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- Even without the 9,600 kilometers from Siberian gas fields to Western Europe, their five-year plan calls for them to build 15,000 kilometers of gas pipeline to meet their own energy needs. For them to produce in the USSR the equipment needed for these pipelines and domestic energy production, given likely trends in production of naval ships, ground force weapons, and aircraft engines, the Soviets would be forced to divert investment from other sectors and cope with important additional costs, delays, and stringencies. These could substantially increase the Soviets' overall economic problems and impose significant costs and difficulties in maintaining the pace of their military buildup.

These factors could induce the Soviets to at least reduce the growth of military spending (if not cut it in absolute terms).

- They would not necessarily result in a reduction in Soviet military capabilities. Soviet defense spending is now so high (Table A-3) that with reduced growth (or indeed with no growth at all) substantial modernization of the armed forces as a whole would continue.
- They could, however, require the Soviets to curtail or stretch out selected weapon programs and perhaps make them more forthcoming in arms control negotiations.

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