acts of sabotage and other minor activities by individuals driven to desperation. As in the

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past, such open resistance activity could only take place in the Carpathian and Transylvanian ranges, which furnish the protection of rough terrain and which border on the areas inhabited by German and Hungarian minorities, largely peasants, who have in the past aided guerrilla bands. In the postwar period isolated guerrilla bands have been active chiefly in the Brasov-Zarnesti section, the Fagaras range, the Dorbruja wasteland along the Black Sea coast and the nearby Danube Delta swamps, the Bristita-Nasaud section, and the Bihor Mountains.

23. In the field of passive resistance, which is well suited to the Rumanian character, the people continue to take advantage of many opportunities. Their lack of discipline has been intensified; they have shown their dissatisfaction by absenteeism, sloppiness and low productivity. Efforts by the regime to remedy these conditions are often counteracted through bribery of willing officials (an ancient Rumanian pastime) and by padding the reports of hours worked. Thus ingrained Rumanian inefficiency is compounded by deliberate carelessness or pretended ignorance. Persistent offenders cannot all be jailed; they are usually punished only by loss of salary on the basis of nonfulfillment of norms. Furthermore, there are indications that Western information media such as VOA, BBC and the French and West German radio stations continue to be popular and to exert considerable influence in keeping alive the hope for eventual liberation. The people are reported to have relied on Western information on the rebellions in Poland and Hungary and on official US statements, sometimes meeting clandestinely to discuss the contents of Western broadcasts.

ROLE OF EMIGRÉS

24. Since the Communist regime came into power there have been three principal emigré groups which have claimed to represent the interests of the Rumanian people and to offer guidance and assistance to organized and unorganized resistance within the country. The tangible results of these groups especially during the past several years have been negligible

or non-existent. Factional strife within the groups has completely vitiated them as a rallying point for any kind-of resistance activities inside the country.

25. The Rumanian National Committee, which has the official blessing of former King Michael, is reduced to the role of maintaining liaison with other emigré groups, and of serving as a waning symbol of royalist Rumania and as a potential channel for Western support. The League of Free Rumanians, a splinter group of the Rumanian National Committee, maintains offices in many of the Western countries and also liaison with other emigré groups. The other major political exile group interested in promoting internal resistance is the militant Legionnaire, or Iron Guard, group. It has a long history of violence and clandestine activity within Rumania and stands compromised in the eyes of most Rumanians at home for its fascist, anti-parliamentarian, and anti-Semitic position.

REGIME MEASURES AGAINST RESISTANCE

26. The regime's measures to frustrate any attempts by resistance groups to threaten its stability have been helped by a number of factors which are typical of the Rumanian scene: lack of traditional revolutionary spirit; lack of potential leadership which could organize effective opposition; general popular fear of police terror; habits and attitudes ingrained under foreign domination for centuries; and reliance on foreign powers for liberation. Moreover, the people realize that the regime has at its disposal strong police and security forces and the support of Soviet troops and that it will not hesitate to take prompt and effective measures against Party and non-Party individuals who show the slightest sign of deviation or rebellion.

27. Following the Hungarian revolution, the Rumanian regime adopted a fluctuating policy of appeasement and enforced controls. However, since the shake-up of the government hierarchy in July 1957, it has become apparent that the regime's agitation and propaganda agencies have increased their manipulation of group and individual fears and aspirations in order to keep the public

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firmly under control. The objective of the regime appears to be to organize workers, peasants, intellectuals and students into responsible, disciplined groups and to encourage the public to believe not only that the regime will endure but that the Western countries regard it as established and respectable.

28. The regime has passed new laws which make certain crimes, considered minor in the past (such as hooliganism, indecency, peddling without a license, short weight, pilferage in government), punishable with prison terms rather than fines. New labor camps have been set up, and it is believed in Rumania that individuals are being sentenced to these camps for one to three years. Unconfirmed reports indicate that in the provinces violators are sometimes arrested and judged by security organs rather than by the regular police and courts; many have been tried, sentenced and transported to prison within several days. On the other hand, concessions have been made to alleviate such basic economic grievances as starvation wages, unrealistic agricultural quotas and industrial norms. These have included raising of minimum wages, modifying delivery quotas, increasing children's bonuses and old age pensions. The morale of the Rumanian people is at a low ebb as a result of police arrests, higher food costs and persistent alarmist rumors.

CAPABILITY OF REGIME TO SUPPRESS REVOLT

29. The Rumanian security apparatus under the Ministry of Internal Affairs has an overall strength of 156,000, made up of the following components: State Security Police (uniformed and plainclothes), 43,000; Frontier Guard, 35,000; and Militia (including Firemen), 78,000. This apparatus is believed adequate to maintain the present regime in power and it will almost certainly continue to be capable of coping with any small scale anti-regime activity. However, it probably would not be able to deal with an uprising such as occurred in Hungary without the assistance of Soviet troops. The presence of two Soviet line divisions, which could be reinforced on short order, and the memory of the Soviet repression of the Hungarian revolt will be

major factors enabling the Communist regime to maintain its hold on the country. With the exception of those higher officers who are good Communists, and have survived the purges, the reliability of the Rumanian Army (some 215,000 men) in case of uprisings is questionable.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS OF PEACE

30. Under present circumstances no level of resistance potential in Rumania has the capability of developing into successful organized resistance. The regime and the Soviet forces in that country are capable of taking the severest countermeasures against any attempt to establish organized resistance. However, a number of internal and external developments could increase the level of the current unorganized resistance and dissidence. Internally, the continuing economic deprivations and the acceleration of agricultural collectivization could increase the discontent of the workers and peasants. Also, any signs of friction within the top Party and government hierarchy or of relaxation of police controls would encourage certain segments of the population to become more vocal against the regime. Externally, disturbances in the other orthodox satellites or political and economic successes in Poland and Yugoslavia could have a telling effect on some groups in Rumania, especially students and intellectuals.

31. From the 1955 Summit conference to the Hungarian revolt, it was evident in Rumania that the lessening of East-West tensions had adversely affected anti-regime resistance. Conversely, with the increase of these tensions after the Hungarian revolt, unrest increased considerably, including open demonstrations by students and by some workers and widespread confusion within the Party. There is also evidence that many Rumanian Party and government officials sympathized with the Hungarian revolutionaries and that the revolt had produced deep confusion in the Party. While the purge of Chisinevski and Constantinescu in July 1957 did not affect the basic stability of the regime, it did create some uncertainty and confusion within the Party ranks. Additional ideological disputes in Ru-

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mania and elsewhere in the orbit could be expected to increase confusion and uncertainty within the Party and to encourage the resistance of the more vocal anti-regime elements, such as students, but in view of the general apathy of the Rumanian people in general, no build-up of popular demands which might result in widespread revolt is to be expected.

32. Only a further deterioration of the already bad economic conditions, combined with a relaxation of security controls, could spark spontaneous unrest. Since such a relaxation can hardly be expected, Rumanians will continue to be prevented from openly displaying their dissidence. Thus their discontent can only take the form of active or passive clandestine opposition, ranging from acts of sabotage to listening to foreign broadcasts, from assaults on individual policemen or soldiers to the voicing of popular grievances and from minor strikes to slow-downs in production. At best, such activities will retard the implementation of the regime's political and economic programs; at the least, they will have a nuisance value.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR

33. At the inception of war between Bloc and non-Bloc countries (local or general) the regime would impose more stringent security controls which would preclude anti-regime resistance activities. If the struggle became so intense that the Bloc nations had to divert their security forces to other tasks, or if Western forces were within the country and appeared to be winning, many Rumanians would engage in espionage, sabotage, and other harassing activities against the Communists. However, it would be almost impossible for anti-regime elements to undertake military action. Rumania's geographical location adjoining the USSR, in addition to the national character and temperament of the people — a lack of spirit to resist and the fear of reprisals and further loss of their limited freedom — would tend to restrict any independent action. The topography of the country, however, would lend itself to guerrilla fighting, and small bands of partisans could retard the advance of Bloc forces by sabotage of lines of

communications and industrial plants. However, widespread, effective military action could be undertaken only if substantial elements of the armed forces defected and took to the mountains. In such an event, peasants could be expected not only to assist the fighting forces but also to augment their numbers considerably. Outside support, especially in war materiel, would be needed by the fighting groups in order to continue active for any length of time. Nevertheless, small guerrilla bands could manage to operate over an indefinite period in sabotage and harassment.

34. Possibilities exist in Rumania for substantial assistance to Western military forces in both the military and political fields, were they to invade that country. Desertion to the West of large segments of the Rumanian armed forces would in all probability occur, particularly if Western invading forces were initially successful; the anti-Communist population could also be expected to engage in economic sabotage and other harassing actions. Resistance elements in Rumania could facilitate the infiltration of agents by the West for intelligence collection and other operational activities. Successful escape and evasion of Western personnel in Rumania are possible but would depend largely on the fortunes and area of the war. The fortunes of war could affect the degree of resistance, although most Rumanians could be expected to resist Soviet forces.

35. The Rumanians probably would make some distinction in the nationality of the Western forces. Their past political and cultural ties with France and Italy might make these countries more acceptable as allies, and, in turn, increase the Rumanians' will to resist. The attitude of Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Greece would have a definite effect on Rumanian resistance potential. If these countries joined in the conflict at its beginning, the Rumanian resistance groups would be encouraged to take a more active part. A considerable number of military units could be expected to desert to Yugoslavia. Also, resistance to Soviet forces in neighboring Bloc countries would encourage opposition to those forces in Rumania.

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36. Although the people of Rumania would not approve the use of nuclear weapons on targets in Rumania, Western employment of nuclear weapons in that country could have a very significant psychological effect on the people and could influence their attitudes toward the attacking forces. Attacks on urban areas resulting in heavy civilian casualties would prejudice most Rumanians against the West. Such adverse reactions might be reduced if nuclear attacks were limited to areas important to the Soviet war effort and were accompanied by a coordinated political, war-

fare campaign. If nuclear attacks were made primarily on military targets isolated from larger populated areas, the will to resist might be increased since such attacks could diffuse and lessen the control strengths of the regime. 37. The Rumanians have a long history of accepting foreign domination. Therefore, it is almost certain that they will continue to endure virtually any type of occupation. Repressive occupation policies would undoubtedly decrease their will to resist but would, on the whole, have little effect on their low resistance potential.

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ANNEX K—USSR

PREAMBLE

1. Although dissatisfaction with various aspects of the Soviet system is widespread, the gulf between such dissidence and resistance, except among certain national minorities, is greater in the USSR than in any other Bloc state. Such dissidence as exists in the USSR does not necessarily indicate opposition to Communist ideology or the Soviet system. It is rather a manifestation of discontent over the neglect or denial by the regime of popular needs or desires. Since the death of Stalin, dissidence in the Soviet Union appears to have decreased, except in some of the recently annexed areas. There has been grumbling and criticism, particularly following the 20th CPSU Congress in early 1956. But, on the whole, most of this criticism is not "counter-revolutionary" nor does it seem to envisage the overthrow of the Soviet state. On the contrary, there has unquestionably developed during the past four decades a widespread identification with the Soviet national state and many of its institutional features and the people have come to identify the Soviet state with the Marxist-Leninist ideology which has shaped its character. Moreover, the successes of the USSR during and after World War II, and particularly the security reforms, economic improvements and technological achievements since 1953, have engendered a pride in the Soviet state and have almost certainly strengthened the loyalty of the population toward the regime, again excepting the recently acquired Western territories. Generally, Soviet citizens appear to feel that their lot has improved and is going to improve further. Therefore many of them, especially the hard-core followers of the Communist gospel, are probably quite willing to accept privations in the name of Soviet patriotism. Such are the premises for an examination of dissidence in the USSR. They do not

rule out the existence of a resistance potential but they obviously put it on a level that differs considerably from that of the other Sino-Soviet Bloc countries.

BASIC FACTORS OF DISSIDENCE

2. The people of the USSR have had to endure extraordinary hardships for many years. Improvements in their standards of living and the relaxation of political terror since 1953 have served to decrease the intensity of dissidence and considerably whittled down, if not eliminated for the time being, actual resistance potential. Thus, while the improvement of living standards has lagged far behind the over-all rates of economic growth, there is evidence that the Kremlin now favors such improvement, mainly in order to increase labor productivity, to remove the stigma of poverty from Communism, and to generate more active support by Soviet citizens. Heavy industry, military requirements, and technological developments will continue to have priority but, barring unforeseen complications, the present regime's economic reforms and increased production will at least give the people the reassurance that something is being done for them. Many probably feel already that they are better off now than they have been for years. Discontent arising from economic causes is likely to diminish as consumer welfare improves over the next several years, although this effect will be partially offset if expectations which have been aroused by regime promises are disappointed and if familiarity with Western standards grows. However, the spectacular successes of Soviet science have almost certainly strengthened the allegiance of the people to the regime and are probably attributed by many to the Soviet system itself. Therefore it should not necessarily be assumed that closer contacts with the West would inevitably generate more dissatisfaction

among the Soviet rank and file, which may have come to believe that the eventual supremacy of the USSR is certain and that ultimately the Russian people will be better off than the peoples in the free world.

3. There remain, however, some causes of dissidence that may continue to create difficulties for the regime. One is the agricultural collectivization policy. Russian peasants remain overwhelmingly opposed to it, especially so the peasants in the newly acquired Western territories who have lived under Soviet rule only since 1944. Realizing this, the Kremlin has introduced reform measures that may pacify many peasants and at the same time raise their output. With the older generation dying out, the younger agricultural workers will probably not have as high a resistance potential, at least as long as the USSR remains generally successful in stabilizing and furthering its economic and political position. Another problem is thought control. The party, more powerful than ever, continues to control virtually every facet of human thought. Adherence or at least lip service to the Party-sanctioned theories, laws, methods, and esthetic positions is required eventually of all. The loosening of intellectual stringency during the past few years has relieved a certain amount of pressure, but the Party has made it quite clear, after the "thaw" set in, that it will not tolerate deviations. Intellectuals are no longer liquidated, however, they are "persuaded" to return to the rightful path. While most of them return to conformity, their public repentances appear extorted and they probably nourish their grievances in secret perhaps more intensely than before.

4. The most disgruntled elements are almost certainly the national minorities. The reintroduction of the policy of russification which began in the thirties has created ill will toward the Russians, especially since some of the minorities were incorporated into or annexed by the USSR against their wishes. Although some of the more blatant forms of russification have been abandoned by the post-Stalin regime, the basic policy has been retained. Russification now involves the spread of the Russian language and culture

throughout the Soviet Union, praise of the Russian people as the leading nationality in the USSR, and the imposition of Russian administrators and officials in key posts throughout minority areas. Anti-Semitism, though not as rampant as in the years just before Stalin's death, is still widespread and the regime not only does little to combat it but by its attacks on Zionism actually encourages it. (For a more detailed discussion of the more important minority areas, see the appendixes on the Baltic, Ukraine and Caucasus.)

MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS

5. *Forced Labor and Exiles.* There may still be as many as 2,500,000 forced laborers — including both political and criminal elements — in prison camps and an indeterminate number of exiles who unquestionably constitute a group that harbors the strongest resistance potential. Although the number of political prisoners has been reduced and prison conditions ameliorated since 1953, the forced laborers still live under very harsh circumstances, and the exiles are denied many rights and opportunities accorded ordinary Soviet citizens. Resistance potential is inherent in these elements, as reflected in the Vorkuta and other labor camp strikes which, incidentally, were organized and led by the political prisoners. It is also possible that large numbers of the many millions of labor camp inmates who have been discharged have a strong hatred for a government that mistreated them and might swell the ranks of potential resisters.

6. *Peasants.* Dissidence among peasants has traditionally been strong and has focussed upon collectivization and the low living standards identified with it. These living standards have risen substantially since 1953 because of successive increases in the prices paid for compulsory state deliveries, but they generally remain below what the peasant thinks he could obtain from a free market. In addition, bureaucratic rigidities and frequent attempts to eliminate their private plots and personal livestock offend the peasants' sense of individuality and tend to alienate them

from the regime. Nevertheless, they have been relatively free from police terror in recent years, and while many peasants resent the anti-religious policy of the government, they probably care little about ideological preachings and thought control.

7. *Intellectuals.* The intelligentsia, in general, stands high in Soviet society in terms of income and prestige, and many of them, particularly among the bureaucrats and engineers, have a vested interest in the regime. Most scientists, moreover, seem to enjoy both official support and relative freedom of pursuit in their fields. The limited relaxation of controls following Stalin's denigration emboldened intellectuals in many less favored fields to protest against party controls, though usually by implication only. These protests revealed that virtually all prominent writers, artists, composers, and scholars would welcome more freedom of expression. Although the post-Stalin regime has somewhat relaxed the extremely stringent Stalinist conformism, it has basically maintained its doctrines, and merely enforces them with greater flexibility and leniency. Strictures on creative expression remain tight enough to cause widespread dissidence among the more sensitive intellectuals. However, the dissidence of Soviet intellectuals is not necessarily one of hostility against the Soviet system but is often directed against the methods and interpretations of the Communist gospel by the Soviet leaders.

8. *Students, Youth.* There has been evidence of student dissidence, and there were demonstrations in 1956 and 1957 by young people against the discipline and the drabness of Soviet life. These demonstrations were all the more striking as youth has for years been considered among the firmest supporters of the regime. Nevertheless, it appeared that as a result of a higher intellectual level achieved by improved Soviet education, of the atmosphere of relaxation following the death of Stalin, the 20th CPSU Congress, and the Hungarian revolution youth has turned a critical eye on the disparity between Communist theory and practice. But in spite of the fact that students at least are now better equipped to think for themselves and that the regime apparently allows for greater leniency in deal-

ing with young deviationists, it would be incorrect to consider Soviet youth a generally disloyal group. Youths remain Soviet patriots even though their understanding of ideology may be superficial and their adherence to it perfunctory. The fact remains that they as yet know little outside the USSR and that their thinking is done through a filter of state-defined ideological premises. It is doubtful, therefore, that their dissidence constitutes a serious threat to the regime's future; it is much more likely to be directed towards gradual reform of the regime than its overthrow.

9. *National minorities,* constituting 45 percent of the Soviet population of 206,300,000,¹ have for many years provided centers of resistance to Soviet Communism. Though the degree of dissidence has varied sharply among minority groups, no other groups inside the USSR have fought so grimly against overwhelming odds. In the first postwar years, a reported 200,000 partisans in the Ukraine and probably 100,000 in Lithuania battled Soviet troops. The process of russification and sovietization was carried out with determination by Moscow; entire minorities were transplanted from home areas and, in the process, more or less destroyed as groups. By 1949, the back of the resistance was broken, and following the death of Stalin, a policy of appeasement was instituted. As will be seen in the appendices, the minorities which had been part of the Tsarist empire and thus become components of the USSR have calmed down and are not, at this time, believed to constitute a threat to the Moscow regime. However, the Western territories which were annexed during or after World War II, while forcibly pacified, still rank high in potential resistance groups.

10. *Industrial workers'* grievances stem mainly from low pay, strict discipline, and bureaucratic arbitrariness. Among the workers, the semi-skilled and unskilled ones, receiving

¹ Population estimate as of January 1, 1958, from "The 1958 Annual Estimates. Political and Demographic Composition of the Sino-Soviet Bloc," (SECRET), prepared by the Air Research Division, Library of Congress.

much lower pay and fewer privileges than the highly skilled, are probably the more disaffected element. However, their living standard has recently improved and there is now less emphasis on the harsh labor discipline that was once a chief factor of dissidence among workers during Stalin's rule. Generally, the resistance potential of this social group cannot be presumed to be high and, with further economic improvements as well as over-all successes of the regime, may further decrease.

11. *Armed Forces.* There is no evidence of serious dissidence in the Soviet armed forces. The permanent cadre of officers and noncommissioned officers (constituting about 20 percent of total strength) is composed of apparently reliable men who have been thoroughly indoctrinated; most of the officers are Communist Party members. There is some dissatisfaction among the conscripts, much of which stems from the normal soldier's customary causes of discontent — low pay, strict discipline, limited opportunities for social activities, etc. Further, the attitude of the conscripts reflects the various causes of discontent among the populace at large, but no anti-regime activities have developed. The increase of party control following the removal of Marshal Zhukov has undoubtedly irritated some elements of the military but not enough to produce serious dissidence. Whether harsh military discipline and the wide cleavage between the status of the officers and enlisted men, and again between the junior and senior officers, actually contributes to dissidence directed against the regime is doubtful. Although it may be true that soldiers do not like compulsory indoctrination, it is also true that at least some of it will sink into their consciousness and that they regard such exercises as an inevitable duty to their nation, of whose achievements they are proud. On the whole, it can be assumed that there is little if any resistance potential to be found in the Soviet armed forces.

INTENSITY OF DISSIDENCE

12. Dissidence exists on nearly every level of Soviet society, extending from simple grumb-

ing to the rejection of the regime and its ideology. It is believed, however, that the latter extreme occurs most often among people who have suffered at the hands of the regime by arrest, imprisonment, or persecution, or those whose close relatives and friends have suffered. The overwhelming majority of the people, particularly in the Russian component of the USSR, are complaining mainly about personal discomforts, which some, however, may well attribute to the faults of the system. Even before the Malenkov-Khrushchev innovations and reforms contributed to a general decline of dissidence, the regime had already established such pervasive authority that the people were forced to devote their energies to coping with existing conditions rather than taking steps to achieve an alternate solution. Although active resistance ceased by 1950, dissidence is still widespread. On the other hand, much of what appears to be passive resistance may be in large part nothing more than a demonstration of time-honored Russian indifference or apathy.

13. Dissidence in many areas of the USSR is not a factor of real significance, and the gulf between dissidence and resistance is far wider than elsewhere in the Sino-Soviet Bloc. In the first place, the Soviet population has experienced Communist rule for four decades and has, by and large, become accustomed to it. In the second place, this rule is exercised by compatriots, not by foreigners, and the grievances of Soviet peoples, particularly the Russians, are not reinforced by the emotional power of injured nationalism. Whether a crisis would change this attitude and create or stimulate a resistance potential, would depend on the type and duration of the crisis. In a war, the vast majority of the Soviet people could be expected to set aside their complaints and defend their homeland. If, as a result of a crisis, improvement of the living standard should decline, it is possible that, at least among some groups, minor types of dissidence could grow into more serious ones. In any event, opposition to the present regime or its methods does not imply a desire on the part of the people to reject all fundamental concepts on which the Soviet state is built.

TRENDS OF DISSIDENCE SINCE 1953

14. Since the death of Stalin and the demise of Beria, a more relaxed political climate and a number of measures taken to alleviate the most serious causes of dissidence have contributed to a decrease in dissidence, particularly in the prewar territories of the USSR but perhaps even, to some degree, in the newly annexed territories. Among these measures were efforts to raise the living standards, the easing of arbitrary police state methods, a gradual decrease of the labor camp population, somewhat more freedom of expression combined with a less fear-laden atmosphere, and, though in a very limited way, increased contact with countries outside the Bloc. The 20th CPSU Congress constituted the climax of these developments and made all previous relaxation moves by the Kremlin leaders official.

15. However, some of the new methods proved to be counter-productive inasmuch as they stimulated questioning by Soviet citizens, who began to express their doubts about the workings of the Soviet system and its tactics. The events in Poland and Hungary caused considerable interest and questioning, particularly among the intelligentsia. These events among others hastened a certain retrenchment by the regime, of which the theoretical bases were announced in the middle of 1956. Mao's "hundred flowers" doctrine, too, led to retrenchment in China, which must have been added evidence that, whatever the nature of their questioning and doubts, expression of dissent and dissidence would meet with regime counteraction.

16. Whether dissidence in the USSR will increase or decrease in the future is hard to predict. Continued improvements in living standards and further gains in Soviet prestige through technological or diplomatic successes will tend to diminish it, particularly among the majority which is largely unconcerned with ideological issues or abstract considerations of freedom. Students and intellectuals, whose ranks are growing, pose a greater problem, since many of their questionings are more fundamental. The regime, while ready to retrench from its more liberal policies when dis-

sidence finds mounting expression, apparently still desires to refrain from total repression in this area lest it stifle the "positive" initiative which it is seeking to encourage. Thus an opportunity has appeared for dissidence to grow so long as it remains quiescent and does not seem likely, in the regime's view, to assume active forms. If the current stabilization program should succeed, dissidence may peter out even in the new Western territories. If not, the security apparatus of the Soviet regime could easily keep such dissidence from growing into resistance.

RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES TO DATE

17. Active and organized resistance was a serious problem during and just after World War II. Thereafter, severe Stalinist repression prevented any active resistance of significance. Stalin's death gave new impetus to resistance as demonstrated by large-scale unrest in some Siberian prison camps. Again, some active resistance erupted in 1956, such as riots in Tbilisi, strike and work stoppages in Moscow's Kaganovich Ball-Bearing Plant, and nationalist demonstrations in Vilnyus and Kaunas in Lithuania. These outbreaks were spontaneous and not necessarily subversive. Otherwise, no organized resistance groups are believed to exist in the USSR, with the possible exception of such religious sects as the Jehovah's Witnesses, the Monashi, and others. The Witnesses have been most active in the western Ukraine and in Moldavia. The sect was accused of taking orders from its parent organization in Brooklyn, of preaching that the United States is a democratic country, of encouraging pacifism among draft-age youth, and having advised its members during the Hungarian revolution to fight against the Soviet government. The group apparently was able to survive as a tight-knit organization for several years because of the total dedication of its members but its continued existence as an organization is questionable.

18. Whatever resistance still exists in the USSR is almost certainly unorganized and passive. Much evidence of unorganized resistance to specific policies or ideological tenets has come to light during the past two years. It often has taken the form of public

criticism of policies or concepts, mostly as criticism of less basic matters; attempts by writers, artists, and scholars to break through official controls; insubordination toward official discipline, from refusal to attend propaganda lectures to hooliganism and crime; and nationalistic grumbling by minorities. Unorganized resistance is most likely to occur in intellectual and student circles and has as its object the greater liberalization of the Soviet regime toward individual freedom.

19. Unorganized resistance is hard to evaluate because it depends on the motivation of the person who performs a particular act. Much of what might be considered resistance probably consists of individual criminal acts, such as looting, robbing, and murder. The murder or beating up of police informants, tax collectors, and administrative officials may perhaps be unorganized resistance but it may also be an act of vengeance of an individual in reponse to a particular situation and not really pertinent to the question of unorganized resistance. Reports of acts of violence in the Soviet Union should be regarded cautiously before being considered indicative of unorganized resistance. Since the death of Stalin, the population of the labor camps has been tremendously reduced and various amnesties, beginning with that of April 1953, released a large number of habitual criminals. That individuals of this sort turn to violence when released can be explained in too many other ways for their actions to be considered indicative of resistance potential.

ROLE OF EMIGRÉS

20. Anti-Soviet emigrés seem to have played a negligible role in directing or even inspiring recent resistance activity within the Soviet Union. The regime seems to have succeeded in isolating potential leaders of resistance from foreign contacts. Most Soviet citizens seem to have little knowledge of emigré activities. Even if the Soviet public were better informed concerning emigrés, it is doubtful that the latter could gain substantial support inside the Soviet Union. The feeling is widespread that emigrés have lost touch with Soviet reality and no longer understand the

real problems facing the Soviet citizenry. Many, in addition, would resent what they consider the emigrés flight to luxurious living while their compatriots at home languished in poverty. Some minorities, particularly the Baltic peoples, may have more sympathy for their emigrés than the Russians do.

REGIME MEASURES AGAINST RESISTANCE

21. The regime seeks to inhibit dissidence by a vast propaganda campaign designed to popularize the Communist Party and the Soviet system and to discredit all Western countries in the eyes of the populace. The regime also maintains an ubiquitous secret police organization under the control of the Committee of State Security (KGB) of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, for the purpose of maintaining complete surveillance over the population and ferreting out any individuals or organizations exhibiting actual or potential anti-regime tendencies. An estimated 400,000 militarized security forces (most of them Border and Interior Troops) are kept in constant readiness to quell summarily any anti-regime uprisings. Punitive measures, including mass deportation and forced labor in remote areas of the USSR, serve both to remove active resistance elements and to discourage further resistance activity. Such measures have been applied with special force in the Baltic States, the western Ukraine, and the Caucasus. The effectiveness of the government's actions is reflected in the apparent stability of the regime. While the present trend in the Soviet Union appears to be toward a less stringent application of security controls than during the Stalin era, there is every indication that the security apparatus itself has lost none of its effectiveness.

CAPABILITY OF REGIME TO SUPPRESS REVOLT

22. The regime has shown its ability to control local and sporadic disturbances. In the event of a revolt in a national minority area, Soviet military units in the area, which usually consist of cross sections of many Soviet nationalities, would hardly be vulnerable, as were the Hungarian and Polish forces, to any

nationalist appeal. In case of a simultaneous or rapidly spreading revolt in several heavily populated areas, the Soviet regime, due to its formidable security apparatus, would appear to be in a better position to defend itself than any other government in the world, unless it were dangerously weakened. While even then it cannot be predicted that the entire Soviet control system would collapse, it is possible that the effectiveness of the security apparatus would be greatly weakened.

MODIFICATION OF SECURITY APPARATUS

23. The Soviet security apparatus has undergone some modification since the death of Stalin in 1953. That year the Ministry of State Security (MGB) was absorbed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and in 1954 the Committee of State Security (KGB) of the Council of Ministers was formed, although without some functions formerly held by the MGB. The MVD which inherited some of the regulatory apparatus from the MGB, including the militia (civil police) and the security troops, lost some of its functions, and control over local operations of some of its remaining functions was decentralized. While the ostensible purpose of these modifications was to restore "socialist legality" to the police system and to increase the responsibility of local governments for law and order, Moscow is in a position to assert its direct control over all security and law enforcement agencies.

24. Modifications in the apparatus have been primarily undertaken with two aims in view: First, to deny to any given individual in the Soviet hierarchy total control over the organs of the secret police and to circumscribe to some degree their power in society. The second concern has been primarily one of allowing Soviet citizens to relax as a whole and to eliminate those secret police functions that seemed ineffective in their coercive aspects for the efficient operation of Soviet society. There has been no indication of a greater hesitation in undertaking investigation of significant causes of subversion and treason. The size of the security police apparatus was reduced significantly after Stalin's death, but in the

summer of 1957 these forces were increased. Available information does not indicate whether the reductions of 1953-1954 period exceeded the increase of the summer of 1957.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS OF PEACE

25. Present capabilities for organized resistance are virtually nonexistent. Even somewhat liberalized security controls are probably more than adequate to stamp out any incipient organized attempt to resist. Unorganized resistance, chiefly passive, is likely to diminish as the USSR becomes militarily and economically stronger. With the exception of some national minorities, the maximum that can be expected from the overwhelming majority of the Soviet people, and particularly the Russians, is dissidence of a type that is not necessarily directed against the system as such. On the other hand, in a monolithic state, opposition to a part of the system can be regarded as tantamount to opposition to the system as a whole; the Soviet leaders almost certainly so consider it. A steady improvement in the living standard would almost certainly reduce an important source of dissidence, but not that of intellectuals and students, for example. A deterioration in living conditions would add to other sources of dissidence and raise resistance potential in time of crisis.

26. The relation between the level of dissidence and a change in the degree of East-West tensions is difficult to predict. Major developments in international relations will certainly affect the level of dissidence, but whether it will increase or decrease depends on the specifics of any given case. Tensions attributable to Soviet foreign policy may well raise the level of dissidence while tensions resulting from moves generally considered to be Western provocation may lower the level of dissidence. A reduction in tension may reduce the amount of dissidence or at least deepen the apathy of national minority groups, but on the other hand it is likely to stimulate further dissidence from intellectuals and artists and in other of the elite levels of Soviet society by turning their attention from external dangers to internal problems.

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27. Whatever doubts in the regime and its ideology might have been aroused by the de-Stalinization campaign and the ensuing ideological controversy, the loyalty of the people to the Soviet state was not shaken. Furthermore, some of the doubts now existing may be assuaged as the regime continues its stabilization drive. In any case, independent thinking and a more objective approach to Marxism-Leninism could not be expected to strengthen resistance potential to the degree that it would endanger the Soviet state. The regime, while fostering a "creative," i.e., non-dogmatic, approach to these problems, will attempt to keep the arguments within a regime-approved framework and to restrict the scope and nature of the changes sought. The regime, however, will not hesitate to revert to harsher, oppressive measures to keep the people in line if it appears necessary.

28. Certain kinds of external support, notably those stimulating active, violent, and futile resistance to the Communist regime, would almost certainly be counter-productive in respect to nearly all dissident elements in the Soviet Union. However, support designed to serve more modest aims, such as continued liberalization, would be welcomed by disaffected individuals and groups. The acceptability and success of external support depend on many factors such as the kind of support, identity and source of support, the safety of the recipient, the nature of "resistance" asked for, the kind of reward involved, etc. General expressions of encouragement designed for the peaceful evolution of the system as are possible for radio broadcasts, may also be welcome to some elements of the population, but be taken by other, more militant dissidents as abandonment by the West.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR

29. Anti-Communist or anti-regime resistance in the USSR in wartime would depend largely on the length, severity, and location of the war and on the course of its military operations. The mere initiation of hostilities would not *ipso facto* increase the resistance potential. It is almost certain that the regime's appeal to Soviet patriotism would not fall on deaf

ears and that most of the Soviet peoples, with the exception of some national minorities, would work and fight for the defense of their homeland. Moreover, security control would undoubtedly be stepped up and dissidents would find it more difficult to organize and more dangerous to state their views than in peacetime.

30. If the war were prolonged and the USSR suffered major reverses, resistance potential would probably increase. In view of Soviet behavior during World War II and considering the fact that since then the USSR has become far stronger and has acquired much more prestige, it cannot be assumed that popular suffering from great hardships, tensions, and tighter controls would in itself catalyze dissidence into resistance. Only if war damage were sufficient to cause a breakdown of central authority would organized resistance develop. Short of this contingency, even if the regime were weakened, anti-regime resistance would still be regarded as treason and enough security controls would remain to render organization or resistance very difficult.

31. Active resistance would become much more likely if the tide of the war turned definitely against the USSR and foreign troops entered the USSR. Until that point, many anti-Soviet elements would be afraid to act, remembering the severe penalties imposed on collaborators with the Germans after World War II. Particularly in minority areas along the border, extensive anti-Soviet activity could be expected as anti-Soviet forces approached. Many natives inspired with the vision of liberation would take to the woods and form partisan bands, as they did during and after World War II, raiding supply lines, performing acts of sabotage, providing intelligence and helping in escape and evasion operations. Some groups in other parts of the USSR would be willing to offer assistance if communication could be established with them. For example, forced labor camps and colonies, representing as they do concentrations of anti-Soviet elements, might be able to create disturbances in the hinterland. Many exiled Germans, North Caucasians, Crimean Tatars, and Balts in Central Asia, the Altai territory, and Siberia probably would be willing intelligence collec-

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tors. However, it would be difficult to organize active resistance in areas still under Soviet control. Even if hard pressed on military fronts, the Soviet leaders would make a determined, and probably successful, effort to maintain control in the hinterland to prevent resistance elements from becoming active behind their lines.

32. In the event of an impending collapse of the Soviet government, anti-Soviet elements of the population, together with forced labor camp inmates and forced exiles, could attain significant resistance capabilities, particularly with external support. But apart from these elements, resistance among the broad masses of the Great Russian people would be difficult to organize. Patriotism, indoctrinated respect for Soviet authority, and apathy probably would render them passive and disinclined to active opposition. Therefore, even if the security apparatus were seriously weakened, little resistance activity could be expected from the mass of the Great Russian population beyond local harassing operations and defections. Similarly, the most common reaction to a foreign occupation of Soviet territory probably would be passivity and suspicion. Memories of the last war are still fresh and the people have not forgotten the brutality of the German occupation, as well as the subsequent Soviet revenge for collaboration. Since Soviet propaganda would try to equate the activities of the invaders with those of the Germans in the last war, occupation policies would be crucial in determining the attitude of the masses.

33. A limited amount of information on nuclear weapons effects has been released to the Soviet public since 1954, but the campaign appears to have minimized the effects of atomic warfare. This effort has been accompanied by propaganda, probably to arouse patriotism, picturing a nuclear war purely as a measure in defense of the homeland and reassuring the people of Soviet victory in such a conflict. Although popular reaction to atomic attack is extremely difficult to estimate, such a familiarization program may

have the effect of leaving the populace so unprepared for the actual destruction and dislocation that survivors would be demoralized and that patriotic fervor might be overwhelmed.

34. A nuclear attack on any scale is unlikely immediately to either increase or decrease resistance activities among the survivors to any appreciable extent. However, within a short period of time the extreme hardships brought about by even a small nuclear attack would tend to create actions of desperate elements which, whether intended or not, would have the effect of resistance. At the same time inevitable disruption of the control structure resulting from such an attack would reduce the regime's capability to deal with such elements. If a limited nuclear attack were planned and executed so as to reduce Soviet administrative, political and military control but to minimize general population casualties in national minority areas, such as the Latvian, Estonian and Lithuanian SSR's, the Georgian SSR, and to a lesser extent the Ukraine, it is probable that resistance activities in these areas would become greatly intensified, particularly if they received external support.

35. Such resistance potential as does exist would probably not be affected by the question of which side started the war. It can be taken for granted that the Soviet government would do all it could to shift the blame to the free world in general and the United States in particular. It may be assumed that potential resisters as well as many dissidents would anticipate such propaganda and not pay too much attention to it. The population as a whole, even if impressed with Soviet arguments at the beginning of the war, would in the long run be influenced by the trend of the war rather than by the question as to who attacked whom first. Also, the nationality of the attacking forces would probably have little effect on long-range popular attitudes, except that popular opposition to the invaders would almost certainly be much stronger against Germans than other nationalities.

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APPENDIX A

ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN THE BALTIC REPUBLICS

BASIC FACTORS OF DISSIDENCE

1. All the factors which engender dissidence in the USSR are present in the Baltic republics — collectivized agriculture, low standards of living, pronounced income inequalities, state control of thought and expression, and fresh memories and continuing fear of police terror. These alienating factors are intensified manifold, however, by the national consciousness and historic experience of the Baltic peoples.¹ Resistance potential is probably nowhere higher in the Soviet Union than in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

2. The most important single factor in Baltic opposition to Soviet rule is the experience of national independence between the world wars. The bitter memory of forced Soviet annexation is intensified by the brutality of Soviet rule, which brought the exile or liquidation of hundreds of thousands of natives, by the radical depression of living standards, and by the imposition of the rule and immigration of the traditionally hated and feared Russians. Thus, anti-Soviet and anti-Russian sentiments pervade all Baltic social strata and groups. Outright Communist sympathizers comprise only a minute fraction of the native population. Many native Communist Party leaders lived in the USSR when the Baltic states were independent and returned only upon Soviet annexation of their native countries; Balts in general look on them as renegades.

3. The near unanimity of anti-Soviet feelings among native Balts is to a certain degree offset

¹Although in a strict ethnic sense the terms "Baltic" and "Balt" should be applied only to Latvians and Lithuanians, Estonians being of Finnish stock, the term is used in this paper to apply to all three, for convenience and on geographic grounds.

by the greater political reliability of ethnic Russians brought into the area since World War II. The estimated proportion of the non-indigenous population of Russians in the Baltic republics ranges from a high of 40 percent in Latvia to a low of 20 percent in Lithuania. Since the position of Russians in these countries is dependent entirely on Soviet rule, they have a strong vested interest in maintaining the present regime.

4. Despite the intensity of anti-Soviet feeling among most Balts, Soviet security measures at present prevent any resistance greater than individual or small-group passive resistance and an occasional mass demonstration. Only a radical alteration of the present situation, such as war, a sharp relaxation of security controls, or a breakdown of the Soviet system itself would seem to make possible organized resistance on a large scale.

5. The de-Stalinization campaign and the partial liberalization of the Soviet system since Stalin's death (both of which were more limited in the Baltic republics than in most other areas of the USSR) brought some hope to Balts, expressed mainly in the form of rumors during the spring of 1956 that the Soviet leadership might restore the Baltic republics to autonomous, although satellite, status. The events in Poland and Hungary in the autumn of 1956 encouraged a few nationalist demonstrations in Lithuania and open anti-Soviet talk elsewhere. The regime easily curtailed such public manifestations of nationalism, however.

RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES TO DATE

6. Reports in 1952 and 1953 indicated the possibility of small groups of organized resistance in Lithuania. However, as in northwestern Latvia, the few remaining groups were be-

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ing successfully penetrated by MVD provocateurs. It is doubtful if any unpenetrated group existed after 1954. As a result, there are no known organized resistance groups in the Baltic area at this time. While there is reason to believe that some former resistance group members may still live in the forests of southeastern Lithuania, there is no recent evidence to indicate that an organization as such exists. Acts of sabotage that occasionally occurred up until 1953 appear to have been the work of isolated persons.

7. The immediate objectives of any remaining groups in the Baltic states probably would be personal and organizational survival. A secondary objective would be harassment of Soviet forces and collaborators. Their ultimate objective presumably would be the creation of a national state in which they could resume a normal life. There is no known organized anti-Communist infiltration of the armed forces, bureaucracy, or war industry. Nonviolent resistance in the Baltic republics, such as occurred during the Hungarian revolt, when there was what appeared to be a spontaneous expression of nationalism, was probably not the work of organized resistance groups.

8. The extent and nature of unorganized resistance is unknown but believed to be decreasing in over-all significance. Students appear to exhibit a potential for unorganized resistance. In all three republics student unrest in the universities has been expressed during 1956 and 1957 in demonstrations and in the distribution of leaflets. Party leaders have been criticized for neglecting student ideological education.

9. Dissidence and passive resistance also appear to exist, but there is not sufficient evidence to evaluate their extent and significance. Newspapers in the Baltic states criticize nonproduction in factories and kolkhoses and there is the usual amount of self-criticism in the papers. While these items indicate that the Soviet regime is not satisfied with conditions in the Baltic republics, only a part of the acts can be attributed to purposeful resistance. Passive resistance in the form of a slow-down of production cannot be in-

creased perceptibly without incurring danger of deportation or other acts of reprisal and control.

10. Dissidence is widespread, but difficult to detect and to evaluate except when the stimulus of external events changes dissidence into action. During the Hungarian revolt in 1956 widespread unorganized resistance was shown in the overturning of a Stalin statue, in demonstrations demanding withdrawal of Red Army troops, in staging of parades, and in singing the national anthems, most noticeably in Lithuania, but reportedly in Estonia and Latvia also. From these actions dissidence appears to be widespread. The independence spirit is still alive in the Baltic states, but there is little opportunity to express it effectively. Expression of dissident feelings has been more successful in Lithuania than in Estonia and Latvia. Moreover, Soviet population transfers have reduced the number of ethnic Estonians to about 75 percent of the population, and ethnic Latvians to about 60 percent and Lithuanians to about 80 percent. Replacement population transferees cannot be expected to participate in resistance activities.

ROLE OF EMIGRÉS

11. Balts seem to know comparatively little about the activities of emigrés, and attempts to resist Soviet domination do not seem to be directly inspired by emigré activity. Many Balts, however, derive satisfaction and encouragement from the knowledge that emigré groups exist abroad, that many nations (including the United States) do not recognize the Soviet annexation of their countries, and that the Baltic states still have formal diplomatic representation in exile.

REGIME MEASURES AGAINST RESISTANCE

12. The regime brought the organized resistance of the Baltic states under control through the use of militarized security forces and Army troops. Suspect elements of the population were deported during the 1945-1950 period and later replaced by other ethnic groups, mainly Russian. Subsequent penetration of resistance groups by security organs along with the individual deportations, depleted the Baltic states of resistance leader-

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ship, organization, and activity. Russification of government organizations has proved effective in keeping potential resistance in check. Unorganized resistance has been controlled in a similar manner. Passive resistance has been inhibited through threatened deportations, pardons to some deportees, and improvement in the standard of living. Feelings of dissidence are widespread but cannot be evaluated accurately because the populations have little opportunity to translate dissidence into action. Until recently, even mildly anti-Soviet statements were punished by arrest and long imprisonment. Even now, persons who show evidence of leading nationalistic activity are arrested — as were the leaders of the November 1956 demonstrations in Lithuania. Both because of the strategic position of the area and the known disaffection of the native population, security measures in the Baltic have been even more stringent than elsewhere in the USSR.

13. Milder methods are also employed by the regime to reduce dissidence and achieve ideological conformity. Party propaganda, agitation, and indoctrination are continual and virtually omnipresent. The regime offers enticing rewards in terms of power and advancement to Balts who collaborate with it, but the threat or exercise of repression remains the most important means of preventing active resistance in the Baltic republics.

CAPABILITY OF REGIME TO SUPPRESS REVOLT

14. The individual Baltic republic governments can suppress any localized revolt at this time. Soviet troops and militarized security forces stationed in the Baltic republics are of ethnic origins other than the local republic in which they are stationed, and can be expected to cooperate in the suppression of any local revolt. It is therefore unlikely that a Hungarian-type uprising could take place in any of the Baltic states. The majority of Balts live in rural areas while most of the Russians and other non-Balts live in cities, although in Estonia one can find in nearly every kolkhoz some persons who are not Baltic. Russians and non-Balts form at least half the population of the Baltic capitals.

15. In both Estonia and Latvia revolts would be difficult because there is no contiguous land border with a foreign country that might supply help. Of all the Baltic countries, Lithuania has the best conditions for staging a spontaneous mass uprising of some duration. In addition to bordering on Poland, a foreign country with a volatile and Catholic population, the Lithuanians have a long history of independence and of fighting for their rights as they see them. Besides, the geography of southeastern Lithuania, particularly the forests and hills, provides a refuge from which partisans can operate.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS OF PEACE

16. There are no known organized resistance groups in the Baltic states. Local capabilities for resistance activities do not go beyond unorganized, mainly passive, resistance or — under the most favorable conditions — occasional demonstrations with nationalist overtones. More violent types of demonstrations, such as holding up Soviet supply vehicles, were reported through 1954 but not since. Such acts probably were the work of outlaw elements, most of whom could not be depended on at the present for specific action or for organized action in the future.

17. A marked increase in East-West tensions furnishing hope of liberation would probably encourage more determined attempts at active resistance. Such a development, however, would probably be accompanied by an intensification of security measures and terror which might neutralize most practical effects of the increased determination to resist. A decrease of East-West tensions would be likely to discourage any sort of active resistance and to increase fatalistic acquiescence to Soviet rule. If accompanied by a liberalization of security precautions and thought control, it might, however, facilitate the spread and development of nationalist sentiment.

18. While it is believed that there is no substantial organized resistance, either active or passive, it is conceivable that some very small isolated groups do exist, particularly in southeastern Lithuania. But it would be extremely

difficult for them to expand. They have no contact with the West and have lost contact with friendly local populations through the deportation of identifiable sympathizers. Their survival efforts constantly require theft and other unlawful acts which increase the partisans' vulnerability and constantly increase their isolation from any possible sources of help, supply, or recruits. At the present time, resistance in new forms is virtually impossible because resistance groups or potential members must be supplied with funds and equipment and, most important, an effective communications system with each other and the West. The lack of communications prevents the identification and location of real or potential resistance members. Until an effective means of communication is established, resistance in the Baltic states will probably further decrease.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR

19. The outbreak of war between the Soviet Bloc and the West would undoubtedly increase resistance potential in the Baltic states. Contrary to the passionate desire for peace in almost every other portion of the Soviet Union, many Balts hope for an East-West war since they see in it their only hope for liberation. It cannot be assumed, however, that in any future war Baltic resistance could be as widespread and effective as it was when Germany attacked the USSR in 1941, at which time the Baltic states had been under Soviet rule less than a year and the Soviet armies had to beat a hasty retreat.

20. The possibilities for active Baltic resistance in any future war would depend largely on whether a fighting front were located in or near the area. If the front were remote, anti-Soviet Balts might be able to form small partisan bands in the forests to harass supply lines and perform acts of sabotage. Many Balts would be willing to assist evasion and escape operations, although the presence of non-Balts on collectivized farms would compound the difficulties of such assistance. Given an opportunity, many Balts would probably be willing to perform espionage. Soviet security measures, however, would probably be able to prevent large-scale organization or military and political warfare of more than nuisance value.

21. If an active front approached the area, on the other hand, more widespread resistance could be expected, though not approaching the Baltic performance in 1941. Under anti-Soviet occupation, native Balts would be unlikely to participate in pro-Soviet partisan activity and most would lend their hearty support to the liquidation of Russian partisans or pro-Soviet native elements in the area.

22. Baltic resistance potential in wartime would be little affected by such matters as the nationality of the attacking forces or which side initiated hostilities. Even German rule would be considered preferable to Soviet (the Nazi occupation of the area having been comparatively mild), although Balts might resist Soviet rule with somewhat greater determination if the attacking forces were non-German.

APPENDIX B

ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN THE CAUCASUS

BASIC FACTORS OF DISSIDENCE

1. Any evaluation of disaffection in the Caucasus must take into account the differing peoples of this area. While there are elements of discontent common to all the indigenous peoples of the area which unite them against the regime, there are also factors which set the Georgians, Armenians, and Azerbaidzhani peoples apart from each other. The Georgians and Armenians, for reasons of longer independent nationhood and a common religion (Christianity), feel superior to the Azerbaidzhani, a Moslem people. At the same time, the Georgians, because of a longer and more unbroken period of independence than the Armenians, feel superior to the latter, who harbor a latent distrust of their mountain neighbors.

2. The underlying basis for dissatisfaction and discontent in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaidzhan is to be found in an anti-Russian attitude on the part of the native populations. Such factors as non-Slavic lineage, distinct languages, acceptance of Christianity in the case of Georgia and Armenia antedating Russian acceptance by several centuries, and different cultural and historical heritages have imparted to the Georgians and Armenians, particularly the former, a sense of national distinctiveness which makes them look upon the Russians as interlopers and late-comers. The assistance rendered to the Georgian and Armenian nations during critical periods in their histories by the Tsarist regime has not eliminated this feeling. In the case of the Azerbaidzhani people, who prior to the Bolshevik Revolution had no real sense of nationhood, the anti-Russian bias stems from Russian colonization. This began in the eighteenth century, and reached its peak in the late 1800's with Russian exploitation of the oil

resources around Baku. The ensuing development of the area meant a dislocation of native groups, a disruption of their traditional way of life, and an incipient second-class citizenship.

3. While difficult to document as to scope and intensity, anti-Russianism is demonstrated by the limited amount of social contact between minorities and Russians. Certain areas of large Caucasian cities appear to be separated into Slavic and non-Slavic sections. Inter-marriage does not appear to be too common and is frequently frowned on. A more immediate source for disaffection is Soviet Communism in practice — material hardships, low living standards, the collective farm system, the antireligious nature of the regime, thought control, and the stifling of nationalism — all of which also engender discontent in other parts of the Soviet Union.

4. Apart from the Party and government elite, discontent would appear to extend to all strata of the population in varying degrees. The politically more mature Georgians have been most vocal in expressing dissidence in the post-Stalin period, followed by the Armenians and the Azerbaidzhani in that order. Among the Georgians, students and intellectuals are the most noteworthy dissident elements. In Armenia, the most disaffected group appears to be the Armenians who returned to Soviet Armenia in the early post-World War II period. Estimates of the numbers who returned range from 25,000 to 100,000. Their disaffection results mainly from very poor economic conditions and the fact that they are not completely accepted by the local population.

5. Discontent, though widespread, does not appear to be intense enough to translate itself into resistance activity, particularly on

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an organized basis. Furthermore, the post-war history of dissidence in the Caucasus suggests that while there has been some resistance, it has been on an unorganized basis and without particular goals in mind. A new pattern of dissidence as a result of the post-Stalin policies of the regime is not discernible. The relaxation of stringent police controls has been welcomed. People express their doubts and criticisms of the regime more openly now. Such events as the de-Stalinization campaign, the Polish-Hungarian events, and the Soviet leadership ousters of June 1957 have caused confusion and doubt about the present policies of the regime. There are, however, no signs of increased dissidence or resistance. The population is aware that the regime is willing and able to eradicate any evidence of resistance.

RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES TO DATE

6. A few small organized resistance groups are believed to exist in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaidzhan. There is no available information on their strength, discipline, training, facilities, or equipment. Furthermore, there is no means of communication with these alleged resistance groups. Such groups would almost certainly be nationalistic in motivation. They would operate within the boundaries of their own national republics in most cases.

7. Unorganized active resistance to some degree by the people of the Georgian and Azerbaidzhan SSR's has been reported. The most serious known disturbance occurred in Tbilisi in March 1956 when student meetings to mark the anniversary of Stalin's death grew into nationalistic demonstrations as a result of the regime's refusal to permit honors to Stalin. The demonstrations were eventually put down by force, with casualties estimated by various sources at from dozens to 500. Apart from this incident, it is often difficult to differentiate other reports of unorganized active resistance from criminal, speculative and blackmarket activities. Available evidence indicates a great deal of dissatisfaction with the Moscow regime. Intellectual dissidence also has been shown in many Caucasian literary publications which have been severely

criticized during the last year for nationalistic deviations. Certain examples of this literature reflect a tone of criticism even stronger than that which has been directed against the regime by Russian writers.

ROLE OF EMIGRÉS

8. Although emigré groups have claimed contact with resistance organizations inside Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaidzhan, such claims have not been substantiated in the post-Stalin era. There was a contact between an internal Georgian opposition element and the Georgian government-in-exile, but this has not been maintained in recent years. No other external sources appear to have influenced any of the internal resistance groups since World War II.

REGIME MEASURES AGAINST RESISTANCE

9. In the past the Soviet government has dispersed from the Caucasus entire ethnic populations which it believed to be disloyal. Many persons have been executed or given sentences in labor camps in Siberia or Central Asia. Moreover, the Soviet Union has a very effective internal security organization, with informers in all walks of life and all ethnic groups. These measures have been very effective in controlling active resistance. It is improbable that any national minority resistance group of significant size could exist without coming to the attention of the Soviet security service. It follows that any major uprising or riot must be essentially spontaneous in origin, because any organization large enough, with good communications, to foment such an event would have been penetrated and neutralized before the event could take place. Since the death of Stalin, the technique of dispersion of people has not been employed and it is possible that the informant system has been relaxed somewhat, but either of these methods could be revitalized at any moment.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS OF PEACE

10. Even under present conditions of somewhat relaxed police controls, the Soviet security system is more than adequate to prevent

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or stamp out any organized resistance activity in the Caucasus. While individual, unorganized resistance might be encouraged by the regime's relaxation of the rigid police terror of the Stalin era, any indication that such acts were becoming common or organized would be enough to bring about increased security controls to prevent the formation of organized resistance. The factor most likely to affect resistance potential would appear to be a breakdown of the police and security control system. Short of this, or of a fundamental change in the leadership of the Soviet Union, such events as an increase or decrease in East-West tensions or ideological disputes within the "socialist camp" would have little effect on resistance activity. Any deterioration in the economic condition of the population would lead to increased discontent, but the regime could easily prevent any organized opposition to regime policies. Signs of external support in any form to resistance groups in the Caucasus would bring the sharpest reaction and punitive measures against such groups.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR

11. The opportunity for anti-regime resistance under conditions of actual warfare would depend considerably on the type and location of war being fought. The outbreak of hostilities would bring extraordinary security precautions into play on the part of the state. As long as the theater of operations remained outside the Caucasus, the likelihood of increased resistance operations would remain small because of the increased security measures. While some resistance groups might become active, most likely in Georgia, as soon as hostilities broke out, the vast majority of the Caucasian population would probably adopt a "wait-and-see" attitude. If the tide

of battle turned conclusively against the Soviet regime, the potential for organized resistance on an expanded basis would increase accordingly. Otherwise, the memory of Soviet punishment of World War II collaborators would militate against large-scale organized resistance movements.

12. The optimum conditions for organized resistance would, of course, occur if the Caucasus became a theater of war or if the collapse of central authority were imminent. If either should occur, resistance activities would probably range from disobedience of Soviet laws to assistance to enemy forces in providing intelligence information, harassment of Soviet security and armed forces, and help in escape and evasion operations. Independent military activity against Soviet forces probably would be beyond the capacity of resistance groups, unless large-scale units defected along with equipment and material. Such military action would depend on direct outside support. Moreover, the troops of this area are ethnic non-Caucasians.

13. With the exception of the Germans who might encounter hostility because of their World War II policies, only the Turks might arouse Armenian antagonism; the Armenian massacres in the late 1890's and during World War I are not yet forgotten. The question of the responsibility for the instigation of hostilities would have little effect on resistance activities. However, the occupation policies of the invading forces would have a strong impact on the local populations as far as their willingness to engage in resistance activities would be concerned. The Soviet postwar propaganda campaign depicting the horrors of German occupation in other parts of the country was designed in part to overcome any latent sympathy in such areas as the Caucasus for future "liberating" forces.

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APPENDIX C

ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN THE UKRAINE

BASIC FACTORS OF DISSIDENCE

1. Ukrainian nationalism continues to be an important political problem with which the Soviet regime must reckon. The Ukrainians are the largest minority group in the USSR. The political, economic and strategic importance of the Ukraine is second only to the RSFSR. The best evidence of Soviet concern over Ukrainian nationalism and its counterpart, anti-Russian sentiment, is found in recurring appeals to root out "bourgeois nationalism."

2. The economic and political grievances common throughout the Soviet Union are at the core of opposition in the Ukraine to Soviet rule. Soviet sponsorship of the liquidation of the rich peasant and of the collective farm is probably resented more there than in some other parts of the Soviet Union since the Ukraine had a fairly large proportion of prosperous peasants. These various grievances, shared with other Soviet peoples, count far more in explaining existing dissidence in the Ukraine than Soviet suppression of Ukrainian nationalist aspirations. Opposition to the regime there is first anti-Communist, and only second anti-Russian.

3. Ukrainian reaction to the russification efforts of the Soviet regime remains, however, considerable. Ukrainians, whether Party members or not, remember with bitterness Stalin's purge of leading Ukrainian Communists who stood up for Ukrainian cultural autonomy in the 1930's and resent the continuation of the calculated policy of staffing a good portion of leading Party and government positions in the Ukraine with Russians. Stalin's glorification of Russian heroes and the continued identification of Russian history with the Soviet state hurt Ukrainian

pride. While religious attitudes may be of diminishing importance in the Ukraine as elsewhere in the USSR, the liquidation of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church in 1930 and of the Uniate Church in the newly acquired western Ukraine after the war is a further cause for resentment.

INTENSITY AND CHARACTER OF DISSIDENCE

4. Ukrainian nationalist tensions, although a continuing nuisance for the Soviet administration, do not now represent any serious threat to the regime. The nationalist resistance organizations active in the years immediately following World War II are now largely, if not completely, quiescent. Only in the event of a disintegration of Soviet central controls might Ukrainian nationalism rise to the surface and serve as a focus for an anti-Soviet resistance movement.

5. The intensity of Ukrainian nationalist feeling is difficult to measure. A great many Ukrainians, probably the majority, are loyal members of Soviet society, particularly now that living standards are gradually rising and police controls have been slightly relaxed. Russification has probably gone further in the eastern Ukraine than in any other of the non-Russian lands and has been much more successful in industrial cities, which now contain large numbers of Great Russians, than in towns and villages. Russians and Ukrainians have mingled together there for hundreds of years and the educated members of society know both languages equally well. Nationalistic sentiments increase as one moves westward in the Ukraine away from the Russian lands. Opposition to Soviet rule is believed to be most intense in the territories absorbed during World War II along the Soviet Union's

western borders, where memories of Sovietization are freshest. Resentment of the Russians is not confined here to Ukrainians alone, but is shared by such other minority groups in the area as Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, and Rumanians.

RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES TO DATE

6. Armed resistance to the Soviet regime after World War II was most intense in these western territories, particularly in the Carpathian mountains. Ukrainian nationalist organizations active in German-occupied Europe during the war mounted guerrilla operations there against Soviet units, communications lines, and collective farms in 1946 and 1947. The Soviet authorities had crushed these organizations by the late 1940's, but reports received from Soviet defectors as late as 1956 indicating that the Banderovtsy (followers of the Ukrainian nationalist Stefan Bandera), are still active, remain unconfirmed. Most likely there is no nationalist resistance movement of any significance in the Ukraine at this time, but the reports suggest that continued popular *belief* in the existence of these organizations may be widespread. Although there has been no evidence of an upsurge of resistance activities since the death of Stalin, such activities seem to have been implied in radio and press appeals, as late as 1956, that partisans in the Volynskaya Oblast surrender voluntarily and receive pardons for their past actions.

7. Unorganized resistance in the Ukraine exists primarily in the western oblasts and is conducted mainly by intellectuals. It is passive in nature and is manifested in resisting russification, e.g., by advocating the use of Ukrainian national feeling in literature. Recent attacks on Ukrainian writers as being national deviationists tend to confirm these trends.

8. Since the suppression of nationalist aspirations and resistance movements during the Stalin regime, there is now no evidence to indicate any nationalist movement. Since the death of Stalin, the Soviets have treated the issue of nationalism cautiously in the Ukraine. Some attempts to conciliate nation-

al feeling can be found in their liberation of former partisans from labor camps, the rehabilitation of former Ukrainian Communist writers suspected of nationalistic tendencies, and the disappearance of some Party and KGB officials who had been engaged in the suppression of resistance. The celebration of the 300th anniversary of the Union of the Ukraine with Russia was officially observed with considerable deference paid to the loyalty and heroism of the Ukrainian peoples.

ROLE OF EMIGRÉS

9. Emigré groups have been of no material assistance to resistance groups in the Ukraine. The little contact that did exist with persons in the Ukraine has been broken by capture and/or liquidation of the Ukrainian individuals involved. The contact between groups in the Ukraine and emigré groups tends to become unilateral; escapees augment the emigré colony and intensify anti-Soviet feeling in the non-Bloc countries, but there has been no significant reverse flow or intensification of anti-regime feeling in the Ukraine. However, the mere existence of an active emigré group may tend to buoy the hopes of those people inside the Ukraine who are bitterly opposed to the Soviet regime. Concern expressed by the Soviets in this matter is reflected in Soviet intelligence activities against Ukraine emigré groups and the propaganda attacks in the Soviet press and radio attempting to belittle and thereby diminish any potential effectiveness of these groups.

CAPABILITY OF REGIME TO SUPPRESS REVOLT

10. Any revolt in the Ukraine could be easily suppressed by the Soviet regime at the present time. The existence of satellite regimes on the western borders of the Ukraine has increasingly tended to isolate this earlier hotbed of resistance, both materially and morally. The ruthless suppression of the Hungarian revolt has served as an illuminating example of what would happen to a revolt that is not materially aided by the West. The existence of large numbers of border troops along the entire western border of the USSR provides

immediate forces to counter any revolt. In addition, Soviet army divisions stationed throughout the Ukraine can aid in suppression of revolts. Zakarpatskaya Oblast appears to offer the best terrain for possible resistance, but its isolation from the remainder of the Ukraine would probably localize any revolt.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS OF PEACE

11. As long as Soviet police and security controls remain relatively intact, there appears to be no prospect for a resumption of active resistance in the Ukraine. Barring an internal upheaval, these controls are likely to remain in force for the foreseeable future. Since the suppression of the Hungarian revolt, there is reportedly little sympathy for a violent form of resistance. Instead, sophisticated Ukrainian nationalists engage in a subtle form of resistance by staying within the bounds of the law and officially approved behavior. This type of resistance is directed against further russification and has as its objective the maintenance and fostering of a Ukrainian national feeling. Apparently it is hoped that this nationalism can be kept alive and that it will serve as an ideological basis for a free Ukraine in the future. Meanwhile, through concessions gained by legal methods, life within the Ukraine, although under a Communist system, is becoming more tolerable, thus further decreasing resistance potential.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR

12. In the event of war, Ukrainians would probably not try to engage in large-scale resistance activities while Soviet military controls remained in force. They remember the tragic results of their resistance to the So-

viet regime during World War II. They would be unlikely to commit themselves to resistance against the Soviet regime unless they were convinced the USSR would lose the war. In other words, Ukrainian dissidence could not be expected to serve a potential enemy of the USSR until the outcome of a war were largely determined. In fact, most Ukrainian soldiers would probably fight fiercely on the Russian side.

13. As long as security controls remained firm, an enemy could expect little or no help from the inside. If, however, the political structure should begin to crumble under the impact of a war, resistance could and might very well become active again. Pent-up opposition to the Soviet regime could quite naturally be channeled into demands for the dismemberment of the USSR. The Carpathian mountains on the border of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, where Soviet controls are less firmly established than elsewhere in the Ukraine, would provide a convenient base for launching resistance activities in the area. Such a move would almost certainly require foreign assistance.

14. The question as to who initiated the war probably would matter little, nor would the nationality of invading forces, with the exception of Germans, who almost certainly would be fiercely resented even as a part of an international force. Their presence on Ukrainian soil would seriously impair the development of anti-Communist resistance

15. While certain resistance activities such as intelligence collection or escape and evasion operations might be possible on a small scale, no large-scale underground movement in the Ukraine is likely to gain momentum until Soviet power had been shaken at its foundations.

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