



Directorate of
Intelligence

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**Near East and
South Asia Review**

[Redacted]

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*Special Issue: Islamic Fundamentalists
and the Gulf Crisis*

[Redacted]

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30 November 1990

Approved for Release
Date JUN 1999

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30 November 1990

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Special Issue: Islamic Fundamentalists and the Gulf Crisis **b3**

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Fundamentalists have taken the lead in articulating the general Muslim distress over the prospect of war between Muslim states and, even more unsettling, the presence of US and other Western forces near the Muslim holy sites. They are likely to become increasingly agitated as the crisis continues and the Western military presence grows. **b3**

Islamic Fundamentalism—An Ideology for the 1990s **b3**

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As proponents of a return to a more "authentic" Islam as the solution to society's ills, fundamentalists are transforming the politics of virtually all states with sizable Muslim populations. The outcome of the Gulf crisis will in part determine whether mainstream activists continue to dominate Islamic fundamentalism or more radical elements come to the fore. **b3**

Egypt: Fundamentalists Caught in a Dilemma **b3**

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Most leading Egyptian fundamentalists condemn the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait but denounce at least as strongly the US troop presence in Saudi Arabia. The fundamentalists will react even more negatively if the United States launches military operations in the Gulf, and more radical fundamentalists might provoke demonstrations that could turn violent. **b3**

Jordan: Fundamentalists' Pro-Saddam Sentiment **b3**

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Jordan's Islamic fundamentalists are exploiting the Gulf crisis to increase their domestic strength and visibility. Establishment Muslim leaders, provided little guidance by King Hussein, are trying to balance popular support for Iraq against international pressure to adhere to UN sanctions and have taken advantage of their looser tether to hop on the Baghdad bandwagon. **b3**

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Radical Palestinian and Lebanese Fundamentalists Exploit Gulf Crisis



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Radical Palestinian and Lebanese fundamentalist groups welcome Saddam Husayn's linkage of the Gulf crisis to the Arab-Israeli conflict and his harsh attacks on the United States. The radicals are using the crisis to strengthen ties to Iraq, increase their influence over the Palestinian movement, and justify future terrorism against the United States and its Arab allies.

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Syrian Fundamentalists: Hoping To Exploit the Gulf Crisis



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The Muslim Brotherhood wants to exploit public disapproval of President Asad's cooperation with the West in the Gulf crisis. It sympathizes with Iraq's ouster of the Kuwaiti monarchy and opposes the presence of non-Arab troops in Saudi Arabia, and it and other fundamentalist elements are likely to seek opportunities to hurt the regime.

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Turkey: Potential Fundamentalist Gains



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The Gulf crisis has given the fundamentalist-dominated Welfare Party an opportunity to attract support from devout Muslims and perhaps play a larger role in Turkish politics. The Welfare Party has strongly protested US involvement in the crisis, and, if President Ozal's support for the West backfires, the party could win seats in the legislature.

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Iran: Parrying Saddam's New Challenge



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The Shia fundamentalist regime that rules Iran fears Iraqi domination of the region and wants to see Iraq's occupation of Kuwait reversed. Lacking the military power to contain Iraq, Iran has had to find a formula to tolerate the largest deployment of US forces to the Middle East since 1945 without compromising Iran's revolutionary image among Muslim militants.

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Saudi Arabia: Juggling Fundamentalist and Security Concerns b3 31

Senior Saudi religious authorities support King Fahd's decision to seek Western military help in the Gulf crisis. Nonetheless, they are uncomfortable with a non-Muslim military presence, fearing it will upset traditional Saudi life.

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Pakistan-Bangladesh: Muted Fundamentalist Reaction to Gulf Crisis b3 35

The fundamentalist reaction in Pakistan and Bangladesh to the Gulf crisis has been eclipsed by domestic political developments. A war in the Gulf or increased Israeli involvement in the crisis would provoke a sharp outcry from fundamentalists as well as the larger Muslim community in both countries.

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Algeria-Tunisia: Fundamentalists Caught in the Middle b3 37

Islamic fundamentalist leaders in Algeria and Tunisia have been unable to forge a consensus on the Gulf crisis. The fundamentalists are likely to keep their focus on domestic issues, but, if hostilities break out in the Gulf, they are likely to side with popular sentiment in protesting against the war.

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Morocco's Fundamentalists: New Opportunities, but Still No Challenge to the Regime b3 41

Morocco's fundamentalist groups oppose King Hassan's support for Saudi Arabia and the United States in the Gulf crisis, but they are too small and disorganized to challenge the monarch directly. Even if a major Gulf war erupts, Hassan should be able to use his security services, personal standing, and religious appeals to keep fundamentalist opposition off balance.

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
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Near East and South Asia Review **b3**

Special Issue: Islamic Fundamentalists and the Gulf Crisis **b3**

Articles

Perspective—Islamic Fundamentalists and the Gulf Crisis **b3**

Since Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August, Iraqi President Saddam Husayn has consistently used Islamic rhetoric and symbols to mobilize support for Baghdad's cause throughout the Muslim world. Saddam's message skillfully employs themes that hit home particularly with Islamic fundamentalists, who represent the most dynamic political and social trend in the Muslim world today:

- Saddam and Iraqi clerics call for a holy war to oust the Westerners from Islam's heartland. Iraqi propaganda is filled with references to depraved behavior by infidel Western troops in the holy places of Saudi Arabia.
- The Saudi royal family is depicted as an unfit guardian of the holy places. In a play on Saudi King Fahd's self-designation—Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques—Baghdad reviles him as the Defiler of the Two Mosques.
- In a clear pitch to the have-nots of the Muslim world, the Amir of Kuwait is regularly dismissed as the Croesus of the Gulf.

Saddam is working hard to overcome his image as a brutal dictator presiding over one of the most secular regimes in the Arab world. In interviews he invariably presents himself as a pious Muslim, and Saddam's speeches are studded with Koranic references. **b3**

In his new guise, Saddam has become a generous patron of Islamic causes. Since the invasion a succession of prominent Islamic personages, including fundamentalist leaders, has trooped through Baghdad, and the Iraqi media have trumpeted their endorsements of Saddam. **b3**

Fundamentalists have taken the lead in articulating the general distress throughout the Muslim world over the

prospect of war between Muslim states and, even more unsettling, the presence of US and other Western forces near the holy sites. Fundamentalists have led demonstrations in Jordan, Pakistan, and elsewhere against the Western presence. There, however, has been no reaction to match the outbursts in response to the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979, when rumors that the United States was involved resulted in violent demonstrations, including the burning of the US Embassy in Islamabad. Many leading fundamentalists appear to be straddling the Gulf issue, condemning, at least by implication, the Iraqi invasion on Islamic grounds, while reserving their heaviest fire for the Western presence in the Gulf. **b3**

There are several likely reasons for the relatively passive response of most fundamentalists and the larger Islamic public to the Western buildup:

- Saddam is widely perceived by fundamentalist leaders as a secular thug who is cynically manipulating Islamic symbols to justify the invasion of Kuwait.
- Saudi Arabia's senior religious authorities have approved the government's request to support the presence of foreign military forces. The Saudis are widely respected for maintaining Islamic law as the law of the realm—the primary goal of all fundamentalists—and for sternly enforcing public morality.
- Saudi Arabia and the smaller Arab Gulf states over the years have bankrolled Islamic programs and causes throughout the Muslim world and in Muslim communities in the West. Wealthy Saudis have contributed generously to fundamentalist political groups and their leaders. Fundamentalist leaders are

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reluctant to alienate their benefactors, and, while denouncing the presence of Western military forces in the kingdom, they carefully refrain from rebuking King Fahd.

- Fundamentalists belong to a myriad of organizations that tend to focus on national and local issues. No Muslim clerical leader has the stature of an Ayatollah Khomeini, around whom Muslims can rally either for or against Saddam.
- Sectarian rivalries continue to divide fundamentalists. Shia Muslims appear torn between enmity for the United States and for Saddam's Sunni-based regime. Despite its rhetoric, Tehran is turning aside calls by Iranian and other Shia Muslim radicals for action against Western forces, preferring to await the resolution of the crisis before deciding whether to confront the United States.
- The absence of hostilities and continuing international interest in a peaceful resolution encourage a wait-and-see attitude. **b3**

Fundamentalists in the Arab Middle East and elsewhere in the Muslim world are likely to become increasingly agitated as the crisis continues and the Western military presence grows. Even archconservative Saudi religious police have recently led anti-US demonstrations. Tensions fanned by Iraqi propaganda could boil over with the approach of the Islamic holy season that begins in March with the monthlong fast of Ramadan and concludes with the hajj or pilgrimage in June. **b3**

In our view, Muslim fundamentalists stand to gain influence no matter how the Gulf crisis is resolved. Saddam's demise, either as a result of US-led military action or an internal coup, probably would be portrayed as one more defeat that Islam must avenge.

Fundamentalist ideologues could portray Saddam's secularism as the seed of his defeat and present this as an object lesson for Muslims. If Saddam is perceived as having prevailed, fundamentalists almost certainly would proclaim this as a victory for Islam. **b3**

• Heavy casualties among Iraqi and Arab coalition forces almost certainly would increase criticism of the United States and its Arab allies. The outcry would become even more intense if Israel becomes involved in military actions. Fundamentalist leaders would charge that Tel Aviv and Washington acted in concert. We believe that, even in Egypt, violence led by fundamentalists and others would pose a high risk to US citizens and property. Terrorist attacks by Islamic and secular radicals against US, Western, and Israeli interests would meet with widespread approval throughout the Muslim world. **b3**

There would also be protests if the war were short and the West perceived as a decisive winner. These probably would taper off fairly quickly, with the Arab-Israeli issue almost certainly returning to the forefront of fundamentalist and Arab Muslim concerns. Fundamentalist leaders throughout the Muslim world would continue to press for the exit of Western military forces from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region. **b3**

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Islamic Fundamentalism— An Ideology for the 1990s b3

Islamic fundamentalism is the most dynamic social and political force in the Muslim world, generally eclipsing other ideologies—Nasirism, Arab nationalism, and Ba'thism (Arab socialism)—in its appeal to the Muslim masses. Fundamentalists, proponents of a return to a more "authentic" Islam as the solution to society's ills, are transforming the politics of virtually all states with sizable Muslim populations. Their rhetoric has a strong anti-Western tone. b3

Fundamentalism's momentum and force vary from one Muslim country to another, and no one religious or political figure speaks for the movement as a whole. Mainstream activists—those willing to work within their countries' political systems—have scored impressive political gains in the last several years in several countries—Algeria, Jordan, Tunisia—and we expect this trend to continue through the 1990s. The outcome of the Gulf crisis and the severity of economic problems in most Muslim states probably will determine whether mainstream activists continue to dominate Islamic fundamentalism or more radical elements come to the fore. [redacted] b3

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Fundamentalism's Roots

Islamic fundamentalists are the most politically assertive component of a large and broad Islamic revival that has been developing since early in this century. The revival is largely a reaction to the legacy of Western colonialism. It also responds to a pervasive sense among Muslims that secular leaders of the Islamic world have failed to meet the continuing challenge from the West. b3

For most fundamentalists, the explanation for the Muslim world's failure vis-a-vis the West has a divine basis—God withdrew His favor as Muslims strayed from Islam's true path. Many fundamentalists trace their "conversion" to a more political Islam to Israel's defeat of the combined armies of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in 1967, an event that sent shock waves

throughout the Muslim world. New recruits over the intervening decades have come mainly from young, urban, educated Muslims in countries that have been wracked by continuing social and economic dislocation. 1 b3

The Fundamentalist Agenda

Fundamentalists assert the primacy of Islamic concerns over narrow national interests and reject Arab nationalism, Nasirism, and Ba'thism as bankrupt ideologies based on Western models. Central to their world view is the concept of the inviolability of Dar al-Islam, the territories that historically have been won for Islam and, as such, are held as a trust from God, no portion of which may be surrendered. 2 This conviction accounts in large measure for fundamentalist opposition to the Western military presence in Saudi Arabia and to a possible US-led military attack on Iraq. It also, for example, makes HAMAS, the Islamic Resistance Movement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, far less amenable than the secular Palestine Liberation Organization to a possible compromise with Israel on territorial issues. b3

Fundamentalist demands are simple and clear-cut—restoration of Islamic law as the basis for the legal systems of all Muslim countries, the purging of Western influences from Muslim societies, and the development of specifically Islamic solutions to political, social, and economic problems. The rhetoric of even mainstream fundamentalist organizations such

1. Muslims do not employ a universally accepted term to identify individuals or groups that are caught up in the Islamic revival. Muslim commentators have used *islamiyy* (pl: *islamiyyin*, translated directly from the English "Islamists") and *asliyy* (pl. *asliyyin*: "authentic ones") as rough equivalents of the Western term "fundamentalist." b3
2. Muslims divide the world into two realms, Dar al-Islam ("Abode of Peace"), which includes all lands dominated by Muslims and those with substantial Muslim populations living under Islamic law, and Dar al-Harb ("Abode of War"), those lands that have yet to accept Islam's message. b3

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as the Muslim Brotherhood is virulently anti-Western.

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Many fundamentalists have rejected "official" Islam—the religious establishment that in most Muslim countries staffs government-funded mosques and Islamic educational and judicial systems—and increasingly are patronizing mosques and Islamic organizations that are independent of government control. In their view, the establishment clergy—most of them salaried state employees—help perpetuate secular state institutions that are based on Western and alien models.

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Paths to Power

The appeal of fundamentalism—with its firm roots in indigenous Islamic culture—has allowed its advocates to outpace secularists in many Muslim countries in mobilizing public support and shaping social and political behavior. Although fundamentalists share common goals, their leadership, particularly in the majority Sunni sect of Islam, tends to be fragmented, reflecting the diverse philosophical orientations, tactical approaches, and often intense political and personal rivalries within the movement in each Muslim country:

- Most fundamentalists assert that society must be reformed according to Islamic principles as a prelude to establishing an Islamic state and order. They generally avoid political activity and work toward their goal by building institutions at the grassroots level—religiously oriented charitable, educational, and welfare societies independent of government control. These groups' programs are often of better quality and lower cost than comparable government-run programs.
- More politically active fundamentalists are building broad-based Islamic networks but push for change inside the political system. Mainstream organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood seek

to provide a viable political opposition while avoiding confrontation with the government.³

- Radical fundamentalists assert that change from within is impossible and that it must be imposed by a theocratic, oligarchical dictatorship. Democracy is anathema because it substitutes the rule of man for that of God. Radical fundamentalists—few in number and divided into a myriad of organizations and cells—are committed to violent overthrow of the established order.

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Radicals Ascendant. During the late 1970s and the 1980s, Islamic radicals riveted international attention with dramatic acts—the establishment of clerical rule in Iran, the assassination of Egyptian President Sadat, and guerrilla warfare by the Iranian-sponsored Hizballah against Israeli forces in Lebanon.

As the decade wore on, the vanguard position assumed by Ayatollah Khomeini and like-minded Islamic radicals elsewhere began to erode. Tehran's efforts to export its revolution were frustrated by:

- Mutual antipathy and suspicion between Sunni and Shia Muslims.
- Iran's uncompromising stance in the eight-year Iran-Iraq war that pitted Muslim against Muslim.
- Revulsion at the excesses of the Iranian revolutionary regime. Muslims generally viewed the violent demonstrations orchestrated by Tehran during the hajj in 1987 that resulted in heavy loss of life as a desecration of Islam's holiest site.

Mainstream Fundamentalists Gain. By mid-decade the threat from the radicals appeared to be receding. Mainstream fundamentalist leaders—those willing to work within the system—were scoring gains in their push for Islamic reforms and access to positions of influence in government:

- In 1988 the new Ben Ali regime in Tunisia relaxed curbs on fundamentalist political activity. In
- 3. The Muslim Brotherhood eschews antiregime violence with the exception of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and HAMAS, the brotherhood's front organization in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.

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elections in early 1989, fundamentalists, running as independents, took up to 15 percent of the vote nationwide and more than 30 percent in the capital.

- Fundamentalists did even better in Jordan in November 1988, winning 31 of 80 seats in the new legislature. They have since picked up additional strength, and a member of the Muslim Brotherhood is now Speaker of the House of Representatives.
- In their biggest gains to date, fundamentalists in Algeria outpolled the National Liberation Front, the secular ruling party, in local and provincial elections in Algeria last June. **b3**

Outlook

Developments in the Gulf crisis and on the economic front could well determine whether mainstream or more radical leaders will dominate fundamentalist movements in the coming decade.

[Redacted]
[Redacted]
Radicals may play an

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increasing role as well if mainstream fundamentalists are denied a share of political power. **b3**

So far, the threat to Muslim regimes from radical fundamentalists has been largely internal; but a regionwide fundamentalist surge could be triggered by actions by non-Muslims that could be perceived as a major violation of Islam. Such actions could include an attack on a shrine such as Jerusalem's Temple Mount, considered by Muslims to be Islam's third-holiest site, after the mosques in Mecca and Medina, as well as by military action against an Islamic-oriented regime. **b3**

So far, no leader with the charismatic qualities of a Khomeini and his skill in manipulating Islamic symbols has arisen around whom a regionwide Sunni fundamentalist movement might coalesce. **b3**

[Redacted]

[Redacted] **b3**

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Egypt: Fundamentalists Caught in a Dilemma

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The Islamic fundamentalists' potential to influence large segments of Egypt's lower and middle classes makes their continued acquiescence to government policy crucial to President Mubarak's opposition to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt is a potent force that poses serious long-term challenges for the regime and for Egyptian society.

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So far, most leading Egyptian fundamentalists continue to condemn Iraqi aggression. But they denounce at least as strongly the US troop presence in Saudi Arabia. We believe the fundamentalists will react even more negatively if the United States launches military operations in the Gulf. If Israel becomes involved militarily, the fundamentalists almost certainly will criticize Mubarak. More radical fundamentalists might try to provoke demonstrations that could turn violent. Either scenario is likely to cause popular support for Mubarak's Gulf policy to falter.

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What the Fundamentalists Want

Fundamentalism's increasing appeal to Egypt's lower and middle classes worries the government. Cairo fears that deteriorating economic conditions will provide the fundamentalists with the purpose and support to topple the regime in a popular uprising. The fundamentalists already have brought about considerable social change in Egypt that has both subtle and direct influence on Egyptian policies.

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The fundamentalists, although from diverse social backgrounds, generally favor common goals. These include reduced Western influence on their society, implementation of Islamic law, the creation of a more equitable economic order, and stricter separation of men and women in public places.

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Egyptian fundamentalists have no common strategy or tactics, and they lack a unifying leader. Mainstream groups like the 60-year-old Muslim Brotherhood favor a nonviolent, gradual evolution toward political change, while extremists such as the Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group) advocate violence to bring about Mubarak's overthrow.

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Countering Iraq's Islamic Media War

We believe the Egyptian Government's longstanding fear of the fundamentalist threat has been heightened by Baghdad's use of Islamic themes and its appeal to Arab have-nots in its propaganda. To counter this, Cairo has nurtured popular sentiment against Iraqi President Saddam Husayn through an intense media campaign that so far has been effective. Testimonials geared toward the Egyptian "everyman" feature tearful Egyptian escapees from "Saddam's hell." At the same time, mainstream Islamic leaders during Friday sermons rail against Saddam's efforts to justify the invasion of Kuwait as a holy war. The two most important religious leaders of establishment Islam—Shaykh al-Azhar and the Grand Mufti—have publicly condemned Iraq's aggression and have demanded that it withdraw from Kuwait.

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Some fundamentalist leaders charge Iraq with treachery and aggression, but they are increasingly balancing their remarks with anti-US criticism. They view the large US troop buildup with unease, calling it "another crusaders' campaign."

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Keeping the Lid on Fundamentalists

Since the assassination of President Sadat exposed the potential dangers from the fundamentalists, Mubarak has worked to bring moderates like the Muslim Brotherhood—the largest and most influential fundamentalist organization—into the political system and to sever their ties to smaller, more violent Islamic extremist groups. He has allowed the brotherhood to participate in legislative elections since 1984—although not as a political party—and has given official sanction to Islamic programs. These include scheduling more religious programs on television, sponsoring Koranic conferences and pilgrimages to Mecca, promoting greater public segregation of the sexes, and placing curbs on alcohol and "immoral" films.

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The government has cracked down harshly on Islamic extremists since the assassination in October of People's Assembly Speaker Mahgoub. Security forces have engaged in a massive sweep of radical fundamentalist cells to crush the Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, which has been blamed for the killing. Although available evidence indicates the assassination is not directly linked to Mubarak's Gulf policy, the government is worried that the extremists are trying to embarrass the regime and stir up popular discontent. ~~_____~~ b3

We believe the government's longstanding effort to suppress Islamic extremists has isolated them from mainstream fundamentalists and stemmed potential widespread unrest. ~~_____~~

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"Provocations" in the Gulf Might Incense Fundamentalists

We believe the Egyptian fundamentalists' quandary—opposition both to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and US intervention in the Gulf—keeps them from uniting and taking a stronger position against Mubarak. The Muslim Brotherhood, in particular, faces a dilemma over whether to undertake more forceful actions that could jeopardize the political legitimacy and respectability it has gained in recent years. Younger, impatient members of the brotherhood appear more prone to radicalism, but ~~_____~~ the organization's senior leaders are counseling restraint. b3

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The mainstream fundamentalists' acceptance of the government's Gulf policy could change. Mubarak's close association with the United States has stirred some

fundamentalist opposition, and the continuing US buildup in the Gulf could trigger even sharper criticism.

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A prolonged military conflict in the Gulf involving heavy Egyptian casualties is certain to provoke a negative reaction from the fundamentalists and make it increasingly harder for Mubarak to sustain a strong Gulf commitment. On the other hand, if the international coalition fails to force Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait, we believe the fundamentalists would ridicule Mubarak's policy and try to turn popular opinion against him. ~~_____~~ b3

We believe Israel's direct involvement in the Gulf crisis would seriously, perhaps fatally, undercut Mubarak's tough Gulf policy. Fundamentalists almost certainly

would galvanize strong and widespread public opposition. Mubarak would have to consider the consequences of staying the course—seeing his popular support swiftly erode—or drawing back. ~~_____~~ b3

Even Egypt's emergence from the Gulf crisis as a winner—with the international coalition prevailing over Saddam—could increase the fundamentalists' demands for change—particularly if they anticipate a reward for their acquiescence to Mubarak's policy. In addition, if Mubarak fails to use Cairo's recent economic windfall to close the gap between Egypt's haves and have-nots, fundamentalists almost certainly will step up criticism of the regime for its lack of commitment to economic and social change. ~~_____~~ b3
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Jordan: Fundamentalists' Pro-Saddam Sentiment

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Jordan's Islamic fundamentalists are exploiting the Gulf crisis—particularly popular opposition to the Western presence in Saudi Arabia—to increase their domestic strength and visibility. The Muslim Brotherhood, the leading mainstream fundamentalist group, is trying to exploit local support for Iraqi President Saddam Husayn to gain a greater role in policymaking in Amman. Radical Islamic groups also are riding Saddam's coattails to increase their membership and gain more widespread acceptance of their agenda. Individual fundamentalists in the government, principally in the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, have been provided little guidance by King Hussein and Prime Minister Badran, who are trying to balance popular support for Iraq against international pressure on Jordan to adhere to UN sanctions. These fundamentalists have taken advantage of their loosened tether to hop on the Baghdad bandwagon.

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Looming Threat

Jordan's security services have repeatedly contended in recent years that Islamic fundamentalists constitute the most serious long-term threat to the Hashemite monarchy. King Hussein's political liberalization drive during the last year—following riots in April 1989 over the deteriorating economy—allowed most of these groups more operating room in exchange for an implicit agreement not to contest regime policies too vigorously.

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[Redacted]

Groups that advocated violence against the regime, like the Islamic Liberation Party and the Jordanian-based factions of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, were repressed.

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The Muslim Brotherhood Reaches for the Brass Ring
Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood, which is the largest and most influential of the fundamentalist groups, is exploiting popular pro-Iraqi sentiments to obtain a

Islamic Fundamentalist Groups in Jordan
Muslim Brotherhood

After Egyptian President Nasir drove out the Muslim Brotherhood in 1957, King Hussein offered it sanctuary. This earned Hussein the brotherhood's tacit support in countering subsequent challenges to his rule. The brotherhood draws its members from upper class students and business leaders. Despite the brotherhood's pro-Palestinian ideology, there are only two Palestinians in the top leadership.

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Islamic Liberation Party

Islamic Liberation Party members oppose Arab nationalism, believing that the Islamic world should be united under a caliph. Their opposition to the monarchy and state precludes their participation in the legislative process.

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Palestinian Islamic Jihad

Muhanna faction, unknown

The Palestinian Islamic Jihad is the Jordanian fundamentalist group most dedicated to regaining control of the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip for Islam. The Muhanna faction has attempted numerous cross-border infiltrations into Israel. Both factions espouse the same sort of extremist Islamic doctrine as the Islamic Liberation Party.

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HAMAS

HAMAS—the Islamic Resistance Movement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip—has focused in Jordan on garnering support for the Palestinian uprising. HAMAS has been paralyzed during the Gulf crisis, its leadership split over whether to support Saudi Arabia or Iraq.

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limited power-sharing arrangement with the regime.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Until the crisis, the Jordanian public perceived the organization as a conglomeration of ineffective political hacks, unable to capitalize on their legislative election victories in November 1989.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The brotherhood's efforts at linkage were given a boost by the killing of 21 Palestinians by Israeli police on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem on 7 October. The brotherhood has harped on the presence of Western troops in Saudi Arabia as an insult to Muslims. It has been careful to emphasize that it supports Saddam Husayn for his defense of Islam against the West, not his secular goals.

This approach has yielded visible results. Most important, the Muslim Brotherhood's increased popularity stemming from the Gulf crisis is allowing it to wield more clout in the legislature and to exert greater influence on policymaking.

[REDACTED]

They formed a coalition large enough to install a brotherhood member, Abd al-Latif Arabiyat, as Speaker of the House of Representatives. The coalition controls 42 seats in the 80-member body.

[REDACTED]

The Muslim Brotherhood is gaining other important concessions from the government because of the crisis. In early November an agreement extracted from the Prime Minister drastically increased the size of the "People's Army." Members of this force are given

rudimentary small weapons training as part of a combination of work-study employment and national service designed to assist students from lower-income families with college costs.


[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] up to 30,000 people have turned out for brotherhood-sponsored rallies. The crowds have spent much of their time chanting pro-Palestinian and anti-US slogans.

Radical Fundamentalists Enter the Limelight
Radical Islamic fundamentalist groups also have profited from the Gulf crisis. Unlike the Muslim Brotherhood, these groups are unwilling to compromise on religious issues or to cease their violent opposition to King Hussein. They have begun to advertise their agendas and to gather followers, using Hussein's decision to reduce domestic tensions over the crisis by relaxing restrictions on speech. Due to their smaller size, refusal to run for the legislature, and tenuous legal status, these groups probably will not be able to exploit the crisis as well as the much larger and better organized Muslim Brotherhood.

The Islamic Liberation Party probably has benefited most among the radical fundamentalist groups. Less than two weeks after the invasion of Kuwait, the regime permitted it to operate openly in Jordan for the first time in 27 years. The group's first legal act was to announce its pro-Iraq and anti-interventionist stance during a Muslim Brotherhood-sponsored rally. The party criticized Saddam's unwillingness to promulgate Islamic law in Iraq but declared its support for his efforts to bring about a united Islam.


Establishment Fundamentalists Muddle Through
Establishment Muslim leaders—many of whom are employees of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs—have been left to find their way through the Gulf crisis with



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no guidance from the King and Prime Minister. Many have followed the Muslim Brotherhood's lead. Many mosque preachers, for example, have echoed brotherhood positions. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] These preachers have mirrored the brotherhood's reticence about embracing Saddam wholeheartedly. [REDACTED]

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Independent mainstream fundamentalists in the legislature, who are few in number and in the past deferred to the regime, are jumping on the pro-Iraq bandwagon. Most of the independents have joined the Muslim Brotherhood-led majority coalition, [REDACTED]


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[REDACTED] We believe many have been impelled

by a desire to counter the growing influence of secular leftist groups since the beginning of the crisis [REDACTED]

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Containing the Fundamentalists



[REDACTED] Hussein [REDACTED]

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He will continue to try to split the antiregime coalition in the legislature by playing leftists against the fundamentalists, as he did when he sponsored the leftist Jordanian Arab National Democratic Alliance conference in Amman in September. Moreover, regime officials have reneged on their agreement to legalize the Islamic Liberation Party. Security forces have begun to arrest party members for handing out pamphlets and giving provocative speeches, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Hussein could dissolve the legislature. Because this would probably provoke nationwide protests and possibly violence, he presumably would take this step only as a last resort.

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Over the long term, Hussein may try to use a new national charter to limit fundamentalist influence on society. He proposed the charter—drafted by moderates whom he appointed—to provide an agenda and guidelines for his liberalization program after the riots in April 1989. The draft charter's statement of political principles, [REDACTED] appears designed to constrain the fundamentalists by requiring recognition of the primacy of the monarchy on all matters of church and state; denying participation to groups that receive funding and support from overseas, such as the Muslim Brotherhood; and stipulating that groups can no longer use mosques for political purposes. [REDACTED]

Fundamentalists Poised To Cause Trouble

If hostilities break out in the Gulf, radical groups will almost certainly launch attacks in Jordan against Western interests and probably cross-border attacks against Israel. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Islamic Liberation Party has a 25-year history of assassination attempts and coup plotting against the King, and it might renew such activity if war breaks out and/or Hussein turns away from Saddam. [REDACTED]

Even in the absence of war, if popular support for Saddam persists and Hussein's subjects perceive that he has swung too far from Baghdad, radical fundamentalists will probably take to the streets. Fundamentalist leaders might try to take advantage of such a turn of events to topple the government. A dissolution of the legislature might provoke the fundamentalists to try to oust Hussein. Short of such events, the regime probably will continue to compromise with the fundamentalists and play them against the secular opposition. [REDACTED]


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Radical Palestinian and
Lebanese Fundamentalists
Exploit Gulf Crisis

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Radical Palestinian and Lebanese fundamentalist groups are suspicious of Iraqi President Saddam Husayn's Islamic credentials but welcome his linkage of the Gulf crisis to the Arab-Israeli conflict and his harsh attacks on the United States. The radicals are using the Gulf crisis to strengthen ties to Iraq, increase their influence over the Palestinian movement, focus world attention on the Palestinian issue, and, in some cases, justify future terrorism against the United States and its Arab allies in the Gulf crisis.

These groups have had to balance their suspicions of Saddam Husayn's Islamic credentials against his popular image as a strong Arab leader willing to stand up to the United States and Israel. HAMAS has in the past rebuked Saddam for un-Islamic behavior. Shaykh Fadlallah, the spiritual leader of the Lebanese Hizballah organization, has publicly attacked Saddam for trying to "weaken the Islamic movement," while other Hizballah officials have denounced the Iraqi leader for presenting false Islamic credentials.



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HAMAS Attacks Western Troop Presence

In both the West Bank and Gaza Strip, HAMAS has emphasized the perceived threat to Islam posed by the intervention of Western forces in the region to generate greater popular Palestinian support for its goals. HAMAS leaders charge that the intervention is part of an imperialist plot involving Israel to destroy Islam and control Arab resources and have called for a holy war against the Western forces and Israel.

By touting the threat to Islam they hope to cut into the strength of the secular-oriented Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

Separate Agendas


The Gulf crisis has fueled strong anti-US sentiment among radical fundamentalist groups, but their support for Iraq has been limited largely to propaganda. Islamic groups agree with Baghdad's charges that the US troop presence serves US interests that are antithetical to those of Muslims—maintaining control of the region's oil supplies, supporting Arab monarchs and autocrats, and backing Israel and its occupation of Arab lands.

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
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


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


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
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


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
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Hizballah Weighs In

Leaders of the radical Lebanese Shia Hizballah condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait within a week of the attack but have since focused their public criticism on the US troop presence in the region. Both spiritual leader Shaykh Fadlallah and Hizballah Secretary General Tufayli have stated that Iraq never threatened Saudi Arabia or other Arab Gulf states and have suggested that the United States took advantage of the Iraqi move to carry out a premeditated plan to dominate the Gulf. ~~_____~~ b3



~~_____~~ Hizballah might conduct a terrorist operation on its own against US or allied Arab forces and hope that Saddam receives the blame. The likelihood of such attacks would increase, in our judgment, in the event of hostilities in the Gulf. ~~_____~~ b3

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
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Implications

We believe radical Palestinian and Lebanese Islamic groups will continue to try to exploit the groundswell of popular Arab sympathy for Saddam Husayn's stand against the United States and Israel to build support for their anti-US and anti-Israel programs. Both the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and HAMAS have a good chance of cutting into PLO strength in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. ~~_____~~ b3

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] A US attack against Iraq would almost certainly spark terrorist incidents by radical Palestinian and Lebanese fundamentalist groups against the United States, Israel, and the Arab states opposing Iraq.

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Despite its hostile rhetoric, HAMAS probably favors a peaceful Arab solution to the crisis, hoping this will speed the departure of foreign forces and prevent further "defilement" of Islamic holy sites. With the possible exception of Hizballah, we suspect Palestinian and

Lebanese fundamentalists want to see Iraq retain its military and strategic capabilities as a regional counterweight to Israel. Because these groups generally represent the poorer, disfranchised elements in the region that have long resented the luxurious lifestyles of the Gulf state elites, we believe they reject a return to the status quo ante in Kuwait. Regardless of the outcome of the Gulf crisis, the radical fundamentalists will retain their anti-US, anti-Israel agenda. Some have little interest in regional stability because, if tensions died down, they could be eclipsed by mainstream fundamentalist groups seeking a wider political role.

[REDACTED] b3 [REDACTED] b3

Syrian Fundamentalists: Hoping To Exploit the Gulf Crisis

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The Muslim Brotherhood, the principal fundamentalist group in Syria, wants to exploit widespread disapproval of President Asad's policy of cooperation with the West in the Gulf crisis. The brotherhood, like the Syrian public, sympathizes with Iraq's ouster of the Kuwaiti monarchy and opposes the presence of non-Arab troops in Saudi Arabia. The group has not trumpeted its sympathies in Syria, probably to avoid provoking the Asad regime. Exiled brotherhood leaders—perhaps with Iraqi coaxing—have expressed more open support for Baghdad. The Muslim Brotherhood does not threaten Asad's rule, but it and other subversive fundamentalist elements are likely to seek more opportunities to hurt the regime as the crisis in the Gulf continues.

They have little sympathy for the Kuwaiti monarchy because of its corrupt reputation and perceived stinginess toward Syria and other poor Arab countries. They believe Baghdad is championing the Palestinian cause more boldly and effectively than other Arab governments.

The Muslim Brotherhood has distributed pamphlets in Syria criticizing Asad's Gulf policy, stressing the heretical nature of the ruling Syrian leadership and questioning, on religious grounds, the government's qualifications to send troops to guard the Muslim holy places.

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Sunni Religious and Political Tendencies

The Gulf crisis coincides with a trend toward greater religiosity among Syrian Sunnis, who comprise 74 percent of the population. greater numbers of Syrians are attending mosques and more women are wearing scarfs on their heads or are completely veiled in public.

[Redacted]

The largely Sunni merchant class resents having its livelihood hurt by the regime's socialist policies. Sunni Muslims occupy mostly token positions in the government, which is dominated by Asad's Alawi sect, a schismatic Shia group. Many Sunnis regard Alawis as heretics and resent the tight restrictions that Asad has placed on Sunni political activities. Sunnis have no legal political parties, and membership in the Muslim Brotherhood, tolerated in most other Arab countries, is illegal.

Syrian Fundamentalist Response to the Gulf Crisis



The reaction of fundamentalists in Syria, other than the Muslim Brotherhood, to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait has been low key.

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


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The exiles have backed Iraq openly in the current crisis, [redacted] sending a cable to Iraqi President Saddam Husayn in August asserting that their organization stood "by the sons of the Iraqi people in one trench" and calling for a holy war against the foreign military presence in the Gulf. The Jordanian press reported a similar statement presumably released in Amman by the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood in mid-August. That pronouncement condemned the policies of Arab governments aligned with the United States and called on all Arab and Islamic governments to prepare for a holy war against the foreign "invasion." Explicit attacks against Damascus have been noticeably absent in these communiques. [redacted]

prevailing public mood [redacted]




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Damascus's Counterpropaganda

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


Outlook

We believe opposition activities by Sunni fundamentalists in Syria will increase as the crisis in the Gulf drags on. The Muslim Brotherhood in particular will seek to expand its operational capabilities in Syria. It will appeal to Baghdad for greater assistance. [redacted]

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Syrian fundamentalists probably would view a protracted standoff in the Gulf as proof of Western intentions to permanently occupy Saudi Arabia—including the Muslim holy sites—and they would grow increasingly critical of Asad's perceived collusion with the West. They probably would welcome a negotiated settlement of the Gulf crisis to avoid bloodshed and facilitate the removal of the Western military presence, but they probably would not favor Saddam's overthrow. We suspect they would oppose Syria's involvement in a military confrontation between Western forces and Iraq.



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The government launched an anti-US campaign in the media in late October, in our view, to put distance between Damascus and the West and to cater to the

Turkey: Potential Fundamentalist Gains

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The Gulf crisis has not significantly aided the Islamic fundamentalists in Turkey, who strongly oppose President Ozal's pro-Western economic policy and Turkey's secular order. The crisis, however, has given the small, fundamentalist-dominated Welfare Party an opportunity to attract greater support from devout Muslims and perhaps play a larger role in Turkish politics. The party is not currently represented in the legislature. Although most Turks condemn Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the Welfare Party has strongly protested US involvement in the crisis and Riyadh's acceptance of it. If Ozal's support for the West backfires, particularly if a negotiated settlement leaves Turkey facing a strong and vengeful Saddam Husayn, fundamentalist leaders of the Welfare Party probably could woo enough voters from the religious wing of Ozal's ruling Motherland Party to win seats in the next legislative election, scheduled for 1992.

Islamic Tendencies in Secularist Turkey

Turkey has been a secular state since Kamal Ataturk founded the republic in 1923. The Constitution bars political parties that advocate Islamic rule. President Ozal and some of his ministers, devout Muslims, have tried to exploit Islam for political gain. The vast majority of Turks consider themselves Muslim but accept secular principles. Fervent secularists—mostly intellectuals, military officers, and established Westernized families—are a relatively small but influential part of Turkish society and politics.


Religiously oriented political parties, even at their peak in 1974, never exceeded 11 percent of the vote. The Welfare Party received only 7.5 percent of the vote in the 1987 national election—short of the 10 percent needed to win representation in the legislature.

Islam as a political force appears to be on the rise. President Ozal and many of his ministers contend that Islam does not necessarily mean a return to backwardness and justify their openness to religion as an expression of free speech and the defense of necessary moral values. Secularists argue, however,

Muslim Divisions in Turkey

Turkey is approximately 98 percent Muslim, but only about 40 percent of the population are practicing Muslims. About three-quarters of the latter go to Friday prayer services and eat no pork. They want moderate Islamic practices to become an established part of Turkish life.

Fundamentalists represent probably less than 10 percent of the voters, divided among Sunni, Shia, and Alevi sects.^a Their theological and political positions vary widely—a strong bar to cooperation. Ankara allows fundamentalist groups that abstain from political activity to function as long as they pose no threat to the secular order.



^a Most Turks are Sunni Muslims, but the absence of reliable figures makes estimates difficult.

that Ozal and his associates are closet fundamentalists with a hidden agenda.



The Welfare Party's stand on Islamic issues is deliberately vague to accommodate a wide range of Islamic opinion and to avoid legal trouble. Most ultraorthodox Sunnis and some Turkish nationalists appear to support the Welfare Party, probably because of its synthesis of Turkish nationalism and Islamic conservatism—the "national view" of party founder Necmettin Erbakan. The Welfare Party disparages "Saudi Islam," which it considers internationalist and a tool of Western imperialism.

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Impact of the Gulf Crisis

Turks across the Muslim spectrum have condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and back Ankara's support for sanctions against Iraq. As Turks first, they tend to rally around the government in times of crisis. At the same time, most Turks, regardless of religious orientation, strongly oppose Turkish military involvement in the Gulf, preferring the traditional Turkish policy of "peace at home, peace abroad."

The Welfare Party has sharply criticized Ankara's pro-Western policies. Party leader Erbakan has blamed Iraq's actions on the United States and accused the government of subservience to US interests.

Erbakan favors an Arab solution to the crisis. He participated in an Arab delegation that visited Iraq in September. He claims to have widespread Muslim support abroad for his plan for Iraq's conditional withdrawal from Kuwait and the protection of Muslim holy places by Muslim troops, possibly including a Turkish contingent.

We believe Erbakan's message has fallen largely on deaf ears as far as the general public is concerned.

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Outlook

Given the current low standing of the Motherland Party [redacted] even without the Gulf crisis, the Welfare Party probably will be able to win seats in the

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next legislative election, scheduled to be held by the fall of 1992. The Gulf crisis should give the Welfare Party a slight boost. To the ultraorthodox, the presence of Western troops in Saudi Arabia confirms Erbakan's allegations of Saudi "internationalism" and "imperialism." This may increase the resonance of the Welfare Party's longstanding anti-US and anti-Israeli themes.

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Iran: Parrying Saddam's New Challenge

The Shia fundamentalist regime that rules Iran fears Iraqi domination of the region and wants to see Iraq's occupation of Kuwait reversed. This objective places Tehran in an awkward position, parallel to the Arab Gulf monarchies and the United States, which blurs its claim to be the leading revolutionary Muslim power resisting the West. Lacking the military power to contain Iraq by itself, Iran has had to find a formula to tolerate the largest deployment of US forces to the Middle East since 1945 without compromising Iran's revolutionary image among Muslim militants.

A Plague on Both Your Houses

Tehran has officially denounced both Iraq and the United States for their military actions in the Persian Gulf. Concerned over Iraqi aggression and seeking to improve diplomatic and economic relations with the West and the Arab Gulf states, Iran has condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and called for the unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops. Foreign Minister Velayati has officially declared Iran's support for all UN resolutions against Iraq.

[Redacted]

At the same time, Tehran has challenged US motives in deploying to the Gulf and called for a rapid withdrawal of Western forces upon resolution of the crisis. In September, Supreme Leader Khamenei referred to US "bullying" in the region, declaring that anyone who dies fighting US aggression is a martyr. President Rafsanjani, however, has implied publicly that Iran will tolerate the Western military presence until the crisis ends.

...Action To Undermine Iraq in the Gulf...

[Redacted]

The Iranian Domestic Response to the Gulf Crisis

Despite the bitter eight-year war with Iraq and in the face of President Rafsanjani's calculated policy toward the Gulf crisis, there are elements in Iran advocating confrontation with the West over its presence in Saudi Arabia. These hardline revolutionaries are Rafsanjani's most vocal critics and typically oppose many of his policies. We believe their criticism of Rafsanjani's handling of the crisis is motivated by both ideology and a desire to weaken Rafsanjani.

The radical position—the views of hardline elements and by such prominent legislators as Ali Akbar Mohtashemi-Pur and Sadeq Khalkhali—is more an expression of anti-US passion than sympathy for Baghdad. Mohtashemi-Pur, who as recently as July had condemned as "cowardly" Rafsanjani's willingness to negotiate directly with Iraq, in September called for immediate preparations for waging a holy war against the United States. Most radical criticism has focused on the presence of US forces in Saudi Arabia near the Muslim holy sites in Mecca and Medina and on the threat they believe US forces pose to Iran and the Islamic world.

Rafsanjani's radical opponents do not seem to have generated much support for their confrontational positions. The radicals have tried to stage anti-US demonstrations to rally the public, but these have lacked conviction and spontaneity and are poorly attended. Radical criticism almost certainly helped prompt Khamenei's call for a holy war against US aggression, a declaration subsequently endorsed by a majority of deputies in the Iranian legislature. On balance, we doubt that the radicals will by themselves move Iranian policy from the course set by Rafsanjani.

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


The Iranians are openly cultivating better relations with the Arab Gulf states. In the week following the Iraqi invasion, Foreign Minister Velayati visited Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman, and he met the Saudi Foreign Minister at the United Nations in September. ~~_____~~ b3


While Playing on Anti-US Themes Elsewhere

Iran is providing publicity and propaganda support to fundamentalist elements in the Middle East. Iranian Government media have broadcast stories highlighting the opposition of Turkish, Egyptian, and exiled Saudi religious militants to the Western military deployments to the Persian Gulf. During the last week of September, the Iranian Government received a delegation of prominent Arab, Pakistani, and Malaysian fundamentalists who argued Iraq's case and condemned US and Western actions. That same week, Iran's Islamic Propagation Organization called for worldwide demonstrations against the United States. ~~_____~~

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
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In our judgment, these activities primarily reflect longstanding Iranian opposition to the US global role and do not represent a new or concerted campaign against the United States. The Iranians probably have seized the chance to make inroads with local Muslims in selected communities by exploiting the Gulf crisis.

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Outlook

We believe Iran will continue to see its interests best served by the defeat of Iraq. We do not expect Iran to take practical actions—diplomatic, military, or terrorist—against the West. Its propaganda will be aimed mainly at preserving Iran's ideological and religious legitimacy with Muslim, especially Shia,

communities. Nonetheless, Iran will criticize Western, particularly US, policy and intentions, and the stridency of this criticism almost certainly will increase if military operations commence.

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Events of great emotional and ideological importance to Iran and Shia Muslims might trigger a change of outlook in Tehran. Such events as an Israeli preemptive attack on Iraq, massive Israeli operations against Lebanese Shias, a draconian suppression of Palestinian unrest, US strikes on such Shia holy sites in Iraq as An Najaf and Karbala, or even a violent crackdown in Saudi Arabia on the Shia minority probably would force Iranian leaders to attempt to protect their legitimacy as revolutionary Muslims by vigorously attacking Western action in the Gulf.

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However the Gulf crisis is resolved, Iran is likely to escalate its encouragement of fundamentalist and Shia Muslim activism. Following an Iraqi withdrawal or military defeat, Tehran is likely to support Shia agitation for greater political participation in a liberated Kuwait. Iran almost certainly will do the same with the Shia majority in Iraq should the crisis seriously weaken or topple Saddam's regime. Iran will be sure to promote Muslim protest against the United States to bolster its demand for a timely US withdrawal from the Persian Gulf. Should the Iranians believe the United States wants to prolong its military deployments to the Gulf, they may well support terrorism by their Shia and Palestinian clients against US personnel, facilities, and interests.

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Saudi Arabia: Juggling Fundamentalist and Security Concerns

Senior Saudi religious authorities—who espouse perhaps the most rigidly fundamentalist religious ethic in the Muslim world—support King Fahd's decision to seek Western military help in the Gulf crisis because they fear Iraqi expansionist designs go beyond Kuwait. Nonetheless, they are uncomfortable with a non-Muslim military presence, even one largely limited to the Eastern Province, far from the holy cities of Mecca and Medina in western Saudi Arabia. The religious authorities fear that so large a Western presence will upset traditional Saudi life, and they are determined to confront legal, political, or social reforms that appear to conflict with strict Islamic precepts.

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Fundamentalist to the Core

Saudi citizens live in a society permeated by an Islamic fundamentalist ethic. Government and religion have been virtually inseparable since the founding of the kingdom in the 1920s. Saudi Arabia provides a model for many fundamentalists. Islam is the state religion, the Koran is proclaimed as the nation's constitution, and religious law is the civil law of the land. The Mutawwi'un, religious police, sternly enforce public morality, including strict segregation of the sexes.

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Most Saudi citizens adhere willingly to the strict moral teachings of Wahhabism, a highly conservative interpretation of Sunni Islam, and accord the Saudi monarch respect as a religious leader in his role as "custodian" of the holy sites in Mecca and Medina. The alliance of the Al Sa'ud family and Wahhabi religious leaders dates to the mid-18th century and has fostered a close relationship between Islam and the Saudi state.

Clerical Reactions to Iraq's Threat

King Fahd's decision to invite US and other non-Muslim troops to Saudi Arabia in August 1990

appears to have been made without broad consultation, and only the imminent Iraqi military threat made Saudi religious leaders accept the decision. Some may have questioned Fahd's "act first, explain later" posture but appear to have been even more irritated by Saddam Husayn's attempt to wrap himself in the mantle of Islam. When Iraqi clerics endorsed Saddam's invasion of Kuwait in early August, Saudi clerics responded quickly and vocally in favor of Fahd.

[Redacted]

An important factor in the religious authorities' positive response is the absence of foreign forces from Hijaz, where the holy cities of Mecca and Medina are located. Few non-Muslim forces are deployed outside Eastern Province. There are small elements in the Riyadh area and none in Al-Qasym Province—the Wahhabi heartland. This deployment pattern has reduced the danger of friction between conservative Saudis and non-Muslim troops.

Saudi Sensitivity to the Western Presence

Despite support from prominent clerics and the virtual absence of popular criticism of the royal family's Gulf policies, there is growing disquiet among religious conservatives, particularly in urban areas, about the effects of the Western presence on traditional Saudi life. A demonstration in mid-November by some 50 Saudi women demanding the right to drive has crystallized

1 On 20 August, Abd al Aziz bin Baz, the most highly respected religious authority in the kingdom, issued a long statement supporting Fahd. he denounced the invasion of Kuwait, called for immediate Iraqi withdrawal, and defended the kingdom's actions in calling for foreign troops. His statements and those of other religious leaders were widely disseminated in the Saudi media.


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these concerns. Religious zealots not only saw the women's action as a reflection of Western influence but blamed the US Embassy for instigating the demonstration. The Saudi regime also condemned the women's action. Two demonstrations were staged in Riyadh against "Western tendencies" by the Saudi religious police. There was a near riot outside the offices of the Governor of Riyadh.

The Governor of Riyadh, accompanied by religious leader Abd al-Aziz bin Baz, has threatened the religious police with crackdowns unless they bring themselves under control. The religious zealots are unlikely to be quelled easily. Religious police have been more visible throughout Riyadh since the women's demonstration, even near the rear gate of the US Embassy which is supposed to be off limits to them.

Male and female university students have denounced the women drivers by circulating petitions and boycotting classes, but they have not been critical of

Saudi Gulf policies. For the most part, Saudi students are politically passive, attracted neither by Western-style democracy nor leftist ideologies.

The Shia Factor

Most of Saudi Arabia's 500,000 Shia Muslim minority—located almost entirely in Eastern Province—appear to be backing Fahd in the present crisis.


Shia volunteers for military service have been quietly ignored.

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
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other Islamic organizations, including the Islamic Conference Organization, which has also condemned the Iraqi invasion. ~~██████████~~ b3



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Mobilizing International Muslim Support
For years Riyadh has used Islam as an important foreign policy tool. Support for Islam has been an important underpinning of the kingdom's support to the Afghan insurgents as well as a determinant in its relations with the Communist world. ~~██████████~~ b3

When Iraqi President Saddam Husayn challenged Fahd's Islamic credentials and criticized his decision to invite non-Muslim troops into Saudi Arabia, Riyadh mustered international Islamic support. In early September the Muslim World League sponsored a conference of prominent Islamic scholars from Arab and Muslim countries in Mecca. The conferees issued a series of anti-Iraqi, pro-Saudi resolutions. ~~██████████~~

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One resolution endorsed Riyadh's request for foreign military assistance, saying it was permissible under Islamic law as long as non-Muslim forces departed once Iraq withdrew from Kuwait. Another resolution called for the establishment of a permanent Islamic force to deal with future disputes between Islamic countries. The Saudis wield strong influence in

Outlook:
In return for their loyalty during the crisis, Saudi clerics probably will expect Fahd to defer plans to reform the kingdom's legal system. ~~██████████~~ b3
Fahd has acquiesced to influential religious leaders by canceling implementation of new laws on civil court proceedings in Saudi Arabia. He, however, probably will proceed with recently announced plans for modest political reforms that are unlikely to conflict with Islamic precepts. ~~██████████~~ b3

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Anxieties about the Western troop presence in the kingdom probably will increase in the coming weeks. The prospect of 250,000 US soldiers celebrating Christian and Jewish holidays in the Muslim holy land will grate on local religious sensitivities and provide substantial grist for Baghdad's propaganda mill. Riyadh will be willing to tolerate some domestic religious criticism as long as it remains low key, hoping that anti-Western rhetoric will act as a release valve. It probably would crack down only if such criticism gets out of hand. ~~■~~ b3

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Next year's Islamic holy season—beginning in March with Ramadan and ending in June with the hajj—will be a critical time for Riyadh if Western troops are still in the kingdom. Religious conservatives in the kingdom are unlikely to tolerate a seemingly open-ended Western troop presence. ~~■~~ b3

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Pakistan-Bangladesh: Muted Fundamentalist Reaction to Gulf Crisis

The fundamentalist reaction in Pakistan and Bangladesh to the Gulf crisis has been eclipsed by domestic political developments. Fervent anti-US reaction to events in the Gulf has been confined to small, Islamic-oriented political parties. The ties of the Jamaat-i-Islami, the most influential conservative Islamic party in Pakistan and Bangladesh, to Saudi Arabia inhibit strong opposition to the presence of US troops in the Gulf. Despite the apparent low-key response, a war in the Gulf or increased Israeli involvement in the crisis would provoke a sharp outcry from fundamentalists as well as the larger Muslim community in both Pakistan and Bangladesh.

Regional Perspective

South Asian Muslims see themselves as an integral part of the world Islamic community. Perceived threats to Islam and Islamic holy sites elicit strong responses. Concern over the presence of US troops anywhere near the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia is almost universal. In November 1979, Muslim fundamentalists burned the US Embassy in Islamabad following rumors of US complicity in the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca. Fundamentalists attacked US offices in Pakistan in 1989 after Khomeini's death sentence against Salman Rushdie for his publication of *Satanic Verses*.

Responding to the Gulf Crisis


Risking the wrath of fundamentalist groups, Dhaka and Islamabad moved swiftly last August to align their foreign policies, both militarily and diplomatically, with the multinational consensus opposed to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Both countries have deployed military task forces to Saudi Arabia and have called for unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.

Conservative Islamic reaction in Pakistan and Bangladesh to the Gulf crisis—from a few small fundamentalist parties—has been primarily directed against the US role rather than in support of Iraqi actions. Religious leaders in both countries have demanded the withdrawal of US forces and their

Fundamentalist Media Comment on the Gulf Crisis

Fundamentalist concern over US troops in Saudi Arabia has been colored by misinformation. Extremist Islamic newspapers in Pakistan and Bangladesh have portrayed Iraqi President Saddam Husayn as the protector of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina against an assault by US forces. A letter addressed to the US Ambassador to Pakistan charged, "You pig eaters have desecrated the holy land by sending your troops infected with AIDS and venereal disease to be stationed in Saudi Arabia. Your unwilling mercenary troops are now ogling at Muslim women with evil eyes..." The Muslim, a generally pro-Iranian newspaper, charged that the United States exaggerated the threat to Saudi Arabia because US policymakers see the crisis as a potential boon to the US economy. According to this line of reasoning, US involvement in the Gulf crisis is motivated by a desire to sell military equipment to the Gulf states, ensure continued supplies of petroleum, and get the Saudis to pay for it all.

"imperialist agents" from Saudi Arabia. Fundamentalist leaders have played on deep-seated suspicions of foreign designs on the Islamic world and its oil to bolster their arguments. There have been several small demonstrations against US installations in both Pakistan and Bangladesh.



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Political leaders in Pakistan and Bangladesh are using every means possible to justify their Gulf policy to domestic audiences. Both Dhaka and Islamabad have played on Islamic sentiment to explain their decision to send troops to Saudi Arabia. Islamabad, for example, has portrayed the troop deployment as necessary to protect Muslim holy sites in Saudi Arabia. Political leaders, particularly in Bangladesh, have played on fears of Indian regional domination by likening Iraq to India.

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Concern Ebbs for Now

Preoccupation with events in South Asia has diverted Pakistani and Bangladeshi attention from the Gulf.

- The dismissal of the Bhutto government the week after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent election campaign focused most Pakistani political parties—including the religious parties—on the election campaign.
- The opposition campaign to unseat Bangladeshi President Ershad preoccupied Bangladeshis throughout most of the fall.
- Muslims in Pakistan and Bangladesh reacted sharply to the storming of the Muslim Babri Masjid in India in late October by Hindu fundamentalists bent on turning it into a Hindu temple. Islamic fundamentalists in Dhaka, for example, burned hundreds of Hindu homes and several Hindu temples.

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Muslims in Pakistan and Bangladesh have primarily focused on the economic impact of the Gulf crisis.

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the principal concern of most Bangladeshis early in the crisis eased with the successful repatriation of approximately 85,000 Bangladeshi expatriate workers from Iraq and Kuwait. Inflation—resulting from higher petroleum prices—has

sparked antigovernment rioting in Bangladesh.

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some Pakistanis are concerned that the economic havoc caused by the Gulf crisis could erode their country's independence because the government will be forced to rely increasingly on outside donors.

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Outlook

Although efforts by Islamabad and Dhaka to control the fallout from their role in the Gulf crisis have been successful, the two governments face potentially serious problems. If the crisis drags on, economic hardship will be felt increasingly in Pakistan and Bangladesh and could spark greater public unrest. Over the long run, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis will probably develop reservations about involvement in what is increasingly portrayed as an essentially Arab dispute.

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Islamic groups critical of the US presence will find a much larger audience in Pakistan and Bangladesh—and support for street demonstrations and agitation—if hostilities break out. Conservative religious groups will be able to exploit the strong undercurrent of anti-Americanism and anti-Zionism. In our view, if hostilities occur or if Israel is dragged into the crisis, the current fragile balance will be undone.

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Algeria-Tunisia: Fundamentalists Caught in the Middle

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Islamic fundamentalist leaders in Algeria and Tunisia have been unable to forge a consensus on the Gulf crisis. The leadership is divided both between moderate and hardline elements and over the conflicting demands of pro-Iraqi constituencies and Gulf benefactors. The fundamentalists are likely to try to keep their focus on domestic issues—such as the impending national election in Algeria and the legalization of Tunisia's fundamentalist movement. Should hostilities break out in the Gulf, fundamentalists are likely to side with popular sentiment in protesting against the war. US personnel in Algeria and, to a lesser extent, Tunisia would face the threat of violence from Islamic extremists.


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Rising Religious Activism

Islamic fundamentalism has become the most conspicuous and potentially dangerous vehicle for political expression in Tunisia and Algeria. Discredited official ideologies, growing economic and social inequalities, high expectations, cultural disorientation, and uncertain prospects for the future have led to growing religious activism, particularly among the young who make up about two-thirds of the population in Tunisia and Algeria. Fundamentalism offers a panacea for the ills of modern life and has become the most popular means of expressing social and political discontent.

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Islamic fundamentalist political gains have seriously challenged the legitimacy and authority of secular regimes in Algeria and Tunisia. The victory of the Islamic Salvation Front in local Algerian elections in June 1990 and the potential for another victory during the national legislative election scheduled for early 1991 make this fundamentalist party a major force in Algerian politics. In Tunisia, Islamic fundamentalism represents the most serious long-term challenge to the Ben Ali regime. Tunisian fundamentalists, affiliated primarily with An-Nahda—an unrecognized political party during the 1980s—significantly increased their political strength at the expense of all other political forces. They are demanding that the government grant their



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group legal status. Both groups have a demonstrated capability to mobilize young people for regime-threatening street-agitation. More extreme fundamentalist groups exist—those advocating overthrow of secular regimes through violent means—but they have small followings in both countries and little credibility.

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Reaction to the Gulf Crisis

Islamic fundamentalists in Algeria and Tunisia have failed to forge a consensus within their respective groups or formulate a clear policy on the Gulf crisis despite pro-Iraqi sentiment among their constituencies and the general population.



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~~_____~~ An-Nahda leader Rachid Ghannouchi, who is in self-imposed exile, urged Muslims to launch a "holy war" against all foreign

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forces in the Gulf in mid-September. Other key figures have criticized Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and Tunisian opposition leaders for leaping on the Iraqi bandwagon.

[Redacted]

In Algeria, Islamic Salvation Front leaders Abbasi Madani and Ali Belhadj have issued contradictory statements during the Gulf crisis. On a swing through Iraq and Saudi Arabia last August, Madani was quoted as saying that the presence of foreign troops was a direct consequence of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and that Saudi Arabia had the right to request foreign assistance. Baghdad Radio later quoted Madani as condemning the US intervention. Ali Belhadj told Algerian journalists in late October that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait "was aggression; there are no excuses...(but) you cannot turn to infidels to make war on Muslims." (SNF)

[Redacted]

The Embassy has received a rash of threats—many from relatively obscure Islamic extremist groups—over US policy in the Gulf.

Government Response

Tunisian and Algerian officials have followed widely divergent strategies—achieving varying degrees of success—in dealing with the rise of fundamentalism. In Algeria, President Bendjedid's commitment to

[Redacted]

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democratization has created the possibility of a fundamentalist-run national government and accelerated the discrediting of the long-dominant National Liberation Front.

[Redacted]

In dealing with the Gulf crisis, North African leaders have adopted policies that conform with public opinion in part to lower the risk of fundamentalist-inspired agitation. Tunisia's President Ben Ali initially took a strong public position against foreign intervention in the Gulf out of concern for a fundamentalist-inspired popular backlash and to throw fundamentalist critics off

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guard. Algeria's neutral public stand on the Gulf crisis also was designed to show sensitivity to public opinion—social tensions over economic hardships have been high in recent months—and to prevent the Islamic Salvation Front from making the Gulf crisis a campaign issue during the national legislative election scheduled for early 1991. [REDACTED] b3

Prospects

We believe the divergence of views among leaders of mainstream fundamentalist movements will prevent them from challenging North African regimes over the Gulf crisis in the near term. The growing political influence of fundamentalist groups has brought to the fore ideological differences that will hamper their effectiveness. In the absence of hostilities, mainstream Islamic fundamentalist leaders are likely to focus on key

domestic issues—such as the impending election in Algeria and legal status for Tunisia's fundamentalists—to avoid choosing between their pro-Iraqi constituencies and Gulf benefactors. (S NF)

Islamic fundamentalist leaders will look for opportunities to press their domestic political and ideological agendas. Should war break out, they would undoubtedly abandon ties to the Gulf states to exploit popular sentiment in the unlikely event their governments adopted policies that deviated significantly from public opinion, such as sending troops to the multinational force. US personnel would face a serious threat of violence from fundamentalist extremists and an angry population in Algeria and, to a lesser extent, Tunisia. [REDACTED] b3 b3

Morocco's Fundamentalists: New Opportunities, but Still No Challenge to the Regime


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Islamic fundamentalists in Morocco oppose King Hassan's support for Saudi Arabia and the United States in the Gulf crisis, but they are too small and disorganized to challenge the monarch directly. Even if a major Gulf war erupts, Hassan should be able to continue to use his security services, personal standing, and religious appeals to keep fundamentalist opposition off balance. Fundamentalist groups will try to exploit the popular mood—which favors Iraq—to expand their following and influence in Moroccan society, but they are unlikely to have much success until they develop a more dynamic leadership. Over the long term a severe economic downturn would help their prospects.


Fundamentalist Issues and Groups

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
Islamic fundamentalist groups are attracting increasing support from secular-minded Moroccans disgruntled with Hassan's handling of social and economic problems and the royal family's ostentatious lifestyle.



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How Hassan Copes

The government-supported religious establishment, which rarely criticizes Hassan, appears divided on the Gulf crisis. An "independent" group of nonestablishment Moroccan clerics criticized Saudi Arabia for seeking the assistance of non-Muslims and argued that the multinational forces in the Gulf represent the "continuation of the Western crusade against Islam."

Hassan generally fends off challenges from fundamentalist groups by using a carrot-and-stick approach—co-opting religious leaders through palace patronage, paying great outward respect to Islam, and using Morocco's security services to intimidate religious extremists. We believe he uses effectively the symbols and ceremonies of his spiritual and political heritage to control the spread of political Islam. Hassan, as a

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descendant of Muhammad, serves as spiritual as well as secular leader and holds the title of "Commander of the Faithful." [REDACTED] b3

In dealing with the fallout from the Gulf crisis, Hassan has countered Saddam's popular appeal in Morocco by softening his initially strong support for the Gulf states and playing to public opinion. As part of this effort, Hassan has quoted liberally from the Koran, minimized the role of Moroccan troops sent to serve with the multinational force, and adopted a conciliatory tone toward Baghdad. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Hassan also was host to an Islamic conference beginning in late August that included such fundamentalist leaders as Rachid al-Ghannouchi from Tunisia and Abbasi Madani of Algeria to burnish his Islamic credentials and to co-opt Islamic fundamentalists across the Maghreb. [REDACTED]

Prospects

Islamic extremists in Morocco are too divided and disorganized to threaten Hassan's regime for at least the

near term. Other religious leaders in the country are a relatively docile and conservative group. They lack known political ambitions and are unlikely to act against the King over his Gulf policy. Hassan, however, will watch for signs of social stress and will instruct his security services to hold opposition activity in check. As long as he employs an Arab League cover, we believe he can successfully balance his support for US policy in the Gulf with his need to stay in step with Moroccan public opinion. [REDACTED] b3

Over the longer term Islamic fundamentalists could mount a serious challenge to the monarchy, particularly if they develop a more dynamic leadership and if the domestic economy runs into more trouble. Kindred groups in North Africa—such as An-Nahda in Tunisia and the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria, both of which are seeking to challenge the authority and legitimacy of secular regimes—probably would encourage fundamentalist activities in Morocco. [REDACTED] b3

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Near East and
South Asia Review

An Islamic Glossary

Caliph. Successor to Muhammad as head of the ummah, or Islamic community. The title implies religious and political suzerainty over all Muslim peoples, but the position, last held by the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, is now defunct. Some Muslim fundamentalists call for restoration of the caliphate.

Fatwa. A formal legal decision or opinion issued by a prestigious mufti in response to questions from officials, judges, or private individuals on a point of Islamic law.

Imam. Leader of mosque prayers or, in some cases, the leader of a Muslim community. Among Sunni Muslims, any renowned religious scholar or authority might be called imam. Mainstream Shias identify 12 historic imams in the line of succession to Muhammad as the legitimate leaders of the Muslim community with special powers of knowledge and revelation.

Jihad (literally "striving in the way of God"). The daily moral "struggle" expected of any good Muslim. It may also designate a "holy" or "just" war that may be waged against unbelievers and may or may not involve military action. Most Islamic religious authorities assert that jihad in this sense can be undertaken only as a defensive measure. Radical fundamentalists raise jihad to the status of a pillar of Islam, equivalent to the five pillars enjoined on all Muslims—profession of faith, daily prayer, fasting, alms giving, and pilgrimage. Some mainstream religious authorities denounce the assertion of jihad as a sixth pillar of Islam as heresy.

Mufti. A learned exponent of Islamic religious law who is roughly equivalent to the canon lawyer of some Christian denominations.

Sharia (literally "the path leading to the watering place"). The Islamic religious law that historically has served as the civil law of Muslim communities. Based on the Koran and the Sunnah, it encompasses every aspect of a Muslim's spiritual, physical, social, economic, and political life. The legal systems of most Muslim countries today are based on Western legal codes dating from the colonial period, with sharia largely relegated to family law. Fundamentalists press for full implementation of sharia as the basis for the legal systems of all Muslim countries.


Shaykh (literally "old man"). An honorific title applied to a prestigious religious leader or scholar as well as to a tribal chief.

Shia Islam. Shia Islam is based on the belief that the legitimate leadership of the Islamic community rests exclusively among the descendants of Muhammad's son-in-law Ali, the fourth Imam. Shias are heterodox, and over time disputes over the line of succession and doctrine spurred the formation of many subsects—the Zaydis of Yemen, the Ismailis of Pakistan and East Africa, the Bahais of Iran, and the Alawites and Druze of the Levant—that espouse highly diverse and esoteric doctrines. Most Shias belong to the mainstream Ithna

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