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1 September 1970

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MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Analysis of Soviet and Satellite Propaganda Directed to or about Yugoslavia

PROBLEM: To analyze Soviet and Satellite propaganda directed to Yugoslavia in order to distinguish current trends and to point out indications of any psychological build-up for war

1. **CONCLUSION:** War-of-nerves propaganda emanating from Cominform radios has reached a level where an attack against Yugoslavia could take place without additional propaganda preparation. The introduction of additional propaganda factors revolving around a more concrete justification for the attack would be useful, but not essential, prior to an outbreak of hostilities.

2. Section I of the following report describes the propaganda picture as it stands to date.

3. Section II indicates the types of propaganda themes and techniques — now largely absent — that might be expected to increase as relations between the Cominform and Yugoslavia continue to deteriorate. These indicators point out in some detail how much further both sides, particularly Yugoslavia, can yet go in their denunciation of the opposing side. If possible, there will in the future be regular reports based on a continuing analysis of between 15 and 20 "indicators of war-mindedness" in Yugoslav and Satellite radio propaganda. The primary purpose of these reports would be to give prompt information on any marked change in broadcasts (such as a sudden large increase in five or six of the "indicators of war-mindedness") which might mean an imminent Satellite attack. Moreover, when a more reliable sample of propaganda material becomes available for systematic and intensive study — which is not now possible — it may be possible to distinguish between a mere spreading in war-of-nerves propaganda and a genuine intention to attack Yugoslavia.

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I. PRESENT EVIDENCES OF INCREASED TENSION

1. Increased Volume of Accusations

The volume of charges attributing warlike preparations and aspirations to the opposing side has markedly increased. It has exceeded previous war-of-nerves campaign periods considerably. Because of the absence of a consistent sample it is risky to attempt to say whether the volume is now increasing or tapering off.

2. Attention to Tactical as Distinguished from Strategic Preparations

One of the most noticeable characteristics of the current war-of-nerves phase is the greater concentration on overtly military preparations. Less attention is given to claims that the other side aims to overthrow the source's government, acquire part of its territory, or force it into a "colonial" status, or that it has "hostile intentions" against the source.

Those Satellite charges of a military nature heard before the Korean war gave primary emphasis to activities which were strategic in nature. Building war factories, receiving military supplies, extending strategic highways, expanding ports and airfields, retaining foreign military instructors, standardizing arms, and the like were the kinds of assertions heard in earlier phases. Although these basic and preparatory-type charges have by no means dropped out, the more pointedly tactical type of charge has of late become more evident. Such charges include contentions that the other side has called up reservists, has failed to release certain classes of conscriptees, is holding large-scale maneuvers, is stationing new units at certain frontier points, etc.

The locus of these more immediate and threatening-sounding activities has also tended to move nearer the frontiers. Thus Tito's radio claimed a short time ago that Bulgarian troops complete with medical units left Sofia in the direction of the Yugoslav frontier.

Each side has said that the other has infiltrated agents across the border with numerous missions (propaganda, espionage, sabotage, and even occasionally assassination). Inherent implications of lack of efficiency in preventing such infiltration do not seem to have deterred the propagandists from making such accusations.

3. Concrete and Specific Charges

The most obvious difference between the current accusations of aggressive intentions and preparations and earlier charges lies in the degree of specificity in the reports. By and large, charges during past normal phases have been quite general in nature, e.g., that "Tito is preparing an attack against the New Democracies." Little was said of how these preparations were to be carried out; the charge was enunciated, and perhaps the motives underlying the intention were mentioned (and often linked with "aggressive" America), but not much more was added. Also, such charges were often quite incidental to the main themes of the passages in which they appeared.

The current phase has seen the use of much more specific themes which give substance, and hence presumably conviction, to the charges. During the past month Tito has been accused of receiving V-2s from Germany, building fortifications along Satellite frontiers, using the German General Von Kleist to plan an attack on Albania, moving munitions factories away from frontiers, billeting troops in frontier towns, and the like.

Thus, while general charges also increase, the focus of attention centers much more on the steps necessary to implement the usual vague charges.

4. Proliferation of New Charges

Although during the previous war-of-nerves period new specific charges were by no means absent, since the current upsurge Tito and particularly the Satellites have interjected a large number of new charges not heretofore used.

During the previous normal phase, the single most specific military charge used was that the other side had provoked a border incident. While these provocation charges were filled out with concrete "facts" on the locality of the attack, the number of troops involved, description of the action, and the like, allegations of other warlike activities did not usually accompany such incidents.

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5. Accusations of Present Warlike Actions Rather Than Past Actions or Future Intentions

During the present campaign, an increased number of the warlike charges heard from both sides are phrased in the present instead of the future or past tense. Preparations for war are said to be "feverish"; border incidents are said to be provoked "in ever greater numbers"; the extension of a strategic highway is said to have been "speeded up." This is true of even the general charges of aggressive preparations, which are not in a military frame of reference. And the more specific charges are likely to be illustrated by more recently initiated actions. Concomitantly, interest in what the other side has done in the past or in what it "intends" or "hopes" to do in the future drops off.

6. Satellite Claims of Active Rather Than Passive Resistance in Yugoslavia

Even during "normal" periods the Cominform radios frequently charge that resistance to Tito (usually described in vague terms) is widespread, and, less often, that his army is disunited. When beamed to Yugoslav audiences, this theme might be interpreted as a direct attempt to impair Yugoslav military morale. Such claims are more specific now than before, and Radio Belgrade has recently charged the Cominform with propagandizing against the army; but in the absence of an actual count, it cannot be definitely stated that an increase has occurred.

(Neither side, apparently, has yet claimed that guerrilla activities are going on in the opponent's countryside, although the Cominform has said that some Yugoslav peasants have "taken to the hills.")

7. Satellite Attention to Formation of "True" Communist Party in Yugoslavia

Another qualitatively new development in recent weeks is an increasing amount of Satellite attention to anti-Tito resistance in the specific form of the formation of a "true" Communist Party in Yugoslavia, wholly different from and opposed to the renegade Party of Tito's "fascists."

II. TENSION-INDICATORS WHICH MAY INCREASE IN THE FUTURE

It is hoped that at an early date a continuing analysis of 15-20 "indicators of warmindedness" in Yugoslav and Satellite radio propaganda, which might assist in anticipating attack, will be possible. A secondary purpose would be to document the nature of a "war-of-nerves" campaign (its components, its amount of variation from week to week, etc.) as a background in relation to which any new development could be evaluated. It is desirable to be able to distinguish as sharply as possible between the ordinary fluctuations in the routine war of nerves and a new development which might be based on actual expectation of imminent war. This involves reliable measurement of shifts of emphasis and of differences of emphasis between different beams (e.g., between what Belgrade beams to the home audience and what it beams to Satellite audiences). Such evidence is not now available.

This continuing analysis would probably be of much greater value than the present interim report. Necessarily, the present report is non-quantitative, incomplete, and not as reliable as later reports (based on an adequate sample, systematically analyzed) would be. An interim report seems worth while, however, for two reasons: (1) Both Yugoslav and Satellite radios have during recent weeks stepped up their propaganda hostilities to a level definitely higher than had previously been reached. This development seems ominous enough to warrant as thorough a description of it as is now possible, even though the description is necessarily non-quantitative. (2) At least on the Yugoslav side, present propaganda is still characterized by noticeable restraint in treating the Soviet world. The ways in which this propaganda is restrained are worth noting, both in order to describe the present situation more adequately and as background for possible subsequent reports.

It should also be noted that this interim report does not attempt to discuss critically the rationale underlying the choice of certain factors as "indicators of warmindedness." Such a discussion would of course be included in the first of the possible series of publications giving quantitative data on such factors. The present report will be limited mainly to a brief description of the facts, with some suggestions as to what the facts may mean.

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Some of the indicators below, it should be noted, may not be used at all, or at best only rarely. Sound conclusions can only be based on a consideration of the rate at which all these themes are elaborated when considered as a group. A marked deterioration in relations between Yugoslavia and its neighbors may express itself in diverse ways (such as increased intensity or frequency of denunciation, appearance of new themes, the audiences to which material is beamed, etc.).

While the above propaganda components in Section I (all of which could perhaps be looked upon as indicators of tension) have apparently increased in frequency, all of them could in the future increase much more than they have. And, in addition, the following list of possible tension-indicators, none of which has recently shown a marked change, might increase. For convenience they are here divided into two groups, military and non-military; the former, presumably, would be more likely to be associated with expectation of imminent military action.

It will be noticed that most of these refer to both the Yugoslav and the Satellite radios, and that some refer only to the Yugoslav radio. This calls for explanation in view of the fact that the aggressive military action anticipated as possible is only on the Satellite side. There are, however, two reasons for considering the Yugoslav side also:

(1) Since there is reason to think that Tito's intelligence sources in Albania and Bulgaria are particularly good, it is reasonable to suppose that he might be informed of military preparations for aggression in those areas before we were, or at least, that he would be sure of them before we were sure. If he were thoroughly frightened, he might be expected to show it in certain aspects of his propaganda. In such a case he might or might not make an urgent secret appeal for Western aid. Propaganda analysis might possibly indicate whether Tito's appeal was founded on genuine fear or on a desire to take advantage of ominous Cominform propaganda. The analysis could thus contribute to an intelligence estimate of the seriousness of the threat.

(2) Apart from the possibility of imminent aggression, it would be desirable to have additional data on Tito's total relationship to his Satellite neighbors, to the Soviet Union, and to the West. At present, while the Satellite radios have gone fairly far in their denunciation of Tito, he has by no means gone equally far in his denunciation of them. This might change in the future. For instance, while not anticipating an imminent attack, he might nevertheless lose hope of winning substantial support among Communists by his present refusal to support openly the Western "imperialists." If so, his propaganda might change radically in certain respects. (This applies primarily but not exclusively to the non-military propaganda components listed below.)

A. Military Tension-Indicators

1. Descriptions of Home-Front War Preparations: Satellite radios have not described fortifications as being built in Yugoslavia; but the Free Greece radio has said that the Greek Government has begun to build air-raid shelters.

2. Descriptions of Enemy Reconnaissance, etc. in Specific Areas: Except for the border provocation charge, activities by military units involving crossing the frontier, such as reconnaissance or scouting, have not been reported.

3. Detailed Description of Enemy Troop Movements: There has not yet been a really serious war scare in terms of alleged intensive preparations for an imminent attack on a particular border area. Much more publicity could be given to threatening troop deployments, logistic build-ups on the frontier, routes of attack, etc.

4. Concentration of Border-Provocation Charges, etc. in One Area: No kind of military activity, even the border provocations, which have been a standard ingredient of radio propaganda on both sides, has been said to be concentrated in any one locality. Nor has any one of the very numerous border incidents (the Albanian radio counted over 600 of them as of last December) been given an exceptional amount of attention.

5. Coordination of Charges by the Various Satellite Radios: There is no substantial evidence of propaganda coordination as yet, although if Moscow were planning actual aggression there presumably would be such coordination. For instance, Free Greece charges of an intended Athens-Belgrade attack on Albania and Bulgaria have not been picked up and used by Satellite radios in any great quantity. Unusual Satellite concentration on alleged Yugoslav persecutions of a minority might indicate that a pretext was being created.

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6. Satellite Charges of American Involvement: In addition to the very frequent general charges that Tito is subservient to Wall Street, a lackey of the imperialists, etc., there are now moderately frequent charges of specific American military aid to Yugoslavia, and of specific American intentions to start a war in the Balkans. The latter might considerably increase.
7. Reassurance Statements to the Home Audience: Tito's reassurance statements--that his country is united, calm and strong--have been a standard component of his output to his own people from the beginning. In the event that he expected an imminent attack by the Cominform, such reassurance statements might increase markedly in volume, and he might add to them a form of reassurance which has not as yet become frequent--the claim that he has powerful friends (i.e., the United Nations). Satellite radios, confronted with morale problems of their own, might show an increase of the same sort.
8. Claims That the Enemy Is Militarily Weak: Apart from their claims that there is widespread Yugoslav resistance to Tito, the Satellite radios have only rarely described his regime as militarily weak. As a morale measure, if they anticipated actual war against him (perhaps with the U.S. backing him with air-atomic strength), these radios might feel a need to belittle him or his potential American support, particularly to their own people. On Tito's side this need might be felt even more acutely; however, he has as yet only rarely made such claims about the Satellites.
9. Descriptions of Attack as Imminent: Apart from the frequency and specificity of military accusations, the imminence of the alleged attack represents a third dimension which could be separately measured. Charges of imminent attack, though now more evident, could still be stepped up considerably.
10. Satellite Claims of Extensive Preparations for, or Outbreak of, Actual Civil War in Yugoslavia; Appeals for Such Action: In the American press the opinion has been expressed that the North Koreans have been handicapped, in the eyes of the world public opinion, by not being able to claim that they were coming to the aid of a widespread "democratic" resistance movement in South Korea; their crossing of the 38th Parallel looked more like out-and-out aggression than it would have if they had been able to claim that "the people" in South Korea were already in revolt against the puppet Syngman Rhee Government. Whether or not this was a mistake, a different strategy might be adopted in the psychological preparation for an attack on Yugoslavia; propaganda might claim (with or without factual justification) that the Yugoslav "people" were rising against Tito. The frequency of the "resistance-to-Tito" theme in the Satellites' present propaganda also suggests this as a possibility. It is therefore relevant to note that they have not yet described preparations for a large-scale uprising, nor claimed that guerrilla war was already going on, nor appealed explicitly for such action, nor (of course) described such action as already in progress.
11. Appearance of Serious Charges of Yugoslav Aggression Simultaneously in Satellite Broadcasts to All Audiences, Including Their Own Home Audiences: In general, Moscow does not concentrate a particular kind of propaganda in a particular beam; there is little "beam-differentiation." Yugoslavia has been to some extent an exception to this in that a particularly large proportion of all Soviet broadcasts about Yugoslavia has been beamed to Yugoslavia. In other words, non-Yugoslav audiences have in general heard relatively little of Moscow's case against Tito. (Evidence is not available as to whether this is true of the Satellite radios as well, nor is there evidence as yet with regard to a possible recent change in this respect.) Presumably, if actual aggression were imminent, the Satellites would want to justify themselves not only in the eyes of the Yugoslavs (who would perhaps be the most difficult to fool), but also in the eyes of Communist-sympathizing persons throughout the world, and especially their own home audiences. If so, imminent Satellite aggression should be accompanied by a relatively great increase of accusations of Yugoslav aggression in broadcasts beamed to non-Yugoslav audiences; and this would presumably occur simultaneously in all or most of the Satellite radios. It has not yet occurred.

B. Non-Military Tension-Indicators

As indicated above, Tito has by no means engaged in all-out denunciation of either the Soviet Union or his Satellite neighbors. Especially before September 1949, his radio maintained the pose of the injured party to the dispute, whose only wish was for justice and "correct relations between socialist states." Instead of taking the offensive, he usually confined himself to answering the accusations hurled at him. Recently this has been less true; Belgrade

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has increasingly taken the offensive. Sly digs at Soviet failings appear more often and with increasing boldness. (Witness Tito's Stip speech in March 1950 concerning "those abroad" who, "under the guise of vigilance, suspect everything and everybody.") Nevertheless, he could greatly increase a number of non-military as well as military tension-indicators in his present propaganda treatment of the Soviet orbit.

Presumably a major reason for his reticence has been a hope of gaining support among Satellite Communists who remain Communists, and who would be repelled either by criticism of their countries as such or by an out-and-out abandonment of the Communist "camp." Tito has apparently had long-term reasons for not playing certain critical themes too heavily. A marked increase in these themes, then, might indicate a loss of his long-term hope of winning Communist support outside his own country, or a feeling of danger great enough to warrant abandoning all long-term purposes in order to achieve short-term ends.

It will be noticed that all of the following non-military propaganda components refer to Belgrade, and that only the first two refer also to the Satellite radios.

1. Explicit Charges of Ethnic Favoritism by Either Side: Although both Tito and the Satellites have given considerable play to charges that the other side is suppressing various national minorities and denying their rights, such accusations are only rarely made in explicitly ethnic terms. Rare also are accusations which state that ethnic rights are suppressed in favor of another nationality. Charges of "Pan-Serbism," "Russification," creating a "Greater Bulgaria" and the like are infrequent, but increasing. As both sides can be considered vulnerable to such claims in terms of the appeal such contentions can be said to have among the traditionally hostile nationalities of the Balkans, the growth of this theme in the future would perhaps indicate that either side (or both) had thrown prudence to the winds in its eagerness to attack the other. (Whether Belgrade has already increased its use of this theme in its output to the Satellites cannot be determined at present.)
2. Charges of Religious Persecution or Favoritism by Either Side: Although Western sources have rumored periodically that Tito would release Cardinal Stepanic from prison, Cominform transmitters apparently have not picked up and condemned this alleged intention. This would at least seem to suggest that the Cominform is sensitive to the religious predispositions of the Yugoslav people. It is not inconceivable that the Cominform might indirectly begin to use the weapon of religion to increase the hostility between the Orthodox Serbs and the Roman Catholic Croats and Slovenes. In like fashion, Tito could play up the persecution of the Church in Satellite countries. Again, however, as with the ethnic theme, both sides are vulnerable to a divisive strategy of this sort. The appearance of the theme in the context of their mutual quarrel might therefore serve to indicate that both were reaching the bottom of the peacetime propaganda barrel.
3. Yugoslav Criticism of Satellite Internal Affairs: Belgrade has given intermittent attention to poor conditions in the domestic affairs of its neighbors, sometimes attributing such conditions to Soviet domination. A marked increase in this might indicate that Tito no longer hoped to win support in that area, or that he had begun to appeal to the "people" rather than to the Governments in the Satellite countries.
4. Yugoslav Denunciation of Soviet Domination in the Satellites: Beginning last fall and to a greater extent last winter, Yugoslav output has used the domination theme. Economic exploitation receives the bulk of the attention. Except for Albania, charges of Soviet domination of internal political affairs, save where it relates to Yugoslav relations, have been secondary. Soviet domination of various front organizations has also received treatment; for example, Satellite prize-fighters are said to have been ordered to throw fights to Soviet contestants. Soviet domination of local Communist Parties, however, has received only peripheral and limited attention; and, with the limited exception of Albania, Soviet domination of Satellite military machines has received only scanty attention. This field thus remains open to greatly increased propaganda exploitation by the Yugoslavs. Extensive use of the theme in any future war-of-nerve campaign would obviously be especially embarrassing to the Soviets, considering their current denials of military aid to North Korea.
5. Yugoslav Criticisms of Internal Soviet Affairs: Increasing criticism of domestic failings in the USSR--to date principally confined to ideological and Party shortcomings--may serve to indicate a growing seriousness of the quarrel. Moscow can be expected to be especially sensitive about charges in this sphere, while anti-Stalin Satellite audiences may find such accusations considerably more satisfying than the usual fare of Communist radios.

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6. Appeals to or Approval of the West: There has apparently been no explicit approval of the West in monitored Yugoslav broadcasts to date. Instead, Yugoslav transmitters have tended to refer to U.S. "imperialism" in somewhat the same terms as are used in describing the "hegemonic" policies of the USSR. Increasing approval of the West, particularly the U.S., may therefore be best measured through a decreasing amount of disapproval. At any future time when Tito might consider himself seriously threatened, criticisms of the West might be expected to drop sharply.

7. Yugoslav Attention to Communist Organizations Abroad:

a. Approval of the anti-Stalinist Left as such. The Belgrade radio has only rarely alluded to sympathy toward Tito. (Last June, Djilas referred to opposition to the USSR on the part of Markos, Rajk, Gomulka, and others, and last fall Tito personally said that Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia were more sympathetic to him than were other Satellites.) With these and other scattered exceptions, Tito has not hinted at the existence of Titoism among Communists. In fact, Djilas last November told a NEW YORK TIMES correspondent that he had "no information" on the strength of "anti-Cominform" forces in the Satellites. Albanian Communist dissatisfaction with Enver Hoxha has been referred to in Yugoslavian output, but even here--where Yugoslav propaganda has consistently been most vitriolic--Titoism in the present tense apparently has not been claimed.

As for Titoism outside the Satellite orbit, there have been more indications of Yugoslav recognition of it. Although the desire to create a new Internationale has been denied by Belgrade, Yugoslav propaganda--especially in its foreign output--has continually played up visits of foreign socialist delegations and expressions of approval for the regime from many quarters. Of late, Titoist output has extended its field of comment to remarks concerning, for example, Chinese, Indian, Japanese, and German Communist affairs. Foreign activities of Tito-supporters have been given increasing attention. Last November Kidric, speaking to some Italian left-socialists, made a statement which would seem calculated to appeal to the non-Communist left. Yugoslavia, he said, wishes to build socialism, but "not a regimented socialism, nor a 'gray' socialism where human individuality is destroyed...." So far, however, Belgrade has not alluded to any organization for coalescing pro-Titoist sentiment, notwithstanding Pijade's recent trip to Western Europe, and in spite of the fact that Satellite and particularly Soviet propaganda has increasingly denounced leftist "visits" to Yugoslavia.

b. Direct appeals to Satellite rank-and-file Communists to oppose their leaders or the USSR. In the main, Tito has implicitly distinguished between his Stalinist enemies and his potential friends in the international Communist movement. At least to date he has avoided an automatic identification of the Satellite Parties with the campaign conducted against him by the Cominform. Even with regard to the Soviets, he uses the term "certain leaders." Usually he identifies his opponents, for example in Bulgaria, as "the Bulgarian Government," "Bulgarian Cominform leaders," or "those in Bulgaria who oppose us." Generally, though decreasingly, his propaganda avoids branding Satellite opposition leaders by name (always excepting Enver Hoxha). Likewise, distinctions between the mass of the Party and the leaders have so far been made only rarely.

What might occur in the future is a more explicit distinction between his enemies and his potential friends, and a more outspoken appeal to the latter.

c. Denunciation of Satellite leaders' subservience to Moscow. So far Tito has made occasional use of the line that Satellite Communist leaders are mere Soviet pawns. Most of these references have been implicit, but now and then (and increasingly) he openly condemns this subservience. Usually this occurs in the context of the Cominform's campaign against Yugoslavia. The theme can be used to a much greater degree, however, than is now the case.

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