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SPECIAL ANALYSIS

USSR-POLAND: Moscow's Reaction to Crisis

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*At this point the Soviets must be questioning whether the Polish leadership has the will or ability to restore stability in Poland in a way that leaves intact the party's authority and the regime's socialist orientation.* [REDACTED]

Moscow probably is willing to give party leader Kania more time to pull the situation together but can hardly be impressed with his progress so far.

--New trade union leaders continue to cooperate with political dissidents.

--Together they maintain the initiative vis-a-vis the regime.

--There is confusion and discord in the lower levels of the party itself. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

We have already seen substantial Soviet political pressure--most notably Moscow's hand in the sweeping changes that were made in the Polish leadership last month. Moreover, Moscow has advanced the ideological justification for any action they wish to take.

--The trade union issue is portrayed as serving the interests of international forces dedicated to exploiting the current crisis to the detriment of Poland and socialism.

--Western assistance to "antisocialist groups" has been noted and described as interference in Poland's internal affairs.

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--Leaders of the strike movement have been said to have "counterrevolutionary aims."

--[redacted] the Soviets have pointed to trends in Warsaw similar to those in Czechoslovakia during the Prague spring.

--They describe the notion of independent unions representing the workers better than the party itself as "inconceivable." [redacted]

We believe that the Soviets are taking some preparatory military measures with the expectation that the use of force may be necessary. [redacted]

#### Options

Additional Soviet political pressure and military preparations can be expected as the Polish political crisis continues to unfold. This could take the form of a Soviet-Polish summit, a broader Warsaw Pact summit, public statements by Soviet leaders, and much higher levels of polemics. [redacted]

If Kania is unable to make demonstrable progress toward containing the situation, the Soviets could hold additional military exercises including some with scenarios that rehearse the invasion of Poland. They could also conduct more extensive mobilization in the

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western USSR as well as move airborne and air transport units. Such developments would be reminiscent of Soviet actions before the invasion of Czechoslovakia. This level of activity might be accompanied by efforts to introduce additional Soviet divisions into Poland under the guise of a "Warsaw Pact maneuver." [REDACTED]

It is possible that the Soviets have already reached a decision to intervene militarily. We continue to believe, however, that they have not passed the point of no return and that their decision will depend on where the situation goes from here, and not on what has happened thus far. The Soviets realize that Kania cannot move precipitously or reverse the situation in a short time. Moscow, however, is now placing itself in a better position to threaten and even use military force if Kania cannot limit the concessions granted the strikers, or if his moves to regain control spark a violent popular reaction. [REDACTED]

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