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~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

29 18 1966

DIST 29 DECEMBER 1966

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI [REDACTED] DECEMBER 1966

SUBJECT VIEWS EXPRESSED BY NORTH VIETNAMESE [REDACTED] THAT ARTICLE BY JAMES RESTON ACCURATELY ASSESSED HANOI POSITION ON NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT SECRET CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

ACQ [REDACTED]

SOURCE [REDACTED]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

1. [REDACTED]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

BOTH HANOI AND THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION [REDACTED] WERE IMPRESSED BY THE ARTICLE BY JAMES RESTON IN THE 26 DECEMBER (SIC) INTERNATIONAL EDITION OF THE NEW YORK TIMES ENTITLED "WASHINGTON:

5
4
3
2
1

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~
(classification)

(dissem controls)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

4/21/98

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~
(classification)

[REDACTED]

(dissem controls)

THE CONFLICT OF POWER," IN THAT IT WAS A GOOD REFLECTION OF THE OFFICIAL MOOD PREVAILING TODAY IN HANOI ON THE QUESTION OF OPENING PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE RELATED QUESTION OF A CESSATION OF THE BOMBINGS IN NORTH VIETNAM. [REDACTED] PARTICULARLY REFERRED TO RESTON'S STATEMENT THAT HANOI HAS EMPHASIZED THAT THERE CAN BE NO NEGOTIATIONS UNTIL THE BOMBINGS STOP AND SAID THAT THIS WAS AN ACCURATE STATEMENT OF HANOI'S BASIC POSITION IN REGARD TO NEGOTIATIONS.

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

2.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF THE BOMBINGS BY THE UNITED STATES WOULD IN A SHORT TIME LEAD TO THE WILLINGNESS OF HANOI TO OPEN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] THE CESSATION OF THE BOMBING MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED IN A WAY THAT WILL NOT CAUSE HANOI TO LOSE FACE OR APPEAR TO BE SURRENDERING TO AN ULTIMATUM, AND IF THE BOMBINGS WERE UNCONDITIONALLY STOPPED, THIS WOULD HAVE THE DESIRED EFFECT. [REDACTED]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE, BY WAY OF SECRET DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS, FOR THE UNITED STATES AND NORTH VIETNAM TO MAKE A SECRET AGREEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT IF THE BOMBINGS WERE UNCONDITIONALLY STOPPED, HANOI WOULD PROMISE AFTER A SHORT PAUSE TO INITIATE NEGOTIATION TALKS.

3. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE CINCPAC PACAF ARPAC PACFLT [REDACTED]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

[REDACTED]