NIE 11-9-62
2 May 1962

(Taken from Pres. Weekend reading dtd 5/29/62)

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

Number 11-9-62

Trends in Soviet Foreign Policy

Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
As indicated overleaf
2 MAY 1962

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, and the FBI.

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Director of the National Security Agency

Abstaining:

The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, the subject being outside of his jurisdiction.

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TRENDS IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

THE PROBLEM

To estimate probable Soviet courses of action in foreign policy over the next year or so and to examine some factors affecting the Soviet outlook on international politics over a longer period.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Despite attacks on the general line of Soviet foreign policy by the Chinese and other Communists over the last two years or so, and despite some disappointment with the results of that line on the part of the Soviets themselves, we believe that the general principles and tactical methods of Soviet foreign policy are likely to be continued for some time to come. (*Paras. 10–12, 43–46, 62*)

2. The Soviet leaders retain basic confidence in their ideologically-motivated belief that the Communist system is destined to prevail worldwide. But the aggressive quality of their policies derived from this belief will continue to be limited by their full appreciation of the dangers of general nuclear war, and their unwillingness to run serious risks of such a conflict. This does not mean, however, that the Soviets would always estimate such risks correctly nor that they would abandon vital interests to avoid them. (*Paras. 13–17*)

3. Soviet tactics of struggle under the slogan of "peaceful coexistence" rest on two basic assumptions: (a) that the USSR's economic system will demonstrate its superiority and increasingly give it a power advantage; and (b) that the "masses," first in the underdeveloped and former colonial

countries but ultimately in advanced Western states also, will increasingly join the Communists in the struggle to overthrow the "system of Western imperialism." (*Paras. 25, 42–46*)

4. The greater stress placed by the Soviets in the last year or two on wars of "national liberation" is in part a response to Chinese criticism that the Soviets were magnifying the dangers of war with the West and underplaying the necessary role of violence. Despite these Chinese pressures, the USSR has not given full political and material support or committed its prestige to all armed anti-Western movements in the underdeveloped areas. We believe that the Soviets will continue to follow an opportunistic policy in this regard. (*Paras. 21–22*)

5. Although the Soviets are unlikely, as a matter of general policy, to use their own forces to achieve local gains, they might do so in some area adjacent to Bloc territory if they judged that the political circumstances were favorable and believed that the West would not make an effective military response. They would probably employ Soviet forces as necessary if some Western military action on the periphery of the Bloc threatened the integrity of the Bloc itself. (*Para. 20*)

6. We see no prospect for acceptance by the Soviets of a permanently stabilized situation in Germany, which they will continue to regard as a key area of struggle. While a direct challenge to the Western position in Berlin proceeding from a separate "peace treaty" with East Germany cannot be excluded, it seems more likely that the Soviets will continue to pursue their aims by diplomatic pressure and by small unilateral steps designed to whittle away the Western position and to establish the *de facto* sovereignty of the East German regime. (*Paras. 29–37*)

7. It is unlikely that a change in Soviet leadership would produce any major shift in the Soviet outlook or lead to policies carrying increased dangers of war. However, Khrushchev's present role testifies to the importance of the individual leader in the conduct of Soviet policy, and the

man or group which succeeds him may introduce significant changes in style and even in the weight attached to various tactics. (*Para. 63*)

8. Over the long run, the concept of ineradicable hostility between systems may gradually come to carry less weight in determining Soviet international conduct. The chances of such a long-run change depend to some extent upon the strength of certain evolutionary trends within Soviet society and, to a greater extent, on the impact of divisions within the Communist movement. But most of all they depend on whether fundamental Communist beliefs are sustained by successes in the East-West struggle or, over an extended period of time, are challenged by failure to achieve substantial progress in that struggle. Thus US strength, maintained at an adequate deterrent level, and the effectiveness of US policy, are crucial factors bearing upon this possible evolution in the Soviet outlook. (*Paras. 64–69*)

9. Even if such a tendency should emerge, however, strong national aspirations would continue to sustain great East-West conflicts of interest. The requirements of Soviet national security, prestige, and ambition, as seen by the Soviet leaders and people, would still bring the USSR into collision with the interests of other states, even if communism lost all of its fanatical character. The most that could be expected would be that some issues would become more tractable and negotiable, particularly those which were not deeply rooted in the national interests of the Soviet state. (*Paras. 65, 69*)

DISCUSSION

I. THE SOVIET OUTLOOK

10. The mood of exuberant confidence which marked the conduct of Soviet foreign policy two or three years ago seems in the last year or so to have sobered somewhat. In the aftermath of the Sputnik success of 1957 the Soviets appeared for some time to entertain expectations of early advances at the expense of the West. But the promising factors which spurred the Soviet mood in that period seem to have lost some of their force and new complications have arisen.

11. As the Soviets contrast 1962 to, say, 1958, they must recognize that the significant advantage they then believed they would acquire in missiles and therefore in strategic posture has failed to materialize. The prospects for a settlement of the Berlin and German question in accord with Soviet objectives, which probably seemed good through 1959 and the spring of 1960, were not realized, and the attempt to resume pressure on this subject in mid-1961 brought a sharp rise in the pace of the arms race. This development in turn tightened the chronic squeeze on Soviet resources at a time when some domestic programs, notably in agriculture, in housing, and in some branches of investment, were falling well short of expectations. Added to these concerns, there has been since at least the spring of 1960 an ever sharpening crisis in relations with Communist China. This development has brought confusion and uncertainty to the international Communist movement, which the Soviets see as an important instrument of their challenge to the West.

12. This is not to say that the last year or two has been marked only by disappointments. On the contrary, there have been significant successes also. The Soviets have doubtless viewed the Cuban development as a gain. Also they evidently believe that trends generally in Latin America and in some other parts of the underdeveloped world show great promise in the long term. They probably regard the "national liberation" struggles in Laos and South Vietnam as progressing on the whole favorably. Nevertheless, the more rapid general advance of Communist fortunes which the Soviets seemed to have anticipated two or three years ago has failed to materialize. Their confidence in the outlook at present, while still strong, seems to have assumed a somewhat more dogged quality and to be keyed to an expectation of slower advance. There has been no evidence, however, of any fundamental reappraisal of policy in the light of a somewhat disappointing record of events. Indeed the general principles and tactical methods of Soviet foreign policy which Khrushchev had developed earlier were reaffirmed at the XXII Party Congress of late 1961.

13. The visible growth of Soviet power and of Soviet influence abroad is the primary factor sustaining the Soviets' basic confidence. Thus the Soviets feel that the present relation of forces enables them to challenge the Western Powers at crisis points everywhere, although they appreciate that the risks of nuclear warfare impose caution on themselves as well as their opponents. The US, Khrushchev now asserts, must realize that the time has passed when it could have its own way in the world, even in an area like Latin America; it must recognize the USSR's claim to be its great power equal, and therefore entitled to be involved in the settlement of all major international questions.

14. In addition to these considerations, the Soviet outlook on foreign policy is also conditioned by the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. This doctrine leads the Soviet leaders to see the world movement of historical forces as favorable to them, to believe that they can associate all sorts of popular and national aspirations with their cause, to regard the developed societies of the West as transitional and destined to give way. Such an outlook contains by itself few tactical prescriptions; it can be used to justify periods of waiting as well as the vigorous exploitation of opportunities. But it anchors Soviet policy to the premise that international politics is at bottom a clash of systems which precludes any genuine, lasting accommodation with the West.

15. Soviet doctrines, however, are not unchanging. Khrushchev has been resourceful in introducing reformulations which reflect a growing awareness of the dangers and complexities confronting the USSR as it extends its operations in the world arena. He has placed great stress, often at the cost of ideological confusion and conflict, on the preventability of war, on the decisiveness of economic competition, on the legitimacy of cooperation with non-Communist and even anti-Communist governments. These theses are intended to permit the USSR to pursue its external objectives with greater flexibility and sophistication. At the same time, they are designed to justify policies which permit careful control of military risks and accord high priority to the goal of domestic economic growth.

16. The US occupies a special place in the Soviet outlook. The primary element in the Soviet attitude is, of course, the concept of Washington as the stronghold of the enemy camp. In addition, however, the Soviets have great respect and even admiration for US material achievements. As rulers of a nation which has newly reached the status of a super power, they greatly value any American acknowledgements of equality and, conversely, are highly sensitive to any American derogation of or challenge to their prestige. This factor also contributes to the recurrent Soviet impulse toward bilateralism. Moscow sometimes appears to be intrigued with the notion that the two greatest powers could somehow combine to contain or override the interests of lesser powers. But this idea, which appears out of harmony with the premise of basic conflict of systems, has not been accompanied by a readiness to compromise on the major issues in dispute between the US and the USSR. We believe that, in the future as well, this idea is more likely to affect the manner in which the USSR approaches these issues, and that only occasionally, than to alter the substance of its positions.

Attitudes Toward War

17. Fundamental hostility toward the non-Communist world defines one limit of Soviet foreign policy; so long as it persists, the USSR will regard international issues as opportunities progressively to weaken and undermine its opponents, and not as occasions for conciliation which would guard the interests of all parties. The other limit, which puts a check upon this aggressiveness, is the Soviet leaders' awareness that their own nation and system would face destruction in a general nuclear war. Both their statements and their actions in recent years have demonstrated their unwillingness to run any considerable risks of this eventuality. This does not mean, however, that they would always estimate the risks correctly, nor does it mean that they would abandon interests they considered vital in order to avoid grave risk of nuclear war.

18. The Soviet leaders evidently continue to base their military and foreign policy planning on the assumption that the present overall military relationship, in which each side can exert a strong deterrent upon the

other, will continue for some time to come. They are clearly determined to maintain and improve their strong military posture. In addition, they are vigorously pursuing programs of research and development in advanced weapons to acquire whatever military advantage they can, and they would, of course, make heavy political use of any successes they achieve. It is possible that some future technological breakthrough would persuade them that they had acquired a decisive advantage and could therefore press the West with far more aggressive policies. We do not believe, however, that the Soviets base their policies upon the expectation that they will be able to achieve, within the foreseeable future, a military posture which would make the deliberate initiation of general war a rational decision; the Soviets realize that the US is determined to maintain second-strike capabilities which would visit intolerable destruction upon them. In any case their policies rest on the conviction that Communist victory can be won without resort to nuclear war.

19. The overt Soviet position on limited wars is that these will grow, rapidly and inevitably, into general nuclear war and are therefore also to be avoided. In our view this formulation is primarily designed to deter the West from the local use of force and does not mean that the Soviets would themselves immediately expand any local conflict into general war; rather, if at all possible they would employ political means to prevent such escalation. In circumstances where they enjoyed a local preponderance of power but important Western interests were at stake, they would probably use that power with restraint in order not to confront their opponent with the painful choice of enlarging the conflict or accepting a conspicuous defeat.

20. We believe that the Soviets are unlikely, as a matter of general policy, to assume the military and political risks involved in using their own forces to achieve local gains. Nevertheless, they might do so in some area adjacent to Bloc territory if they judged that the West, either because it was deterred by Soviet nuclear power or for some other reason, would not make an effective military response. They would probably employ Soviet forces as necessary if some Western military action on the periphery of the Bloc threatened the integrity of the Bloc itself. Even in the latter case, however, they would attempt to use their forces in a way calculated to bring hostilities to a conclusion short of general war. At a much lower level, they will almost certainly encourage and support the use of force by pro-Communist forces when they believe that a local situation is ripe for forceful exploitation and that the challenge to Western interests is not great enough, and their own involvement not direct enough, to involve risks of a direct encounter between US and Soviet forces.

21. This estimate of Soviet views on general and local war is generally consistent with the positions laid out by Khrushchev on 6 January 1961, when he defined various types of wars and the USSR's attitude toward them. On that occasion, in addition to stating Soviet opposition to both world wars and local wars between states, Khrushchev distinguished a category of "wars of national liberation, or popular uprisings." Such internal wars, ranging pro-Soviet or anti-Western forces against colonial or pro-Western regimes, he declared to be "just" and deserving of Communist support. He was carefully vague, however, in discussing the forms which this support would take, and in particular he neither promised nor hinted that Soviet forces would join in the fighting. It has become clear in the past year that this was not a statement of intent to usher in a new phase of vigorous Soviet incitement of such conflicts everywhere, or of maximum military assistance to "national liberation" forces.

22. Instead, it seems likely that Khrushchev's emphasis on "national liberation" warfare, not a new idea at all, was intended in part to meet Chinese criticisms then being made that the USSR, by its undifferentiated stress upon the need to avoid war, was in fact ruling out altogether the use of force in advancing the Communist cause. This charge is a major component of the Chinese attack upon the correctness of Soviet policies and, therefore, upon the legitimacy of the USSR's traditional leadership of the Communist movement. It is also designed to win for China the allegiance of Communists and radicals in the less developed countries, who are less firmly tied to Soviet leadership than their European counterparts. Despite these Chinese pressures, the USSR has not given full political and material support or committed its prestige to all armed anti-Western movements in the underdeveloped areas. We believe that the Soviets will continue to follow an opportunistic policy in this regard.

The Strategy of "Peaceful Coexistence"

23. In the Soviet leaders' assessment of the forces at work in the modern world, there are a host of issues, trends, and sentiments which can be turned to their account. The strategy of "peaceful coexistence," which is the fruit of this assessment, is intended to focus the attention and energies of Communists everywhere upon the incessant exploitation of these forces. This strategy puts great stress on the virtues of flexibility and expediency, and allows for a wide variety of contradictory tactics, frequently pursued simultaneously. Thus military intimidation goes hand in hand with championing of the peace theme, bourgeois governments are courted while their local Communist opponents receive Soviet support, and the Western Powers are treated to promises of detente while their colonies and ex-colonies are urged to turn against the "imperialists" and while Moscow maintains its demands for concessions on Berlin.

24. One noteworthy tactic of this strategy is the raising periodically of demands for Summit meetings. Because his success in Soviet politics has depended partly on his personal qualities, Khrushchev is probably prone to overestimate the effect on foreign statesmen of the pressure he brings to bear in personal encounter. He also believes that, at such a meeting, his Western counterparts will be under greater pressure than he to avoid a "failure" and will therefore be obliged to make concessions to Soviet positions. Khrushchev clearly has a personal penchant for meetings with the President, which we believe reflects his desire that the USSR shall be acknowledged as America's great power equal and that he himself shall personify this equality. Finally, he probably also conceives of Summit meetings as a way of further entrenching his own leadership in the USSR and the validity of his own prescriptions for dealing with the West.

25. Central to the "peaceful coexistence" strategy is the belief that time is on the side of the USSR and that, without general war, the Western position can be gradually but steadily eroded. This belief in turn rests in great part upon the Soviet conviction that economic competition is the decisive factor in the struggle of the two systems. This is the meaning of the slogan emphasized so prominently at the XXII Congress, that the Soviet Party "considers Communist construction in the Soviet Union as the fulfillment of its international duty to the working people of all countries." The Soviet leaders expect that tangible economic successes in physical power and popular well-being will prove so impressive and attractive, and so disheartening to their opponents, that their own position and prospects in the international arena will be steadily enhanced.

The Chinese Critique of Soviet Policy

26. But this slogan, however closely it is linked in the Soviet outlook with the prospects of the Communist movement, clearly implies that the claims of that movement will be subordinated to the security concerns and national interests of the USSR. And so it is precisely at this point, where the theses on war and economic competition combine to produce the strategy of "peaceful coexistence," that the Chinese Communists have raised a fundamental dissent. They perceive in this Soviet analysis a justification for denying priority to courses of action which meet Chinese interests but fail to serve directly the objectives of the USSR. The Chinese leaders see confirmation of their suspicions in a host of indicators: Soviet reluctance to provide them with advanced weapon capabilities, Khrushchev's recurrent moves toward detente and direct dealings with the Western leaders, Moscow's stress on the disarmament issue, and its unwillingness to give support to all-out tactics of militancy in all areas of contention with the West. Perhaps most important, the Chinese object to the Soviet leaders' insistence upon building communism in the USSR first and their concomitant refusal to delay domestic progress in order to bring all members of the Bloc up to the level of their own country.

27. There is some truth, we believe, in Chinese contentions, but it is an old truth. Ever since its founding the USSR has regularly subordinated the claims of foreign Communist parties to national objectives whenever a conflict arose between them. The essential difference now is that, with the growth of the international movement and especially with the accession of some parties to state power, these claims have become more diverse and urgent. In particular, China has sufficient power and independence to defy Soviet discipline and to argue its case with great force.

28. We have analyzed in a recent estimate the way in which the Soviets sought at the XXII Congress, by the attacks on Stalin, Albania, and the "antiparty group," to discredit Peiping's policy views.[1] Then and subsequently, the USSR has reasserted its foreign policies in the face of opposition within the movement and has served notice that adherence to "peaceful coexistence" is a matter of Communist discipline. The Chinese have nevertheless continued publicly to oppose and criticize Soviet policies, making use of doctrinal arguments which find considerable response among Communists who cling to the orthodoxy of an earlier day. We believe that there is no longer much chance of a fundamental resolution of Sino-Soviet differences, and that in the continuing competition between the two the USSR, despite its vigorous rebuttal of Chinese criticisms, will find itself unable to ignore them entirely in framing its tactics. This factor will not, in our view, cause the Soviets to run significantly greater risks in East-West confrontations than they are now willing to contemplate. But, depending upon the course of this competition, it will exert greater or lesser pressures on the USSR to display militancy against the West and to achieve tangible successes which demonstrate the correctness of Moscow's policies.

II. SOVIET POLICIES IN THE NEAR FUTURE

Berlin and Germany

29. The issues arising from the division of Germany remain, as they have for the entire postwar period, the most critical in the whole confrontation between East and West. The Soviets wish to bolster beyond challenge the internal stability of the East German Satellite regime, always the potential weak link in the East European system, where a break-

[1] NIE 11-5-62, "Political Developments in the USSR and the Communist World," dated 21 February 1962.

down of Communist power could place in hazard all the regimes under Soviet hegemony in that area. The concurrent Soviet offensive aim is to limit the West German contribution to the strength of NATO and ultimately to separate the Federal Republic from its Western partners. Both of these objectives have inspired the three year old Soviet effort to erode the Western position in Berlin and ultimately to effect a withdrawal of the allies from the city. Khrushchev believes that, if he is successful, this would be a long step toward establishing the permanence and stability of the GDR and would at the same time deliver a body blow to West Germany's confidence in its allies and, indeed, to the confidence and cohesion of the entire NATO Alliance.

30. More than three years of postponement, however, clearly signifies the USSR's awareness of the dangers inherent in unilateral actions encroaching upon Western rights in Berlin. The chief result of the stiff Soviet demands put forth again in June 1961 was to provoke from the US a display of firmness and a military buildup; as a consequence, the USSR felt obliged to undertake increased military expenditures and demonstrations which in turn curbed Khrushchev's efforts to readjust economic priorities in favor of the consumer. In this situation, he was quick to use the subsequent US initiative for bilateral talks as a pretext for withdrawing his 31 December deadline for a separate treaty.

31. In the light of this record, we think it unlikely that the Soviets are resolved to bring the Berlin issue to a head in some fixed period of time. The USSR, by closing the sector border, has overcome the refugee problem in a way which avoided a direct infringement on essential Allied rights. Nevertheless, the building of the wall has reduced only one of the urgencies in their Berlin problem, and their basic objectives remain unsecured. In addition, Soviet prestige, and that of Khrushchev personally has been deeply committed to demonstrable progress in this question. The Soviets must fear that continued failure to advance will not only hearten their Western opponents, but will also lend greater weight among Communists to Chinese criticisms that the "peaceful coexistence" strategy is a failure and in reality disguises the USSR's abandonment of militant struggle against the West.

32. Thus we believe that the USSR will continue its efforts to obtain at least minimal concessions through negotiation. Its tactics in current diplomatic conversations and periodic harassment on the access routes to West Berlin are intended to serve this end. At the same time, however, other Soviet maneuvers suggest an effort to broaden the scope of East-West discussions in a fashion which would obscure a fundamental stalemate over the Berlin question. These maneuvers are probably intended to preserve Soviet flexibility while diplomatic probing of the Allied position on Berlin continues. In addition, they permit the USSR to explore the possibilities of making gains in related political areas, such as European security arrangements or greater recognition for East Germany, which could for a time compensate for the lack of progress toward their objectives in Berlin.

33. We believe that, despite their hitherto essentially unyielding stand on the terms of a Berlin solution, there will be some flexibility in actual Soviet negotiating tactics. Among the various provisions associated with the "free city" proposal, probably the demand for a change in the status of West Berlin has the greatest immediate importance to the USSR. The Soviets probably do not expect to obtain Western agreement to this demand, however, and they are likely at some point to accept some "compromise" formula. It might provide for the allies to remain in West Berlin and to enjoy access to the city in exchange for undertakings which the Soviets could repre-

sent as a change in the city's status and some *de facto* recognition of the GDR. This would have the additional advantage of allowing them subsequently, with minimum risk, to fulfill their commitment to sign a separate peace treaty, particularly if the new arrangements left open to the allies the face-saving device of treating East German controllers as Soviet agents. The Soviets might even accept, as part of a Berlin arrangement, some form of international supervision over access, but they would seek to inject the GDR as fully as possible into these procedures.

34. We have regularly estimated that, if the USSR reached the conclusion that the allies were unwilling to grant any significant concessions in negotiations, it would proceed along the road of a separate peace treaty. Repeated Soviet procrastination on various pretexts, however, has demonstrated the USSR's extreme reluctance to take this step. While we believe that the USSR would not accompany the signing of a treaty with an immediate and absolute challenge to Allied access, the Soviets would not wish such a treaty to be entirely meaningless, yet its risks would increase in proportion to the meaningfulness of its implementation. Accordingly, there is a good chance that they will continue for some months to exercise their pressures through a variety of local harassments, hoping in this way to demoralize both the allies and the West Berliners and thus to create more favorable conditions for later negotiations. But we cannot exclude the possibility that a combination of circumstances might lead the USSR, sometime during the next year or so, to embark on a course of major unilateral steps of the kind threatened under a separate peace treaty.

35. Whatever their tactics in the period immediately ahead, we think it highly unlikely that during the next few years the Soviets will come to regard Berlin as an issue to be settled by a genuine and lasting compromise which stops short of incorporating the western half of the city into East Germany. Their objectives in this area are deeply rooted in their view of Soviet security requirements: nor will they soon abandon the idea that the changed relation of forces between East and West has rendered West Berlin an anachronism which they need not tolerate forever.

36. The USSR intends, by demonstrating the firmness of its hold upon East Germany and its ability to threaten West Berlin, to stimulate doubts in the Federal Republic about the validity of Bonn's whole foreign policy orientation. As a supplement to this approach, the Soviet Government has recently stepped up its efforts to urge upon German opinion the advantages of a more neutral posture. The Soviets are encouraged in this effort by the recent political gains of the Free Democrats and the prospects of Adenauer's departure. They are likely to develop this tactic further in the coming year.

37. The more active policy the Soviets have lately pursued toward West Germany probably reflects also their concern about the advance of the Common Market and the European unity movement. They have already made it clear that they regard affiliation of the European neutrals with the Common Market as a threat to their interests. Their understanding of the European unity movement has probably never been very clear, perhaps because the phenomenon of "capitalist" states submerging national interests in supranational institutions is in flat contradiction to Marxist-Leninist teachings. But their misgivings about this development, which they have few means to combat, are evidently real. Most of all they would be prone to suspect that the Germans will come to dominate "Europe" and find in it the means of power to pursue "revanchist" aims. In addition, they are bound to fear the disruptive effects

on their inherently unstable and relatively impoverished Satellite empire of a Europe growing in unity, strength, and prosperity.

Disarmament

38. Soviet behavior in the disarmament field in the last year or so has reinforced our earlier judgments that the USSR's primary objectives in this area are to identify itself with universal desires for peace and an end to the arms race and to inhibit and discredit Western policy. Thus agitation for disarmament is conceived by the Soviets as political action intended to bring about alignments favorable to their interests, and also to make it difficult for their opponents to employ force against Communist advances. We believe that the Soviets do have an interest in reducing their present and particularly their prospective military burden. The economic argument for disarmament, which in the past clearly has not been compelling, may acquire increasing weight if the armaments race is not contained. As for the dangers of war, the Soviets still prefer to rely on their own armed strength, and on the control which they intend to retain over the development of crisis situations, rather than to meet Western requirements for inspection and to forfeit the political advantages of their great military power.

39. We believe that, at least during the near future, Soviet activity in this field will continue to aim at political exploitation and the imposition of restraints upon their opponents rather than at agreements on terms which the West would find acceptable. Along with their advocacy of general and complete disarmament, they will maintain an interest in some partial measures, especially those which have a specific political import. A nuclear free zone, for example, tends not only to impede Western nuclear deployment and sharing, but applied to Germany has the effect of imposing a special denial on the Federal Republic and weakening its military and political ties with its Western partners. The Soviets will also advocate schemes in the European security field which would promote the *de facto* recognition of the GDR and require a reduction in the American military presence in Europe. They will also try to make use of the disarmament negotiating process for other ends: cultivating support among participating nonaligned states, establishing the principle of tripartitism, and achieving direct contact with Western leaders.

40. Having completed an extensive nuclear test series last fall, the Soviets are now seeking to maximize the political costs of further Western testing, coupling propaganda with repeated offers to sign a test ban treaty based on national detection systems. Now that the US has resumed atmospheric testing, we think it certain that Soviet tests will follow. At the same time, however, the USSR will continue to agitate the test ban issue if only because of the general political appeal of this question. But we do not foresee any considerable movement towards Western terms in the Soviets' position over the next year or so. They probably consider that they have a high priority requirement for further testing and in any case they will almost certainly continue to resist the inspection features of Western test ban proposals.

The United Nations

41. Clearly the admission of new member states has produced a shift in the balance of forces in the General Assembly away from Western predominance. The Soviets believe that this process has made the UN a favorable arena for agitating Soviet aims. They have experienced some disappointments, however, in soliciting Afro-Asian support for Soviet positions which go beyond the interests of these states. Moscow's tactics will continue to aim at developing and exploiting those issues, particularly anticolonialism, which

provide effective demonstrations of Soviet sympathy and support for the underdeveloped countries. At the same time, the USSR will continue to build a record, in the UN and elsewhere, on the troika principle. This device is intended in the first instance to prevent international authorities, particularly the Secretary General, from taking effective actions against Soviet interests; it also serves as a means of asserting the USSR's claim to a position in the UN and the world at large which fully acknowledges its power. When the question of the Secretary General's role comes up in 1963 the Soviets will again press vigorously the case they made for reorganization upon Hammarskjold's death, but we believe that in the end they will accept a compromise solution.

The Underdeveloped Areas

42. Moscow inaugurated its offensive against the West in the underdeveloped areas of the world some seven years ago. It did so in the first instance in order to counter and complicate Western policy and to remove dominant Western influence from these areas. Secondly, it sought to establish a pattern of economic and military dependence on the USSR and, in this way, to gain a lasting and influential Soviet presence. It also sought to become the political sponsor of anticolonialist regimes and to magnify their radical anti-Western tendencies. At the same time it hoped to establish or strengthen the local Communist parties and to prepare conditions for their eventual revolutionary role. Although it is unlikely that the Soviets had established a timetable for the advance of the Communist movement in the underdeveloped areas, they probably anticipated fairly constant and fairly rapid progress toward these various goals.

43. In reviewing successes and failures over the years, the Soviet leaders must now count their efforts as generally successful, though marked by some disappointments. Soviet policy has contributed to the removal of Western dominance, the emergence of neutralist—and in some cases pro-Bloc—regimes, and the creation of an image of the USSR as a benign, though powerful, anticolonialist country. In addition, through Bloc economic and military aid programs (involving agreements totaling almost $7 billion to date), propaganda campaigns, and political maneuverings, Moscow has sown the seeds of trouble for the Western Powers in various areas of the world, reduced Western influence in the UN, and, at least indirectly, encouraged differences between the Western allies.

44. On the other hand, to the extent that the Soviet leaders hoped to achieve dominant influence in certain countries at an early date, they have had to curtail their expectations. Despite notable gains in some areas they have as yet failed to achieve decisive influence in any of the states which have welcomed their economic and military assistance, except perhaps in the case of Cuba. As for promoting the growth of local Communist parties, the Soviet leaders—with eyes on, for example, Iraq and Egypt—must consider their efforts to date as largely a failure.

45. The increasing complexity of Soviet involvement in the politics of various countries and the growing number of embarrassments, as in Guinea, and such a heavy setback as occurred in the Congo, must also serve to give Moscow a more sober view of the prospects for its policies. The tendency among neutralist states to concert their independent policy and the emergence of other influential voices on the anticolonialist scene, chiefly Egypt, Yugoslavia, and even Communist China, represent additional complications which may, in time, reduce Soviet influence and contain Soviet inroads. Finally, such factors as these may loom the larger as the various competing demands on Soviet economic resources grow.

46. On the whole, however, Moscow almost certainly views its policies in a favorable light and believes that, over the long term, its interests will be served by maintaining the general thrust of its programs in these areas for the foreseeable future. There will probably be some adjustments in Soviet policies over the next few years keyed to specific developments in particular areas. But we do not foresee a general shift of Soviet policy toward the underdeveloped areas or a major change in the level of the Soviet aid programs; Moscow's commitment to this aspect of its strategy, together with its conviction that over the long-term developments in these areas will work in its interests, is too broad and too deep for a radical change in the foreseeable future.

Africa

47. The USSR's activities in Africa have expanded rapidly over the last three years and are being pressed in a variety of ways. Through diplomacy and propaganda, it seeks to associate itself with the anticolonialism of the continent and to place new strains on remaining ties to the West. It is vigorously cultivating the African trade union movement and is beginning to give greater attention to the development of Communist cadres. Primarily, however, the Soviet effort is concentrated upon state-to-state relations. Almost one-third of Soviet aid extended in 1961 went to sub-Saharan Africa, and the USSR not only concluded new assistance agreements with Ghana, Mali, and Somalia, but made efforts to establish some influence among the 12 states of the Brazzaville group with offers of aid and expanded trade relations.

48. The USSR's setback in the Congo, its troubles in Guinea, and the difficulties it has encountered in offering itself as the chief sponsor of African political aspirations all suggest that the Soviets have not found any reliable means of building a solid position in this turbulent area. We believe that, over the next several years, the consolidation of political and economic relations with existing regimes, whatever their political complexion, will be the primary object of Soviet policy. Attempts to capture power in individual African states by means of Communist parties or through the infiltration of native political movements hold less immediate promise, mainly because of the almost complete absence of Soviet-controlled Communist cadres. Nevertheless, the USSR will continue to develop assets against the day when opportunities for these tactics might arise.

Middle East

49. The complexities currently facing Soviet policy toward the Arab world contrast sharply with the relative simplicity of the initial phase of Soviet intervention in Near Eastern politics—a period when the USSR scored heavily with such measures as its arms deal with Egypt in 1955 and its aggressive support for Nasser's campaign against the Western Powers. The USSR's support of Qasim's regime in Iraq has complicated the problem of staying on good terms with Qasim's antagonist, Nasser. Moscow's attempts to avoid offense to either of these powers during the Kuwait crisis in 1961 illustrated this dilemma.

50. Although the USSR's relations with Egypt have not gone smoothly since the revolution in Iraq and the subsequent Communist bid for power there, the cooling in Moscow-Cairo political relations has not resulted in any reduction in Soviet economic and military support for the United Arab Republic (UAR). The USSR welcomed the breakup of the UAR last September, and presumably hopes to resume close economic and military cooperation with Syria. The question of the future role and tactics of the Syrian Communist Party, the strongest and best-led party in the Middle East prior to its suppression by Nasser after the formation of the UAR, will

again pose a difficult problem for Moscow. It seems likely, however, that the Soviets will seek to prevent overly militant Communist tactics, of the sort unsuccessfully employed by the Iraqi Communists in 1959. We believe there will be no significant change in Soviet policy toward Iraq, Syria, and the UAR over the next year; Moscow will seek to avoid involvement in controversy among these three states and to maintain good relations with all of them.

51. The Soviet leaders view Iran as an especially promising and vulnerable target. They appear confident that events are moving toward a revolutionary explosion which will result in the overthrow of the Shah's regime by nationalist, anti-Western forces which would sever Iran's ties with the West. Soviet propaganda has endeavored to hasten these developments by seeking to discredit the Shah and his government as American puppets. We believe that the Soviet policy toward Iran, and CENTO, will continue along the same general lines; we do not foresee any dramatic Soviet moves in Iran over the next year or so, barring a domestic upheaval which offered the Soviets new opportunities for subversion and expansion of their political influence. They will continue to press for a nonaggression pact and restrictions against foreign military bases.

Latin America

52. The Soviets view Latin America as being in the opening stage of an "active struggle against imperialism" and they expect that favorable opportunities for the expansion of their influence will develop. They apparently recognize Brazil as the most significant and promising target for economic and political overtures and will make considerable efforts to broaden the opening won in the resumption of diplomatic relations last November. Elsewhere, however, the USSR's effort to expand ties with Latin American states has made only moderate progress in the past year. With the exception of Cuba, Bloc aid offers have had limited acceptance. The Soviets, however, are not likely to be discouraged by the modest gains scored thus far for they recognize that losses to US influence in Latin America would be especially damaging to the US world position.

53. Moscow sees in Cuba a symbol of great importance in the struggle for Latin America and has demonstrated its intention to provide the necessary economic and military assistance to insure the survival and strengthening of the Castro regime. But there are signs of Soviet concern that the regime's self-identification with the Communist Bloc and its belligerent and provocative attitude toward the US and the rest of Latin America will weaken the appeal of the Cuban revolution and limit the prospects for expanding the Communist movement and Soviet influence in other countries in the hemisphere. The Soviets apparently were both surprised and embarrassed by Castro's proclamations that Cuba has entered the "era of socialist construction" and that he is himself a "Marxist-Leninist." Such proclamations and the formation of the new Marxist-Leninist party in Cuba are making it difficult for Moscow to refrain from promoting Cuba into full membership in the socialist camp. We believe, however, that they will avoid the latter step so as not to acquire explicit military obligations to defend the security of the regime.

54. Moscow almost certainly looks upon developments in Cuba as the forerunner of further revolutionary successes in Latin America. In certain countries, the Soviets may urge revolutionary elements to follow the Cuban model of a guerrilla struggle for power. However, the Cuban example may have suggested to the Soviet leaders that their long-term objectives in Latin America as a whole will not always be best served by encouraging early Communist or crypto-Communist seizures of

power. The Soviets will be chary of allowing the prestige of the world movement to be staked on regimes whose continuation in power might be uncertain. Such regimes, even if they maintained power, would be eager to pursue national interests of their own and possibly might not be fully responsive to Soviet direction. They might embark on policies which could involve the USSR in unwanted economic and even implicit military commitments. Thus the Soviet leaders may advocate caution in their approach to this problem, seek to control the militancy of the local parties, and encourage them to work in cooperation with non-Communist "progressive" elements, trying in this way to eliminate US influence without substituting in its stead a direct and obvious Soviet presence. They will of course attempt to turn to their advantage such promising revolutionary developments as may occur, even if they cannot fully control them.

Asia and the Far East

55. Soviet policy in the Far East is complicated by the large and sometimes conflicting role which Communist China plays in the area and its challenge to Moscow's traditional authority over the Communist parties of the region. Soviet policy in recent years has nevertheless hewed fairly consistently to the line of cultivating good relations with nationalist, neutralist governments, even when this brought them into conflict with Chinese objectives. The Soviets refrained conspicuously from supporting China in the Sino-Indian border dispute and in the Sino-Indonesian quarrel over Indonesia's Chinese Community. Even though Moscow's friendly attitude toward these "bourgeois" governments has facilitated Peiping's efforts to form its own factions within the Communist parties the Soviets have not been deterred. We think it likely that, over the next year or so, the Soviets will not alter their line for the sake of composing their relations with the Chinese or helping Moscow-oriented Communists in factional conflicts within the national parties.

56. Indonesia has become the target of a vigorous Soviet drive to establish a predominant position, with important implications for the contest for influence with Peiping. There has been a marked increase in Soviet assistance to Djakarta since the fall of 1960. Moscow appears to regard its vigorous program of political, economic, and military support for Indonesia as providing a compelling demonstration of the correctness and effectiveness of its policy of backing nationalist, neutralist governments, as opposed to the more radical prescriptions of Peiping. As part of this policy the Soviets are encouraging the Indonesians to take West New Guinea by force. However, Sino-Soviet differences already have resulted in a heightened struggle for influence over the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and have accentuated factional differences within the party. In the event of an open Sino-Soviet break, the Soviets would probably encourage the PKI to purge its Chinese-oriented faction and would seek to retain influence over a "legitimate" party which would support the Soviet policy of cooperation with Sukarno.

57. Moscow evidently continues to view favorably the results of its policy towards India, where the Soviet commitment in economic aid and other support to Nehru is deepening with time. Moscow's desire to establish Communist control in India has not diminished, but the Soviets continue to regard this as a long-term process and are prepared in the meantime to build up good will and enhance Soviet prestige in India against the time when prospects for Communist acquisition of power are considerably improved. We believe that Soviet policy toward India will be a bone of Sino-Soviet contention for some time to come. The Indian Communist Party is seriously split on

the issue of the correct internal strategy to follow, and a strong faction has close ties with Peiping. An open Sino-Soviet split would almost certainly result in a split of the party. Although this would weaken the Indian Communist movement considerably, it would not have a significant effect on Soviet policy toward India.

58. The USSR's political relations with Japan remain at an impasse. Soviet hopes for a leftward turn in Japanese policies following the mass demonstrations against the pro-US Government in 1960 have been largely disappointed, in part because of Soviet overeagerness to capitalize upon this trend during subsequent elections and Mikoyan's visit. On the governmental level, Moscow continues to reject Japanese claims to the southern Kuriles and to insist upon abrogation of the defense treaty with the US as a precondition for normalizing Soviet-Japanese relations with a peace treaty. The USSR would probably relax somewhat its present unyielding position, however, if it detected in Tokyo signs of a willingness to loosen ties with the US. The USSR would probably also modify its demands if an open Sino-Soviet break were to occur, since such a break would almost certainly lead to competition between Moscow and Peiping for a closer association with Japan.

59. The Soviets of course desire to see Communist control established at an early date in Laos and South Vietnam, and would regard this development as opening up new opportunities in the area of Southeast Asia as a whole. Soviet involvement in these conflicts has been influenced heavily by the Sino-Soviet quarrel, and we believe that the Soviets will continue to feel that Chinese arguments oblige them to present a show of firm support for the Communist forces there. At the same time, they will prefer to advance the Communist cause primarily by political means and to avoid substantial risks of direct US military intervention.

60. This attitude is likely to govern the USSR's reaction to the intensification, with US support, of operations against the Viet Cong. Moscow will share the concern of both Hanoi and Peiping to prevent a decisive defeat for the local Communist forces in South Vietnam; and the USSR may come under strong pressure to support the more aggressive political and military policy favored by these two Communist states. But the Soviet leaders almost certainly realize that the US commitment raises the stakes in South Vietnam. The USSR is not disposed to make heavy sacrifices or jeopardize other objectives vis-a-vis the West in order to make immediate advances in an area which is of more direct concern to Hanoi and Peiping. They are likely, therefore, to urge a gradualist strategy and to accept some temporary setbacks in preference to the risks of substantial involvement to sustain the Viet Cong.

61. Despite their differences, the Soviets and the Chinese do not appear to be working at cross purposes in these two countries. Although an open split between the two would place great strains upon their cooperation, we doubt that a split would produce an early and radical shift in Communist conduct in Laos and South Vietnam. North Vietnam has maintained a degree of independence from both China and the USSR. In both Laos and South Vietnam it is the interests of North Vietnam which are most immediately at stake, and the tactics being followed are those developed by Hanoi and implemented primarily by Hanoi-controlled assets. In the wake of a Sino-Soviet split, both Moscow and Peiping would be concerned with increasing their influence with the North Vietnamese, and probably disposed therefore to support Hanoi's wishes as to policies in Laos and South Vietnam.

III. SOURCES OF POSSIBLE LONG-TERM CHANGE IN THE SOVIET OUTLOOK

62. In the opening section of this estimate, we have set forth certain broad considerations underlying Soviet foreign policy which are likely to remain generally valid for some time to come. We recognize, however, that the environment in which Soviet policy is made is changing. It may therefore be useful to examine three major factors—the course of developments within the USSR, changing relations inside the Bloc and the Communist movement, and the movement of events in the East-West competition—and to consider how they might in the long run affect the Soviet outlook on international politics.

Internal Developments

63. Within the USSR, Khrushchev's removal from the scene might be followed by a prolonged power struggle which could produce confusion and uncertainty in foreign policy or considerable fluctuations in tactics. Apart from this possibility, Khrushchev's present role testifies to the importance of the individual leader in the conduct of Soviet policy, and the man or group which succeeds him may introduce significant changes in style and even in the weight attached to various tactics. We think it certain, however, that such a leadership would appreciate, as fully as does the present one, the consequences of nuclear war. Further, this leadership would be unlikely to take a substantially different view either of the interests of the USSR or of the risks justified by these interests. We do not believe, therefore, that a change of Soviet leadership would in itself produce any major shift in the Soviet outlook or lead to policies carrying increased dangers of war.

64. Present trends suggest that, over the long run, popular aspirations are likely to acquire a larger influence in Soviet domestic politics.[2] We believe that such a development would have some effect on the conduct of foreign policy, but this process would almost certainly be gradual and subject to setbacks. Even now the Soviet people are not enthusiastically committed to all aspects of Communist ideology. In particular, they are not obsessed with the idea of ineradicable and total conflict, on ideological grounds, between themselves and the non-Communist world. Their desire for peace and for more rapid gains in material welfare is pronounced. To the extent that these attitudes become more important in formulating Soviet foreign policy, the USSR's reluctance to enter upon risky confrontations with the West—especially for the sake of advancing the Communist cause in remote areas—would be reinforced.

65. At the same time, the Russian people possess strong nationalist feeling. They welcome and support a vigorous assertion of Soviet power on the world scene in furtherance of Soviet national interest. Accordingly, we believe that, even if Soviet politics come to represent popular opinion to a greater degree than at present there would not necessarily be any substantial lessening of international conflict. But the nature of such conflict, and the atmosphere in which it took place, would change, becoming less ideological and more traditional. While East-West disputes would persist, there would be a better chance of the occasional recognition of areas of common interest between the contending powers.

Relations in the Communist World

66. Soviet control over the international Communist movement is likely to be further diminished in the face of pressures for national autonomy. This process, insofar as it

[2] NIE 11-5-62, "Political Developments in the USSR and the Communist World," (paragraphs 33-37), dated 21 February 1962 for a more complete discussion of this matter.

enables individual parties to give a more national cast to their policies, may increase the effectiveness of Communist political appeals in some areas. This result, however, is likely to be more than offset by the spectacle of policy conflicts and doctrinal argument within the movement. These consequences will tend to rob Soviet policy of the special authority which it has derived from the concept of a wholly united movement based on a single agreed interpretation of human society. In addition, some of the Soviet energies now directed against the West may be diverted to combating Chinese policies in various areas.

67. Behind these difficulties for the execution of Soviet policy, however, lies the possibility of an important change in the Soviet outlook itself. If the Chinese challenge produces a definitive and open Sino-Soviet break, and if China subsequently progresses toward great power status and develops an effective rivalry to the USSR as a claimant to leadership of the Communist movement, the Soviet view of world politics as essentially a bipolar struggle would be increasingly difficult to sustain. In these circumstances, the Soviet leaders might come to feel that in some matters their interests paralleled those of the West rather than those of their enormous and uncontrollable neighbor.

The Course of East-West Competition

68. Perhaps the most significant factor which will affect the Soviet outlook, however, is the success or failure which the USSR's foreign policy encounters in the years to come. Successes in expanding Soviet influence, major weakenings in Western positions, and in particular any further advances of direct Communist rule will act to confirm the Soviet leaders in their analysis of a fundamental conflict of systems destined to end in their triumph. However, they have already experienced difficulty in translating real gains in military power into concrete political successes under conditions of nuclear stalemate. And in the underdeveloped areas, it has proven far more difficult to move the newer nations into a full association with Soviet policies and thence along the path toward Communist control than the Soviets thought it would be when, in an earlier phase, these countries were emerging from Western rule. If Soviet objectives should be continually frustrated, the Soviet leaders would have to reappraise the validity of some of their key doctrines. They might in this case gradually relax their effort to extend communism everywhere.[3] Alternatively, they might become far more aggressive in order to make good on the traditional commitment to make communism a world system; but, assuming that the West retained its deterrent power, this seems less likely because of the greater risks such a course would involve. Thus US strength, maintained at an adequate deterrent level, and the effectiveness of US policy are crucial factors bearing upon this possible evolution in the Soviet outlook.

69. In sum, none of the factors discussed above portends any early or sharp change in the basic Soviet outlook upon the external world. Still less do they suggest that any deliberate renunciation of Marxism-Leninism, or of the international movement built upon it, is likely. They do point, however, to the possibility that in time—almost certainly a long time—the special intensity which ideological hostility imparts to world politics may diminish. Such a development would not mean that international conflicts of interest ceased to exist, or even that the danger of general war was appreciably reduced. On the

[3] The FBI representative to the USIB does not concur with paragraph 68, feeling that:

If Soviet objectives should be continually frustrated, the Soviet leaders would have to reappraise their tactics in applying some of their key doctrines. They might, in this case, find it necessary to delay their efforts to extend communism everywhere.

contrary, the requirements of Soviet national security, prestige, and ambition, as seen by the Soviet leaders and people, would still bring the USSR into collision with the interests of other states, even if communism lost all of its fanatical character. The most that could be expected would be that some issues would become more tractable and negotiable, particularly those which were not deeply rooted in the national interests of the Soviet state, and that the occasional recognition of a measure of common interest between the USSR and its adversaries would not be invariably stifled by ideological hostility.

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