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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
Washington, D.C.

March 23, 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD:

SUBJECT: Plan for Psychological Exploitation of Stalin's Death.

The attached revised draft containing the latest changes is circulated for vote-slip action at your earliest convenience, in accordance with the Board's instructions of March 19.

George A. Morgan
George A. Morgan,
Acting Director.

Enclosure:

FSB D-40, March 20, 1953,
Copy 15

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

Date JUN 1999

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PLAN FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLOITATION OF STALIN'S DEATH

PART I INTRODUCTION

1. Problem

a. The problem is to devise a plan of psychological operations as one part of a comprehensive ~~and decisive~~ program for the exploitation of Stalin's death and the transfer of power to new hands in order to make real progress toward our national objectives.

b. No once-for-all psychological plan is possible in the present situation. Psychological operations, like other actions, must be capable of rapid and flexible adjustment to changes in the situation. Therefore, a strong, high-level, continuing interdepartmental working group should be especially constituted to keep psychological plans and operations under continuous review and in harmony with national policy.

2. Basic Considerations

a. Psychological operations by themselves cannot have sufficient impact on the Soviet system to produce those changes which we would regard as real progress toward our national objectives. They can only contribute to the success of diplomatic, political, military, and economic actions taken by the United States Government, or aggravate stresses which emerge within the Soviet system itself. They should be fully geared into a comprehensive ~~and decisive~~ program for the exploitation of ~~Stalin's death~~ the situation in the Soviet Orbit created by the death of Stalin and installation in the USSR of a new regime.

b. It is beyond the scope of this paper to say what the elements of such a program should be. However, it has been essential to develop a plan for the exploitation of the situation in the Soviet Orbit created by the death of Stalin and installation in the USSR of a new regime.

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national policy. The assumptions adopted for the purposes of this paper are set forth in paragraph 3 below. If these assumptions are in error, the plan for psychological operations will have to be adjusted accordingly.

3. Assumptions

a. It is assumed that the fundamental objectives of the United States with respect to the Soviet system remain as stated in the relevant National Security Council papers, namely, NSC 20/4, NSC 68, NSC 114, and NSC 135. In essence, these fundamental objectives are:

(1) To bring about a retraction of Soviet power and influence from the satellites and Communist China and thus a reduction of Soviet power and influence in world affairs;

(2) to bring about a fundamental change in the nature of the Soviet system—which would be reflected above all in the conduct of international relations by the Soviet regime in a manner consistent with the spirit and purpose of the United Nations Charter.

b. It is assumed that the United States Government intends to exploit to the full the opportunities presented by Stalin's death and the difficulties inherent in the transfer of power to make progress toward these ends.

c. It is assumed that the United States Government will undertake a comprehensive ~~and decisive~~ program of action—involving whatever diplomatic, political, military, and economic measures are appropriate and are within our capabilities—to make real progress toward our national objectives and that this plan for psychological operations, as revised from time to time is part of this ~~passive-and~~ integrated campaign.

d. Finally, it is assumed that the ~~initial~~ major move in this national campaign will be a Presidential speech delivered at a time when it is likely to achieve maximum effect, outlining a United States program

for peace. This will be intended as a serious move which will, we hope, lead to serious negotiations for adjustment of these issues. It follows, therefore, that the move must be treated and built up as a serious effort on the part of the United States to make progress toward a peaceful world.

4. Psychological Estimate of the Situation*

a. It has long been estimated that one of the most promising opportunities to make real progress toward our national objectives with respect to the Soviet system would arise following the death of Stalin. The inescapable necessity of transferring power to new hands, no matter how careful the preparations for it, has created [a-time-of-~~crisis-for-the~~ Soviet-Union-and-the-Soviet-system-as-a-whole] difficulties and uncertainties for the Soviet Union and the Soviet system as a whole which may endure for some time and which may, in due course, result in a severe power struggle in the Soviet hierarchy. We should not be misled by the apparently smooth transfer of power. A despotism can be ruled in the long run only by a despot and history is strewn with unsuccessful efforts to replace a tyrant with a committee. There is a real question whether Malenkov (or anyone else) will be able to bring or maintain all of the power factors under his iron control as Stalin did.

b. Among the facts which have already emerged, the following are of particular significance in developing a program of psychological operations designed to support our national effort to make progress toward our objectives:

(1) The accession to power of the new regime has been executed in a dramatically rapid and apparently resolute manner. This development and the announced changes in governmental structure, indicate careful preparation and premeditation.

*This should be read in conjunction with the Special Intelligence Estimate of the situation (SI-39, March 12, 1953).

(2) The reorganization of the party and governmental apparatus is on lines almost identical to the organization employed during World War II. This points clearly to an effort to concentrate power in a manageably small number of hands and to present, both internally and externally, an impression of hardness and unity and continuity at the top.

(3) The following three features of the reorganization deserve special mention. First, it continues an effort, under way for some time, to strengthen its control over the military and to bid for its loyalty. Second, the recently criticized internal security apparatus has been consolidated and placed for all to see in the hands of the most experienced and ruthless policeman of them all--Beria. Third, there has been an extensive regrouping and consolidation of industrial and transportation and economic ministries, with control being placed in the hands of a few lieutenants.

(4) The initial pronouncements by the new regime stressed the leading role played by the Great Russian people. The funeral speeches emphasized the multinational character of the USSR. Thus the regime may fear that the non-Russian Republics as well as the satellite states are of doubtful reliability and may have to be held in line by increasingly tight measures of repression. The fact that Stalin was a Georgian and Malenkov is a Great Russian may have symbolic significance in this connection. However, the peoples of the Soviet Union are definitely not playing a major role in the situation.

(5) Beyond this, there is nothing at the present time which suggests a change, or the nature of a change if one is contemplated, in the conduct of foreign and domestic policies. Barring the drastic intensification of internal or external strains there appears little likelihood of such changes at an early date.

c. On the other hand, the very rapidity with which the transfer of power has been effected, the nature of this change, and the stringency of the controls that have been imposed, together with the speed with which Stalin is to be interred and the warnings against "disorder and panic" (an extraordinarily revealing quote from Pravda), suggest that nervousness and concern over the stability of the new regime are prevalent at the highest levels and that, as regards Malenkov particularly, the effort to consolidate both the power of the regime and his control over it is the overriding preoccupation.

d. It is probably safe to assume, therefore, that the regime hopes to avoid serious external difficulties until it has consolidated its power or unless a struggle for power develops in such a way that one aspirant or another sees an opportunity to advance his interests by pursuing an aggressive and adventurous course. However, it is also in the nature of such a new regime that it must display its hardness or, to state it negatively, that it must avoid any sign of weakness. On balance, therefore, it is concluded that:

- (1) the regime is unlikely to undertake any rash actions or dramatic new initiatives for some time.
- (2) the new rules are likely to be more "royalist than the King" in adhering rigidly for the time being to the policies laid down by Stalin.
- (3) the new rulers will react promptly, sharply, and perhaps even excessively to any external threats.

e. ~~The evidence available to date suggests that the regime may be particularly concerned about:~~ The new regime may be presumed to be concerned for some time with the problems of:

- (1) the loyalty and subservience of the satellite regimes.
- (2) relations with Communist China.

- (3) the loyalty of the army.
- (4) internal security.
- (5) the attitudes of minority nationalities in the USSR.
- (6) party control of government and police: close ties between party and people.

f. Regardless of its overt attitudes toward the outside world, the basic concern of the new regime and of Malenkov in particular is with the consolidation of the internal position. ~~✓ Serious friction within the regime over external issues is most likely to arise where such issues are too novel to be adequately covered by policies already established by Stalin.~~ ✓ Serious friction within the regime over external issues, though not probable in the near future, is likely to arise only in circumstances where such issues are too novel adequately to be covered by policies already established by Stalin.

5. Strategic Concept.

a. The plan for psychological operations must be drawn up within the context of a strategic concept. Although its formulation is beyond the scope of this paper, it has been necessary to outline the main features of a strategic concept as a basis for the psychological plan. If this concept is revised, the plan for psychological operations will have to be revised accordingly.

b. Aims. In accordance with our fundamental objectives and as the most promising ways of making real progress toward these objectives, our basic aims in the present situation are to use the opportunities presented by Stalin's death and the difficulties inherent in the transfer of power to new hands.

(1) To foster any and all divisive forces within the top hierarchy of the Kremlin with particular reference to the Malenkov-Beria-Molotov-Bulganin situation.

(2) To stimulate divisive forces between the Kremlin and the satellite governments including Communist China.

(3) To maximize the disaffection between the peoples of the Soviet Union and Malenkov.

(4) To maximize the division between the peoples of the satellites, including Communist China, and Malenkov.

(5) To maintain and increase unity between the governmental leaders of the free nations.

(6) To maintain and increase the unity between the peoples of the free nations.

(7) To follow through successfully in the defense building of the United States and the other free nations.

(8) To maintain and increase the unity between the peoples of the free nations.

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c. Assets.

(1) The greatest asset we have for all of these purposes is the dynamic effective personality and position of President Eisenhower in the United States.

(2) The second greatest asset is the diplomatic leadership we have in all international agencies, spearheaded by Secretary of State Dulles and U. N. Representative Lodge.

(3) The third greatest asset is our military potential, including atomic weapons with deterring force and consequent feeling of relative greater security on the part of those who associate with us.

(4) The fourth greatest asset is our economic strength with our tremendous production and our capacity to assist others.

d. Our greatest liabilities are:

(1) A natural tendency on the part of other free nations to resent United States top dog position.

(2) Difficulty in maintaining the impetus of defense build-up in the face of understanding desires for lower taxes, less military service, social security.

(3) Danger of attitude of complete dependence of other free nations upon United States defense and economic strength.

(4) Uneasiness of our associates as to our own long-term economic and political objectives.

(5) Our heritage of heavy debts and mistakes from previous years.

e. Methods.

(1) Main effort; strategy of choice. One of the most significant means of furthering the above aims is to confront the communist rulers with difficult major choices in a way which does not encourage them to close ranks, but which tends to isolate them and divide their counsels, while uniting humanity, especially the free world, with us. The Presidential speech assumed above, should serve this purpose.

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(2) Supporting efforts.

With respect to the communist world:

(a) We should [overlead] confront the untried regime with other stimuli apt to provoke internal arguments--e. g., occasions requiring decision, or failures leading to recrimination--but avoid threats or sabre-rattling.

(b) We should plague it with doubts--e. g., about reliability of key individuals and groups.

(c) We should foster internal antagonisms by other suitable means, such as fostering nationalistic feelings.

(d) We should combine "carrot" and "stick" both in direct support of the main effort and in executing the other supporting efforts. An essential feature of the strategy of choice is a "push-pull" situation, combining pressures and inducements which show the disadvantages of a choice contrary to our interests and the advantages of one which is favorable.

(e) Fluctuations in direction and emphasis (e.g., between carrot and stick) should be used as an added means of confusion except where steadiness of tactics is desirable for a special reason.

(f) Probing (see f(2) below).

With respect to the free world:

(a) The most promising ways of furthering our aims with respect to the free world are:

(1) to stress the importance of increased strength and unity by emphasizing the new elements of danger and opportunity in the situation.

(2) to manifest a willingness and desire to cooperate in developing unity of effort by the free world. In this connection it will be desirable to approach our allies in a spirit of give and take.

(b) We should exploit the possible weakening of ties between the Kremlin and Communist parties throughout the world due to Malenkov's lack of stature, experience and ideological prowess as the new leader of world communism.

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It may be noted that some time may elapse before the divisive forces inherent in the present Soviet power set-up can mature into a severe power struggle. Initial and intermediate actions, therefore, should not compromise the prospects of successful psychological action in the event that the power struggle breaks in the open.

f. Phases.

(1) Initial spurt. During the next few weeks, much risk and expenditure are justified in order to prolong and make the most of the condition of nervousness following the sudden transfer of power. The Presidential speech is assumed above, specially for this reason.

(2) Follow-up. It is most important that the spurt, particularly the Main Effort, should not be left as one-shot operation. Above all, an adequate "stick" should be ready for the expected Soviet evasion of the initial "carrot" of the Presidential speech. Every energy must be employed to make all seeds of disunity grow. For this purpose, many actions even if unlikely to produce great effect will be desirable for purpose of probing to find out where the seeds are sprouting. If events evolve very favorably, this phase could eventuate in a

(3) Climax in which the communist system breaks into open internal conflict. This third phase in our strategy should begin if and when such conflict seems near. If it never comes, the strategy should still have contributed usefully to our basic purpose.

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PART II

PLAN FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. General.

a. The importance of psychological pressures in the present situation is of sufficient moment to warrant not only the concentration of all psychological media upon the stated objectives, but also the resolute development of expanded and more effective capabilities. Even more essential, perhaps, is the determination to seize and consistently maintain the initiative through psychological operations imaginatively conceived and dramatically executed. Before it can win the hearts or influence the intellects of its targets, United States psychological strategy must capture their imaginations.

b. The major hope of fulfilling the aims of this plan lies in substantive government acts of psychological significance. The Presidential speech assumed in Part I, para. 3.d. is the keystone upon which the present psychological strategy is based. This assumed speech, and the various official actions which would stem directly from it, need, however, to be complemented by a series of psychologically significant acts. All but a few of the overt and covert psychological programs proposed in the following paragraphs of this section are intended primarily to exploit, prolong and intensify the psychological impact of various political, economic and military actions.

2. Covert Operations

c. For administrative reasons the present plan merely summarizes the broad outlines of the effort called for in the field of covert operations, but it assumes that this effort will be adequate in its material scale, and sufficiently energetic and imaginative in its approach.

As to general direction, the covert effort will be guided by the following general considerations:

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a. In covert operations we should be guided in the propaganda field chiefly by test of plausibility. Within this limitation there should be broad scope and wide latitude of action in this field; and in the political action field we shall, as usual, be guided by national objectives and the necessity of avoiding provocation to a point where solidification of the Soviet regime or a response by force might result. Our covert propaganda should not be concerned with consistency, either as regards themes or as between areas, so long as care is exercised to avoid actions which would be mutually self-cancelling or which would tend to undermine or discredit significant overt actions.

b. Covert information operations should develop plausible material to be picked up and reported factually by overt information media.

c.

[REDACTED]

(1)

[REDACTED]

(2)

[REDACTED]

d. The covert arms of the Government will nevertheless be alert to any possibilities of reaching the ruling groups of the USSR themselves and creating suspicion, uncertainty and pressure.

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3. Overt Information Operations:

A. General

While the possibilities for rapid increase in capabilities and effectiveness of our overt information programs is limited—the scale of the present effort is already considerable—these programs are also called upon to play a vital role in the implementation of the plan and the

*Par. 3 has been written by the Dept of State and therefore changes are not underscored.

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need for maximum energy, initiative and resourcefulness in developing the tasks listed below is no less great than in the case of covert operations.

In the situation with which this paper deals, all governments and all peoples of the world may be assumed to be deeply interested, first, in accurate reporting and interpretation of events in the Soviet Union and their consequences and, second, in the relationship of the United States to the situation and its intentions and its actions with regard to it. Therefore, a primary responsibility falling upon official overt information media is to provide widespread factual coverage and reliable commentary, from original and attributable sources, on developments, including the statement of the President crystallizing the attitude of the United States. This is the essential foundation upon which effective propaganda will rest.

Successful use of overt media in the operation will require careful coordination of all media. Of special importance will be the coordination of official statements, inasmuch as such statements are the most effective weapons for overt use. The watch committee envisaged in this plan must be specifically charged with alerting overt media in advance to forthcoming actions and their significance. (For example, should a public statement be intended to launch a "trial balloon", the overt media should be advised in order to give it maximum dissemination.)

In propaganda directed to many areas, much should be made of the fact that this is a time for purposeful, determined and united action on the part of the West.

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With the change in regime, defection deserves a high priority in propaganda. The principal role of overt media in this work is not the direct inducement of defection but such indirect assistance as publicizing defections when they occur and indicating that escapees from behind the Iron Curtain are not returned to captivity.

Congressional and public leaders should be consulted with regard to exploitation of the new situation and particularly as to the imperative necessity for maintaining the continued building of defensive strength in the United States and the free world.

This plan should be under constant review in light of the developing situation.

B. Tasks

a. To the Soviet Union.

Without engaging in vituperative attacks on Soviet personalities living or dead, official overt media should seek to accomplish the following tasks:

(1) To throw doubt on the stability of the leadership of the new regime. In this connection it will be useful to cite history and contemporary experts on Soviet affairs, such as Tito and former Communists, to exploit reports by former escapees who have been in the Communist apparatus of differences among the present leaders of the regime, to show that a despotism requires a despot, to suggest that Malenkov has not brought all the power factors under his control and to indicate that the new arrangements are not likely in the long run to function smoothly, with the result that a struggle for power, complete with purges, is highly probable.

(2) To exploit the fact that the reorganization of the Soviet government and the Communist Party concentrates rather than decentralizes

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responsibility and to question why this is necessary in view of the Soviet claim to have the overwhelming support of the Soviet peoples.

(3) To imply that although the Red Army appears to have been induced to lend its prestige in support of the new regime, the military in fact has not been given the role that it has deserved on the basis of its service to the people of the USSR.

(4) To exploit plausible indications that the leaders of the satellites, including Communist China, are not completely loyal to the new regime.

(5) To report factually any indications of divergence of policies or interests between satellites or Communist China and the Soviet Union.

(6) To exploit apparent personal coolness between Malenkov and Mao, especially the failure of Mao to go to Moscow for the funeral of Stalin, in such a way as to suggest that relations with Communist China pose a special problem for the new regime.

(7) To provide useful advice to Soviet citizens on how to survive in this dangerous and unsettled time, thus contributing to the psychology of individual caution impairing the efficiency of the system.

(8) To recall that the United States and other free nations do not return to captivity escapees from communist tyranny and to exploit the escape of significant personnel from the Soviet world.

(9) To provide renewed evidence of the peaceful intentions of the free world by exploiting expressions of friendship for the Soviet peoples and by recalling efforts made by the United States and other of the United Nations to help them during and immediately after World War II.

(10) To convey the impression that the attitude of the United States Government is one of "sharp watchfulness" and of awareness that

the new situation possibly contains elements of danger, which if they materialize will be met firmly, and elements of hope, which if they materialize, will justify a careful review of United States policies.

(11) If and when discussions take place between the Soviet Government and the United States Government and the fact is made public, to exploit the development intensively in order to portray the serious purpose behind this action to achieve a lessening of international tensions and, in the event that it is not successful, to place the responsibility squarely on the USSR.

b. To the Satellites of Eastern Europe.

In the light of factual reporting and reliable interpretation of the events in the USSR and their consequences elsewhere, official overt media should carry out in the satellites of Eastern Europe the following tasks:

(1) To maintain and to invigorate the profound national including religious, sentiments that have been stimulated by the events in the USSR.

(2) To recollect in detail the indignity and the exploitation suffered by the peoples of the satellites as the result of their subjugation to the interests of the Kremlin, to give sympathetic expression to the fear that their lot will be harder rather than easier under the new, inexperienced and insecure regime and to suggest to leaders of the satellites that they might take advantage of the present opportunity to urge the Kremlin to relieve its pressures, particularly economic, on the people.

(3) To portray the United States as a strong, reliable power, seriously determined to advance the cause of freedom without general war.

(4) To nourish in the minds of the leaders of the satellites, all proteges to one degree or another of the dead tyrant, doubts as

to their relationships with the new masters of the Kremlin, together with encouragement of the consideration that their survival may depend upon a new regard for popular nationalist sentiments.

(5) To recollect the successful deviation of Tito and the successful collaboration of Yugoslavia as an independent state with other independent nations in the free world.

(5) To remind that the United States does not return escapees from countries behind the Iron Curtain and to indicate in detail the achievements of the escapee program.

(7) To discourage excessive hopes and consequent rash actions on the part of the general population that might expose patriotic citizens to harsh reprisals at the hands of uneasy leaders.

(8) To disparage the stature of current leaders in the USSR and the satellites on the ground that Mao has now become the leading theoretician and revolutionary leader of international communism.

c. To Communist China.

In the light of factual reporting and reliable interpretation of events within the USSR and their consequences elsewhere, official overt media should carry out the following tasks:

(1) To promote friction at all levels between Chinese and Soviet communist leadership by indicating, among other things, that the Chinese Communists are tools of the Kremlin.

(2) To foment disunity between Moscow and Peking regarding the continuation of the Korean War, by portraying a growing determination in the United States to bring the Korean war to an end, by force if necessary, by planting doubt whether the Soviet regime, in the period while it is trying to consolidate its power, will back up the Chinese Communists in the event the United States takes more

forceful action to end the Korean War, and by planting doubt about the stability of the new Soviet regime and particularly about Malenkov's ability to gather all the power factors under his control and to give ideological leadership acceptable to Mao.

(3) To exploit ideological differences and rivalry between Mao and Moscow.

(4) To exploit Mao's conception of Malenkov as an ideological inferior and to build up Mao as the real heir of Lenin and Stalin.

(5) To create doubt whether or not agreements and commitments made by Stalin to Mao, especially as regards aid for the Korean War, will be honored by the new regime.

(6) To encourage the belief that the Soviet Union is holding back material assistance in order to keep the People's Republic militarily and economically dependent.

d. To Yugoslavia.

In the light of the experience of Tito with the Soviet regime, his defection in 1948 and his implacable hostility not simply to the dead tyrant but to the whole system embodied in the Kremlin and the Cominform, official overt media in output to Yugoslavia does not need to labor the significance of events in the USSR, but to carry out the following tasks:

(1) To encourage the pride of the Yugoslavs in their escape of the domination of the Kremlin and the disagreeable consequences of present events in the nations still dominated by it and the Cominform.

(2) To recall the mutually beneficial results of past collaboration with the United States and other free nations and to develop confidence in the security to be derived from similar collaboration in the future.

(3) To maintain confidence in the power, the reliability and the seriousness of the United States as the leader of the free world in the situation now created.

e. To Western Europe (including Germany).

Overt media to Western Europe should have primarily the following tasks:

(1) To emphasize, particularly by the use of testimony by responsible Western statesmen and experts on Soviet affairs, that the threat to the security of the free world has not in any way been diminished by recent events in the USSR.

(2) To raise questions concerning the stability of the new regime and the possible dangers arising from Malenkov's relative inexperience. (Caution: Do not imply that there is imminent danger of war.)

(3) To emphasize the continuing character of the Soviet system regardless of its leadership, especially its lust for power, its ignorance of the world, its debasement of culture, its perversion of education, its scorn of religion and its utilization of anti-semitism.

(4) To stress the need for prompt ratification of EDC and active support of NATO, as well as other constructive programs which promote the strength and well-being of Western Europe and the free world.

(5) To point out that Western unity and strength at this juncture of history are of decisive importance and may well create long range advantages for the free world.

(6) To encourage the belief that the United States is soberly and carefully watching the new situation in the USSR in order, both to guard against the dangers that may inhere in it, and to take

advantage of whatever opportunities may appear to advance the cause of freedom without general war.

(7) To stimulate confidence in the steadiness, strength and reliability of the United States in its role of leadership in the free world.

(8) To exploit the doubts and insecurity, both personal and doctrinal, assailing members of Communist parties and front organizations in Western Europe, which, already beset by internal dissensions and loss of strength in many areas, now face the further problem of adjusting to an uncertain situation in Moscow.

(9) To suggest that Malenkov being a product of the Moscow party bureaucracy, and having little or no knowledge of the outside world, is likely to prove indifferent to the local needs and interests of communist parties and their members outside the USSR.

(10) To indicate that Malenkov's reported lack of background in theoretical matters creates ideological uncertainties which are likely to cause confusion and difficulty particularly in communist parties and among fellow-travelers outside the USSR.

(11) To ask who is now the preeminent theoretician and ideological spokesman for world communism--Mao or Malenkov.

f. To the Near and Middle East.

In view of the lack of appreciation generally prevailing in the Arab States concerning the nature of the menace of Soviet Communism and in view of need to promote the stability and the security of the area through cooperative economic and military measures, official over the media have the following tasks:

(1) To emphasize that the death of Stalin leaves Soviet tyranny and its unlimited external imperialist ambitions unchanged.

(2) To emphasize the continuing character of the Soviet system, regardless of its leadership, especially its lust for power,

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causing others to consider the communist menace less serious than it has been.

The following major tasks therefore fall on official overt media in output to the area:

- (1) To emphasize that the change of command in the USSR involves no change in the imperialistic ambitions of the regime.
- (2) To emphasize the continuing character of the Soviet system, regardless of its leadership, especially its lust for power, its ignorance of the world, its debasement of culture, its perversion of education, and its scorn of religion.
- (3) To emphasize that, although there may appear to be points of disagreement between Mao and Malenkov, proof of a favorable change of attitude on Mao's part will be shown not by words but only by concrete actions in Korea, Indochina and elsewhere, including Communist China itself.
- (4) To emphasize that the national aspirations of the people of the area will not be achieved as the result of fortuitous events elsewhere, but only by hard, strenuous effort by each nation in the area and by individuals within it.
- (5) To seize every opportunity to enhance in the area the prestige and the standing of the United States and, as appropriate, its major allies, and to demonstrate the strength, steadiness and reliability of the United States as the leader of the free world.
- (6) To exploit the confusion and the uncertainty that is likely to beset Communist organizations and affiliated bodies in the area, particularly to encourage jealousies and to promote friction between Chinese and Soviet Communist Party apparatuses in Southeast and Southern Asia.

4. Supporting actions.

Appropriate political, military and economic actions consistent with this plan and related to it should also be undertaken.

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