


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Intelligence Report

ANNEX

TEN YEARS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST FOREIGN POLICY

Section II: South and Southeast Asia
(Reference Title: POLO XXVII)

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the seige of the Indian embassy in Peking on the 17th further strained relations. Sporadic demonstrations against the Indian embassy occurred, but by 1 October following the border clash, they were limited in scope.

The prospect seems to be for sporadic small-scale patrol clashes at various points on the border, for government-to-government political abuse, and for sustained Chinese support for Naga guerrillas and the new extremists of the Indian Communist movement. They will insist on complete support from any Indian Communist who is willing to be pro-Peking. By their action in firefights during September 1967 on the Sikkim-Tibet border, the Chinese have discarded the earlier policy contained in the pledge they had made to "first of all inform all the Colombo conference countries" before taking military action against Indian forces. (People's Daily article of 13 October 1963)

B. Old Enemies

1. Thailand

Chou En-lai had invited Thailand's representatives at the Bandung conference in April 1955 to visit Peking, and in this way he initiated the effort to move Bangkok to loosen its ties with SEATO and Washington. (Chou's invitation is referred to in his foreign policy report of 30 July 1955) At the same conference, Chen Yi worked with him and tried to mollify Foreign Minister Prince Wan (Chen interview of 28 July 1958) As a result, some Thais visited Peking and some trade developed, until it was restricted by Thai-imposed import controls in early 1959. Chou and Chen attained very little in all their efforts, the main difficulty for them having been the fact that Bangkok, with no experience of Western colonial domination to make its leaders anti-Western in attitude, preferred a strong assertive alignment with the U.S. and an assertive opposition to Communism in South-east Asia. They openly rejected a policy of accommodation with Peking and Hanoi.

Failure to move the Thais away from their close relationship with the U.S. and toward a neutral foreign policy position and the increased presence of the U.S. in Thailand impelled the Chinese leaders to drop their restraint and to begin to denounce Bangkok for its attitude of supporting anti-Communist efforts in the area. In mid-1962, Chen Yi referred to the authorities in Bangkok as "reactionary," and stated that the country was a "bridgehead for invading Laos" (speech of 12 July 1962). Regarding the war in Vietnam, they viewed Thai support of the South Vietnamese and American effort as sufficiently important to require warnings to Bangkok to cease this support or accept the consequences, namely, a subversive movement of insurgents in the Thai countryside. At some time between the central committee work conference of June 1964 and the U.S. airstrikes against North Vietnam in August 1964, the Chinese leaders apparently decided to create trouble for Bangkok by organizing all anti-government Thais, including prominent non-Communists, into a united front of political and military opponents. This action probably reflected a decision to discard the 1954-1964 policy of non-support, or low-key support, for Bangkok's internal enemies. According to Thai security services reports, in late summer of 1964, Communist-led insurgent activities (assassinations of police informants and propaganda attacks on the government) had increased considerably. As organizational activities moved forward among Thai insurgents, the Chinese leaders began to enlist the active support of prominent political figures, the most prominent having been sheltered in Canton. On 19 September 1964, the son of Pridi Banonmyong, the former Prime Minister, reported that "recently" the Chinese had permitted (or encouraged) leaders of the "patriotic movement" in Thailand to visit Pridi in his Canton sanctuary. These leaders apparently tried to induce Pridi to directly associate his name with their group in an effort to gain some support among non-Communist Thai political figures. Pridi apparently did not agree; further, he did not agree to any association with Thai Communists on the mainland or in Thailand.

Nevertheless, the Chinese continued on their course; on 13 December 1964, NCNA rebroadcast a manifesto issued

by the Independence Movement of Thailand (said to have been founded on 1 November and originally reported in the clandestine radio broadcast of the Voice of the People of Thailand on 8 December), declaring as policy the expulsion of U.S. personnel from Thailand and the "overthrow" of the Thanom government. The manifesto stated that the Independence group was willing "to cooperate" with "any" individuals or organization who were "patriotic" --i.e., anti-government--and in this usage it was similar to the greetings sent to the PRC on 1 October by the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT). U.S. officials in Hong Kong noted this similarity and also commented that Thai was among the first three foreign languages to be studied in Peking's new (established on 5 September 1964) Foreign Language Institute. By January 1965, the Thai Patriotic Front was launched as the second anti-government organization which was "willing to cooperate with all compatriots... who love peace and democracy." (Voice of the People of Thailand broadcast of 23 January 1965 reporting the formation of the Front on 1 January) Both organizations were given wide and unprecedented coverage by Peking and Hanoi media, suggesting the primary role of these Communist capitols in organizing and supporting the subversives.

Activation of the Thai insurgent and subversive movement was one of the ways the Chinese had decided to react to increased U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Chen Yi had stated to the French ambassador in January 1965 that guerrilla warfare might "spread" to Thailand in 1965, and Chen apparently was making a statement of intent. Prime Minister Thanom declared on 19 January that the Chinese had already sent agents into Thailand and were financing them partly through funds made available in Thai currency in Hong Kong banks. By March 1965, Communist insurgent activity in northeastern Thailand was reported to be well organized and in the same month, Communist-led Independent Movement personnel were circulating propaganda tracts in Bangkok. The "liaison representative" of the Independence Movement, a Thai, reported that he had arrived in Peking on 24 March, had been provided broadcasting facilities, and then denounced the Thai government for permitting the country to be used as a base for attacks on North Vietnam ("neighboring countries"). Peking broadcasts in the Thai

language intensified by May 1965 and the People's Daily on 30 July 1965 attacked Bangkok authorities for "playing the role of an accomplice of the U.S."

Direct Chinese participation has centered on training of Thai cadres and financing political and military operations. Thai cadres captured in December 1965 told Thai authorities that they had received two months training in Peking sponsored by the Thai front organization but conducted by Chinese instructors. A course in subversion and guerrilla warfare was conducted in Peking for a single Thai student in May 1965, and the reported route for trainees to travel to and from the mainland was either through Laos or by way of Hong Kong-Macao. A Sino-Thai, who had received training in Peking for one month in the spring of 1965 at a "tutorial" course conducted by three PLA officers, reported that building a "people's army in Thailand" was one of the main subjects; another was the strategy and tactics of Mao's guerrilla warfare doctrine. Another student reported in a letter from Peking (10 April 1965) that he was being instructed on the matter of accelerating the process of "world revolution," and he affirmed in this context that "An army capable of carrying out the revolutionary struggle has been formed in Thailand." By mid-1965, Communist-led insurgents and "patriotic" figures in Thailand were working actively along the lines of Mao's prescription for a revolutionary seizure of power, namely the building of an army in isolated territorial base areas and the organization of Communists and non-Communists in a broad united front in order to wage a protracted military and political war against the central government.*

*Thai Front leaders in Peking indicated to a Thai trainee in the fall of 1965 that the insurgency plan for Thailand was to (1) establish bases in the main mountain ranges which separate the country into three sections, (2) establish guerrilla training centers, one near Laos close to the route connecting Muong Sing with Yunnan Province, (3) send for PLA instructors while using Thai trainees from Peking for political indoctrination work, (4) gain control of as many remote villages as possible before the (footnote continued on page 139)

Mao himself participated in the effort to exploit Peking-based opponents of the Bangkok government when, on the morning of 6 October 1965, he received and had "a cordial, friendly conversation" in Peking with Pridi (with the help of Liao Cheng-chih and Wu Hsiu-chuan). Pridi's son is reliably reported to have viewed this as a move by the Chinese leaders to publicly associate his father with the two Peking-sponsored Thai front movements; he said that his father refused to lend his name to either front group. He also stated that the leader of the Independence Movement was "definitely a member of the Communist Party of Thailand." He also said that his father was strongly opposed to the Chinese strategy, namely, that the best way to support the North Vietnamese was to extend the armed struggle to "Laos and Thailand."* While he referred to

(footnote continued from page 138)

government can establish strategic hamlets, and (5) ultimately expand into the urban areas, using troops recruited "from the people."

The leader of the Thailand Patriotic Front indirectly confirmed that part of this plan was being implemented: "Our compatriots' armed uprisings, which were staged in the northeastern and southern regions of Thailand and which will be followed by our compatriots in other regions, are aimed solely at waging the struggle for self-defense and at repelling U.S. imperialists and the reactionary traitors." (Peking Radio Broadcast in Thai to Thailand of 7 December 1965) (emphasis supplied)

*Sihanouk claimed that Chou En-lai and Pham Van Dong were preparing a plan "to warn" the Thai Prime Minister against involvement with U.S. operations in Vietnam, but were unable to do so only because the Thai leader did not stay in Djakarta (at the April 1965 anniversary of the Bandung conference) long enough for the plan to be implemented. (Sihanouk speech of 30 May 1965) Peking and Hanoi support for the insurgents suggests some degree of cooperation between the two Communist regimes. Reliable reports indicate that not only the Chinese and Vietnamese but also the Pathet Lao have infiltrated instructors into northeast Thailand from Laos to assist and train Thai insurgents, the latter appearing in September and October 1965 in the northeast.

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three PRC organizations as responsible for subversion in Thailand--viz., the Prime Minister's Office, the CCP, and the Thai section of the Foreign Ministry--it seems that Mao has engaged his own prestige in support of the effort to use Pridi's name to attract non-Communist recruits to the front movements, which are led by CPT members.*

By the fall of 1965, the Chinese leaders were actively engaged in reviving the armed struggle policy which Mao had permitted Chou En-lai to discard.** Thai Communists, who submerged in 1952 and who had made their way to Canton and Peking, were reported in September 1965 to be back in Thailand actively organizing youth front groups. According to several sources, some Thai cadres resent the Peking-oriented leadership (which includes ethnic Chinese) for national reasons and because they do not agree with the Maoist emphasis on armed struggle. In any case, Mao's personal intervention in early October 1965 seems to have resulted in a considerable step up in Peking's public

*High-level CPT members captured in the summer of 1967 have provided more precise information on the Chinese Communist departments which have been responsible since 1950 for maintaining contacts with Thai subversives. According to their accounts, the CCP's International Liaison Department had handled relations with the CPT; within this liaison department, the Afro-Asian and Latin American Committee has handled relations with Communist front organizations such as the Thai Patriotic Front. The Staff Office for Foreign Affairs of China's State Council--an office responsive to Chou En-lai and Chen Yi--has dealt with non-Communist groups (used for Communist recruiting and propaganda purposes) such as that of Pridi Panomyong.

**The CPT's Second Congress in 1952 is said by the Chinese to have proclaimed armed struggle as "the only path" for seizing power in Thailand. However, by late 1951, Mao was under pressure from Stalin's aides to drop the concept of his road as the model for Asian Communist revolutionaries, and he complied, moving toward a more diplomatic policy centered on improving Peking's international image.

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warnings to Thailand that closer Thai-U.S. military cooperation would lead to an intensification of the "patriotic struggle" in Thailand. (People's Daily article of 7 October 1965, published one day after Mao met with Pridi) A CPT cell was informed on 10 October that the party had "now" decided to shift from defensive to offensive tactics, and by late 1965, instructors from the mainland and North Vietnam were training Thai hill tribesmen at two centers in northern Laos under Thai Communist party direction.

Liao Cheng-chih, who appeared with Mao during the Pridi interview, continued to shepherd Thai front leaders in Peking, meeting with them on 1 November 1965 on the first anniversary of the founding of the Independence Movement and probably implementing a new policy of higher level Chinese leaders to make the fronts a more compact fighting unit by uniting them.* On 1 November 1965, the Independence Movement announced that it had joined the United Patriotic Front. The first Communist insurgent attack against a government installation, indicating a switch to more aggressive tactics, was conducted by a 12-man raiding group on 21 December 1965. Liao tied the subversive Thai political effort (he remained silent on insurgent activities) to peace "in Indochina" and the world and appealed for "bigger contributions" from various political groups "in 1966." (Liao speech of 2 January 1966) However, a People's Daily article of 28 January 1966 did refer to the insurgents: the Thais have taken up arms and are determined to overthrow "the reactionary

*In October 1966, the former Lao charge in Peking, who had met with Thai front leaders on the mainland, stated that the Chinese leaders had tried to induce Pridi to become the leader of the combined organization, but he is said to have refused.

rule of the traitorous Thanom Kittikachorn government by means of people's war." This article also was unprecedented in official party and government publications because it had dropped the equivocal euphemism, "Thai authorities," and had disparaged the Thanom government specifically and in highly derogatory terms. Peking increased its public support. On 24 March 1966, Peking Radio rebroadcast a Voice of the People of Thailand report that the Thailand Patriotic Youth Organization was established on 15 February 1966; on 13 April, Liao referred publicly to the Thai "people's war" and the readiness of the Chinese people to help "at any moment;" and on 27 April, a People's Daily article praised the battles fought by "the patriotic people's armed forces of Thailand."*

The Chinese leaders were careful to indicate that increased Thai involvement in the Vietnam war would be handled by others, by a riposte to be delivered by Thai insurgents and by the Vietnamese Communists and the Pathet Lao. For example, following the 6 January 1967 announcement in Bangkok that 100 Thai troops would be sent to Vietnam, Peking (following Hanoi by an interval of five days) warned that "the peoples of Vietnam and other Indochinese states will certainly deal you resolute counterblows and the Thai people, too, will certainly rebel against you extensively and in enhanced unity." (PRC Foreign Ministry statement of 19 January 1967) Peking's reaction to the announcement that B-52s would use Thai bases was attacked in a "Brief Commentary" in People's Daily on 25 March 1967 which warned that this action "will inevitably add fuel to the flames of the armed struggle of the

*The Chinese had been helping at earlier "moments" in subtler ways without using the PLA directly, that is, by training Thai insurgents over the years. For example, interrogation reports indicate that all six of the high-ranking members of the CP, captured in the summer of 1967, had been trained in Communist China and that the party is dominated by its Chinese members.

Thai people." The Chinese leaders' reluctance to commit the PLA to any action, while hinting that the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao might retaliate, was a reflection of caution and a source of embarrassment. But in subsequent comment, they still avoided saying what Peking would do in response to the enlargement of U.S. military bases in Thailand, committing the Vietnamese to "hit still harder." (People's Daily editorial of 2 April 1967)

The prospect appears to be for greater Chinese encouragement of the Thai insurgents and Thai front groups. This almost certainly will include military training and covert financing.

2. Malaysia

Malay's leaders in the 1950s had refused to recognize Peking while Communist insurgent activity continued in the countryside. Prime Minister Rahman had stated this position on 23 August 1957, eight days prior to Malayan independence, and this was repeated by his successor on 11 May 1959. Before they had granted the Malaysians independence, the British refused to accept any Peking representatives in the country, as the CCP's guidance of the Communist Party of Malaya made Chinese Communist officials a direct security threat. However, the Malaysians viewed the early establishment of trade relations as a secure form of contact with Peking, and by 1964, the Chinese had exported \$95 million to Malaya and had imported \$210,000 in commodities. As noted earlier in the section of this paper discussing Indonesia, the Chinese Communist leaders were cautious after the establishment of Malaysia as an extended country on 16 September 1963, at first avoiding any direct commitment to support Sukarno's "confrontation" policy in the hope that a relatively non-antagonistic attitude would sustain their trade relations with Kuala Lumpur and Malaysia's friends, the British.

However, the Chinese leaders significantly increased their support of Sukarno in the fall of 1964 when the Indonesian leader became more assertively anti-U.S. and after the U.S. airstrikes of August 1964 on North Vietnam. On 15 April 1965, the CCP sent a message greeting the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) on its 35th anniversary (released