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


POOR ORIGINAL

Zaire: The Military
Under Mobutu



An Intelligence Assessment



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November 1978

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Zaire: The Military Under Mobutu

Key Judgments

Information available
as of 12 September 1988
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the Zairian military, after 23 years under President Mobutu, has become a weak, ineffective force that is incapable of defending the country's borders or of containing more than limited internal disorders. Many of the military's shortcomings stem from such fundamental problems as inadequate manpower, resources, and military know-how. Mobutu's strategy for ensuring military loyalty has been the major cause of military decline. His patronage network has fostered an epidemic of corruption, and his frequent manipulation of personnel and assignments has hampered effective leadership.

Mobutu's strategy of patronage and frequent reassignments has succeeded in keeping the military out of the political arena, although, in the event of his death, we would expect the military—by virtue of its monopoly on armed force—to play a critical, if not decisive, role in the succession process. Even if the constitutionally mandated civilian successor regime is cohesive, it would be unlikely to exercise Mobutu's close control over the military. Key officers would be likely to intervene if the civilian elite gets bogged down in a power struggle, if the succeeding regime is weak, or if the new government tries to challenge the military's key institutional interests.

While Mobutu's desire to maintain a passive and apolitical military has substantially reduced the threat of a military coup, it also has made Zaire vulnerable to military pressure by neighboring states, such as Angola and Congo, and to dissident or terrorist operations. Although most of Zaire's neighbors are preoccupied with their own political, military, and economic problems, the Zairian military would be hard pressed to face up to even a small, lightly armed force. At the same time, Mobutu must rely almost entirely on foreign expertise and support to sustain his forces' limited readiness and capabilities to defend Zaire.

Mobutu to undertake the fundamental reforms needed to improve Zairian military capabilities, despite abundant evidence of a lack of preparedness. Because many military inefficiencies are products of Mobutu's patronage system, serious reforms in this area could lessen the stake senior officers have in maintaining his rule. The goal of Mobutu's 10-year armed forces modernization program is to improve the military by significantly increasing its size and the sophistication of its weapon systems. This goal is far beyond Zaire's financial capabilities.

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and capacity to absorb new weapons and skills. If pursued, the program will only overtax the armed forces and further decrease overall combat effectiveness.

In view of Zaire's many military shortcomings, we believe Kinshasa will be more dependent than ever in the coming years on foreign military assistance and training. In the event of a national emergency beyond the capabilities of his forces, Mobutu almost certainly would look to his chief foreign military patrons, particularly France and Belgium, to provide materiel and even to send troops.


We believe Mobutu will continue to press the United States to make a significant contribution to Zairian security. Mobutu is disappointed over declining US military aid levels and concerned about the degree of US support he would receive in a crisis, but we expect little more than periodic expressions of displeasure as long as the United States continues to provide some logistic and materiel support to his forces. If Mobutu's sense of military vulnerability increases, he may—on the basis of his belief that Zaire is entitled to more aid because of its staunch support for US policies in the region—seek to retaliate, possibly by threatening to limit US access to Zairian military facilities. In view of Zaire's military weaknesses and Mobutu's fear of aggression by Soviet- and Cuban-backed Angola and Congo, however, we believe he probably would stop short of causing serious damage to the bilateral relationship.

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Contents

	<i>Page</i>
Key Judgments	iii
Introduction	1
Mobutu's Dominating Presence	1
The Plight of the Military	2
Fundamental Problems	2
The Logistic Nightmare	5
Mobutu's Modernization Program	6
Foreign Aid and Advisers	6
Impact of Foreign Support	6
The Key External Players	9
Foreign Support and Modernization Efforts	11
Outlook	12
Implications for the United States	13
Appendixes	
A. A Look at the Services	15
B. Ground Forces Order of Battle	17
C. 	19

Selected Zairian Tribes



Zaire: The Military Under Mobutu

Introduction

Since seizing power in a coup in 1965, President Mobutu has used his leadership skills and dominant personality to create a loyal 52,000-man military and security force that poses little threat to his rule. At the same time, however, Mobutu's manipulation of the armed forces has helped to undermine its morale, professionalism, and effectiveness, and it remains unable to protect Zaire's 9,000-kilometer-long borders or to put down more than scattered, small-scale, and temporary internal disorders. Despite significant amounts of military aid and training over the past 23 years from mostly Western sources, the Zairian armed forces appear no stronger today than they were in the late 1970s, when they were twice battered by a small force of Angolan-backed insurgents. As long as Mobutu remains in power, we expect little improvement in Zairian military capabilities and, in light of the country's staggering economic problems, possibly a steady decline.

This paper looks at the state of Zaire's armed forces under Mobutu to assess their capabilities for defending the country and maintaining domestic order. The paper takes into account the increasingly important role played by Zaire's foreign benefactors in the military's limited combat readiness. It analyzes the prospects for reform and modernization, the military's role in the succession issue, and, finally, the implications of these developments for the United States.


Mobutu's Dominating Presence

As President, Commander in Chief, and Minister of Defense, Mobutu wields extensive control over the armed forces. He makes virtually all decisions affecting the military, including the selection of personnel. Mobutu, for example, has ensured that key units are composed predominantly of Ngbardi tribesmen from his home region of Equateur. A patronage

system, in which Mobutu loyalists are given positions or other opportunities to enrich themselves, extends his control over military matters from senior echelons to the lowest levels. Backing this network is a ubiquitous security apparatus that reports directly to the President and has virtually eliminated internal opposition and deterred potential challengers.

To further ensure its loyalty, Mobutu has kept the military out of the political arena—in large part by manipulating personnel and assignments—but his efforts have damaged military effectiveness. The President's regular reshuffling of senior military positions—designed to reward the faithful and prevent ambitious officers from developing independent bases of support—has elevated incompetent and corrupt members of the "old guard" at the expense of talented, motivated, and independent-minded midlevel officers. Under these conditions, the morale of many younger field grade officers—most of whom have received advanced training in the West—has eroded steadily, leading some to adopt the corrupt ways of their superiors.

Mobutu's heavyhanded control of the military also has created an environment of fear and suspicion among the officer corps that paralyzes decisionmaking and inhibits planning. To reinforce military loyalty, Mobutu has made regional unit commanders subordinate to local civilian authorities and has assigned political officers—usually loyal members of his ruling Popular Movement of the Revolution Party (MPR)—to each unit. Fear of contradicting the government line has prompted many officers to avoid decisions even on routine matters. As a result, commanders rarely conduct training or other activities designed to increase combat readiness for fear that they will arouse suspicion in Kinshasa about antigovernment intentions.



[redacted] Mobutu's efforts to tighten his control of the military have had several other adverse effects:

- The President's favoritism toward fellow Equateurians and Ngbandi tribesmen has undermined professionalism and popular respect for the military and generated resentment among troops from other ethnic groups and regions.
- His exploitation of personal rivalries among senior officers has disrupted the chain of command and military discipline. Recently, for example, Mobutu cashiered the Army Chief of Staff and four of his staff officers on the strength of accusations of coup plotting trumped up by political rivals.
- Mobutu's frequent micromanagement of military affairs intimidates senior officers, most of whom are unwilling to risk their careers by reporting bad news or the dismal condition of their forces [redacted].

The enlisted ranks are equally passive and ineffective as a result of Mobutu's policies toward the military. Rather than turning to coup plotting, for example, dissatisfied soldiers—faced with harsh conditions and few government benefits—frequently resort to desertion. Some supplement their income and rations by hunting or farming at the expense of their military duties. Morale and discipline in the ranks also have been seriously undermined by the presence of apathetic and corrupt senior officers whose positions are based on loyalty to the President [redacted].

The Flight of the Military

Fundamental Problems

In addition to the problems created by Mobutu's dominance of military matters, the Zairian armed forces are plagued by a host of manpower, logistic, and other weaknesses that contribute to overall ineffectiveness [redacted].

The Military in Politics

While the armed forces have remained an important base of political support for Mobutu, his need for military backing to maintain internal security has decreased as he has strengthened his grip on power. Because Mobutu has established an unprecedented sense of national unity and political stability, the military's role in keeping domestic order has been increasingly handed over to civilian security forces and a growing intelligence apparatus. The creation in 1967 of the country's sole political party, the Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR), has provided Mobutu an efficient and reliable civilian vehicle for exercising political leadership. This has prompted him to name the party the supreme organ of government. Although the rapid development and prominence of the party have created jealousy in the military, Mobutu's mastery of Army politics and his shrewd manipulation of personal and ethnic loyalties have muted military unhappiness and deterred or eliminated potential challengers to his authority. At the same time, his absolute control of all military, paramilitary, and security forces continues to ensure that civilian authority is always subject to the consent of Commander in Chief Mobutu, and the armed forces.

the military's monopoly on arms and the absence of a successfully tested succession mechanism, armed forces support will be

When Mobutu dies or becomes incapacitated, the Constitution provides that the Central Committee of the ruling Party—members of which are appointed by Mobutu—is to assume collective leadership. The party's dean, 80-year-old Denisys Tisa

critical for any would-be successor and that the military will play a major, if not decisive, role in the post-Mobutu era. Despite their exclusion from the political arena, key officers—by virtue of their favored status—have more prestige and influence than civilian officials and will be needed by civilians to ensure domestic order when Mobutu passes from the scene. Senior officers in the capital would be especially likely to step in if Mobutu unexpectedly died, particularly if the civilian elite were beset by squabbling and power struggles.

Even if a successor civilian regime was cohesive enough to assert itself, it would be unlikely to exercise Mobutu's close control over the military. the military leadership probably would successfully demand a greater share of political power. It probably would be able to gain more resources for itself and might even undertake some cosmetic reforms. Nonetheless, senior officers—all of whom have profited from Mobutu's rule—probably would perpetuate his patronage system to maintain military loyalty.

Avungura, would chair the Central Committee until the popular election of a new president, which must take place within 60 days. According to the Constitution, the Committee recommends a candidate, who must then be approved by a party congress.

The Shaba Debacles

No events in Zaire's history have illustrated the weaknesses of the armed forces more clearly than the 1977 and 1978 invasions of the Shaba Region by Angolan-backed guerrillas. The lightly-armed rebel forces, composed almost entirely of former gendarmes from Katanga (Shaba) Province who had taken refuge in Angola following a failed secession attempt, overwhelmed the impotent Zairian Army.



[REDACTED]

From bases in Angola, the rebels began their first invasion in March 1977 with a three-pronged assault across the border that quickly drove the Zairian Army out of large portions of Shaba, the country's economic heartland. The rebels, who intended to cut off Shaba from the rest of the country and depose Mobutu, met little opposition from Zairian troops, many of whom fled as the rebels occupied territory across a wide front. The rebels lost the initiative only when their rapid advance overextended their supply lines and the popular uprising they expected failed to occur. Even when the invaders' advance stalled, Zairian units were unable to mount a counterattack until Moroccan King Hassan II sent 1,500 battle-tested troops to assist Mobutu's forces. One month after the invasion began, Moroccan transports airlifted the Moroccan troops into battle, where they quickly drove out the rebels.

When the crisis ended, the embarrassed Mobutu launched a sweeping military reorganization to repair his shattered forces. Large numbers of high-ranking officers and regional commanders were sacked, and up to 25 percent of the enlisted ranks were purged as undependable or disloyal. In addition to wholesale structural changes, Mobutu reorganized the territorial defense forces, merged the military general staff with his own presidential staff, and redeployed key units formerly stationed in or near the capital—such as the Kamanyola Division—throughout the country.

In May 1978 the rebels—calling themselves the Front for the National Liberation of the Congo (FLNC)—returned for a second try. Realizing that their first invasion failed because it captured too much territory, the rebels crossed the border through Zambia and focused on the key mining town of Kolwezi. Drawing on sympathetic residents, the rebels routed the Kamanyola Division and occupied Kolwezi in a few hours, prompting Mobutu to call for outside help. France and Belgium, concerned about the safety of Kolwezi's 2,000 to 2,500 European residents, responded to Mobutu's pleas; Paris sent a 700-man Foreign Legion battalion to Kamina, and Brussels sent a paratroop regiment to Kamina, approximately 200 kilometers to the north. Backed by US C-141 supply flights, the French quickly cleared the city, rescued hostages, and routed the undisciplined rebels. In the only successful Zairian military operation of the crisis, a company of the 31st Parachute Brigade—trained by French advisers just months earlier—jumped on to the Kolwezi Airport and secured it until the arrival of the legionnaires. The crisis ended the following month when a force composed of troops from several African countries was airlifted to the region to patrol the border and keep order.

Mobutu launched another shakeup of the armed forces in the wake of the second Shaba invasion. He reorganized the military into regional commands, fielded new units, and tried to solve logistic problems by creating a support system responsive to remote garrisons. Recognizing that the Army's poor performance was in part attributable to sagging morale brought on by the post-Shaba purges, Mobutu made only limited personnel changes this time. [REDACTED] however, none of these moves—or any of the reforms undertaken in ensuing years—have improved Zairian capabilities, and the military is no stronger today than when the invasions occurred.



[redacted] units in the key military region of Bas-Zaïre in western Zaïre reflect the scope of these problems:

- As a result of desertions and the limited manpower pool, some units in Bas-Zaïre are at less than 25 percent of authorized strength.
- The average age of soldiers in the region is more than 40, and requests for new and replacement personnel are ignored by Kinshasa.
- In addition to irregular pay and insufficient food and clothing, units suffer from severe shortages of equipment, vehicles, ammunition, maintenance, and training.
- Medical care and supplies are virtually nonexistent, and troops are highly vulnerable to the spread of disease, including AIDS.

[redacted] morale is so low that Zaïrian troops would abandon their posts if suddenly threatened by hostile forces.

At the root of these problems [redacted] is the corruption fostered by Mobutu's patronage system. Senior officers—many of whom spend duty time on personal business—frequently pocket the pay of their troops, misappropriate operating funds, steal food and equipment from other units, and profit from funds and supplies allocated to phantom units they have created. [redacted] many

soldiers turn to banditry, extortion, or other illegal activities to earn a living. For example, the sale of stolen military equipment, especially items with a high street value, has become a common source of income for Zaïrian soldiers. Because most corruption, particularly by officers, is part of the tribute Mobutu pays for military loyalty, he does little to rein in or punish offenders.

The Logistic Nightmare

[redacted] apathy, mismanagement, and rampant corruption have left the Army's logistic system a "disaster." Supply of basic items is erratic at best; some units have not been issued new uniforms for over two years. Most units are short of ammunition, and those located farthest from Kinshasa, even in the economically vital Shaba Region, probably have only enough stocks for one week of combat. In addition, communication links between units are poor or nonexistent, and many outlying posts have little contact with the capital.

[redacted] because fuel is scarce and a major source of income for soldiers, military vehicles normally are drained of gasoline after their daily missions and the fuel resold on the black market.

Table 1

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED TABLE]

The logistic capabilities of the other branches of the armed forces are in a similar state of disarray. For example, chronic fuel shortages and maintenance problems have severely constrained the Air Force's ability to transport troops and equipment, and senior officers usually rely on commercial air services to move their forces during exercises. The Navy is afflicted by these problems as well as by shortages of spare parts, leaving it unable to perform its patrol duties (see appendix [REDACTED]).

Mobutu's Modernization Program

In January 1988, Mobutu announced an ambitious 10-year program designed to upgrade the armed forces' capabilities in response to the perceived ground and air threats posed by Angola and Congo. He has already visited a number of Western countries to seek help in acquiring air defense, antitank, and infantry weapons, early warning radars, and new combat aircraft for the program. The proposed buildup [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] also calls for doubling the defense budget and the addition of seven new combat brigades [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Mobutu's plans are unachievable unless foreign donors assume complete costs, a highly unlikely eventuality. Zaire's economic situation is

desperate, and Mobutu is under intense pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and several debt consortiums to take some decisive action toward implementing economic reforms that have been promised for several years. Recently, the IMF and World Bank have focused on Zaire's growing budget deficits, caused in part by excessive military spending, and on mounting debt arrears. Both the Fund and the Bank have suspended their programs, putting a further financial squeeze on Kinshasa. Budgetary indiscipline, corruption, and deteriorating creditworthiness are likely to continue to limit severely Zaire's access to funds from all sources [REDACTED]

Foreign Aid and Advisers


Zaire's military continues to depend heavily on foreign advisers and equipment, without which even key units could barely function. The vital role played by foreign states can be traced to the tumultuous years following independence, when Belgian, French, and Israeli assistance and United Nations security forces helped hold the country together. Largely because of Mobutu's staying power, Zaire has been able to attract and retain the military support of states with widely diverse interests and ideologies, including both Communist and Western nations [REDACTED]

Impact of Foreign Support

Mobutu's strategy of relying on a broad group of foreign military benefactors is designed primarily to prevent dependence on a single source and to give several states a stake in Zairian security [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The key roles played by Morocco and France in defeating the rebels during the invasions of the Shaba Region in the late 1970s almost certainly convinced Mobutu that keeping friendly countries involved in training and outfitting his forces will help to ensure their support in the event of future crises. In addition, the presence of several suppliers gives Mobutu some flexibility in choosing equipment as well as the prospect of getting the most advantageous terms by exploiting differences or rivalries among donors [REDACTED]

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The Military Threats From Neighbors and Insurgents

Although several of Zaire's neighbors resent Mobutu's pro-Western orientation and have harbored his opponents, we believe they are either too weak militarily or too preoccupied with their own internal problems to pick a fight with Kinshasa, at least for the near term.



Zaire's other potential regional adversaries, Congo and Uganda, are constrained by serious political and economic difficulties as well as by many of the same military inefficiencies that plague Zairian forces.

none of the Zairian dissident factions in neighboring countries poses a significant threat to the Mobutu government. All of the groups are demoralized, deeply divided along tribal lines, and suffer from leadership squabbles and severe shortages of supporters, funds, training, and equipment. Nonetheless, the dissidents have mounted small-scale border-run raids in recent years in isolated border areas. While these attacks are infrequent, Zaire's inability to respond effectively has enabled the insurgents to score a number of propaganda victories in the past year. These successes may embolden them to stage terrorist or sabotage operations against important economic targets—actions that are probably within their capabilities.

An Angolan-led campaign to transform any of the dissident groups into an effective force would require the commitment of considerable time and resources by a third power—


Because of the stiff manpower and logistic demands of current anti-UNITA operations,



Several other factors also are likely to limit the development of a significant dissident threat in Zaire. The failure of past insurgencies—including the Shaba invasions—to spark the domestic opposition to Mobutu expected by the invaders leads us to conclude that most Zairians are unlikely to risk displaying overt support for dissidents. In addition to the fear of government retribution, many Zairians—mindful of the chaotic years following independence and subsequent secession uprisings—appear to support Mobutu if only for his skill at maintaining internal order. In any event, Zaire's imposing size, low population density, and inhospitable terrain and climate pose formidable barriers to sustained guerrilla operations.

The Key External Players

foreign aid and advisers are responsible for sustaining all key units as well as major supporting functions, including logistics, training, medical services, and maintenance.



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Table 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

support for a permanently stationed Belgian C-130 aircraft in Zaire.



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


Foreign Support and Modernization Efforts

Mobutu expects foreign donors to play a major role in the ambitious military modernization program.



most donors, especially those familiar with Zairian military inefficiencies, have turned a deaf ear to Mobutu's requests, and all realize that Zaire's ability to strengthen its forces even modestly is severely limited. Recruiting and training the 23,000 new troops the program calls for—more than doubling the active personnel strength of the Army—is far beyond Zairian financial capabilities. Such an undertaking would require massive new infusions of foreign resources and several hundred advisers, new facilities, and the reorganization of the military's already inadequate logistic, personnel, and training systems. In view of Zaire's military and economic problems, most foreign donors have advised Mobutu to reduce the size of his forces to a level that could be supported by the central government.



Outlook

Mobutu's concern about maintaining personal political control over the military probably will continue to outweigh the need for major reforms required to make his forces an effective counter to any foreign threat. In the event of a national emergency that exceeds the capabilities of his military, Mobutu probably would again seek external assistance—including another direct military intervention by one or more of his allies. Although Mobutu's unwillingness to undertake serious reform measures may prompt some foreign governments to reassess their assistance programs.

Mobutu's reputation as a force for stability and moderation in Sub-Saharan Africa, together with Zaire's importance as a source of strategic minerals and other raw materials, probably will keep major foreign donor states committed to supporting Zairian security, at least for the near term.

Nevertheless, the growing ineffectiveness of the Zairian armed forces is cause for concern among Kinshasa's allies, particularly if Zaire is confronted by external meddling, for example, at a time of internal crisis. Although most of Zaire's neighbors are preoccupied with their own political, military, and economic problems,



Although some elite units, notably the Special Presidential

Division and the 31st Parachute Brigade (see appendix B), probably would perform fairly well in an emergency. more protracted crisis—on the scale of the two invasions of the Shaba Region—would overwhelm Zaire's ability to sustain its forces, and would erode the combat effectiveness of even the elite units.

In view of its serious logistic and manpower shortcomings, the Zairian military also will be even less able to fulfill its role of keeping domestic order in the coming years.

the military's inefficiencies and the country's declining standard of living have begun to sap morale even in the Special Presidential Division and the 31st Parachute Brigade. A further decline in the living standards of these units could put their loyalty in jeopardy, although Mobutu eventually to take steps to keep them satisfied and motivated. Barring a collapse of the military's morale, Mobutu can continue to count on his forces to suppress small-scale uprisings, riots, or demonstrations of short duration.

a significant curtailment of military corruption and mismanagement by Mobutu is unlikely because it could lessen the stake that senior commanders have in perpetuating the President's control and may prompt coup plotting. Even if these measures were undertaken, Mobutu's personnel practices probably would continue to undermine military effectiveness. Mobutu is also unlikely to force the military—despite pressure from donor states—to make improvements, such as streamlining the military's bloated organizational apparatus and overall size, increasing the mobility of combat units, or enhancing the professionalism of the officer corps. Mobutu, like the leaders of many underdeveloped states, will continue efforts to improve military capabilities primarily through acquisition of advanced, high-prestige weapons that his forces are ill-prepared to maintain and utilize. this policy—currently a key feature of his armed forces modernization program—is likely to result in even greater military disarray and further reduce the combat capabilities of Zairian forces.

Implications for the United States

As long as Mobutu remains in power, he will look to Washington to play a role in maintaining Zairian security.

[REDACTED]

For now, however, we expect little more than periodic expressions of displeasure

[REDACTED]

Should Mobutu's sense of military vulnerability increase, however,

Under such circumstances, Mobutu also is likely to try to play one Western backer off against another. He may even attempt to

[REDACTED]

of Zaire's military weakness and Mobutu's fear of Soviet- and Cuban-backed Angola and Congo, however, he probably will stop short of causing serious damage to the bilateral relationship.

Appendix A

A Look at the Services

The Army

By virtue of its size, mission, and command of resources, the Army is the predominant service.

The Army general staff is located in Kinshasa and administers its forces through three regional headquarters located at Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, and Kisangani. Ground forces units presently consist of two divisions, seven independent combat brigades, and a logistic corps.

Despite a number of sweeping personnel and organizational changes and the commitment of large amounts of domestic and foreign resources,

Army border-patrolling capabilities are still inadequate, leaving the country virtually defenseless against infiltrations by dissidents, saboteurs, and terrorists.

Woeful living conditions in the Army have made recruitment and retention of competent personnel increasingly difficult. These same conditions engender criminal activities and indiscipline among the troops and spark friction between the military and civilian population, especially in remote areas where central authority is weak or nonexistent.

The Navy

The Navy is the smallest service.

A fairly well-trained force by Zairian standards, the Navy is charged with defending territorial waters, conducting search and rescue operations, and interdicting smuggling and illegal entry into the country. The Navy has three regional headquarters, each with a defined area of operations and a specific role. The first naval region headquarters, located at Kalernie, is responsible for

Lakes Tanganyika, Albert, Edward, Kivu, and Mweru. Six US-made Swift boats are assigned to this region and patrol on Lake Tanganyika. The second naval region headquarters is based in Kinshasa and is responsible for operations on the Congo and Ubangi Rivers. Several small, ineffective craft are assigned to perform the limited missions in this region. The third naval region headquarters is in Banana and is charged with coastal security duties in and around the mouth of the Congo river. Five Chinese-made Shanghai-class patrol boats operate in this area and perform marginally effective missions.

The Air Force

The 2,000-man Air Force is the most neglected service and the least able to fulfill its mission. Divided into three commands located at Kinshasa, Kamina, and Kisangani, it is charged with airlifting troops and materiel to trouble spots within the country, providing close air support for ground forces, and performing limited reconnaissance functions.

Only three of Zaire's five C-130 transports are available to airlift ground forces or to drop paratroopers, and poor maintenance practices and lack of spare parts frequently ground these aircraft. Combat fighter support is limited to a maximum of four Mirage 5's that may be able to fly only two sorties each before breaking down because of inadequate maintenance. Four remaining Italian-made Aeronaocchi counterinsurgency attack aircraft—three others were destroyed earlier this year in a mid-air collision—also have serious problems with their weapon systems and would probably prove ineffective in combat. Twelve light Cessna aircraft are available for reconnaissance and training, but the Air Force has done little of either in recent years. In addition to an acute pilot shortage—less than 20 percent of the pilots are currently proficient—few reliable pilots have the ability

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to operate their weapon systems efficiently. The Air Force has no air defense capability. Moreover, leadership is virtually nonexistent. [REDACTED]

National Gendarmerie

The 24,000-man National Gendarmerie is the country's police force and, in remote areas, is the sole source of defense against internal and external aggression. The Gendarmerie's mission is usually limited to internal security, standard police functions, and some immigration and intelligence duties. The force is divided into nine districts corresponding to the eight Zairian regions and Kinshasa, with district commands headquartered in the regional capitals. Because the Gendarmerie depends on the armed forces for equipment, logistic, and medical support—and it is usually last in line for all of these—its capabilities are limited. Like the regular military, the force suffers from corruption, low morale, irregular pay, and poor training. [REDACTED] gendarmes frequently extort money from civilians. Because few recruits are attracted to service in the Gendarmerie, its personnel average over 40 years of age. [REDACTED]

Civil Guard

The Civil Guard, established in 1985, is the most recent addition to Zaire's paramilitary forces. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] for border protection and enforcing customs laws. To date, two battalions have been trained and deployed in Kinshasa and Matadi, with a third battalion scheduled for deployment in Lubumbashi in 1989. Although a part of the armed forces, the Guard is directly under the President and is not subordinate to the traditional defense establishment. [REDACTED] the Guard will someday replace the Gendarmerie, but so far it has been plagued by most of the same problems afflicting other Zairian military institutions. [REDACTED]

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Appendix B Ground Forces Order of Battle

Special Presidential Division

The Kinshasa-based, 5,200-man Special Presidential Division (DSP) is the elite unit of Zaire's ground forces. Formed in 1977, the DSP is composed of five battalions, including fully equipped parachute, infantry, and artillery units. At least 80 percent of its assigned personnel hail from the President's home region of Equateur, and the primary criterion for selection is loyalty to Mobutu and DSP commander Nzimbi. Unit morale is high, and Mobutu bolsters troop loyalty with cash awards and other gratuities.

Unlike most Zairian units, the DSP appears combat ready: equipment is modern and in working order, troops are generally well fed and more regularly paid, and training is rigorous and performed daily. The division, however, is heavily dependent on advisers; the division's discipline and effectiveness would disintegrate rapidly if it were deployed out of Kinshasa without help. The DSP's mission is limited to the protection of Mobutu, his family and estate, and foreign dignitaries visiting Zaire. Growing discipline and morale problems suggest that even the DSP has begun to feel the effects of the country's general economic deterioration.

Kamanyola Division

This Shaba-based unit, which was routed in the 1978 Shaba invasion, is severely understrength, unprepared for combat, and generally neglected by the government. The division's logistic support is virtually nonexistent, and assigned armor and artillery support is inadequate for a division-sized unit. On paper, the division has three brigades—the 11th, 12th, and 14th—with an authorized strength of 10,000 troops; in reality, because the 11th and 12th Brigades are badly understrength, the Kamanyola consists of approximately 4,100 troops. The 14th Brigade—deployed in the Kolwezi area—was retrained, reorganized, and reequipped.

in 1984-85 and is the division's only combat-effective unit. The 14th Brigade's fortunes, however, also have declined steadily as a result of inadequate logistic support. soldiers have begun to desert in growing numbers

31st Parachute Brigade

This 3,800-man brigade, which is organized, trained, equipped, and commanded by French officers and NCOs, is one of Zaire's most effective Army units.

The unit is as well-supported and well-led as the DSP and maintains a high state of combat readiness. The 31st is Zaire's only reserve element and is designed as a quick reaction force. It consists of three line battalions and one logistic battalion; one combat battalion is permanently deployed at Kamina airbase, and the other two are located at N'Djili Airport near Kinshasa. Since its formation in 1978, the 31st Brigade has accounted for three of Zaire's most successful military operations: in May 1978, it seized Kolwezi Airport in Shaba from FLNC rebels; in November 1984, it secured the village of Moba in northern Shaba following a rebel attack; and seven months later, it repelled another dissident assault at Moba.

32nd Parachute Brigade

This unit is still being formed. When fully manned, trained, and equipped—only one battalion, located in Kinshasa, has been activated—it will be deployed to Kitona base in the Bas-Zaïre region. Its present strength is approximately 1,000 troops.

1st Armored Brigade

Stationed at Mbanza Ngungu, about 165 kilometers southwest of Kinshasa, this 1,300-man unit

Only 30 of the brigade's approximately 100 Chinese-made T-62 and T-59 tanks are operational, and the

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weapon systems on these are considered nonoperational. Moreover, the deployment of the unit's vehicles is limited by poor maintenance, lack of spare parts and transporters, theft of fuel, and the country's shoddy transportation network.

41st Commando Brigade

This brigade, formed in 1979 by a Chinese advisory group, consists of four combat battalions with a total strength of approximately 1,200 troops. Headquartered at Kisangani, the brigade has three operational battalions deployed along Zaire's eastern borders, where they are responsible for defending approximately 350,000 square miles of territory.

The 41st Brigade is badly understrength, undisciplined, plagued by desertions, and poorly led, equipped, and trained by its Chinese advisers. The brigade operates on a small budget that severely limits training exercises. As a result, it is only marginally effective in its mission of counterinsurgency and commando operations.

13th Infantry Brigade

This brigade is located at Kalemie on Lake Tanganyika. It consists of approximately 1,500 troops, and it is one of the most neglected units in the Zairian ground forces. In 1984, the unit's combat capabilities were so poor it was unable to react to the Moba crisis, and had to be reinforced by a battalion from the 31st Brigade.

21st Infantry Brigade

This unit, deployed in and around Lubumbashi,

consists of approximately 1,700 troops whose mission is to defend the eastern half of the Shaba mining region. The brigade has only a modest combat capability.

22nd Light Infantry Brigade


The 2,500-man 22nd Brigade is located at Kamina base. Its mission is undefined, and it was deployed at Kamina by Mobutu to occupy the recently renovated infantry brigade billeting area there.

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
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
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
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
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