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THE SOVIET PROGRAM OF MILITARY AID  
TO LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

1955-65

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE  
Office of Research and Reports

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THE SOVIET PROGRAM OF MILITARY AID TO LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES\*  
1955-65

Summary and Conclusions

During the period 1955 through June 1965 the USSR extended an estimated US \$3.6 billion in military credits and grants to 17 less developed countries of the Free World. Six of these countries accounted for more than 90 percent of Soviet military aid commitments, as follows (in billion US \$):

Indonesia	1.1
United Arab Republic (UAR)	1.1
Iraq	0.4
India	0.3
Syria	0.3
Afghanistan	0.2

Arms aid has contributed to the growth of neutralism in strategically located areas and has created a general image of the USSR as a benevolent, anticolonialist power. Furthermore, the Soviet program has led to ties with military leaders in recipient countries, and these ties have influenced the formation of national policy in these areas to the detriment of the West.

In 1955, when the program began, large quantities of standard weapons were available at low cost in the USSR because of the streamlining of the Soviet armed forces. As the program developed, a great variety of ground, air, and naval equipment was sent to the less developed countries, including some advanced models not yet supplied to other Communist countries. As a supplement to the shipment of arms, the USSR has trained about 16,300 foreign military personnel in the USSR and has supplied 18,800 Soviet military technicians to recipient countries, at a cost equivalent to about \$290 million.

In contrast to the Soviet economic aid program, the military aid program has been marked by rapid delivery, immediate impact, and swift development of rapport with military leaders in the less developed countries. Although military aid has accounted for less than one-half of total Soviet aid commitments to less developed countries, military equipment valued at twice that of economic goods and services has been delivered.

As for financial terms, the USSR has charged low prices and has made generous credit arrangements with recipient countries. Interest has

\* The estimates and conclusions in this report represent the best judgment of this Office as of 1 September 1965.

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been 2 percent and the period of repayment has averaged ten years. The USSR has also provided discounts averaging 45 percent deducted from the list price value of \$3.6 billion. General economic difficulties, however, have forced some recipients to seek an easing of terms and a re-scheduling of payments. By the end of 1964 the less developed countries had repaid about 30 percent of an estimated arms aid debt of \$1.4 billion.

From the Soviet point of view, the outlook for the military aid program is encouraging. The major objective of the program -- that of replacing Western with Soviet or neutralist attitudes in the less developed areas of the Free World -- is being met for the most part. Further opportunities exist to expand the number of recipients and the kinds of weapons and technical support. From the recipients' point of view, the outlook for the program is also favorable. In most instances, their armed forces have shifted from Western to Soviet equipment and have graduated from simple to more complex armament. The recipient countries will continue to seek arms and technical support, especially if the USSR remains circumspect in using the military aid program for political leverage.

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## I. Beginnings of Soviet Military Aid

### A. Milieu and Motivations

Following World War II the USSR attempted indirect aggression in less developed countries of the Free World by encouraging rebellions in Burma, Greece, Indonesia, Malaya, and the Philippines. After these failed, Stalin showed little interest in the less developed areas and became preoccupied with problems of economic reconstruction in the USSR and with the economic and political consolidation of Eastern Europe. During the later years of his life, Stalin seemed unable or unwilling to recognize the revolutionary implications of the newly won independence of former colonial areas in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, and he branded such freedom as fictitious and the emergent nationalist leaders as "reactionary" and unworthy of Soviet support.

After Stalin's death in 1953, the new leadership sought ways to free Soviet foreign policy from the rigidities then characterizing it. Moscow attempted to outflank the major centers of Western power by moving the area of its active operations to the less developed countries -- practically all of which had emerged from colonial rule with active anti-Western sentiment -- as the most fruitful field for economic and military penetration. The USSR undoubtedly hoped that, if the traditional Western preeminence in these areas could be eroded gradually by an expanding Soviet presence, the USSR would achieve a measure of influence and eventually, perhaps, political leverage. Along with economic aid, military aid came to be viewed by Moscow as an expeditious and relatively safe method of extending Soviet power.

### B. Decision to Go Ahead

The initiation of an economic aid program in 1954 provided a prelude to a comprehensive program of arms aid to less developed countries of the Free World. In 1955 the USSR began military aid shipments to less developed countries by proxy, using Czechoslovakia as an intermediary, and the following year it started direct shipments. Once begun, Soviet arms aid produced a quicker and more visible impact than the economic aid program and soon gained independent status as a significant instrument of Soviet foreign policy among the less developed countries. The decision of the USSR to launch a program of military aid to less developed countries was influenced further by three factors: (1) a change in Soviet military doctrine, resulting in the availability of large quantities of weapons; (2) the receptivity for the aid in less developed countries; and (3) the personal influence of Khrushchev.

#### 1. Change in Military Doctrine

One consideration leading to the inauguration of a comprehensive program of military aid was the shift in Soviet military doctrine

away from the mass-troops concept that had characterized it since before World War II. In 1955-56, changes in the Soviet military posture resulted in substantial quantities of arms becoming surplus. The first large-scale reductions in military manpower from the peak attained during the Korean War were announced by the USSR in 1955. Realignment of the forces to increase their effectiveness in nuclear war by changes in organization and equipment, operational concepts, and tactical and strategic doctrine also was initiated in this period. In addition, new generations of aircraft, ships, and ground equipment, as well as missiles, were being issued to the forces, rendering obsolescent many older models that were in use at the time.

Military industry has always been a favored high-priority sector in the Soviet industrial complex and as such has been characterized by stable production lines not subject to the continual budgetary review and interruption seen in the West. With new models or series in production and with the surplus caused by the reduction and realignment of manpower, the USSR had quantities of older equipment beyond any reasonable requirement for mobilization. By 1955, considerable progress had been made in equipping the Eastern European Communist countries with these items, the losses of the North Koreans and Chinese Communists in the Korean War had been made up, and the inventory of available weapons was well beyond what could be absorbed by prospective buyers. Military aid, then, constituted a useful alternative to scrapping equipment.

## 2. Receptivity in Less Developed Countries

The USSR was not long in finding a market for its surplus arms among the less developed nations. Fifteen of the 17 recipients of Soviet military aid had been colonies, and 13 had received their independence since World War II. Relatively small in terms of population (14 have populations under 15 million), most of them are governed by authoritarian regimes whose stability has depended and continues to depend on national military forces. All were faced with a broad spectrum of problems bearing on political stability and economic viability and development. None of them possessed the necessary equipment, technological skills, and industrial base to organize their armed forces without outside assistance.

Almost without exception, ultimate recipients of Soviet military aid first sought arms from the West, and only after their requests were denied, did they treat with the USSR. Sometimes the USSR solicited requests, and often its offers were rejected by countries that feared antagonizing the West or becoming too involved with the USSR. Such countries included Burma, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan.

### 3. Influence of Khrushchev

The military aid program began and evolved to its present proportions during Khrushchev's leadership. Khrushchev was personally involved in much of the military aid activity, from initial negotiations to the delivery of equipment. He traveled extensively to less developed countries and received their leaders in Moscow on behalf of the program. Reportedly, he played the "generous uncle" role in some of the negotiations, arguing against the obdurate Mikoyan. Invariably, his advocacy of the recipient's request produced results favorable to the recipient.\*

Khrushchev was at first reluctant to publicize the Soviet military aid program, but after 1960, perhaps in response to increasingly strident Chinese criticisms of Soviet lack of support for national liberation movements, he became less reticent about openly acknowledging Soviet deliveries of arms to less developed countries. He repeatedly boasted that the USSR had sent large quantities of weapons to the Algerian "patriots" free of charge and asserted:

We also afforded Indonesia, Yemen, and other countries considerable help in their armed struggle. We lent all our power to the support of the Egyptian people when they were faced with the necessity of dealing the imperialist aggressors an armed rebuff. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries are actively helping the young national states to strengthen their defenses and to establish and train armed forces to protect the independence they have won from the inroads of the imperialists. We Marxist-Leninists stand firmly on Lenin's position -- we believe that the peoples do not take up arms and shed their blood of their own free will. The violence of the colonialists forces them to it, and when a people is forced to rise in armed struggle it is the duty of all internationalists to give them every possible aid and support. That is our position with respect to the armed struggle of the peoples for their national liberation.

On 19 September 1964, just a month before his ouster, he told a youth forum in Moscow that the USSR would supply weapons to "any

\* On occasion, however, Khrushchev could be as tough a negotiator as Mikoyan. In 1957, UAR Defense Minister Amir gave him a list of equipment sought by Cairo. Khrushchev, after examining it, said it was entirely too large. He then told Amir a story of the legendary Grand Duke Nikolay who ordered the heaviest suit of armor obtainable, rode off to battle, and drowned because of the weight of the armor. Khrushchev ended by commenting that he did not want the UAR to become another Nikolay.



people fighting against any oppressors. Many peoples have already won victory with Soviet military aid," he said, and added, "If there are any others who need weapons, we are ready to discuss the question in fraternal fashion and to give help."

Since Khrushchev's ouster in October 1964, additional agreements with established recipients (the UAR and Syria) have been signed, and rapid implementation of existing agreements is evident. Moreover, aid to dissident groups in African countries whose governments the USSR does not support has been expedited. Both of the present key Soviet leaders, Brezhnev and Kosygin, were active in the arms aid program of their predecessor -- Brezhnev as a sometime traveling salesman and Kosygin as an administrator (Kosygin, for example, signed the Soviet-Indonesian arms accord of 8 May 1962 for the USSR). Thus Khrushchev's removal has left the Soviet military aid program unimpaired.

## II. Dimensions of the Program

### A. Extensions and Drawings

In 1955-56, Czechoslovakia, serving as an intermediary for the USSR, began extending US \$284 million worth of military assistance to Afghanistan, the UAR, Syria, and Yemen. The Soviet military aid program began in its own right in 1956, when \$117 million in assistance was extended to Afghanistan and Syria (see Figure 1). By 1959, more than \$660 million in military aid to less developed countries had been extended by the USSR. In 1960 the USSR accelerated this activity, extending \$556 million worth of assistance, and in the following year extensions were a record \$830 million. New extensions of military aid, however, dropped to \$371 million in 1962 and \$388 million in 1963. In 1964, military aid extensions again climbed precipitately, to \$787 million, reflecting extensive new agreements with Afghanistan, India, Indonesia, and the UAR, as well as several smaller commitments. By mid-1965, cumulative Soviet military assistance commitments totaled an estimated \$3.6 billion (the value of aid after applicable downpayments).

In the period from mid-1954 to mid-1965 military assistance accounted for less than one-half of total Soviet economic and military aid commitments to the less developed countries, but because it can be implemented so quickly, it constituted almost twice as much equipment actually delivered as that supplied under the more highly propagandized economic aid program. By mid-1965, drawings amounted to an estimated 80 percent of Soviet military aid commitments, whereas economic aid drawings constituted less than 40 percent of economic aid extensions. Although tapering off considerably since the peak of \$800 million estimated for 1962, drawings have remained at a high level, totaling an estimated \$550 million in 1963 and \$300 million in 1964 at list prices (see Figure 1).


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Figure 1

# Extensions and Drawings of Soviet Military Aid to Less Developed Countries, by Year\*

1956-64

Million US \$




\*These data reflect Soviet list prices for military equipment. They do not reflect the large price discounts frequently granted by the USSR.

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B. Composition of Military Aid

Weaponry has been the major component of the Soviet military aid package, constituting about 60 percent of the total value (see Figure 2).



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Ammunition accounts for 15 percent and spares account for 10 percent of the total value.\* These two components, like weaponry, are subject to sizable discounts from stated list prices. Other military-related equipment -- chiefly vehicles, construction materiel, and naval auxiliary craft -- represents the final 15 percent of total value. This equipment, however, is not discounted and its period of repayment is shorter. Technical assistance -- Soviet advisers in recipient countries and recipient trainees in the USSR -- normally is structured in separate contracts, which usually are financed outside of credit agreements and are not discounted.

\* These data are based on Indonesian and Iraqi experience. Although it may be argued that the proportions reflected in military aid to these countries may not hold for smaller countries or for countries with different military establishments, it is believed that, in general, they reflect a meaningful order of magnitude.

## 1. Equipment

The equipment provided under Soviet military aid agreements has often been characterized as obsolete, and much of it is supposed to have been delivered in various states of disrepair. The fact is, however, that about two-thirds of the total equipment provided to date is of types that still are in standard use in the Soviet armed forces, and of these, more than one-half are still in current production in the USSR. These proportions should rise slightly as more advanced weapons systems are exported, although the proliferation of newer weaponry among established recipients will be balanced in part by exports of conventional weaponry which ensue as other countries join the list of recipients.

Some purchases were inappropriate from a point of view of tactics. Perhaps the best example is the light cruiser costing \$50 million that Indonesia bought essentially for prestige purposes in 1960. Most of the equipment, however, fitted easily into the existing military framework.


Much of the equipment, although classified as used, has come directly from Soviet warehouse stocks and has never been used even in training.\* Its delivered state generally has been excellent. What problems do arise in regard to Soviet equipment invariably occur after the recipients receive it. Early in the program mistakes occurred frequently (Arctic gear was sent to the Middle East and Africa, weapons were sent without spares, and so forth), but as the program progressed, efficiency improved. Currently the major problem is spares. The USSR provides spares in the original agreement adequate for maintenance and most repair for a specified period. The insistent demand by recipients for additional spare parts or major repairs is largely attributable to faulty storage procedures and frequent misuse of equipment and available spares.

A trend discernible since 1961 is the export of advanced weaponry to countries that had previously received only conventional arms. Only in part has this reflected actual need: the desire of the recipients for prestige afforded by modern weapons has been almost as important an element as the desire for security in the form of an effective military establishment. This desire for modern weaponry for prestige purposes has induced competition among recipients of Soviet military aid. Some of the advanced systems delivered to less developed countries have not as yet been exported to Communist countries. Figure 3 reflects the newer weapons systems ordered or delivered.


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\* Review of the equipment estimated to have been in depots of the Soviet ground forces in 1955 shows that in most instances the amount in storage greatly exceeded troop holdings.


# Soviet Advanced Weapons Systems Delivered to or Ordered by Less Developed Countries 1956-64




MIG-21 jet fighter  
(Afghanistan, Algeria, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Syria, UAR)




Tu-16 medium jet bomber  
(Indonesia, Iraq, UAR)




An-12 assault transport  
(India, Indonesia, Iraq, UAR)




Mi-6 helicopter (Indonesia, UAR)




Komar-class guided-missile motor gunboat  
(Indonesia, Syria, UAR)



Qsa-class guided-missile motor gunboat  
(Indonesia, UAR)



SA-2 surface-to-air missile  
(Afghanistan, India, Indonesia, Iraq, UAR)



Surface-to-surface antitank missile (Snapper)  
(Afghanistan, Iraq)

## 2. Technical Assistance

The increasing complexity of modern military equipment necessitates increasingly higher skills for the people who assemble, maintain, and operate the equipment. This has required the USSR to provide a program (complementary to the weapons aid itself) of technical assistance embracing two activities: the training in the USSR of military personnel from less developed countries, and the sending of military technicians from the USSR to countries receiving military aid. Every recipient of military aid has received both types of technical assistance. During the period from 1955 to mid-1965, more than 35,000 individuals were involved in this two-way flow of personnel (see Figure 4). The costs to recipient countries of the technical services, training, travel, and maintenance growing out of the Soviet military aid program during this period totaled about \$290 million.

Technical assistance usually is carried in separate contracts, generally financed outside of credit agreements and not discounted. The only known exception to this practice were four of the major Soviet-Indonesian agreements in which technical assistance expenditures, representing about 6 percent of the total value, were financed under medium-term credits. These four credits, totaling about \$60 million, covered the costs of training Indonesians in the USSR and the services of Soviet technicians sent to Indonesia and were to be repaid in Indonesian currency and/or convertible currency during a period of ten years at an interest rate of 2 percent.

### a. Technicians

Since the inception of the arms aid program, more than 18,800 Soviet military technicians have been employed by less developed countries, with Afghanistan, Indonesia, Iraq, Syria, and the UAR accounting for more than 80 percent of the total. This program is estimated to have cost about \$120 million. As of mid-1965, more than 3,600 Soviet military technicians were present in less developed countries. These technicians assist in three functions: (1) the delivery, assembly, and maintenance of military equipment; (2) the training of indigenous personnel in the operation and maintenance of equipment; and (3) the instructing in tactics of indigenous military officers in staff and line units. Courses are established for the utilization of the entire range of armaments from small arms to aircraft and naval vessels. Soviet officers also serve as instructors in the major military academies of these countries. In their capacity as advisers, Soviet officers have played key roles in modernizing and reorganizing the military establishments of aid recipient countries.

### b. Trainees

As of mid-1965, about 16,300 military trainees from less developed countries had gone to the USSR for instruction costing

about \$160 million. More than 80 percent of the trainees were from five countries -- Afghanistan, Indonesia (which sent nearly one-half of the total), Iraq, Syria, and the UAR. Approximately 3,200 trainees were being trained in Soviet military institutions. Although Soviet technicians usually arrive following delivery of equipment, indigenous trainees invariably are sent to the USSR before the delivery of the weaponry in which they are to be trained. These training programs range from six weeks to five years, with the bulk of the trainees engaged in programs lasting less than a year.

C. Pattern of Distribution



Between 1955 and mid-1965 the Soviet Union concluded formal military aid agreements with 17 less developed countries of the Free World (see Appendix A). Six countries -- Afghanistan, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Syria, and the UAR -- account for about 93 percent of all Soviet military aid extensions (see Figure 5). The Middle East accounts for about 51 percent of total Soviet military aid extensions; Asia, about 44 percent; and Africa, less than 5 percent.

The initial tactic used by the USSR in providing arms to recipients -- that of utilizing Czechoslovakia and Poland as intermediaries -- now has been extended by the Soviet Union to new, less stable situations. This change, which gained momentum in 1964 and continues in 1965, involves the supply of arms not only to existing regimes but also to dissident groups within a country and even to a group sharing power in a country (the Greek Cypriots). The former intermediaries, Czechoslovakia and Poland, now have been replaced by the UAR, Algeria, Ghana, and others. Although some of these recipients' activity in arms supply may be the result of unilateral decisions on their part, the formal agreements for the delivery of Soviet military equipment to these countries prohibited its transshipment to third countries without Soviet approval. For example, the Soviet-Indonesian agreement of 21 January 1961 stated:

The Republic of Indonesia will not without the consent of the USSR formally or de facto transfer any equipment delivered under this contract, or permit its use by any third party. The USSR and the Republic of Indonesia will take all necessary security precautions for the secrecy of correspondence and information regarding the agreement ... . Only strictly confidential persons whose official activities directly involve use of this equipment should have access.

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Figure 4




\*Trainees are those departing for training in the USSR in a given year. Technicians are those Soviet experts present in less developed countries in a given year for one month or more.

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Figure 5



\*These data reflect Soviet list prices for military equipment. They do not reflect the large price discounts frequently granted by the USSR and they do not indicate the debt obligations of recipients. Although this chart shows known extensions and drawings, token deliveries also have been made to Tanzania.

\*\*Negligible

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D. Prices and Terms

The USSR generally provides low prices and generous terms to recipients of its military aid. The prices charged less developed countries by the USSR vary with the type and quality of the equipment and the identity of the recipient country. Table 3, Appendix B, permits a comparison over time of list prices quoted by the USSR to various recipient countries for comparable equipment from 1955 through June 1965. These list prices, although diverging at some points, are close enough to suggest that Soviet catalog prices are derived from cost of production, with differences reflecting time (during a period of time the price of an item tends to fall) and distance (the slightly lower prices quoted to Iraq compared with those to Indonesia probably depended heavily on lower costs of transportation). Beyond this, a third factor -- political favoritism -- may influence the list price somewhat, but this factor comes into play more in the discounting than in the price-setting stage of the negotiating process.

The discount from established list prices has by now become an intrinsic feature of Soviet arms aid to less developed countries. About 45 percent of the \$3.6 billion extended thus far has been in the form of discounts, including grants.\* Although discounting probably is premised on the assessment by the USSR of a recipient's ability to pay higher prices, political favoritism also is seen in the variation evident in Soviet practice. Among less developed countries receiving military aid from the USSR, the most favored nations in respect to the proportions of aid in the form of discounts from list prices have been Afghanistan (77 percent), Iraq (53 percent), Syria (51 percent), and the UAR (64 percent). Two other recipients (Yemen and India) reflect the extremes of Soviet military aid practice. About 95 percent of the value of the arms provided Yemen has been written off, making this fledgling republic virtually a grantee. On the other hand, arms aid to India has been conducted largely on a no-discount basis.

It may be argued that weaponry -- particularly conventional arms, which rapidly become obsolescent -- has no alternative use and therefore that the USSR can afford to be generous in its pricing policies. Nevertheless, the fact that the USSR currently exports advanced weapons systems carrying the same price and discount features indicates that it views selective pricing as an important political technique in its military aid program.

Price is only one lever that the USSR employs to further its military aid objectives. The terms of military aid agreements contain other inducements for recipient countries. A uniform 2 percent annual interest rate, a grace period averaging three years before payments commence, and a repayment period averaging ten years characterize

\* Although grants may make entree in the short run easier, the Soviet Union probably views them as weakening the ties produced by credit agreements and resulting financial indebtedness.

the terms. Moreover, to the recipient hard-pressed for foreign exchange, the USSR frequently permits repayment in commodities or local currencies.

E. Repayments

Total repayments on Soviet military aid credits through 1964 are estimated at approximately \$434 million, 31 percent of total drawings (see Table 1). Annual repayments on military aid increased steadily, reaching a peak in 1963 and 1964 of approximately \$108 million per year. In each of these two years, about \$65 million to \$75 million was repaid in the form of commodities, representing approximately 10 percent of the annual exports of less developed countries to the USSR.

Table 1

Drawings and Repayments on Soviet Military Aid  
by Less Developed Countries, by Year  
1956-64

			Million US \$
<u>Year</u>	<u>Drawings <sup>a/</sup></u>	<u>Repayments</u>	<u>Net Indebtedness</u>
1956	10	Negl.	10
1957	77	Negl.	77
1958	83	Negl.	83
1959	35	26	9
1960	89	30	59
1961	156	63	93
1962	482	100	382
1963	314	108	206
1964	154	107	47
Total	<u>1,400</u>	<u>434</u>	<u>966</u>

a. Drawings shown are after applicable grants and discounts and reflect the estimated debt obligations of recipients.

Despite the generous terms provided by the USSR in its military assistance, the arms debt accrued has taxed the fiscal ability of many of the less developed countries. This has led to a continual process of renegotiation, which usually has resulted in a further easing of terms. In some cases, the USSR has written off part of the indebtedness, and in others it has eased repayment schedules. A prime example of the latter occurred in January 1965 when the USSR agreed to reschedule the arms debt repayments of the UAR. The UAR, experiencing an acute shortage of foreign exchange in late 1964, requested the Soviet Union to postpone all

military debt repayments for the years 1964-66. In the ensuing discussion, the USSR refused to postpone the repayments but did agree to reduce annual payments for 1965-67 by more than 50 percent (from \$43 million to \$21 million) and to lengthen the repayment period.

The repayment performance of the less developed countries to date has been a mixed one. As of the end of 1964, the less developed countries had repaid 31 percent of an estimated arms debt of \$1.4 billion. The repayment rate of individual countries has varied considerably. Of the prime recipients, Afghanistan, India, and the UAR have been the best to date, having repaid approximately 81, 93, and 58 percent, respectively, of their accumulated arms debts. At the opposite extreme, Indonesia and Syria each have repaid only about 11 percent of their indebtedness to the USSR, with Indonesia accounting for nearly one-half of the total outstanding indebtedness of all less developed countries for Soviet military aid. The repayments of each of the recipient countries through 1964 are shown in Table 2.

Table 2

Drawings and Repayments on Soviet Military Aid  
by Less Developed Countries, by Recipient  
1956-64

<u>Recipient</u>	<u>Drawings</u> <sup>a/</sup>	<u>Repayments</u>	<u>Net</u> <u>Indebtedness</u>
Afghanistan	21	17	4
Algeria	60	1	59
Cambodia	1		1
Ghana	6		6
Guinea	8		8
India	72	67	5
Indonesia	577	66	511
Iraq	160	86	74
Mali	2		2
Morocco	8	2	6
Somalia	2		2
Syria	151	16	135
UAR	311	179	132
Yemen	21		21
Total	<u>1,400</u>	<u>434</u>	<u>966</u>

a. Drawings shown are after applicable grants and discounts and reflect the estimated debt obligations of recipients. Cyprus and Tanzania have drawn negligible amounts but have made no repayments.

### III. Technique of Implementation

#### A. Organization

Although the operations of the USSR in the realm of military aid are highly classified, it is known that the Soviet Chief Engineering Directorate (GIU), subordinate to the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations (GKES), is charged with overall responsibility for this activity. It acts as the "supplier" in military aid contracts, being charged with the distribution of military equipment and services to Communist countries as well as to less developed countries of the Free World. Moreover, with the Directorate of External Relations of the General Staff, GIU oversees the instruction of foreign military trainees in the USSR.

#### B. Negotiation, Agreement, and the Delivery Contract

The initial negotiations for military aid are characterized by the visits of high dignitaries between the USSR and potential aid recipients, during which they discuss broad areas of a proposed aid package. These meetings are followed by visits by high military personages from both sides. An overall purchase agreement -- incorporating types and amounts of equipment, technical assistance, and training in general terms -- is then signed on a country-to-country basis by appropriate governmental leaders.

During the next phase, the GIU takes over. Acting for the USSR, GIU signs the delivery, or implementing, contracts as "supplier," and either the Ministry of Defense or a specific branch of the armed services signs as "customer" for the recipient. Types and quantities of equipment, terms, prices, and delivery schedules are hammered out and agreed to by the GIU and representatives of the recipient country. These contracts usually are signed in Moscow, but several have been signed in recipient countries. Subsequent requests for changes by the recipient must be approved by the GIU. If the requested changes go beyond the value specified in the agreement or if they affect advanced weapons systems -- for example, the cancellation by Iraq of its surface-to-air missile program in 1963 -- the GIU sends them upward for a decision by the Minister of Defense or by the Soviet Council of Ministers itself.

#### C. Transportation and Delivery

In the next phase, the GIU, in concert with the Directorate of External Relations, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and the Ministry of Maritime Fleet, arranges for the shipment of military equipment to recipient countries. Whereas the majority of intra-Bloc shipments of Soviet military aid are by rail, most Soviet arms shipments to non-Communist countries are by ship, the majority originating in Black Sea ports. In recent years, Soviet cargoes of military aid have been

carried by ships of both the USSR and Free World countries. Deliveries by Soviet ships range from entire shiploads of military cargo carried by ships on tramp voyages to small consignments of military items mixed with cargoes of civilian goods on ships in scheduled line service that call at a variety of ports en route to and from the USSR. Sometimes, ships almost fully loaded with bulk cargo such as coal will carry military vehicles as deck cargo. Free World ships carrying cargoes of military equipment usually belong to the recipient country or are chartered by the recipient from other countries. These ships seldom carry actual weaponry. Instead, they carry vehicles, aircraft, and other equipment having both civil and military uses that are consigned to the armed forces of the recipient country.

#### IV. Evaluation of Soviet Military Aid

##### A. Comparison with Economic Aid

Moscow's decision in 1955 to provide military aid to the less developed countries originally focused on the same short-term objectives as the economic aid program begun the year before: establishing a presence, developing ties, fostering neutralism, and stimulating economic relations through repayment obligations. The advantages of military aid compared with economic aid soon became apparent: plentiful stocks to draw upon, rapid delivery, immediate impact, and the enlargement of contacts with military leaders in less developed countries. Much more than economic aid, military aid implied a type of intimate collaboration that could involve taking sides in cold war disputes. As the Soviet aid and trade offensive matured, embroiling Moscow in the complexities and slow fruition of economic development, the arms aid program became even more attractive.

Military aid has another advantage over economic aid and even over diplomatic tactics with the regime in office. This advantage is that the direct recipient of military aid is the military establishment, which must grow in power through the acquisition of equipment and know-how from outside sources. In promoting military aid, the Soviet Union evinced a growing appreciation that the real locus of power in many less developed countries is the military establishment, and the USSR openly acknowledged that, in terms of Communist objectives, "everything depends on what forces gain control of such a vitally important instrument as the army -- the champions of progress or [the] reactionaries."

##### B. Comparison with the US Military Aid Program

Although much smaller in value and volume, Soviet military aid has some advantages over the US program. In an area where speed can be crucial, its arms aid is negotiated and implemented more rapidly than that of the US. The USSR has not restricted its aid to strategically placed recipients: it has given weaponry to any regime asking for it, and it often has solicited requests. Many of the recipients of Soviet

aid first tried to get arms assistance from the US and were discouraged by US reluctance to inject weaponry into sensitive trouble areas or by conditions placed on the use of such aid.\*

The most significant difference between the two programs is the factor of responsibility. The aim of US military assistance is the creation and maintenance of effective local military forces and their inclusion in the Western mutual defense system. Having undertaken the responsibilities of building stable alliances and relationships, the US hoped to strengthen or protect local economies from the disruptive effects of the military burden. The USSR, on the other hand, has had the advantage of far less responsibility in its role as supplier of arms. Its military posture does not depend on the effectiveness of the armed forces developed in the recipient countries and it is not concerned with specific levels of preparedness. Unlike the US, the USSR does not supplement its military aid with defense support. It assumes no responsibility for any adverse economic effects of arms aid in recipient countries and, indeed, may even welcome economic disruption from time to time.

C. Influence: a Problem and an Opportunity

The Soviet presence promoted by military aid has evolved to varying degrees of influence in some of the recipient countries. In only one known instance, however, has this influence permitted the USSR to exercise leverage on any of these countries.\*\* The degree of susceptibility of a government to Soviet influence has depended far more upon

\* The US Mutual Security Act, which governs the sale of military equipment, requires a commitment from a recipient nation that it will use such assistance "solely to maintain its internal security, its legitimate self-defense, or to permit it to participate in the defense of the area of which it is a part ... and that it will not undertake any act of aggression against any other state." The provisions controlling grants are nearly the same but, in addition, impose a requirement for continuous review by US representatives. Although there have been instances in which the USSR may have placed restrictions on the weapons it provided -- for example, in the current Indonesian-Malaysian confrontation -- there is no hard evidence that it has done so.

\*\* After the overthrow of the Kassem regime in February 1963 the new Iraqi government opened a vituperative attack on the international Communist movement, began an intensive and violent repression of the local Communist Party, and stepped up military operations against the Kurdish dissidents. As a result of these developments, the USSR first slowed the pace of its military deliveries to Iraq in the spring and stopped deliveries altogether during the summer months. The effect of this stoppage of deliveries -- including desperately needed spare parts and ammunition -- was an immediate diminution in Iraqi combat operations against the Kurds. Following protracted Soviet-Iraqi negotiations, the Iraqis ceased their anti-Communist propaganda campaign on the international front and reduced their repression [footnote continued on p. 17]

the policies and disposition of each country's leaders than it has upon any possible leverage afforded the USSR through its extension of military assistance.

There is no evidence that the USSR has ever sought base rights in any of the non-Communist countries that have received military aid. Indeed, there is little evidence of actual Soviet participation in military operations of the recipient countries. The instances of Soviet crews manning submarines during the height of the West Irian crisis and Soviet personnel flying UAR bombers against Yemeni royalist strongholds provide the unique exceptions.

Even the behavior of Soviet military assistance groups resident in less developed countries has been exemplary but aloof. Their demands have been limited to strictly procedural and housekeeping matters. The overall impression gained is that the Soviet presence is a discreetly technical one having little if any political overtones. The USSR seems aware that, if it should attempt to use military aid as leverage for political purposes, it might jeopardize a program which has used considerable Soviet resources and which has contributed to a significant contraction of the sphere of Western influence among the less developed countries.

D. Impact on Recipients

1. Effect on National Security and Regional Balances of Power

As some of the less developed countries emerged from colonial status, they provided an ideal climate for Soviet offers of military assistance. Often left without even an adequate police force, the new countries were eager to obtain arms for internal security as well as to protect their sovereignty and impress neighbors. At the same time, the emergence of the new states was accompanied by frictions of every kind. Conflicts or the bases for conflicts among neighboring countries and between new nations and the former colonial powers existed in abundance -- differences in approach to relations with excolonial powers, nationalist rivalries, old territorial disputes, and tribal antagonisms. In many such cases, even relatively small shipments of arms could upset delicate regional balances of power.

Soviet military assistance accordingly has been the primary vehicle for achieving a position of influence in certain regions vital to Western interests. In the guise of an advocate of national aspirations, generally anti-Western in character, the Soviet Union has exploited regional or local conflicts for the broad political objective of displacing or diminishing Western influence in strategic areas.

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of local Communists, and the Soviet Union agreed to resume normal military aid shipments. The exact degree of leverage that the Soviet Union was able to wield in this instance is difficult to assess, but the fact that military deliveries were used to pressure the Iraqis appears clear.



The timing of Soviet offers of arms almost invariably coincided with periods of tension between the target country and a neighboring country or a member of a Western alliance. The Arab-Israeli tension, Yemen's conflict with the UK over Aden, Afghanistan's border dispute with Pakistan, and Indonesia's internal strife and territorial dispute with the Netherlands over West Irian presented prime opportunities for Soviet exploitation. In more recent years internal security requirements or tensions arising from disputes with neighboring countries have led to Soviet military aid for Algeria, India, Iraq, and Somalia.

The armed forces of almost all recipient countries have increased in size conspicuously, following initial receipt of Soviet arms aid. In several instances -- for example, Afghanistan, India, and Indonesia -- the increase has approached or even surpassed 100 percent. Soviet military aid has been a significant ingredient in this growth.

In September 1955 the willingness of the UAR to conclude a military agreement with Czechoslovakia -- serving as a Soviet intermediary -- resulted largely from the prevailing Arab-Israeli hostility and UAR-Iraqi competition for hegemony in the Arab world. The agreement opened the door to other Soviet activities in the Middle East, negated the Western embargo on arms shipments to the Arab States and Israel, decreased the effectiveness of the newly created Baghdad Pact, and set off a prolonged period of turmoil in the area.

In Syria, where anti-Western nationalism had reached a fierce intensity, the opportunity for Syria to obtain large supplies of arms to defend itself against hostile neighbors, particularly Israel, was seized quickly. Within months after the agreement of the UAR in 1955, Syria also signed an arms agreement with Czechoslovakia. Soviet military assistance enabled Yemen to press its claim to Aden with military action against the British and also provided support for Afghanistan in its dispute with Pakistan over Pushtunistan. The availability of a large volume of Soviet military equipment also initially encouraged Indonesia to threaten an invasion of West Irian if the Dutch did not relinquish control of the territory, and subsequently enabled Sukarno to mount his confrontation campaign against Malaysia.

Despite the inherent troublemaking potential of Soviet arms aid, there is little evidence that the USSR has prompted major recipients of its aid to engage in hostile acts against their neighbors. The availability of such aid nevertheless has served to exacerbate regional conflicts and has encouraged extreme political and military activity that these countries otherwise might not have undertaken. Furthermore, Soviet military aid has injected the USSR into regional disputes throughout the world, with Moscow thus becoming a critical factor where otherwise it would have had little influence.

2. Dependency Resulting from Aid

Once begun, military aid tends to expand and continue. The USSR, like the US, has found that, once a program is begun, it is difficult to stop. Soviet arms aid has established a continuing need for ammunition, spare parts, replacements, and technical support. When an uncommitted country turns to the USSR for arms, it usually abandons its previous sources of materiel in the West and completely reequips its armed forces with Soviet weapons, thus placing complete dependence on the USSR for military supplies. Moreover, fledgling nations that have been attracted first by use of conventional arms inevitably desire more and better weaponry, and they match justifications to the new requirements with facility. The USSR probably believes that, in some instances, if it abruptly ends its aid to a particular country, it may leave that country more susceptible to an adversary than if military assistance had never been started. Stoppage of aid to a country still facing a security threat, moreover, could project an image of the USSR as no longer vitally interested in the security of that country and, by extension, other countries in similar circumstances.

The injection of Soviet weaponry has resulted in prime recipients such as Afghanistan, Indonesia, Iraq, Syria, and the UAR being almost completely equipped with Soviet equipment, and in other countries the process of replacing Western with Soviet equipment continues. Of the original recipients of Soviet military aid, only Morocco appears to be inclined to stop the relationship, and as late as December 1964, even Morocco had to purchase \$600,000 worth of spares to make its MIG-17 fighter squadron operational.

Soviet emphasis on training has been consistent with Soviet long-term goals in influencing the armed forces of recipients. Additional factors, however, have been the more complex equipment being sent to some countries and the extension of assistance to countries with very low levels of literacy and technical proficiency. Advanced equipment not only has required greater technical facility in the people operating and maintaining it but also has necessitated a higher level of competence from staff officers and unit commanders. In the countries that recently had been colonies, even where cadres of trained men did exist, the cadres have been very small and training necessarily had to begin on a very low level. Military technical assistance thus has offered the Soviet Union one of its best prospects for extending its influence in the recipient countries.

Military aid consequently has resulted in a dependence unmatched by most economic relationships. A country relying largely on the USSR for military equipment, spare parts, and technical aid must at least consider Moscow's views before embarking on a venture hostile to Soviet interests. Reluctance of local military leaders to jeopardize their source of supply almost certainly has tempered some political decisions. The Soviet Union, however, has thus far been careful not to abuse this lever in its relations with recipient countries.

V. Outlook

The USSR will undoubtedly continue to press arms assistance on a variety of potential recipients. As the Soviet military aid program grows and proliferates, other less developed countries will become recipients of arms aid. Possible future recipients in Asia are Burma and Pakistan; in the Middle East, Lebanon and Jordan; and in Africa, any number of new states. Present trends suggest that the USSR will expand the list of advanced arms and weapons systems available to non-Bloc customers and will provide the technical support and training programs that such complex equipment makes necessary. The Soviet Union probably hopes that this program will have particular influence on military elements in the recipient countries and that such influence will promote Soviet aims, especially where the military is likely to have substantial influence on the orientation of existing governments and on the choice of their successors. The USSR will provide direct arms aid only to reasonably stable regimes, preferring to permit fledgling powers and dissident groups to arrange procurement from original recipients of Soviet aid.

The USSR will continue to be punctilious -- at least initially -- in dealing with recipients of its military aid. This will not prevent pressure from being applied by some of the recipient countries -- for example, almost certainly Indonesia and the UAR -- for further easement of repayment terms. Although the USSR will not write off any portion of its claims, in a further manifestation of largesse toward recipients, it probably will acquiesce -- as it already has done in some instances -- to the extent of modifying original agreement terms to permit lengthier periods of repayment.

The USSR will not act in concert with Communist China in supplying arms to any less developed countries but, influenced by Peiping's challenge to Soviet influence, will provide arms, sometimes reluctantly, to certain recipients. A few countries probably will follow Cambodia's lead in mixing weaponry from both sources. The USSR, however, will continue to dominate the field.

APPENDIX A

SOVIET MILITARY AID AGREEMENTS WITH LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, BY RECIPIENT  
1956 - June 1962

Recipient and Time of Signing	Estimated Minimum Value a/*	Downpayment	Amount of Aid	Amount of Aid in the Form of Grants or Discounts b/		Million US \$
				Form of Credits	Form of Grants or Discounts b/	
Total	3,657	59	3,598	1,983	1,615	
Afghanistan	202		202	46	156	
First half of 1956	75		75	13	62	
August 1959	25		25	6	19	
Second half of 1960	1		1	1	15	
First half of 1964	20		20	5	60	
July 1964	81		81	21	40	
Algeria	110		110	70	7	
1961-63	10 c/		10	3	33	
October 1963	100		100	67	2	
Cambodia	4		4	2	1	
April 1963	1		1	2	1	
April 1964	3		3	2	1	
Congo (Brazzaville)						
January 1965	N.A.					
Cyprus	14		14	7	7	
September 1964	14		14	7	7	
Ghana	6		6	6		
First half of 1962	6		6	6		
Guinea	8		8	8		
First half of 1960	8		8	8		
India	350	58	292	292		
November 1960	21	8	13	13		
March 1961	6 d/	6				

\* Footnotes follow on p. 23.

Million US \$

Recipient and Time of Signing	Estimated Minimum Value a/	Downpayment	Amount of Aid	Amount of Aid in the Form of Credits	Amount of Aid in the Form of Grants or Discounts b/
India (Continued)					
May 1961	2		2	2	
January 1962	2		2	2	
August 1962	46	17	29	29	
Second half of 1962	12 d/	12	6	6	
January 1963	6		16	16	
April 1963	16		38	38	
August 1963	38	8	32	32	
April 1964	40	7	154	154	
September 1964	161 e/				
	1,090	1	1,089	815	274
Indonesia					
February 1957	8		8	8	
October 1959	6	1	5	5	
September 1960	283		283	200	83
First half of 1961	445		445	333	112
May 1962	93		93	67	26
November 1963	55		55	42	13
October 1964	200		200	160	40
	378		378	179	199
Iraq					
November 1958	131		131	42	89
February 1960	98		98	30	68
October 1961	111		111	81	30
June 1964	38		38	26	12
	2		2	2	
Mali					
First half of 1961	2		2	2	
Morocco					
November 1960	11		11	8	3
January 1962	3		8	8	3
Somalia					
November 1963	35		35	3	32
Syria					
	302		302	147	155
November 1956	42		42	14	28
October 1957	75		75	25	50
February 1958	90		90	60	30
March 1962	60		60	30	30
October 1964	35		35	18	17

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Million US \$

Recipient and Time of Signing	Estimated Minimum Value <sup>a/</sup>	Downpayment	Amount of Aid		Amount of Aid in the Form of Grants or Discounts <sup>b/</sup>
			in the Form of Credits	in the Form of Grants or Discounts <sup>b/</sup>	
Tanzania					
January 1964	N.A.				
UAR	<u>1,085</u>		<u>1,085</u>	<u>395</u>	<u>690</u>
July 1957	155		155	50	105
1958-59	60		60	20	40
1960	150		150	50	100
1961-62	420		420	140	280
June 1963	100		100	35	65
November 1964	200		200	100	100
Yemen	<u>60</u>		<u>60</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>57</u>
November 1962	20		20		20
March 1963	30		30		30
March 1964	10		10	3	7

a. The estimated value is derived either (1) by using the aggregate value (at list prices) of agreements where known or (2) by pricing the material through analogous prices noted in aid agreements between other less developed countries of the Free World and Communist countries.

b. Grants are shown as discounts of 100 percent.

c. This transaction includes grant aid in arms provided to the Algerian rebel government before independence.

d. The agreement of March 1961 called for cash on delivery, and the agreement of the second half of 1962 probably did also. Because the USSR agreed to accept payment in rupees rather than hard currency, these agreements are carried as military aid even though no credits were involved.

e. Including an estimated \$86 million for a MIG-21 assembly complex.

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APPENDIX B

SELECTED MILITARY EQUIPMENT EXPORTED OR OBLIGATED BY THE USSR  
TO LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES  
1955 - JUNE 1965

The following table is a comparison of list prices for selected types of military equipment and is an indication of the total quantities exported or obligated by the USSR to less developed countries. Because the USSR used Czechoslovakia and Poland as intermediaries in the early years (1955-59), some of the data include inputs from these two countries, but most reflect only direct Soviet inputs. In the Status column, A indicates that the item is in current production in the USSR, B that it is not in current production but is in current use, and C that it either is being phased out of use or is obsolete. No differentiation is made between used and new equipment; and in most instances, the year given is the year in which the initial contract was concluded.

The quantities noted after "Other" in the Recipient column indicate the sum of deliveries to one or more countries for which price data were not available. The Total Equipment column indicates totals of priced and unpriced equipment exported and obligated. The total for each recipient country listed may not be related directly to the list price for that piece of equipment, because list prices varied over the years and price data were not available on all equipment ordered.

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Table 3

Selected Military Equipment Exported or Obligated by the USSR to Less Developed Countries: Types, List Prices, and Quantities  
1955 - June 1965

Equipment	Status	Year	Unit List Price (US \$)	Recipient	Total Equipment (Units)
Land armaments					
Armor					
T-34 medium tank	C	1955 1956 1960	51,660 55,125 28,921	UAR Syria Iraq Other	516 256 100 505
Total					<u>1,377</u>
T-54 medium tank	B	1961	87,324	Iraq Other	300 710
Total					<u>1,010</u>
PT-76 amphibious tank	A	1962 1964	52,836 59,994	Indonesia India Other	155 93 32
Total					<u>280</u>
SU-100 assault gun	C	1956 1958	63,210 53,466	Syria Iraq Other	90 120 385
Total					<u>595</u>
BTR-40 armored personnel carrier	C	1958 1961	13,866 14,168	Iraq Indonesia Other	90 180 250
Total					<u>520</u>
BTR-152 armored personnel carrier	C	1956 1960 1960 1961	12,000 23,027 23,000 22,851	Syria Indonesia Guinea Iraq Other	450 24 25 230 1,010
Total					<u>1,739</u>



Equipment	Status	Year	Unit List Price (US \$)	Recipient	Total Equipment (Units)
Lend armaments (Continued)					
Artillery					
85-millimeter (mm) field gun (D-44)	B	1960	10,041	Iraq Other	128 650
Total					<u>778</u>
100-mm field gun (BS-3)	C	1958	18,575	Iraq Other	60 50
Total					<u>110</u>
122-mm howitzer (M-30)	B	1955 1956 1960 1961	17,000 16,800 11,642 12,586	UAR Syria Indonesia Iraq Other	160 100 50 116 496
Total					<u>922</u>
37-mm antiaircraft gun	C	1955 1956 1958 1962	9,300 9,332 8,618 8,365	UAR Syria Iraq Indonesia Other	225 108 286 60 255
Total					<u>934</u>
85-mm antiaircraft gun	C	1956 1958	18,228 20,760	Syria Indonesia Other	50 25 88
Total					<u>163</u>
100-mm antiaircraft gun	C	1960	47,376	Iraq Other	77 35
Total					<u>112</u>
132-mm mobile rocket launcher (BM-13)	C	1961	17,990	Iraq Other	30 270
Total					<u>300</u>
120-mm mortar	A	1960	2,747	Iraq Other	85 582
Total					<u>667</u>

Table 3

Selected Military Equipment Exported or Obligated by the USSR to Less Developed Countries: Types, List Prices, and Quantities  
 1955 - June 1965  
 (Continued)

Equipment	Status	Year	Unit List Price (US \$)	Recipient	Total Equipment (Units)
Land armaments (Continued)					
Missiles					
V-750 surface-to-air missile firing battalion	A	1961	1,512,437	Indonesia	14
		1961	1,512,437	Iraq	1
				Other	33
Total					48
V-750 surface-to-air missile	A	1961	57,977	Indonesia	338
		1961	57,977	Iraq	16
				Other	784
Total					1,138
P-15 surface-to-surface missile	A	1961	102,889	Indonesia	300
				Other	80
Total					380
KS air-to-surface missile	C	1962	64,313	Indonesia	80
Total					80
K-13 air-to-air missile	A	1964	7,167	India	500
				Other	160
Total					660
S-2 ("Sobka") surface-to-surface cruise missile division	A	1964	3,266,668	Indonesia	2
Total					2
S-2 ("Sobka") surface-to-surface cruise missile	A	1964	76,989	Indonesia	27
Total					27

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Equipment	Status	Year	Unit List Price (US \$)	Recipient	Total Equipment (Units)
Land armaments (Continued)					
Special-purpose vehicles					
BRDM amphibious combat reconnaissance vehicle	A	1961 1961	17,864 17,850	Indonesia Iraq	64 128
Total					<u>192</u>
K-61 tracked amphibious personnel carrier	A	1961 1961	43,176 42,955	Indonesia Iraq	54 32
Total					<u>86</u>
BAV large amphibious truck (ZIL-485)	B	1960 1961	18,718 18,738	Iraq Indonesia Other	23 15 100
Total					<u>138</u>
Infantry weapons					
82-mm recoilless gun (B-10)	A	1960 1962	3,741 3,233	Iraq Indonesia Other	139 140 200
Total					<u>479</u>
RPG-2 anti tank grenade launcher	A	1960 1962	129 112	Iraq Indonesia Other	900 123 3,500
Total					<u>4,523</u>
7.62-mm semiautomatic carbine (SKS)	B	1958 1962	82 76	Iraq Indonesia Other	33,000 21,775 150,000
Total					<u>204,772</u>
7.62-mm submachine gun (AK)	A	1960 1962	101 95	Iraq Indonesia Other	34,250 12,367 120,000
Total					<u>166,617</u>

Table 3

Selected Military Equipment Exported or Obligated by the USSR to Less Developed Countries: Types, List Prices, and Quantities  
 1955 - June 1965  
 (Continued)

Equipment	Status	Year	Unit List Price (US \$)	Recipient	Total Equipment (Units)
Land armaments					
Infantry weapons (Continued)					
12.7-mm heavy machinegun (DShK)	A	1961	1,792	Iraq	527
		1962	1,666	Indonesia	882
				Other	1,500
Total					<u>2,909</u>
Combat ships					
Light cruiser (CL), <u>Sverdlov</u> -class	B	1960	49,649,880	Indonesia	1
Total					<u>1</u>
Destroyer (DD), <u>Skoryy</u> -class	B	1956	8,968,750	UAR	4
		1960	7,529,928	Indonesia	8
Total					<u>12</u>
Medium submarine (SS), <u>W</u> -class	B	1962	3,867,000	Indonesia	12
				Other	10
Total					<u>22</u>
Large submarine chaser (PC), <u>Kronstadt</u> -class	B	1960	859,124	Indonesia	16
Total					<u>16</u>
Escort ship (DE), <u>Rige</u> -class	B	1960	5,360,964	Indonesia	8
Total					<u>8</u>
Motor torpedo boat (PT), <u>P-6</u> -class	A	1955	591,220	UAR	25
		1960	603,820	Iraq	12
		1960	562,280	Indonesia	14
				Other	27
Total					<u>78</u>

Equipment	Status	Year	Unit List Price (US \$)	Recipient	Total Equipment (Units)
Combat ships (Continued)					
Guided-missile motor gunboat (FGMG), Komar-class	A	1961	750,400	Indonesia Other	12 21 33
Total					
Combat support					
Fleet minesweeper (MSF), T-43-class	B	1960	1,074,998	Indonesia Other	6 6
Total					
Missile-storage ship	A	1961	7,000,000	Indonesia	12 2
Total					
Submarine tender (AS), Don-class	A	1960	15,312,772	Indonesia	2 1
Total					
Submarine tender (AS), Atrek-class	A	1962	12,600,000	Indonesia	1 1
Total					
Torpedo retriever (YPT), Poluchat'-1-class	A	1960	331,800	Indonesia Other	1 2 7 2
Total					
Aircraft					
MIG-15 (Fagot) jet fighter	C	1955 1956	180,810 112,400	UAR Syria Other	60 20 4
Total					
MIG-17 (Fresco) jet fighter	C	1958 1958	219,301 173,524	Indonesia Iraq Other	84 62 32 333
Total					
MIG-19 (Farmer) jet fighter	B	1960 1961	343,801 344,400	Iraq Indonesia Other	427 16 17 143
Total					
Total					176

Table 3

Selected Military Equipment Exported or Obligated by the USSR to Less Developed Countries: Types, List Prices, and Quantities  
1955 - June 1965  
(Continued)

Equipment	Status	Year	Unit List Price (US \$)	Recipient	Total Equipment (Units)
Aircraft (Continued)					
MIG-21 (Fishbed) jet fighter	B	1961 1961 1962	616,000 609,996 945,000	Indonesia Iraq India Other	20 16 12 228 <u>276</u>
Total					6
MIG-21D (Fishbed D) jet fighter	A	1964 1964	879,200 825,000	Indonesia India Other	38 18 <u>62</u>
Total					15
IL-28 (Beagle) light jet bomber	C	1958 1961	351,582 350,000	Iraq Indonesia Other	28 28 125 <u>168</u>
Total					10
Tu-16 (Badger) medium jet bomber	B	1961 1961	1,478,400 1,458,000	Iraq Indonesia Other	14 14 20 <u>44</u>
Total					12
Tu-16K (Badger K) medium jet bomber	B	1962	1,666,664	Indonesia	12
Total					12
IL-14 (Crate) light transport	C	1958 1958 1958 1961	280,000 269,000 262,500 180,000	Syria Yemen Indonesia India Other	8 2 20 24 93 <u>147</u>
Total					147

<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Unit List Price (US \$)</u>	<u>Recipient</u>	<u>Total Equipment (Units)</u>
Aircraft (Continued)					
An-12 (cub) assault transport	A	1960	2,128,000	Iraq	6
		1960	2,087,000	India	32
		1963	2,388,800	Indonesia	16
				Other	30
<b>Total</b>					<b>84</b>
Mi-4 (Hound) helicopter	A	1960	200,000	Guinea	1
		1960	180,000	Indonesia	50
		1960	168,000	Iraq	24
		1961	229,600	UAR	36
				Other	112
<b>Total</b>					<b>223</b>
Mi-6 (Hook) helicopter	A	1963	1,800,000	Indonesia	9
				Other	10
<b>Total</b>					<b>19</b>
U-MIG-15 (Midget) trainer	B	1961	142,498	Iraq	14
		1961	138,746	Indonesia	10
				Other	39
<b>Total</b>					<b>63</b>
Uti-MIG-21 (Mongol) trainer	A	1964	825,000	India	6
				Other	2
<b>Total</b>					<b>8</b>
U-11-28 (Mascot) trainer	C	1958	272,326	Indonesia	6
		1958	271,404	Iraq	2
				Other	7
<b>Total</b>					<b>15</b>
Electronic equipment					
P-20 (Token) early warning/ground-controlled intercept radar	C	1958	338,240	Iraq	8
		1961	337,501	Indonesia	16
				Other	60
<b>Total</b>					<b>84</b>

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Table 3

Selected Military Equipment Exported or Obligated by the USSR to Less Developed Countries: Types, List Prices, and Quantities  
 1955 - June 1965  
 (Continued)

Equipment	Status	Year	Unit List Price (US \$)	Recipient	Total Equipment (Units)
Electronic equipment (Continued)					
P-30 (Big Bar) early warning/ground-controlled intercept radar	A	1961 1961	380,000 337,282	Indonesia Iraq	30 8
Total					38
Son-9 (Fire Can) antiaircraft fire control radar	A	1960	146,160	Iraq Other	6 50
Total					56
R-103 radio station	A	1960 1961	32,710 36,960	Iraq Indonesia	60 44
Total					104
R-108 radio transceiver	A	1961 1962	857 1,042	Iraq Indonesia Other	882 250 1,000
Total					2,132
R-824 mobile radio station	A	1961 1961	32,500 31,038	Indonesia Iraq	10 8
Total					18
General support equipment					
Light pontoon bridge (LPP)	A	1958 1961	257,180 279,510	Iraq Indonesia Other	2 1 1
Total					4
Heavy pontoon bridge (TFP)	A	1958	904,260	Iraq Other	1 1
Total					2

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<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Unit List Price (US \$)</u>	<u>Recipient</u>	<u>Total Equipment (Units)</u>
General support equipment (Continued)					
TRM-A mobile tank repair shop	A	1960 1961	15,795 17,153	Iraq Indonesia	24 2
Total					26
TRM-B mobile tank repair shop	A	1960 1961	17,618 17,738	Iraq Indonesia	16 1
Total					17
PARM-2 mobile aircraft workshop	A	1961 1962	32,148 36,400	Iraq Indonesia Other	2 4 4
Total					10
KRAS-2 mobile radar and control shop	A	1961 1961	34,938 34,653	Indonesia Iraq	25 6
Total					31

APPENDIX C

DISCUSSION OF SOURCES

This report is a synthesis of available information on Soviet military aid to less developed countries and has involved the use of a large number of documents. The nature of this report makes the inclusion of detailed source references impractical. Documentation of significant data is available, however, in the files of this Office.

The best overall work on Soviet military aid on a continuing basis is the EIC semiannual series Aid and Trade Activities of Communist Countries in Less Developed Areas of the Free World, SECRET,

Two other general works on the subject are CIA/RR ER 62-18, Military Assistance by the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 1955-61, June 1962, SECRET/ and CIA/RR 59-5, Military Assistance by the Soviet Bloc to the Underdeveloped Countries of the Free World, January 1959, SECRET/

A comprehensive study of types, quantities, and prices of equipment end items and of spares, ammunition, and vehicles, as well as agreement terms of Soviet military aid to non-Bloc countries, is provided in CIA/RR A.ERA 63-6, Exports of Bloc Military Equipment to Non-Bloc Countries: a Catalogue of Prices and Quantities, October 1963, SECRET/

Among the shorter works used in the preparation of this study are CIA/RR CB 64-14, Continued Momentum of Soviet Military Assistance in 1963, February 1964, SECRET, and CIA/RR CB 64-24, New Developments in Soviet Military Aid to Iraq, March 1964, SECRET/

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