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
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THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

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THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

SUMMARY

Because of South Africa's strategic position, its membership in the British Commonwealth, and the world-wide sensitiveness to the racial issues which dominate its domestic scene, the partisan politics of the Union's small white electorate take on an international significance.

The coalition Government headed by Dr. Malan, which replaced the Smuts Government in an electoral upset last May, holds power by a narrow parliamentary margin. Primarily it represents the Afrikaans-speaking element, a group in which isolationism and anti-British feelings are still very strong; but it must attract some support from the English-speaking element to retain power. Malan has sought a solution for this difficulty in two major unifying policies: (a) stricter segregation of the various non-European races (a program summed up in the word *apartheid*); and (b) a belligerent South African nationalism displayed chiefly in the forum provided by the UN. In spite of a threatened split with Finance Minister Havenga and the Afrikaner Party over the constitutional means of implementing the Government racial policy, Malan has found both these issues politically popular and has forced Smuts' Opposition to yield some ground on both.

The issues which unite white South Africans are among those which divide the world. Racial tensions, already on the rise throughout Africa, have been further heightened by Malan's repressive policy. Local Communists have begun to exploit this, and although their threat to the Union is not immediate, it is potentially serious, for the tensions are real, and the whites are outnumbered four to one.

In the wider field of international affairs South African intransigence on the racial issue and on the control of colonial areas has provoked criticism from non-Soviet as well as from Soviet sources, and has made the country something of a propaganda liability to the US and the Western bloc.

Note: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Navy, and the Air Force have concurred in this report; the Intelligence Division, Department of the Army, had no comment. The information herein is of 19 January 1949.

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THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

1. THE IMPORTANCE OF SOUTH AFRICA TO THE UNITED STATES.

The importance of the Union of South Africa to the United States is in the first instance a consequence of its geographical position. It is the only independent state of European traditions and of substantial power and stability on the African continent; south of the Equator it is the only African state of consequence. It is therefore capable of exerting over a very large and important area an influence greater than the intrinsic power of the nation would otherwise justify. The Union can contribute to order and stability in the whole of Africa, or it can follow policies which will tend to upset the precarious social balance of the continent.

Strategically, the Union is in the broadest sense a major stronghold in the southern hemisphere, but its most useful functions are as a naval base and a way-station on the line of communications to the East. World War II showed how important the Cape route could be; it likewise showed the industrial potential of the Union, which in large part furnished the equipment for the 80,000 South Africans who fought abroad. South Africa currently produces twelve of the twenty-three strategic minerals listed by the National Security Resources Board as so critical that stock-piling is deemed essential; it also possesses uranium deposits.

Politically, the Union's orientation is unquestionably toward the West. More immediately significant is South Africa's influence on the position of Great Britain, the principal ally of the United States. The power with which the UK can speak in Europe and in the world has been for generations past a result in part of its relationship to the Dominions and overseas dependencies. Insofar as South Africa, a member of the Commonwealth, strengthens that relationship, the position of the United States is also strengthened; conversely, South African tendencies to weaken Commonwealth ties also tend to weaken the position of both the UK and the US.

2. DOMINANT FACTORS IN SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICS.

The primary political fact about South Africa is the existence of a social structure in which two and a third million Europeans make up the effective citizenry of the country, and nine million non-Europeans provide the semi-skilled and unskilled labor. These non-Europeans are of various races and cultural levels, ranging from that of primitive tribal societies to a much higher standard. They include Bushman, Hottentots, various mixed breeds, Indians, Malays, and Bantu tribesmen, the so-called Kaffirs. That all real power should be retained in white hands is a principle on which virtually all the European inhabitants agree, but they differ on the method of doing so concurrently with the requirements of industrialization, and on the concessions which should be granted non-Europeans on humanitarian grounds.

Within the European community the usual forces and conventions of Western democracy operate. The distribution of political power is, however, complicated by the

white population's division into an Afrikaans-speaking group,* of mainly Dutch ancestry, which makes up about 60 percent of the Europeans, and an English-speaking group which makes up the remainder. A large part of this Afrikaner population is rural, much under the influence of the intensely conservative Dutch Reformed Church, and prone to look back nostalgically to the pioneering days of its Boer ancestors. Much of the British element stems from people attracted to South Africa by the late 19th century gold mining boom, and it is still concentrated in industry and commerce. The Afrikaners' rankling sense of cultural—and, to some extent, economic—inferiority is well illustrated in the *Broederbond*, a semi-secret society founded a quarter of a century ago to establish the supremacy of Afrikaner culture, and now an important political force.

Despite these divisive tendencies the two linguistic groups are held together in one polity by the theory of equal status for the two cultures and their mutually tolerated separate development, by the common interest in white supremacy, and by a growing feeling of South African nationalism. On such an issue as the Union's title to the former German territory of South West Africa, for example, people respond as South Africans, not as Afrikaners or Britishers. Differences on economic questions do not deeply divide the white community, which has in general a comparatively high standard of living. The importance for the whole country's economy of the largely British-controlled gold mining industry is recognized by all responsible political leaders; conversely, much of the industrial community is, for the sake of white supremacy, willing to subsidize forms of agricultural life and certain labor monopolies which are economically inefficient. Even in the labor movement there is no strong pressure for socialism as such. And despite the preeminence of historic loyalties in the Union's political life, the parliamentary groupings of Government and Opposition have never quite followed simple linguistic lines. As in most political democracies, there has been in the past a persistent tendency for parties having acquired power (usually through coalition) to forget the more violent passages in their campaign oratory, and to govern with a moderation which respects both the existing institutions of the country and the rights of opposing parties.

3. THE PRESENT PARTY SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA.

The reins of government are at present held by an uneasy coalition of the Nationalist Party, led by Prime Minister D. F. Malan, and the Afrikaner Party, led by Finance Minister N. C. Havenga. This situation derives from the general election of 26 May 1948, in which, to outside observers' and their own surprise, the alliance won a narrow victory over General Smuts' United Party and the Labour Party. General Smuts had been Prime Minister since 1939 (since the 1943 election with a large majority) and a general dissatisfaction of the electorate with the continuation of wartime shortages

* "Afrikaans" is the language developed from seventeenth century Dutch; "Afrikaners" (sometimes written "Afrikanders") are white South Africans having Afrikaans as their primary tongue, though many of them also speak English. The term "Afrikaner" also applies to the political party led by N. C. Havenga.

and with the increasing administrative laxness of his Government is considered to have had much to do with his defeat. The United Party actually received more popular votes than the Nationalist and Afrikaner Parties combined, but since rural constituencies in South Africa normally contain fewer voters than urban ones, this was insufficient for parliamentary control. Dr. Malan took office with 70 seats in the House of Assembly held by his own Nationalist Party and 9 by the Afrikaner Party; the United Party opposing him held 65 seats and its ally, the Labour Party, 6; but Malan's working majority was cut down to the narrow margin of 4 by various inescapable technicalities. These figures did not change during the special session of Parliament, which ran from early August to the beginning of October, and still obtained on the eve of the regular session scheduled to open 21 January.

The Nationalist Party has been for years past the main political expression of the Afrikaners who resent the British and the Commonwealth connection, looking forward instead to the eventual goal of an Afrikaans-speaking republic with a minimum of ties to the outside world. Some of the "wild men" in the present Cabinet—men such as J. G. Strydom, Minister of Lands, and C. P. Swart, Minister of Justice—continue to express this point of view openly; but Prime Minister Malan, whose own political past is not unlike theirs, has in the last year or two been acting on the assumption that the Nationalists must attract some English-speaking voters in order to achieve and retain power. He has accordingly been muffling the anti-British note and trying, in effect, to change the context of the Party's title from Afrikaner Nationalist to South African Nationalist. A more potent aspect of his electoral appeal—emphasized both during the campaign and since—consists in rousing antagonisms against the non-European races.

The Afrikaner Party, though possessing only 9 seats, holds the balance of power in the present House of Assembly. Formed in 1940 as a split from the Nationalist Party, it is a grouping explicable more on historical than on logical grounds. Its leader and only Cabinet member, Finance Minister Havenga, is widely respected for integrity and competence, and is a believer in the Hertzog concept of "parallel development," or the co-existence of the British and Afrikaner elements in the community with their differences unresolved but mutually tolerated. In a sense, the Afrikaner Party has been put together on the same principle, for it contains within it both disgruntled former adherents of Smuts' United Party and a large group of the most extreme and Nazi-like Afrikaner nationalists. The latter are to be found mainly in the *Ossewa Brandwag*, an organization on paramilitary lines founded a decade ago in connection with the centenary celebrations of the Great Trek and now estimated to contain 50,000 members under its "Commandant-General," J. F. J. van Rensburg. Malan has refused to let the *O.B.* become affiliated with the Nationalist Party, partly on the ground that there is no proper place in a parliamentary state for an organization of its totalitarian tendencies, partly because of personal antagonism between him and van Rensburg. Though the Afrikaner Party is jealous of its separate organization, its acceptance of the Nationalists' racial policy makes it a natural ally of that party at present.

The United Party, led by the internationally famous Field Marshal J. C. Smuts, is the second large party on the political scene, currently holding 65 seats in the Assembly to the Nationalists' 70. It represents, though not always wholeheartedly, the liberal tradition in South African politics—cooperation between British and Afrikaner elements on a basis of equality, maintenance of Commonwealth ties (but with a jealous regard for South African autonomy), and a faintly progressive policy of gradual improvement in the status of the non-European races. At present, however, it is troubled by internal dissension, particularly on the racial issue, between an avowedly liberal minority, leaderless since the sudden death of J. H. Hofmeyr in December 1948, and a conservative majority which holds many of the same views as the moderate elements in the Nationalist and Afrikaner Parties. The personal prestige of the 78-year-old Smuts has so far prevented an open split but has not prevented a widespread conviction on the part of the electorate that the Party currently lacks a positive program. The UP is also deficient in capable secondary leadership and, for a party claiming to be a reconciling instrument between British and Afrikaner elements, is surprisingly lacking in speakers able to address the electorate in both languages, less than a fifth of its present House of Assembly membership being reckoned fully bilingual.

The Labour Party is a small and not very homogeneous group representing primarily the interests of urban middle-class intellectuals and English-speaking workers in the mining and industrial districts of the Transvaal. Though formally committed to a program of state socialism, it is interested primarily in maintaining high standards of pay and working conditions for skilled workers—which means, in effect, restricting the desirable jobs to white workers—and in various social welfare measures. Its natural alliance is in most respects with the more progressive wing of the United Party, but there is an element which sympathizes somewhat with the Nationalists' racial policy.

The Communist Party for the first time in South African history sent to the House of Assembly in November 1948 a representative for one of the three native constituencies. The Party's effective political influence, however, is still negligible. In part because of the racial situation, all European groups represented in Parliament are hostile to Communism, domestically and internationally. White Communists are to be numbered in hundreds only, and few of these have any influence in the labor movement or in any other politically significant spot. Communist efforts to organize the natives and mixed breeds have so far had little apparent success, despite the Party's recent electoral victory—which, indeed, was a reflection of rising racial tensions generally and to some extent of local conditions, rather than of solid organization and indoctrination. About a quarter of the politically conscious Indians are said to be under Communist influence; but the Durban riots of January 1949 forcibly demonstrated the bad blood existing between the Indian and native communities.

During his first six months of office, Prime Minister Malan pursued with some success a basic tactic of appeasing his own extremists without disturbing moderate opinion sufficiently to rally it to the Opposition. He immediately lifted the ban on civil servants belonging to the *Broederbond* and *Ossewa Brandwag*, which the Smuts

Government had stigmatized as subversive organizations during the war. He stopped governmental assistance to immigration from the UK, which dashed the hopes of moderate South Africans that such immigration would in time redress the electoral balance between themselves and the extremist Afrikaners. On the other hand, most of his Cabinet appointees were able men and some were, for Nationalists, men of moderate political views; his initial radio address to the nation had a reassuring tone; and the tax cuts provided in Havenga's first budget were distributed without apparent attempt to favor one element of the white community over another. But these were relatively minor questions. Two important issues were with some skill given major emphasis by Malan: the first was racial policy, the second international affairs.

4. THE RACIAL ISSUE.

The racial situation in South Africa is dominated by two basic factors: the small number of the Europeans (outnumbered four to one) and the diversity of the non-Europeans. The eight million natives spring from many different tribes; some live in the native reserves almost as primitively as their ancestors, others live in modern slums on the fringes of the industrial towns, and still others leave their families on the reserves and live in huge compounds attached to the mines. A quarter of a million Indians, mainly in Natal, cling to their own culture but demand equal political and economic status with the whites. Nearly a million mixed breeds ("Cape coloureds"), mainly in the Cape Province, aspire to the standards of European civilization. In a society having little common denominator but geography, and recently plagued by the dislocations of rapid industrialization and wartime shortages, the racial question inevitably bulks large and rouses strong emotions.

The present Government's answer is known as *apartheid*, a term for which no precise and generally accepted definition exists. The Afrikaans word means approximately "segregation," but all important political groups advocate an extent of racial segregation greater than that obtaining anywhere in the US. Minister of Native Affairs Jansen, who is one of the moderates of the Nationalist Party, has since the May 1948 election defined *apartheid* as meaning the retention of the natives as much as possible in a tribalized state on the native reserves, allowing outside the reserves only those necessary to white economic life, and strictly controlling the conditions under which these natives may enter urban areas to accept employment. He denies that it means complete separation of the black and white communities. Before the election, however, the campaign oratory of the Nationalist Party extremists lent considerable credence to the United Party charge that *apartheid* meant not merely the removal of certain political and economic privileges from the natives and other non-Europeans, but the wholesale return of the former to the already crowded native reserves. The United Party's own racial policy called for a recognition of the fact that over half of the natives already live outside the reserves and are necessary to the nation's economy, and insisted that the natives could not make their full contribution to the Union's economic life under an unsatisfactory system of migrant labor whereby they moved back and forth between the reserves and the farms, mines, and factories depend-

ing on their labor. The United Party called instead for maintenance of the present limited rights of the non-European races and for certain welfare measures to integrate them more effectively in the country's industrialization program.

The policy of *apartheid*, in the general sense of stricter segregation for all non-European races, has so far had for the electorate a focus and a positive appeal entirely lacking in the United Party racial program. The Government has implemented it chiefly by closing the gap between existing regulations and actual administrative practice. Pass laws restricting the movement of natives have been tightened, native employment has been more strictly controlled, and the Government offices concerned have tended to adopt a "tough" attitude toward individual cases. The status of the "Cape coloured" has been attacked by a new ordinance forbidding them for the first time to ride in the "European" coaches in the commuting trains in the Cape Town area. A 1946 act providing a limited franchise for the Indians was repealed by the August session of Parliament in a shrewd tactical move to embarrass the United Party representatives from Natal, where the Indians are concentrated and particularly unpopular. All of these moves seemed to strengthen the Government's political position.

In announcing an intention to deprive the natives of their few representatives in Parliament and to remove the "Cape coloured" from the common electoral rolls, Malan raised a deeper constitutional question. The voting rights of persons of color in Cape Province were specifically protected, by one of the "entrenched clauses" of the British South Africa Act of 1909, from alteration by less than a two-thirds vote; and when Malan, referring to South Africa's complete legislative autonomy under the subsequent Statute of Westminster, spoke of altering these voting rights by simple majority vote, he caused widespread concern for the permanence and stability of South Africa's political institutions. The Opposition immediately gave expression to this concern; and, more seriously for Malan, his colleague Havenga expressed a similar sentiment a few months later, thus threatening a fatal break in the Government coalition. Attack was trained, however, on the method rather than the substance of the proposition; and the more extreme Nationalist Party leaders seem confident that the racial issue will be popular enough to override the constitutional one if a general election is held on the subject.

5. SOUTH AFRICAN EXTERNAL RELATIONS.

On many aspects of South African external relations all politically important South Africans agree. All are insistent that the Union's independent status be maintained beyond question. All desire friendly relations with the US. All are hostile to the USSR. Nearly all recognize that history and economics have irrevocably established a special relationship between the Union and the UK.

Where they differ is on the degree of South African participation in international affairs and the nature of the special relationship to the UK. Isolationism and republicanism, though currently played down for political reasons, are still very strong. The most anti-Soviet of Afrikaners do not necessarily favor an active role for South Africa in the event of a war between the Soviet Union and the West; friendliness toward the

US does not always imply willingness to follow US leadership or advice on accepting UN commitments; recognition of the inevitability of some UK connection does not mean genuine acceptance of the present one. Starting with Malan himself, most of the present Cabinet members are men whose aim, to judge from their past records, is an Afrikaner-directed republic with only such ties to the UK as are minimally necessary and obviously in South Africa's self-interest. They are most of them aware, however, that General Smuts has an appeal to part of the electorate when he stresses the advantages of a strong British Commonwealth, and that many South Africans less pro-British than Smuts still look with favor on the maintenance of something like the present relationship, either from sentiment or from their own appraisal of South Africa's long-term interests. It is this intermediate body of opinion that Malan seems variously trying to conciliate, confuse and—eventually—win over.

In this endeavor Malan has been astute enough, with some exceptions, to choose his specific moves so that it is hard for the United Party to oppose them without also appearing to oppose the national self-interest. The general tactic seems to be to combine expressions of friendliness toward the UK with indirect suggestions that South Africa's relations with the UK are essentially the same as with any other state, and that South Africa recognizes no obligations deriving purely from membership in the Commonwealth. At the London Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, for example, the Union's representative surprised British public opinion by the generally cooperative nature of his public utterances. He was, however, careful to add that he was there only in the cause of South African self-interest; he uttered a tactless reminder that the UK now needs friends and should act accordingly; and he is reported to have taken the line in conference that South Africa was willing to participate only in such consultations as directly involved its own interests. The last point ratified Malan's stated preference, expressed on assuming office, for handling Commonwealth relations through "separate contacts between the individual members of the Commonwealth, rather than through discussions at joint and inclusive conferences."

In the area of defense cooperation with the UK, the Malan Government has followed a similar course, though not so successfully. In its early weeks of office the Government announced that the traditional reliance on UK assistance for much of the higher training of the armed forces had not been in South Africa's best interests and proceeded to alter a number of these arrangements (decreeing even that training manuals must be written in Afrikaans), simultaneously conducting a purge of pro-British senior officers from their key positions. By October, however, the Government had evidently found that these moves both harmed military efficiency and gave the Opposition a political issue to exploit in Parliament. Some of the canceled training arrangements were then restored and Malan made the gesture of sending a few airmen to the UK to assist in the Berlin air lift.

The other important area of South Africa's present external relations lies in the UN. On two questions in particular the Union has been under attack there since 1946: its treatment of the Indian minority in South Africa, and its refusal to submit a trusteeship agreement to cover its administration of the former German colony of South West

Africa, which was handed over to the Union as a League of Nations mandate after World War I. On both these issues South African nationalism has permitted no real difference of policy between the Malan Government and its predecessor. But Smuts was sensitive to world opinion and anxious to conciliate it by making occasional gestures toward negotiating with the Indian Government over the status of Indians in the Union as requested by a General Assembly motion, and by quietly submitting to the UN Secretariat factual reports on South West Africa like those which would have been required under a trusteeship agreement. The present Government, on the other hand, has made a point of publicly defending the Union against "interference." South African Delegate Louw's refractory attitude at the 1948 Paris General Assembly seems to have made a strong appeal to national feeling at home.

On the Natal Indians Malan has simply announced that the Government policy is repatriation and that he would insist on this being the primary topic of any discussion with the Indian Government on the matter. On South West Africa he submitted in early June the long report prepared under the Smuts Government in reply to UN's questionnaire, but in mid-November stated bluntly that South Africa would rather leave UN than submit the territory to trusteeship, adding that the people of South West Africa had apparently no desire to be ruled "by the United Nations with its Communist influence." In the meantime Malan has gone ahead with measures originally initiated by Smuts to give South West Africa representation in the Union Parliament. Since the new representatives would mostly be Nationalist Party members, such a development would also have the result of increasing Malan's slim parliamentary majority. In its political effects at home, therefore, Malan's handling of UN disputes has so far been conspicuously successful.

In world opinion, however, and particularly in the General Assembly, the Union has put itself in an unfavorable light on two issues—race discrimination and the exploitation of colonial areas—which the Soviet bloc has been assiduous in exploiting for propaganda purposes, and on which many non-Soviet nations—both in Asia and Latin America—feel deeply. Some of this unfavorable light, furthermore, is likely to be reflected on the US because of its close alignment with South Africa in various other respects.

6. PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS.

The elements of strength in the Malan Government's present position consist partly in the strong popular appeal of its racial policy and its foreign policy, partly in the disorganized state of the Opposition. Smuts has implicitly recognized the Nationalists' advantage on the two political issues by attempting since the May election to make the United Party seem somewhat more nationalistic and somewhat less liberal on racial questions. He has also been attempting to revitalize the organization of the United Party and has succeeded in checking its tendency to split into liberal and conservative factions; but the improvement in the party machinery still has a long way to go before the UP can rival the Nationalist Party in this respect. In the one by-election held so far—a mid-November contest in a safe Nationalist seat—the Nationalists even increased the large majority won by a popular candidate at the general election.

The main element of weakness in the Government's position is the fact that it is a coalition government and that one part of the coalition—the small but essential Afrikaner Party—is showing signs of parting company with the rest on the constitutional issue of native representation and on the distribution of power within the coalition. A minor element of weakness is the increasing payments deficit with dollar areas, which forced the imposition in early November of limited import controls and naturally caused some shortages, price increases, and patches of unemployment. The inevitability of such controls had for some time been recognized by responsible opinion and the Opposition did not make a political issue of their imposition; but the depletion of the Union's reserves of gold and hard currency continues, and Smuts has already started trying to pin the label of "a depression Government" on the Cabinet. Should serious economic difficulties ensue, the Opposition might then effectively exploit the situation with the argument that the Government's political behavior had shaken the confidence of businessmen at home and abroad.

The growing rift between Malan and Havenga is, however, the more immediate threat. With the known antagonism between Malan and the Afrikaner Party's second most powerful figure, van Rensburg, the alliance has always been an uneasy one. From the very beginning of the Government Havenga consistently refused overtures for closer relations between his party and the Nationalists; and in early December he indicated publicly that the two parties were unable to reach agreement on the allocation of seats for contesting the provincial elections in March. A few days earlier Havenga had announced in a major speech that he would oppose any Government effort to reduce the political status of "coloureds" and natives by a simple majority vote in the Union Parliament, rather than by the two-thirds vote required by the South Africa Act for the alteration of its "entrenched clauses."

Havenga's political bargaining position is at present a strong one. Generally regarded in South Africa as a man of prime-ministerial calibre, and holding with his party's nine votes the balance of power in the present Parliament, he is now on record as favoring in general the Nationalists' popular racial policy but opposing the particular implementation of it which has roused the fears of the British element that their status also might be altered by mere majority vote. His stand on this important issue, which was taken only after some months of consideration, is reported already to be winning him support in Natal, where much of the British element favors a repressive racial policy because of the Indians. His chances of reaching an accord with Smuts' United Party were, moreover, fortuitously increased by the death on 3 December of J. C. Hofmeyr, the Party's liberal leader who most obviously stood in the way of any such deal.

As Parliament gathered for the session opening on 21 January, political developments seemed destined to take one of the three following lines:

- (1) Appeasement of Havenga by Malan—presumably at the price of greater influence within the Government for the Afrikaner Party—at least until the provincial elections in March provide a test of public sentiment. This would presumably mean continuation of the Government's present program except for the particular imple-

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mentation of racial policy to which Havenga has publicly objected. Continued Afrikaner collaboration could conceivably, however, be had on even cheaper terms.

(2) Formation of a new coalition Government by the United Party, the Afrikaner Party and the Labour Party—a Government whose parliamentary majority would be nearly as slim as the present one's and whose very formation Malan could almost certainly prevent by calling a general election instead of resigning.

(3) Calling of another general election, to take place after certain essential matters such as appropriations have been attended to by Parliament. Since Malan was expected to call a general election in any case, if the Nationalist candidates did well in the March provincial elections, and since many Nationalists feel confident of winning a clear majority on their popular racial policy of *apartheid*, there will be strong pressure within the Party to follow this course. Noting that the United Party is still in a disorganized state, the pro-election Nationalists can plausibly argue that an election now might give them undisputed power for five years, and at worst would merely replace their Government with a Smuts-Havenga coalition possessing even more elements of instability than the present one.

Exact prediction is impossible; but the fact that the pre-session cabinet meeting scheduled for 12 January passed without an open split in the Government makes the first line of development seem the most likely. Whatever Government emerges in the next few months, however, will probably be more inclined to a repressive racial policy at home and a strident nationalism abroad than was the Smuts Government which fell in May 1948. Smuts himself has since that election shown some tendency to adopt the political coloring of his opponents on these issues, and with Hofmeyr dead, the liberal wing of the United Party will be much less able to make its influence felt in party conclaves. In coalition with the Afrikaner Party and thus with the ultra-nationalist *Ossewa Brandwag*, the United Party would be even less inclined to a liberal program.

7. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE US.

The implications for the US international position of the South African political situation lie less in the success or failure of the Malan Government—or of a similar successor—in maintaining itself in power than in the means currently being adopted by that Government to do so. In its short-term electoral results the general racial policy of *apartheid* seems quite likely to be a conspicuous success; but the issue that unites white South Africans is also one that divides the world. As the Gold Coast riots of last winter demonstrated, black-white antagonisms are on the rise not only in the Union but in colonial Africa generally; and the problem is one which affects the US as well as the UK, since the US's extensive political and economic responsibilities give it a stake in stability almost everywhere in the world. Furthermore, as is seen in the aggressive and persistent way with which the Indian Government has concerned itself with the status of the Indian minority in the Union, South African racial policy takes on symbolic values for colored peoples in other continents as well. This situation has been reflected in statements at UN and was again illustrated in connection with the serious rioting around Durban in mid-January 1949 when smouldering native resent-

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ments broke out in mob violence directed against the Indians, who are to a large extent the retail traders of the area, but not against the whites. The initial reaction of the Indian Government, however, was to blame the racial policy of the Malan Government.

The danger of the Communists' exploiting *apartheid* within South Africa may be still more serious, though less immediate. There is no reason to suspect any Communist handiwork in the Durban outbreaks; but the mere fact that the outbreaks occurred is only the most recent example of a deterioration in racial relations which has been taking place for the past decade, has been accentuated under the Malan Government, and seems destined to continue under *apartheid*. The genuineness of many of the native grievances provides an excellent opportunity for Communist agitation, as was demonstrated in November 1948 by the Communists' success in winning by a large majority one of the three native constituencies of the Cape Province. Since that election, a further increase of Communist influence among the natives has been reported. Though the failure of the natives up to now to develop any effective indigenous leadership or to come together in trade unions indicates that the political danger point is still some distance off, continued Communist failure to acquire significant influence can by no means be assumed.

Finally, the effects of the chauvinistic nationalism fostered by the Malan Government may be indirectly felt by the US in two ways. One is through its possible weakening of the British Commonwealth as a stabilizing force in the world. The other is through the effects in the UN of South African intransigence on the issues of race discrimination and colonialism. Because of the association of the Union with the US and the "Western Bloc", Soviet propaganda can the more effectively use these issues in its attacks on the Western Powers; and Asian or Latin American resentment at the Union on these counts may on occasion make more difficult the task of organizing common action for US objectives.

South Africans' pride in their new nationhood is such as to make them unusually sensitive and obstinate when confronted with direct criticism of their domestic institutions such as has recently appeared in various American periodicals. They do, however, possess an acute sense of immediate national self-interest and are therefore subject to indirect governmental pressure, particularly in the economic sphere. The Malan Government, for example, soon shifted its ground on defense cooperation with the UK when it found that military self-sufficiency was more difficult than anticipated and that the US seemed to receive more pressing demands than South Africa's for assistance. The US opportunity for indirect pressure is, of course, the wider because of the Union's complete lack of any international alternative to alignment with the US and the UK.

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