

~~SECRET~~

REF 368-1126

MEMORANDUM

TO: Lt. Col. Carroll Gray November 26, 1943
FROM: Francis Kalnay JK
SUBJECT: X-2 METO
Balkan Division, Istanbul

The following is an attempt to formulate some ideas and suggestions concerning the Balkan Division of X-2 M E T O at Istanbul.

BALKANS IN THE FOREFRONT

Latest reports indicate a desperate effort on the part of Balkan satellite nations to establish contact with Allied representatives. Thus, a "constant stream" of emissaries from the Balkans is arriving in Istanbul. It is, of course, vital for Axis agents to smoke out these efforts. Furthermore, the deterioration of Nazi organizations and pro-Nazi sympathies in every stratum in the Balkans; the shifting of vital German industries to safer regions in Central Europe; the extreme need for protection from saboteurs of oil fields, refineries and communication lines in Rumania and Hungary; the reluctance of satellite countries to supply additional divisions and industrial manpower to the Germans; the growing tension over territorial revisions and treatment of minorities between Hungary and Rumania, Bulgaria and Rumania, Hungary and Slovakia, Albania and Greece; the fratricidal battles between Serbs and Croats; the ever-increasing aid given to the Jugoslav, Albanian and Greek guerrillas by the Allies; all these are forcing the Germans to multiply their agents in the Balkans and in Turkey, the neutral meeting ground.

LOWD-OSS-Peris-15
JOB NO. 61-887 (5)

8073

~~SECRET~~

PE 25368

PERSONNEL

Because of the uncertainty of Turkey's next move, it seems advisable to process, as soon as possible, all individuals being considered for the following posts:

Chief of Balkan Division

(Assistant)

Bulgaria2 officers
6 field operatives

Rumania2 officers
6 field operatives

Hungary2 officers
6 field operatives

There will be need for at least two secretaries for this division. Cable, file clerk and guards, it is assumed, would be covered by the overall METO Istanbul office.

PHYSICAL SET-UP
AND SOME SECURITY
MEASURES

Cover, local regulations, housing and other factors will determine location, size and type of headquarters. Under ideal conditions, the Balkan Division would operate under one cover such as a bank, export-import company, embassy, scientific institution, a particularly well-situated apartment house, etc. However, from the standpoint of security, a breakdown into isolated units would be preferable since otherwise, should the enemy at any time penetrate into one unit, the entire organization might be endangered.

Whatever the physical set-up of the headquarters of this division may be, internally the isolation or separation should be fool-proof, to the extent that no documentary evidence of the existence of one section or area should be found in the files of another.

~~SECRET~~

REF 2536:

DIVISION OF
WORK

The activities of the two officers in each of the geographic areas mentioned above could be divided as follows:

One would be responsible for the handling of operatives in the enemy field (employment, dispatching into the field, maintenance of contact, collection of information, etc.)

His colleague would concentrate on the enemy agents to be found among, or through, his nationals on the immediate scene, and on the coordination of material concerning his area coming from other Middle East sources.

In addition, one or both would be assigned, when necessary, to assist in protecting American government agencies located in Istanbul from enemy penetration. Again, it would be their responsibility to prepare and keep up to date as complete a file as possible of all suspect individuals among their particular nationality groups, entering or leaving Istanbul; to analyze all political, ^{economic} military and cultural ties between the country of their interest and Turkey; and to discover the identity, function and movement of Nazi agents through whatever medium presents itself.

MOBILITY OF
PERSONNEL

Once there is any suspicion that his cover has been discovered, an officer should be transferred to a new post.

FIELD
OPERATIVES

Operatives would fall into two groups: one to be sent into enemy territory to accomplish a certain specific mission; the other to track down agents engaged in military, political

~~SECRET~~

4.

or economic espionage, or sabotage in a given area.

Probably the best type of agent to penetrate the field is the man who has legitimate business requiring his presence in one of the Balkan countries, with natural reasons to make occasional trips to Istanbul, such as representatives of a well established industrial firm, engineers, government officials, officials of a transportation company, commercial travelers, scientists, press representatives, church dignitaries, etc.

Another potential source of operatives might be the dissident minority groups from each country. Some of these maintain underground contacts with parallel political organizations in neighboring countries. (For example, the Agrarian parties in Bulgaria maintain close relations with Machek's Croatian Peasant Party in Yugoslavia. This is also true of persecuted religious groups: Moslem, Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, etc.) Field operatives should never be brought to headquarters nor to field offices except upon specific instructions from the chief of the division. While it might be expedient, occasionally, for operatives to work in teams, for security reasons they will be employed individually by a single officer, and will maintain contact through him alone. In most cases, the operatives will have no knowledge of each other.

POSSIBLE LEADS

The officer will find his leads through such sources as shipping companies, cultural relations organizations, industrial and commercial representatives, export and import companies, insurance companies, tourist bureaus, scientific organizations, motion picture companies, press and press photo bureaus, radio, religious organizations, schools, newspaper stands (particularly kiosks selling foreign periodicals) and booksellers. A considerable colony exists in Turkey of nationals of each of the Balkan countries and it may be that a few key people will be able to furnish the clue to such a "Who's Who." One of the tasks of the officer would be the preparation of a dossier on suspect local residents of each nationality.

The officer will find himself surrounded not only by Nazi espionage and counter-espionage organizations, including Ribbentrop's private political espionage bureau, but individual espionage units representing group interests from each of the Balkan countries.

SPECULATION ON
PROBABLE RE-
SHUFFLING OF NAZI
HEADQUARTERS AND
AGENTS

The heavy bombing of the two major Nazi espionage centers, Hamburg and Berlin, gives rise to speculation as to where the Abwehr and other Nazi intelligence headquarters will be located. It seems likely that the new headquarters might be located somewhere around Vienna, where Balkan divisional headquarters have been established for some time.

Should Turkey suddenly align herself with the Allies, it is likely that some of the well known Nazi agents from Turkey will leave, while fresh agents will penetrate Turkey before the door is closed. It is to be expected that this influx of new Nazi agents will have to be of the keenest type, possessing the best cover; therefore the most dangerous.

COOPERATION WITH
ALLIED INTELLI-
GENCE AGENCIES

It is to be assumed that in addition to contact with British Intelligence, X-2 will have liaison with other established Allied intelligence units such as the Free French, Polish, etc., in Istanbul?

FLOW OF INFORMA-
TION FROM WASH-
INGTON

It is expected that METO X-2 headquarters in Washington will supply its Balkan Division at Istanbul, through the usual channels, with available vital information which might be used in the field (R & A, SI, SO, MC, etc.)

It is suggested that an administrative assistant be attached to the office of the Theater Officer of X-2 METO, Washington, who will collect, analyze, classify and channel material bearing on X-2 Middle East activities. Particular attention should be paid to unearthing possible contacts in the Middle East or enemy-occupied countries who may be reached and used in the respective territories. As an illustration of a potential source within OSS for such contacts, there is the Survey of Foreign Experts in New York which has indexed thousands of

~~SECRET~~

7.

individuals now residing in the United States, recent arrivals from neutral or enemy-occupied countries. Some are native Americans, others are refugees. Many of these have knowledge of conditions and personalities, business contacts, relatives or friends in those countries.