

*Central Intelligence Agency
Inspector General*

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION



INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO CIA REGARDING THE
1985 ATTACK ON U.S. MARINES IN THE ZONA ROSA
(96-0043-IG)

September 18, 1996

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GLOSSARY OF INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS

Andrade Martinez, Pedro Antonio	PRTC member and a leader of the PRTC urban commandos. Believed by some to be the planner of the Zona Rosa attack. He used the aliases "Mario" and "Mario Gonzalez."
Alvarado Martinez, Maria Elba	A PRTC member and keeper of a safehouse used as a meeting place by the urban commandos.
Araujo Ramirez, Americo Mauro	Sub-Secretary General of the Communist Party of El Salvador. His alias was "Comandante Hugo." He was also known within the insurgency as Mario Americo Duran.
Bolanos Rivas, Jose Antonio	Participant in the Zona Rosa attack. His alias was "Macias."
CAJIT	Central America Joint Intelligence Team; part of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency.
Cruz, Mardoqueo	PRTC guerrilla killed in a gun battle with security forces on June 20, 1983. The PRTC group that carried out the Zona Rosa attack was named for him.
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence.



DGOE

Cuba's General Directorate of Special Operations.

DIA

U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency.

Diaz, Nidia

The alias of Maria Martha Concepcion Valladarea Mendoza de Lemus, a military commander and member of the Central Committee of the PRTC. She was captured on April 18, 1985, along with a large number of PRTC documents.

Dimas Aguilar, Ismael

PRTC member who led the unit that committed the Zona Rosa murders. His alias was "Ulises."

Dimas Aguilar, Jose Abraham

PRTC member who provided support to Zona Rosa perpetrators.

DNI

El Salvador's Directorate of National Intelligence.

DoD

Department of Defense.

DoJ

Department of Justice.

Duarte, Inez

Daughter of President Jose Napoleon Duarte.

Duarte, Jose Napoleon

President of El Salvador, 1984-89.

Duran, Mario Americo

Sub-Secretary General of the Communist Party of El Salvador. His alias was "Comandante Hugo." He also identified himself as Americo Mauro Araujo Ramirez.

Estado Mayor

El Salvador's Armed Forces Joint General Staff.

FARLP

Revolutionary Armed Forces for Popular Liberation, the military arm of the PRTC.

FARN

Fuerzas Armadas de Resistencia Nacional, an insurgent group within the FMLN.

FMLN

Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, an organization of guerrilla groups engaged in civil war against the Salvadoran Government.

Gallardo, Fernando

Alias of a PRTC leader who claimed responsibility for the Zona Rosa attack. It may be an alias for "Walter" or a name used to represent the urban commandos in public statements.

Garcia Melendez, Juan Miguel

A PRTC member who was apprehended by the U.S. Border Patrol and volunteered information on the Zona Rosa attack.

Gonzalez, Mario

The alias of Pedro Antonio Andrade Martinez, PRTC member and a leader of the PRTC urban commandos.

Jovel Urquilla, Francisco Alberto

Secretary General of the PRTC; Commander of its military wing, the FARLP; member of the FMLN Joint General Command. He used the alias "Roberto Roca."

Julio

Alias of Jose Roberto Salazar Mendoza, a participant in the Zona Rosa attack. He was shot in the attack and died of his wounds. True name was possibly Jose Roberto Salazar Mendoza or Jose Roberto Torres Ortiz.

Lemus Figueroa, Jose
Antonio

A PRTC member who was erroneously identified as "Walter."

Lopez Alvarenga, Jose
Mario

PRTC Political Commission member.

Lopez Nuila, Carlos
Reynaldo

El Salvador's Vice Minister of Public Security.

Mario, also
Mario Gonzalez

The alias of Pedro Antonio Andrade Martinez, PRTC member and a leader of the PRTC urban commandos.

Masferrer Valladares, Jose
Anibal

A member of the PRTC Metropolitan Front.

Melgar, Jose Manuel

PRTC leader in charge of the Central Front. His alias was "Rogelio Martinez."

MLP

Popular Liberation Movement, a *masas* organization composed of sympathizers of the PRTC.

Morales Lucero, Juan
Antonio

A participant in the Zona Rosa attack. He provided security from the back of a truck. His alias was "Ruperto." He may also have used the alias "Pepe."

OGC

CIA's Office of General Counsel.

Orellana Mena, Axel
Armando

PRTC Military and Political
Commander and full member of the
PRTC Central Committee. He divulged
information leading to the capture of
Andrade.

Osorio, Romeo Gilberto

A U.S. citizen and PRTC member who
used the alias "Gerardo Zelaya."

Pepe

The alias of a participant in the Zona
Rosa attack. There is no firm
identification of his true name. He
might be Juan Antonio Morales Lucero,
who also used the alias "Ruperto."

PRTC

Central American Revolutionary
Workers Party, the insurgent group
responsible for the Zona Rosa attack.

Rivas Bolanos, Wilian Celio

PRTC member and self-confessed
participant in the Zona Rosa attack.
His alias was "William."

Rivas, Emerson


Military commander of the Central
Front of the PRTC. His alias was
"Camilo Turcios."

Rivera Valladares, Ana
Concepcion "Connie"

Andrade's wife.

Rodriguez Guardado,
Pedro Vladimir

A PRTC member who hid the weapons
used in the Zona Rosa attack. His alias
was "Mauricio." He is the son of Pedro
Rodriguez, alias "Raul."



Rodriguez, Pedro	A PRTC member who helped hide the weapons used in the Zona Rosa attack. His alias was "Raul." His son, who collaborated with him, is Pedro Vladimir Rodriguez Guardado.
Salazar Mendoza, Jose Roberto	Possible true name of alias "Julio," a participant in the Zona Rosa attack. He was wounded in the attack and died.
SSCI	Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
SIU	El Salvador's Special Investigative Unit.
Torres Ortiz, Jose Roberto	Possible true name of "Julio," a participant in the Zona Rosa attack.
Ulises	The alias of Ismael Dimas Aguilar, on-site leader of the unit responsible for the Zona Rosa attack.
Valladarea Mendoza de Lemus, Maria Martha Concepcion	A military commander and member of the Central Committee of the PRTC. She was captured on April 18, 1985 with a large number of PRTC documents. Her alias was "Nidia Diaz."
Walter	The alias of a participant in the Zona Rosa attack who led the security squad of the unit that did the killings.
Zelaya, Gerardo	Alias of Romeo Gilberto Osorio, a U.S. citizen and PRTC member.


**OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
INVESTIGATIONS STAFF**

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO CIA REGARDING THE 1985 ATTACK ON U.S. MARINES IN THE ZONA ROSA (96-0043-IG)

September 18, 1996

INTRODUCTION

1. (U) On June 19, 1985, 12 people were murdered by members of an insurgent group at an outdoor restaurant in the Zona Rosa section of San Salvador, El Salvador. Four of the victims were members of the U.S. Embassy Marine Security Guard, two were U.S. businessmen and six were Latin American civilians. They were slain by members of the Central American Revolutionary Workers Party (PRTC), one of the guerrilla groups engaged in a civil war against the U.S.-backed Salvadoran Government.

2. (U) The Zona Rosa attack was one subject of a *60 Minutes* television broadcast aired on May 21, 1995. The program contained an interview with Gilberto Osorio, an admitted member of the PRTC. Osorio referred to guerrilla involvement in the killings of the four U.S. Marines, and stated, "We made it a point to target some American servicemen in order to make a point to Congress and to have them take a second look about what was going on." The *60 Minutes* interviewer stated that Osorio helped plan the killings. However, from the context, it was uncertain whether Osorio meant

[REDACTED]

that he participated directly in the decision or that the PRTC, as an organization to which he belonged, made the decision to engage in the terrorist action.

3. (U) A month after the *60 Minutes* broadcast, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) John Deutch presented a report of his first 30 days in office to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI). At that time, he was questioned about Osorio's presence in the United States and whether the former guerrilla had any dealings with the CIA. DCI Deutch was also asked about an alleged 1985 retaliatory attack on a Salvadoran guerrilla encampment during which 85 insurgents were killed by U.S. Army Rangers. DCI Deutch promised to gather information and report back to the SSCI.

4. (U) Subsequently, CIA officers arranged to brief the SSCI on October 12, 1995 regarding these and other questions relating to the Zona Rosa attack. They reported that CIA had no intelligence linking Osorio to the killings, but they did provide information relating to another insurgent, Pedro Antonio Andrade Martinez. Andrade was thought by some to be the planner of the murders and was paroled into the United States in 1990. In addition, on November 2, 1995, CIA provided written responses to 11 questions from the SSCI about Osorio and the perpetrators of the Zona Rosa attack.

5. (U) On February 22, 1996, the SSCI requested that DCI Deutch ask the CIA Inspector General to investigate the facts surrounding the 1985 terrorist killings of the six Americans in El Salvador. Similar requests were made of the Inspectors General at the Department of Justice (DoJ), Department of Defense (DoD), and State Department.

BACKGROUND

6. (U) **The Civil War in El Salvador.** A series of repressive military governments held power in El Salvador for over 40 years, beginning in the 1930s. Throughout the 1970s, the gap between the landless population and a small landed elite continued to widen as

[REDACTED]

wealthy citizens became more willing to use force to defend their privileges. The peasants, spurred on by religious teachings on social justice, increasingly organized to demand change. Death squads, composed of former and active-duty military personnel, emerged to root out subversives. Clashes between the rival groups dramatically increased the incidence of assassinations and more than 600 citizens were killed in 1979 alone. Leftist guerrilla groups contributed to the violence by accelerating involvement in assassinations, kidnappings and bombings.

7. (U) Political polarization and violence intensified in the early 1980s even as attempts were made to implement government reforms. A series of reform-minded juntas that came to power in late 1979 were thwarted by both the right, which resisted liberalization, and by the left, which decided to forego cooperation in favor of revolutionary struggle. The left was composed mainly of five armed guerrilla groups loosely organized under an umbrella organization, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). One of the smallest, but more violent, of these groups was the Central American Revolutionary Workers Party (PRTC, from the Spanish name *Partido Revolucionarios de Trabajadores Centro Americanos*). (See box on following page for more information regarding the PRTC.)

8. (U) Even though there was limited support for the guerrillas among the general population, the FMLN maintained international support, retained military strongholds and engaged in a protracted conflict marked by economic sabotage. During the 1980s, FMLN influence expanded throughout the rural areas.

9. (U) Until the end of the 1980s, civil war continued alongside the strengthening of the democratic electoral process. Salvadorans voted five times between 1982 and 1988 for president, legislators and other offices despite ongoing political violence. By the end of the 1980s, insurgent leaders increasingly became interested in legitimate political activity because of a perceived improvement in the political climate.

[REDACTED]

PRTC

(U) The PRTC was officially formed in 1976 as a Trotskyist regional party with branches throughout Central America. However, the PRTC shed all vestiges of Trotskyism by the mid-1980s and professed a Marxist-Leninist ideology. The PRTC organized along classic Leninist lines of parallel political, military and mass organizations. In Spanish, this latter group of sympathizers and support elements was called *masas*. The PRTC was the political arm, with key leaders in the military and *masas* organizations; the Revolutionary Armed Forces for Popular Liberation (FARLP) was the military arm; and the Popular Liberation Movement (MLP) formed the *masas* organization. The PRTC and FARLP were further divided into three organizational echelons: directive, intermediate, and cell.

(U) Prior to its 1980 admission into the FMLN, the PRTC, unlike the other FMLN factions, was attempting actively to organize armed insurgent movements throughout Central America rather than just in El Salvador. The PRTC officially renounced its claims to regional subversion upon joining the FMLN. However, it retained branches of its *masas* arm in Costa Rica and Honduras.

[REDACTED] The PRTC was the smallest of the five factions that made up the FMLN. The exact size of the PRTC's components was never known by outside observers with any great accuracy. A 1987 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) estimate put the number of armed combatants [REDACTED]. The number of supporters or sympathizers was a much more nebulous figure, probably even to the PRTC, [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] The number of combatants was larger prior to the Zona Rosa attack. But because of increased pressure by the Salvadoran military, there was, according to the same DIA estimate, [REDACTED] decrease in combatant strength through military action and desertions.

(U) The PRTC combatants were armed with a variety of military small arms and explosives. Some of its combat leaders had received guerrilla training in Cuba or other Soviet Bloc countries.


[REDACTED]

10. (U) The conflict between insurgent and government forces came to a head during the latter half of 1989. The rebels refrained from attacking polling places during the elections, but they blacked out San Salvador and 80 percent of the country by attacks on the power grid and generator plants and ordered a transportation shutdown. In November 1989, the rebels launched their last major offensive, reaching the capital city of San Salvador itself. The fighting resulted in a stalemate that forced both the Salvadoran Government and the FMLN to respond favorably to a negotiated settlement.

11. (U) Talks mediated by the United Nations began in 1990, culminating in the Chapultepec Peace Accord of January 1992. The accords called for a cease-fire and set forth numerous demands, including an independent investigation of human rights abuses committed by both sides during the war. To date, progress in the implementation of constitutional, judicial and economic reforms has been excellent and former adversaries are using the political system to resolve their differences.

12. (U) **The Zona Rosa Attack.** On June 19, 1985, gunmen dressed in camouflage clothing opened fire on a crowd at an outdoor café in a residential area of San Salvador, killing six U.S. and six Latin American citizens. The victims were sitting at three outdoor cafés when the gunmen drove up in a pickup truck and opened fire. U.S. Marines sitting at a sidewalk table in front of Chili's restaurant were specifically targeted in the attack. Four Marines were killed and two others escaped as the attackers sprayed gunfire at patrons in Chili's and the adjacent Flash Back and Mediteranee cafés. The gunmen escaped by truck, carrying one of their wounded comrades with them.

13. (U) Within minutes of the attack, officials from the U.S. Embassy, who had been called by Americans at the scene, arrived and transported the four Marines to a local hospital. One died at the scene, two others enroute to the hospital, and one shortly after reaching the hospital. The Marines were:

- 
- ◆ Sgt. Bobby Joe Dickson, age 27, Tuscaloosa, Alabama;
 - ◆ Sgt. Thomas Taschner Handwork, age 24, Dayton, Ohio;
 - ◆ Cpl. Patrick Robert Kwiatkowski, age 20, Wausau, Wisconsin; and
 - ◆ Cpl. Gregory Howard Weber, age 22, Cincinnati, Ohio.


The Marines were examined by the medical examiner at the Diagnostic and Emergency Hospital in San Salvador within hours after the attack. The cause of death in each case was multiple bullet wounds.

14. (U) Approximately one hour after the attack, a guerrilla with bullet wounds in his back was left at a Red Cross station by unidentified men who claimed to be members of the FMLN. The wounded man was taken by a Red Cross employee to the Rosales Hospital where he died that night.

15. (U) Eight other people died and six were wounded in the Zona Rosa attack. The dead were:

- ◆ George Viney, age 48, Miami, Florida, employed by WANG Corporation;
- ◆ Robert Alvidrez, age 47, Lexington, Massachusetts, employed by WANG Corporation;
- ◆ Oswaldo Gonzalez Zambroni, Guatemala;
- ◆ Richard Ernest Macardle, Chile;
- ◆ Humberto Antonio Gonzalez Pineda, El Salvador;
- ◆ Arturo Alonso Silva Hoffs, El Salvador;
- ◆ Jose Elder Vidal Penalva, El Salvador; and
- ◆ Umberto Saenz Cevallos, El Salvador.

16. (U) The bodies of the Marines were transported to Gorgas Army Hospital in Panama and prepared for burial. On June 22, 1985, they were taken by military aircraft to Andrews Air Force Base where President Reagan met the plane. At the tarmac ceremony, Reagan told the family members:



(U) Chili's café, scene of the June 19, 1985 attack, still serves the Zona Rosa district of San Salvador.



Photos by Philip Bonds, State Department OIG, June 1996.

[REDACTED]

They say the men who murdered these sons of America escaped, disappeared into the city streets. But I pledge to you today, they will not evade justice on earth any more than they can escape the judgment of God. We and the Salvadoran leaders will move any mountain and ford any river to find the jackals and bring them and their colleagues in terror to justice.

17. (U) On June 20, 1985, a public statement by President Reagan ordered the State Department, DoD and U.S. intelligence agencies to provide the Government of El Salvador with whatever assistance was necessary to find and punish the terrorists who perpetrated the attack.

18. (U) Two days after the attack, the PRTC claimed responsibility for the killings. In a communiqué issued over clandestine radio on June 21, 1985, a guerrilla leader said a small group within the PRTC, the Mardoqueo Cruz urban commandos, carried out the "annihilation attack" on the Americans. The commandos were named for PRTC member Mardoqueo Cruz who died on June 20, 1983 in a gun battle with public security forces. Terrorist activities of the group in the metropolitan area had begun in June 1984 and were limited mainly to dynamiting basic services such as electricity, transportation and communications, and attacks on police and business vehicles. The commandos were organized in three groups, or "cells," of five members each.

19. [REDACTED] It was FMLN policy that Salvadoran and U.S. military personnel were considered legitimate targets only when at military sites. This policy excluded injury to civilians or actions at any non-military sites. In a late June 1985 intelligence report, a ranking official within another FMLN faction is cited as saying that the June 19 attack had been planned and carried out by PRTC members without previous coordination with the FMLN. Once it was carried out, however, FMLN leaders had no choice but to express support for the attack in order to maintain a unified front within FMLN ranks.

20. (U) On August 4, 1985, Salvadoran citizen Juan Miguel Garcia Melendez was caught by the U.S. Border Patrol as he crossed

[REDACTED]

the border illegally into the United States near San Diego, California. Garcia volunteered to the Border Patrol that he had information about the slaying of four U.S. Marines in San Salvador, and he provided details of the attack in hopes of earning a \$100,000 reward that had been offered by the U.S. Government for information regarding the Zona Rosa attack. He named other PRTC members and told authorities about two safehouses where the commandos met regularly. One was an upholstery shop and the other was an auto repair shop. Garcia was returned to El Salvador on August 16 and was arrested by the Treasury Police. He was later identified as a member of the PRTC's Mardoqueo Cruz urban commandos.

21. (U) Acting on the information provided by Garcia, on August 12, 1985, the Salvadoran National Guard arrested Wilian Celios Rivas Bolanos at the upholstery shop and Jose Abraham Dimas Aguilar at the auto repair shop. A fifth member of the commandos, Ismael Dimas Aguilar, fled as police approached his house.

22. (U) A sixth guerrilla was arrested on January 18, 1986 for assisting the PRTC by hiding weapons used in the Zona Rosa attack. Pedro Vladimir Rodriguez Guardado and his father, Pedro Rodriguez, cached guns, grenades, rocket launchers, and ammunition for the commandos in barrels buried in the yard around their house. The senior Rodriguez, who was not at home when the National Guard raided the residence, escaped capture, but his son was taken into custody.

23. (U) Juan Antonio Morales Lucero was identified as a member of the commandos and was taken into custody on July 13, 1988. Jose Antonio Bolanos Rivas and an individual known only by the alias "Walter"¹ were identified as additional perpetrators, but they were never arrested. Several guerrillas and other sources

¹ (U) As a result of Cuban advice and for self protection, insurgents adopted aliases as "war names." Often fellow insurgents would know each other only by their alias. Senior members of insurgent groups tended to have more than one alias. In this report, aliases are noted by the use of quotation marks.

[REDACTED]

identified Pedro Antonio Andrade Martinez, using his alias "Mario Gonzalez,"² as head of the three urban commando groups and planner of the Zona Rosa attack.

PROCEDURES AND RESOURCES

24. [REDACTED] When the DCI forwarded to the Inspector General the SSCI request to investigate the Zona Rosa matter in February 1996, two investigators from the Office of Inspector General's (OIG) Investigations Staff were assigned to the task. An auditor joined the team for a five-week period to assist in tracing financial transactions. Two senior investigators served as advisors to the team throughout the investigation and provided editorial, distribution and coordination guidance. The investigation team reviewed CIA files and relevant documents from the Latin America Division and the Operations and Resource Management Staff of the Agency's Directorate of Operations; the Office of African and Latin American Analysis of the Directorate of Intelligence; the DCI Secretariat; the Office of Congressional Affairs; the Office of General Counsel (OGC); and open source material provided by the Office of Information Resources of the Directorate of Intelligence and the Foreign Broadcast Information Service of the Directorate of Science and Technology. Field work was conducted from February through August 1996.

25. [REDACTED] More than 1,000 documents consisting of over 16,000 pages of text were reviewed during the course of the investigation. Twenty-one present and former Agency employees were interviewed. This included former Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of San Salvador Station and officers who served at the Station during the

² (U) Some members of the PRTC knew Andrade only by his alias "Mario" or "Mario Gonzalez." Their descriptions usually included background or other information about "Mario" that was used to identify him as Andrade, an alleged planner of the attack. Although CIA documents contain references to more than one insurgent who used the alias "Mario," the only references included in this report are those identifying "Mario" as the leader of the PRTC urban commandos or by other positions that Andrade, according to his own admission, held. His true name was not known to Salvadoran authorities until shortly before his capture in 1989. For the benefit of the reader, the name Andrade, rather than "Mario" or "Mario Gonzalez" has been used throughout this Report, except when quoted from the original material.

[REDACTED]

periods 1985-86 and 1989-90, as well as officers who had served at CIA Headquarters in relevant positions during the same periods.

26. (U) In conjunction with personnel from the DoJ, DoD and State Department Offices of Inspector General, CIA OIG investigators participated in interviews of 24 officials from those departments as well as from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Immigration and Naturalization Services who served in El Salvador or in Washington during the pertinent periods and were in positions to provide relevant information. DoD, DoJ and State Department shared their written records with CIA to allow a more complete and accurate reconstruction of the events.

27. (U) Current and former government officers who were interviewed in connection with this investigation had to depend on their memories of events that happened six to 11 years ago. Most explain that their recall of those events is imperfect, especially in light of the fact there was a civil war underway in El Salvador during 1985-1990. Because of the lapse of time and faulty memories on many topics, this Report draws heavily on documents prepared as the events happened, both formal reports and informal memorandums. When memories of two or more participants in events appeared to be contradictory, the findings are based on the written record.

ISSUES PRESENTED

28. (U) The SSCI requested that eight issues regarding the Zona Rosa attack be addressed by each of the agencies. In an effort to ensure that related information is presented together, the issues are treated in a different order in this Report. (The page at which the discussion of each issue begins is indicated in parenthesis following each issue.) As applied to CIA, the SSCI asked that the OIG determine:

Issue 1: "What information the [CIA] has on perpetrators/ intellectual authors of the murders and the subsequent investigation into the matter." (Page 13)

[REDACTED]

Issue 2: "What action has been taken by officials from [CIA] against the perpetrators/intellectual authors of the murders." (Page 44)

Issue 3: "What information [CIA] received from perpetrators/intellectual authors of the murders." (Page 57)

Issue 4: "What relationship [CIA] had, either before or after the murders, with the perpetrators/intellectual authors of the murders or other individuals known or suspected to have been involved." (Page 63)

Issue 5: "What role [CIA] has played in the investigation of the murders, and what priority has been placed on the investigation." (Page 39)

Issue 6: "What role [CIA] played in determining whether any of the known or suspected perpetrators/intellectual authors of the murders, or members of their families, were authorized to travel to or take up residence in the United States, and under what conditions and with what justification." (Page 70)

"In addition, whether or not any wrongdoing, negligence, or a breach of procedures occurred in allowing known or suspected Zona Rosa perpetrators/intellectual authors of the murders to enter or remain in the United States, and if so by whom." (Page 85)

"If suspected perpetrators/intellectual authors of the murders are in this country illegally, or without current authorization, what is being done to correct the situation?" (Page 85)

Issue 7: "What dealings, since the murders, [CIA] has had with the Government of El Salvador on this matter, and whether in the course of that relationship the Salvadoran government demonstrated an aggressive effort to identify, prosecute and incarcerate the perpetrators/intellectual authors." (Page 49)

[REDACTED]

Issue 8: "What specific action and or information [CIA] now has, or may have provided, regarding any reprisal for the Zona Rosa terrorist act." (Page 90)

FINDINGS

A. CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF THOSE INVOLVED

Issue: "What information [CIA] has on perpetrators/intellectual authors of the murders and the subsequent investigation into the matter."³

29. [REDACTED] "Julio"/possibly Jose Roberto Salazar Mendoza/Jose Roberto Torres Ortiz. On June 19, 1985, at approximately 9:00 p.m., a pickup truck drove up to the front of Chili's restaurant in the Zona Rosa section of San Salvador where U.S. Marines and other Americans attached to the U.S. Embassy frequently met to socialize and dine. Information about the attack was included in a Salvadoran National Police report to President Duarte, which was disseminated as a U.S. intelligence report on July 4, 1985. "Julio" and three other men dressed in camouflage shirts and caps and armed with M-16 automatic rifles jumped from the bed of the truck. Following their leader, they opened fire on Marines seated at a sidewalk table in front of the restaurant. During the initial bursts of gunfire, "Julio" was shot in the back and mortally wounded when he stepped into the line of fire of another guerrilla. When the shooters returned to the vehicle, the leader noticed that "Julio" was missing. The leader returned to the café, picked up "Julio" and carried him to the truck.

³ [REDACTED] Most of the information in this section was derived from statements of captured perpetrators Rivas, Garcia, Abraham Dimas, Vladimir Rodriguez, and Morales. Salvadoran security forces holding the prisoners interrogated them extensively and shared that information with San Salvador Station. The Station, in turn, prepared intelligence reports based on the data, and, after Headquarters' review, those reports were disseminated to other U.S. intelligence consumers.

[REDACTED]

30. (U) A doctor at the Salvadoran Red Cross reported that, at 9:40 p.m. on the same day, three men driving a white pickup truck arrived at the Red Cross facility with a man who had suffered a gunshot wound in the back just above the waist.⁴ The men said they were members of the FMLN but did not give their names, and they left their wounded comrade behind. Because of the seriousness of the injury, an employee of the Red Cross transported the guerrilla to Rosales Hospital. There, he was taken into surgery but died before the National Police could obtain a statement from him. Paraffin tests conducted on the deceased guerrilla were positive, indicating he had recently fired a weapon.

31. (U) The National Police report to President Duarte disclosed that identity papers on the body bore the name of Jose Roberto Salazar Mendoza, age 21 years. The identity papers had been falsified: the address of residence was non-existent, and there was no record of the mother and father of the individual listed on the card. A policeman gave a tentative identification of the body as that of Jose Roberto Torres Ortiz, a former school mate. Neither Salazar nor Torres was ever identified as the true name of "Julio."

32. [REDACTED] An FMLN member told a Salvadoran security service that "Julio" was a close friend of Mardoqueo Cruz, a guerrilla who had been killed on June 20, 1983 in a battle with public security forces and for whom the urban commandos were named. The attack occurred just one day prior to the second anniversary of Cruz' death, and some have speculated the attack may have been planned in commemoration of the event.

⁴ [REDACTED] Information from the Red Cross was obtained by a Salvadoran security service and passed to San Salvador Station. It was included in an intelligence report disseminated to the U.S. intelligence community on June 22, 1985.

IDENTITIES AND ROLES OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE ZONA ROSA ATTACK		
NAME	POSITION	OUTCOME
"Julio," true name unknown	Shooter.	Died June 19, 1985, from gunshot wounds suffered in Zona Rosa attack.
Wiliam Celios Rivas Bolanos, alias "William"	Shooter.	Arrested August 12, 1985; found guilty of subversive association, cooperation in propaganda, acts of terrorism resulting in deaths of several persons; sentenced to 25 years in prison, released September 1995 after serving 10 years 8 months.
Ismael Dimas Aguilar, alias "Ulises"	Shooter, led the attack.	Never apprehended, believed killed in action November 20, 1985.
Jose Antonio Bolanos Rivas, alias "Macias"	Shooter.	Never captured, whereabouts unknown.
Jose Antonio Morales Lucero, alias "Ruperto"	Provided cover from back of truck.	Arrested July 13, 1988; charged with subversive association, spreading anarchical propaganda, and planning and carrying out terrorist acts; found not guilty; imprisoned 5 years 1 month while awaiting trial.
"Pepe," true name unknown	Provided cover from back of truck.	May be the same as Jose Antonio Morales Lucero; no further information available.
"Walter," true name unknown	Fired at Brazilian embassy guard during attack.	Never apprehended, believed killed in action November 20, 1985.
Juan Miguel Garcia Melendez	Worked at a guerrilla meeting site, did not participate directly in attack.	Arrested August 16, 1985; found guilty of subversive propaganda, subversive association, and acts in support of terrorism; sentenced to 11 years in prison with subsequent reduction to 7 1/2 years; released February 1993 after serving 7 years 6 months.
Pedro Vladimir Rodriguez Guardado, alias "Mauricio"	Stored weapons used in attack.	Arrested January 17, 1986, no further information available.
Pedro Rodriguez, alias "Raul"	Stored weapons used in attack.	Fled San Salvador when his house was searched, never apprehended, whereabouts unknown.
Jose Abraham Dimas Aguilar	Worked at a guerrilla meeting site, ran errands for commando group.	Arrested August 12, 1985; found guilty of acts in support of terrorism; sentenced to 4 years; released March 1992 after serving 6 years 7 months.
Pedro Antonio Andrade Martinez, alias "Mario Gonzalez"	Leader of 3 cells of the Mardoqueo Cruz urban commandos; believed by some to have been the planner of the attack.	Arrested May 28, 1989; held in police detention until June 28, 1990; granted a parole into the United States in the public interest; resides in New Jersey.
Romeo Gilberto Osorio, alias "Gerardo Zelaya"	PRTC member; no connection to Zona Rosa murders.	American citizen; resides in San Francisco, California.

[REDACTED]

33. (U) Wilian Celio Rivas Bolanos/"William." Wilian Celio Rivas Bolanos, also known as "William," was the ostensible owner of the upholstery shop, *Tapiceria Estrella*, which was a meeting place for the guerrillas.⁵ When the Zona Rosa attack took place, Rivas was 17 years old and had been a member of the PRTC for four years.

34. (U) Rivas was recruited into the guerrilla group by Ismael Dimas Aguilar in 1981, and they worked together in Cerros de San Pedro for two and one-half years. In the rural areas, Rivas participated in sabotage of transportation on the Pan-American Highway and in clashes with Salvadoran armed forces. He relocated to San Salvador in 1983 to establish a PRTC presence in the city where he again worked for Ismael Dimas. He took part in the sabotage of telephone boxes and lamp posts, attacks on military troop transport vehicles and the takeover of a radio station. He was paid the equivalent of \$22 per month for his work in the PRTC.

35. (U) On June 14, 1985, Ismael Dimas told Rivas that a plan was underway to attack some North Americans, but he provided no further details. On the morning of June 19, Ismael Dimas told Rivas the group would carry out a special operation that night and instructed Rivas to meet him at the *Café de Don Pedro* at 8:00 p.m. Rivas and another commando were picked up by Ismael Dimas and other group members in a Toyota truck. Andrade met the group at *Don Pedro's*, spoke briefly with Ismael Dimas out of the hearing of the other commandos and then left in his own car. Ismael Dimas then told the group that Andrade had said that North Americans were to be the targets, and "they were in the place where they would be massacred."

36. (U) As they drove to the Zona Rosa, the men donned camouflage shirts, caps and green knapsacks. Each of them also took

⁵ [REDACTED] Most of the information in this section regarding the Zona Rosa attack is from interrogation statements provided by Rivas to Salvadoran authorities after his arrest. The data was shared with San Salvador Station, and much of it was provided to the U.S. intelligence community in disseminated reports.

[REDACTED]

a weapon. During the trip, Ismael Dimas made assignments:⁶ Rivas, Ismael Dimas, Bolanos, and "Julio" were to do the shooting; "Walter" was to target the National Police guard stationed at the Brazilian Embassy across the street from the cafés; and Morales and the unidentified driver were to remain in the truck and provide cover in case the National Police arrived on the scene.⁷

37. (U) Upon arriving at the Zona Rosa restaurants, the truck stopped in front of Chili's, and the men jumped out. Ismael Dimas started firing at the Americans who were sitting closest to the sidewalk. Rivas, Bolanos and "Julio" followed suit. Rivas was less than six meters from the victims when he fired 30 rounds at them. "Julio" stepped into Rivas' line of fire and was shot.

38. (U) After the shooting, the men returned to the truck and fled the area. Once out of the Zona Rosa, they removed their camouflage clothing and left the weapons in the truck. Rivas was dropped off at a park in the city.

39. (U) The day after the attack, Rivas went to the *Tapiceria Estrella* late in the day and found Garcia already at work there. Shortly thereafter, Ismael Dimas arrived and the two men conferred regarding the previous night's attack. Ismael Dimas accused Rivas of shooting "Julio" intentionally, saying there was bad blood between them.

40. [REDACTED] Rivas continued working at the *Tapiceria Estrella* until he was arrested by the National Guard on August 12, 1985. He was interrogated by local authorities and underwent a polygraph examination by a CIA officer on August 24. A cable from San Salvador Station to CIA Headquarters reported that the test showed that he answered truthfully when he said he had personally participated in the shooting at the Zona Rosa. He showed deception,

⁶ (U) Rivas' testimony about the guerrillas who participated in the attack and their roles changed several times during his imprisonment. The detail in this section is most consistent with information provided by other sources as well.

⁷ (U) During one of his statements, Rivas said Garcia participated in the attack. He later recanted that information, explaining that he had only said Garcia was a participant because the interrogator pressed him on the issue.

[REDACTED]

however, when responding to questions regarding whether he made inaccurate statements to the police, whether he was withholding information and regarding the others who participated in the attack. Later, Rivas said he did not know who he was supposed to kill--just that U.S. officials were the intended targets. He told police he had never before shot defenseless people.

41. (U) A Salvadoran newspaper described initial judicial procedures against the shooter. On August 27, 1985, Rivas, who already had homicide charges pending for the murder of National Police agents, was remanded to a military judge. The first phase of the judicial investigation was completed on January 21, 1986, when a trial judge found there was legal merit to prosecute Rivas. The case was elevated to the Decree 50 First Instance Court where military and terrorist cases were reviewed and certified for trial.

42. [REDACTED] Embassy officers in San Salvador followed the Rivas' case closely and reported by cable to State Department in November 1987 that the judge determined the case fell within the parameters of the general amnesty signed by President Duarte in October 1987 under the Esquipulas II Peace Accords between the Salvadoran Government and the FMLN. According to an interagency report prepared by the U.S. Government for the United Nations Truth Commission, on November 12, 1987, orders were given for Rivas' release. When it appeared that he might be released, the U.S. Government began to investigate the possibility of prosecuting Rivas in the United States for the murder of "internationally protected persons."⁸ Urged by vigorous diplomatic intervention from the U.S. Government, a Salvadoran prosecutor appealed Rivas' release on November 16, 1987. Two months later, the Appeals Court upheld the lower court decision to grant amnesty to the Zona Rosa defendants. The Military Appeals Court sent the case to President Duarte for review as Commander-in-Chief of the

⁸ (U) In its review of the Zona Rosa attack, DoJ attorneys concluded that the U.S. Marines were internationally protected persons, and, as such, punishment for their murders was covered by 18 U.S. Code §1116, "Murder or manslaughter of foreign officials, official guests, or internationally protected persons."

[REDACTED]

armed forces. On April 11, 1988, however, Duarte overturned the amnesty finding. The basis of Duarte's decision was that the murder of the U.S. Marines was covered by the International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, which was acceded to by the Salvadoran Government in 1980.

43. [REDACTED] The interagency report further described that defendants' counsel appealed the case to the Supreme Court, but in September 1989, the Court ruled that Rivas' case should be reopened and tried on the basis that he murdered internationally protected persons. The case was remanded to a military court for action. In January 1991, the case was moved to the Court of Second Instance for a ruling on whether civilian or military courts had jurisdiction. The ruling was that the military court should hear the case.

44. (U) Embassy officers who followed the case closely reported in a cable to the State Department the outcome of Rivas' trial. They reported that on May 2, 1991, Rivas was found guilty of subversive association, cooperation in propaganda, and acts of terrorism resulting in the deaths of several persons. For those crimes, he was sentenced to three, two and 20 years in prison, respectively, with the sentences to run consecutively.

45. (U) A routine appeal was filed for the Zona Rosa defendants, but an appeals court judge upheld the conviction and confirmed the sentences in March 1992. Rivas petitioned for amnesty under the 1992 and 1993 amnesty laws, but both petitions were denied. The 1992 petition was elevated again to the Supreme Court, which upheld the lower court's decision to deny amnesty.

46. [REDACTED] A Salvadoran security service notified San Salvador Station that Rivas remained in prison until 1995 when a new law pertaining to juvenile offenders was passed in El Salvador limiting the sentence of a minor to seven years. The law was applied retroactively, and Rivas, who was only 17 years old when the killings were committed, was released in September 1995. By that time, he had served 10 years and 8 months in prison.

[REDACTED]

47. (U) Ismael Dimas Aguilar/"Ulises." Ismael Dimas Aguilar was known to the guerrilla band by his alias, "Ulises." Co-conspirators Rivas and Garcia described Ismael Dimas as the leader of the commando group that met at the upholstery shop, and he had recruited some of the cell's members into the PRTC. Although Ismael Dimas did not work at the shop, he stopped by every day to meet with cell members. From November 1984 to June 1985, Ismael Dimas and his men planned and carried out guerrilla operations in San Salvador, including attacks on National Police units and privately owned trucks, the takeover of radio stations, an attempted kidnapping, mining of a road, and an unimplemented assassination of a government official. Ismael Dimas was the planner as well as a participant in most of those activities.

48. (U) During his interrogations by the National Guard, Rivas described Ismael Dimas as leader of the cell who was in charge of finances and seemed to have a great deal of money available to him. He was also responsible for the weapons used by PRTC members. When not being used for guerrilla activities, the weapons were buried in barrels in the yard of a house in San Salvador. Ismael Dimas was responsible for collecting the weapons before operations and returning them afterwards. Three days before the Zona Rosa attack, he picked up three M-16 rifles, two Galil rifles, one AR-15 rifle, and one machine gun that were used in the operation.

49. (U) According to the testimony Rivas gave to the National Guard in August 1985, Ismael Dimas was the on-site leader of the Zona Rosa attack. He directed the men in his cell and two other cells, led the shooting and claimed credit for the attack over the insurgent radio station. On June 19, he arranged a final planning meeting of the commandos for early evening at an auto repair shop owned by his brother. Later that night, he directed each of the guerrillas to various locations where they were picked up in a truck. The last stop was the *Café de Don Pedro*. Just before 9:00 p.m., Ismael Dimas spoke privately with Andrade at the *Café de Don Pedro* and received final guidance for the attack.

[REDACTED]

50. [REDACTED] Ismael Dimas gave last minute instructions as he and the men drove to the Zona Rosa. Upon arriving at the restaurants, Ismael Dimas jumped out of the truck first and began firing at the Marines. He and another shooter then walked through Chili's and adjacent restaurants firing indiscriminately at other patrons. Finally, Ismael Dimas gave the order to return to the vehicle. He picked up the wounded "Julio," deposited him in the truck and they all fled the area.

51. [REDACTED] According to unconfirmed information obtained from Garcia on August 17, 1985, Ismael Dimas was one of the men who delivered "Julio" to the Red Cross for medical attention after the attack.⁹ That same night, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Ismael Dimas took the Zona Rosa weapons to a house in Barrio Santa Ana that was used as a guerrilla meeting place and buried them under the patio. Several weeks later, the guns were transferred by PRTC members to a house in the Colonia Gallegos section of San Salvador where they remained until they were recovered by the police in January 1986.

52. (U) Garcia and Rivas told police shortly after their arrests in August 1985 that on the day following the attack, Ismael Dimas went to the upholstery shop where he discussed details of the attack with Rivas. When Ismael Dimas questioned Rivas about shooting "Julio"--intimating it was intentional because of bad feelings between the two--Rivas denied he was responsible. Ismael Dimas commented, "'Julio' didn't go alone, we also killed the Americans."

53. (U) On September 19, 1985, Ismael Dimas was interviewed about the June 19 attack on Radio Venceremos, a clandestine station operated by the FMLN. He said he participated in the operation and criticized the Salvadoran Government for its ineptitude in investigating the attack.

54. [REDACTED] An August 15, 1985 cable from San Salvador Station to CIA Headquarters described in detail the Salvadoran National Guard arrest of two members of the Mardoqueo Cruz commandos on

⁹ (U) Garcia said that Ismael Dimas and Andrade transported "Julio" to the Red Cross facility. According to a doctor at the Red Cross, three men delivered "Julio" for treatment.

[REDACTED]

August 12. One of them was Ismael Dimas' brother. Under interrogation, he led the authorities to Ismael Dimas' house in the Barrio San Jacinto section of San Salvador. As the National Guard approached the house at 7:00 p.m., Ismael Dimas escaped out the back door. He was never captured.

55. [REDACTED] A Salvadoran security service notified San Salvador Station that five days after the police raid at his house, Ismael Dimas' wife and two children moved to the Bethania Refugee Camp at Zaragoza, an establishment controlled by the PRTC. Ismael Dimas was known to have visited his family and attended meetings with FMLN leaders in the camp during October 1985.

56. [REDACTED] In 1989, authorities learned from Andrade that the Mexican Ambassador to El Salvador had provided asylum to Ismael Dimas in November 1985.¹⁰ Ismael Dimas had been hidden in the Mexican embassy and given aid in escaping from San Salvador.

57. (U) In late November 1985, a PRTC informant told local authorities that Ismael Dimas had died in a Salvadoran Air Force bombing raid on a PRTC camp at the Guazapa Volcano on the evening of November 20-21. During the following months, three additional reports from PRTC members indicated that Ismael Dimas died in the bombing raid or in an ambush by Salvadoran forces that occurred immediately following the raid.

58. (U) **Jose Antonio Bolanos Rivas/"Macias."** The fourth shooter in the Zona Rosa attack was Jose Antonio Bolanos Rivas, also known as "Macias." Wilian Celio Rivas Bolanos told the National Guard in August 1985 that Bolanos was his cousin, Bolanos was one of the shooters, and they had served together in the PRTC in Cerros de San Pedro before moving to San Salvador to join the Mardoqueo Cruz commandos.

¹⁰ [REDACTED] FBI Headquarters notified State Department in November 1992 that their records showed the Mexican Ambassador admitted he hid Ismael Dimas in the Mexican Embassy shortly after the Zona Rosa attack.

[REDACTED]

59. (U) Bolanos worked in Abraham Dimas' auto repair shop that also served as a meeting site for one of the three Mardoqueo Cruz cells. Bolanos joined other PRTC guerrillas in sabotage activities in San Salvador in the months prior to the Zona Rosa attack.

60. (U) Rivas further reported to the National Guard that on the afternoon of June 19, Bolanos met at the auto repair shop with the others to coordinate details of the attack. Later that night, Ismael Dimas picked him up in the truck. Bolanos' assignment was to be one of the shooters in the attack. After the initial bursts of gunfire aimed at the Marines, Bolanos and Ismael Dimas walked through the restaurants firing at restaurant patrons who had taken cover during the first hail of bullets.

61. (U) A PRTC member who was captured in January 1986 said at that time Bolanos was in a PRTC camp on the Guazapa Volcano. No other information was developed about his location, however, and he was never captured.

62. (U) **Juan Antonio Morales Lucero/"Ruperto."** Information provided to Salvadoran police by a captured member of the PRTC led to the arrest of Juan Antonio Morales Lucero on July 13, 1988. After his arrest, Morales, who used the alias "Ruperto," was interrogated by the National Police and described how he joined the Fuerzas Armadas de Resistencia Nacional (FARN), an insurgent group in the FMLN, in 1979. He was taught to handle a G-3 rifle and assigned to a platoon of 25 men in the Cerro de Guazapa area. In December 1983, he moved to the metropolitan area and gradually lost contact with the FARN insurgents. In June 1985, he was recruited by "Walter" to join the PRTC.

63. [REDACTED] After his arrest in 1988, Morales confessed to the National Police his part as look-out in the Zona Rosa operation. Morales' version of the Zona Rosa attack was included in a San Salvador Station cable that was eventually disseminated as an intelligence report on July 20, 1988. During the attack, he remained in the back of the truck to provide cover in case National Police arrived on the scene during the shooting. After the shooting, he was

[REDACTED]

dropped off at a park. The following day, he went home to Santa Ana. Apart from the driver, he never again saw the others who were involved in the attack. Fifteen days after the attack, the driver told him that the other perpetrators had gone to the Cerro de Guazapa region.

64. [REDACTED] The U.S. Government interagency report to the Truth Commission in November 1992 described judicial procedures brought against Morales. He was charged with subversive association, spreading anarchical propaganda, and planning and carrying out terrorist acts that resulted in the deaths of the eight foreigners (six Americans, one Chilean, and one Guatemalan) at the Zona Rosa. A court found that he was not eligible for amnesty under the 1991 law because the U.S. Marines who died in the attack were persons protected under international law.

65. (U) The U.S. Southern Command *Weekly Intelligence Digest* for August 20-26, 1993 reported on the outcome of the judicial proceedings. Morales' case was heard on August 17, 1993 in a trial that lasted 14 hours. He claimed his earlier confession had been coerced by the police and that he had not participated in the attack. Closing arguments were heard at 11:00 p.m. The jury immediately took up deliberations, and just before 2:00 a.m. returned a verdict of not guilty. They were apparently swayed by Morales' relatively low level of involvement, time already served while awaiting trial (five years) and the fact the Salvadoran military personnel who had been accused of murdering several Jesuit priests¹¹ had been freed under the amnesty law.

66. (U) "Pepe"/possibly Juan Antonio Morales Lucero. Another insurgent who participated in the shooting was known as "Pepe." He was a member of "Walter's" cell that met at the auto repair shop. Garcia told the U.S. Border Patrol that "Pepe" was a name that had frequently been mentioned by Rivas and Ismael Dimas in the upholstery shop. Garcia once heard Rivas say he thought

¹¹ (U) On November 16, 1989, six Jesuit priests, their cook and her daughter were killed near the campus of the University of Central America. At first, the FMLN was blamed. Later, it was discovered Salvadoran military personnel were responsible.

[REDACTED]

"Pepe" was stupid. However, after the group attacked a National Police truck in February 1985, Rivas changed his mind because "Pepe" proved he was not stupid. Rivas said that, during the Zona Rosa attack, "Pepe" was assigned to remain in the truck with the driver and watch for any National Police vehicles that might respond to the scene.

67. (U) It is possible that "Pepe" and Juan Antonio Morales Lucero are the same person. Morales, by his own admission, remained in the truck with the driver during the attack as Rivas and Garcia said "Pepe" had done. Even though Morales admitted his part in the attack, none of the arrested insurgents mentioned the name Morales as one of the perpetrators. This omission would be consistent with their practice of referring to each other by aliases.

68. (U) "Walter." Zona Rosa perpetrators Garcia and Rivas identified "Walter" as the leader of one of the three cells that made up the Mardoqueo Cruz urban commandos. His cell included "Julio" and several others who were not involved in the Zona Rosa attack. "Walter" participated in sabotage activities in San Salvador with other PRTC commandos in the months prior to the Zona Rosa, including attacks on National Police trucks.

69. (U) Four perpetrators identified "Walter" as a participant in the Zona Rosa attack, but they could not provide his true name.¹² The co-conspirators said "Walter's" assignment was to fire at the policeman who was guarding the Brazilian embassy located directly across the street from the restaurants. This was intended to prevent the police guard from shooting at the guerrillas.

70. (U) According to the account of the attack Rivas gave when he was interrogated by the National Guard, on the night of June 19, "Walter" was already in the truck when it arrived at the *Café de Don Pedro* to pick up the last terrorists. Upon arriving at the Zona Rosa,

¹² Eyewitness reports by Garcia, Rivas and Abraham Dimas were obtained by Salvadoran authorities soon after the arrests of those individuals and were forwarded by San Salvador Station to CIA Headquarters in August and September 1985. Information from Morales was reported in cable format by DoD in November 1988.

[REDACTED]

he jumped out of the truck and fired at the Brazilian embassy guard. General indications from witnesses at the scene were that the policeman immediately sought cover and did not emerge until after the shooting stopped. "Walter" fled from the scene with the other attackers in the truck.

71. (U) After the shooting, police circulated a composite sketch of "Walter" prepared from eyewitness descriptions. The sketch produced several leads, but they proved to be unproductive.

72. (U) Early leads in the case led President Duarte and the National Guard to announce at an August press conference that "Walter" could possibly be Jose Antonio Lemus Figueroa. Salvadoran officials subsequently discovered and announced publicly that Jose Antonio Lemus Figueroa, who was indeed a member of the PRTC, had been held in Mariona Prison since 1984 and could not have participated in the Zona Rosa attack.

73. [REDACTED] A PRTC member who was arrested in January 1986 told the Salvadoran 5th Brigade Intelligence Unit that "Walter" also used the alias "Fernando Gallardo" and had been at the PRTC camp at the Guazapa Volcano. That same source said "Walter" died in the bombing raid on November 20, 1985.¹³ DoD reported in 1988 that co-conspirator Morales told National Police that he had heard that "Walter" died in combat. No further information became available on the fate of "Walter," and authorities had no traces on his activities after the Zona Rosa attack.

74. (U) **Juan Miguel Garcia Melendez.** Juan Miguel Garcia Melendez furnished the Treasury Police with details about his involvement in the PRTC after his arrest in 1985. He became a PRTC member in October 1980 and was a combatant in the San Felipe and Cerro de Guazapa regions. He was assigned to work for the PRTC in San Salvador because his skill as an upholsterer supported the

¹³ [REDACTED] Information obtained by the Salvadoran military from PRTC member Jose Anibal Masferrer Valladares was shared with San Salvador Station and forwarded to CIA Headquarters via cable on January 18, 1986. The disseminated intelligence report was released on the same day.

[REDACTED]

PRTC's use of an upholstery shop as a cover for PRTC meetings. He met Ismael Dimas, Andrade and Rivas when he moved to the city in November 1984. At the time of the attack, he was 19 years old.

75. (U) Garcia claims he did not participate in the Zona Rosa attack and was at home when it occurred. He was cognizant, however, of PRTC activities that were planned at the upholstery shop, and he ran errands for the group. He was present when the insurgents were talking about the Zona Rosa attack, and, on the day following the attack, he overheard Ismael Dimas and Rivas as they discussed the mission.

76. (U) A month after the Zona Rosa attack, Garcia says he quit work at the *Tapiceria Estrella* because he was afraid of the activities in which Rivas was involved. He traveled to Tijuana, Mexico by truck. From there, he slipped across the border into the United States on August 4. He was part of a large group of illegal aliens that was apprehended by the U.S. Border Patrol near Spring Valley in the vicinity of San Diego, California.

77. (U) During his detention, Garcia told the Border Patrol he had information concerning the murder of U.S. Marines in El Salvador. He was interviewed by a Border Patrol intelligence agent who passed the information to U.S. intelligence services and U.S. officials in San Salvador.

78. (U) Garcia volunteered to return to El Salvador, and he was deported from the United States on August 16, 1985. Upon his arrival at the airport in San Salvador, he was arrested by the Salvadoran Treasury Police. Statements Garcia made to Salvadoran authorities differed in many respects from the version he told the U.S. Border Patrol, but the main difference was that he told the Salvadorans that he had actually participated in the Zona Rosa attack. When he was asked to reconstruct the events at the scene of the shooting, however, he was not able to do so. Eventually, he said he only told the police that he was a participant after prolonged interrogations during which he was physically abused. He confessed to having fabricated the account of his involvement based on

[REDACTED]

conversations he overheard of plans for the attack and PRTC members' comments afterwards. Rivas, the shooter, finally agreed that Garcia was not a direct participant in the attack. Another informant within the PRTC said that Garcia only served the PRTC by running errands and was not involved directly in the shootings.

79. (U) An Embassy cable to the State Department on January 26, 1986 described progress on Garcia's trial after he was turned over to the military courts for prosecution. His case proceeded through the court system together with those of co-conspirators Rivas and Abraham Dimas. After the initial judicial investigation, which lasted six months, the case was remanded to the Decree 50 First Instance Court for trial. Garcia's testimony before the judge and confession of his knowledge of the Zona Rosa attack were duly ratified. The case moved slowly because Garcia initially did not have a defense attorney and there were few judges to hear cases on crimes of terrorism.¹⁴

80. [REDACTED] State Department officers at the Embassy determined from sources in the Salvadoran judicial system that Garcia was being considered for release under the 1987 general amnesty law in November 1987. At that time, the U.S. Government became involved in determining whether action could be taken against Garcia in U.S. courts. He was interviewed by representatives of DoJ, State Department and the FBI who traveled to San Salvador in February 1988. The U.S. Government conclusion was that there was not enough evidence to proceed with legal action against Garcia within the United States. President Duarte overturned the amnesty finding of two courts, however, and Garcia remained in prison.

81. (U) Embassy officers following the case reported by cable to State Department that, in April 1988, the case moved to the Salvadoran Supreme Court in an appeal of Duarte's decision. The Supreme Court heard the appeal in September 1989 and ordered the

¹⁴ (U) Salvadoran judges who heard cases of terrorism or human rights violations were in danger of assassination by the supporters or enemies of those being tried. Consequently, few judges were either available or willing to try such cases.

[REDACTED]

case reopened on the basis of the U.S. Marines' status as internationally protected persons. The case was eventually remanded to a military court for trial.

82. (U) On April 7, 1991, Garcia was found guilty of subversive propaganda, subversive association and acts in support of terrorism. He was sentenced to 11 years in prison. The attorney for the defense appealed the sentence, and it was reduced to seven and one-half years. Garcia completed his jail term and was released in February 1993.

83. [REDACTED] Pedro Vladimir Rodriguez Guardado/"Mauricio." A PRTC weapons cache was discovered on January 17, 1986, when Pedro Vladimir Rodriguez Guardado, also known as "Mauricio," was arrested. The National Guard raid on Vladimir Rodriguez's house was reported by San Salvador Station in an intelligence report disseminated on January 21, 1986. His residence was used as a storage site for PRTC weapons, including those used in the Zona Rosa attack. The weapons were buried in barrels under two feet of soil in the yard of the home that was occupied by Vladimir Rodriguez, his father and younger sister and brother. Vladimir Rodriguez had been recruited into the PRTC by Ismael Dimas when he was 15 years old, just two months before the Zona Rosa attack.

84. (U) Vladimir Rodriguez described to the National Guard how, five days before the Zona Rosa attack, Ismael Dimas told Vladimir Rodriguez to prepare three M-16 rifles, two Galil rifles, one AR-15 rifle, one submachine gun, and two hand grenades to be picked up later. Two days later, Ismael Dimas and Andrade picked up the weapons. That was the last time Vladimir Rodriguez saw the two men. The weapons were returned to the house several weeks later by two PRTC members who were not directly involved in the Zona Rosa attack.

85. [REDACTED] The Salvadoran security service reported to San Salvador Station that, after Vladimir Rodriguez's arrest, he was held in the Mariona Prison and his case was turned over to a military

[REDACTED]

judge for the initial phase of the investigation. As of March 26, 1987, he was still held in prison. No information was provided to CIA after that date regarding his ultimate fate.

86. (U) **Pedro Rodriguez/"Raul."** Pedro Rodriguez, also known as "Raul," supported PRTC activities by storing weapons at his home in San Salvador. After his arrest, Vladimir Rodriguez, the son of Pedro Rodriguez, described to the National Guard his father's role as an accessory in PRTC activities. Pedro Rodriguez's responsibilities included storing, cleaning and guarding the weapons used in terrorist operations. In exchange, the PRTC paid the rent on the house. Living with Pedro Rodriguez was his son, Vladimir Rodriguez, also a PRTC member, and two younger children who were not cognizant of the guerrilla activities. Either Pedro Rodriguez or his son were at home with the weapons at all times.

87. (U) Vladimir Rodriguez said "Julio" stayed with the Rodriguezes for several days in March 1985 when he first moved to San Salvador from the Guazapa front. Vladimir Rodriguez further reported that his father dealt with Ismael Dimas, Andrade and "Walter" when they delivered or picked up weapons for commando operations. When the National Guard raided the house on January 17, 1986, the cache of weapons included 15 rifles, shotguns, pistols, and more than 3,000 rounds of ammunition.

88. (U) Pedro Rodriguez was not at home when the National Guard raided his house. Neighbors reported later that he returned during the raid, saw what was happening, and left the area. Salvadoran authorities failed to discover his whereabouts, and he was never captured.

89. (U) **Jose Abraham Dimas Aguilar.** Jose Abraham Dimas Aguilar was the brother of Ismael Dimas, and he operated the auto repair shop that was used by one of the commando cells as a meeting place. According to his statement at an August 1985 press conference sponsored by Salvadoran authorities, Abraham Dimas was a PRTC member but was not a combatant and did not participate directly in the Zona Rosa attack. He ran the cell that met in his auto repair shop

[REDACTED]

and assisted the two other cells with support activities. Abraham Dimas knew of plans for the Zona Rosa attack at least five days in advance, and he aided one of the shooters after the attack. He was 29 years old when the Zona Rosa attack took place.

90. (U) After he was arrested by the National Guard on August 12, 1985 at his auto shop, Abraham Dimas led authorities to his brother's house.¹⁵ Even though Ismael Dimas was at home when the police arrived, he managed to escape.

91. (U) State Department included an update of Abraham Dimas' case in its cable to all diplomatic posts in June 1991. The cable reported that Abraham Dimas was charged with acts in support of terrorism and was committed to Mariona Prison. The cases of co-conspirators Rivas and Garcia were joined with Abraham Dimas' case, and they passed together through the judicial system. After being moved through several civilian and military courts and after various amnesty appeals were denied, Garcia's case was heard in 1991. On May 2, he was found guilty and sentenced to four years in prison. He was released on March 10, 1992, after serving six years and seven months.

92. [REDACTED] Pedro Antonio Andrade Martinez/"Mario Gonzalez." The CIA Station in San Salvador began to inquire into the connection of Pedro Antonio Andrade Martinez, known by the alias "Mario Gonzalez," to the Zona Rosa attack immediately after it occurred. Andrade came under scrutiny because he was the known leader of the PRTC Metropolitan Front, a unit of which had carried out the attack.

93. (U) Americo Mauro Araujo Ramirez (who was also known within the insurgency as Mario Americo Duran), Sub-Secretary General of the Communist Party of El Salvador, one of the FMLN factions, was arrested by the National Police in August 1985. Araujo told police that Andrade devised the plan for the Zona Rosa attack without coordinating it with the rest of the FMLN general command.

¹⁵ [REDACTED] A report of the National Guard raid was described in a disseminated intelligence report that was prepared by San Salvador Station and disseminated on August 15, 1985.

[REDACTED]

Araujo met Andrade frequently in the Zona Rosa, and they noticed that some of the patrons were U.S. Embassy Marine security guards. Andrade joked that the Marines would make a good target for an attack.

94. (U) During Garcia's extensive debriefing after his arrest by U.S. Border Patrol agents, he described sketchy details of guerrilla operations that he had overheard in the upholstery shop. He said the insurgents mentioned Andrade was the commander of several participant cells, Andrade was the "key figure," and Ismael Dimas had to do everything Andrade asked of him.¹⁶

95. (U) When Garcia was deported to El Salvador and arrested by the Treasury Police, he said that, when he moved to San Salvador, Ismael Dimas had introduced him to Andrade, who was head of several guerrilla cells in the city. According to Garcia, it was Andrade's idea to use an upholstery shop as a cover for PRTC activities. Garcia reported that Ismael Dimas said on June 14 that an operation to kill Americans was being planned with Andrade and "Julio" doing the casing.¹⁷

96. (U) Rivas told police soon after he was arrested in August 1985 that Andrade, who was overall commander of the three squads, ordered Ismael Dimas to undertake the Zona Rosa attack. During subsequent interrogations, Rivas told the National Police that Andrade met the guerrillas at *Café de Don Pedro* on the night of the attack. He arrived in a Lancer model car, talked with Ismael Dimas privately and drove away. Rivas said Andrade was not present during the actual shooting. Abraham Dimas stated at a press conference arranged by the police in September 1985 that he knew Andrade, "Walter" and Ismael Dimas had been planning an action just prior to the Zona Rosa attack. Vladimir Rodriguez, who maintained the weapons cache for the PRTC, said Andrade and

¹⁶ (U) Garcia only knew Andrade by his alias "Mario."

¹⁷ (U) During interrogations with the Treasury Police, Garcia said he participated in the attack, but it was later determined he was not on the scene. He claimed he made up the story of direct involvement because he was coerced by the police.

[REDACTED]

Ismael Dimas delivered various rifles, pistols and explosives to him on May 1 and collected some of them a few days before the attack.

97. (U) PRTC finance chief Jose Anibal Masferrer Valladares was arrested in January 1986. At that time, he said Andrade went to Mexico in August 1985 following the Zona Rosa attack. Masferrer identified Andrade as Chief of the PRTC Metropolitan Front and "intellectual author of the 19 June 1985 Zona Rosa massacre." PRTC member Maria Elba Alvarado Martinez, who was arrested by the National Guard on July 14, 1987, lived in a house that was used by PRTC members for meetings and to cache weapons. She rented the house on orders from Ismael Dimas. From February through May 1985, she said the house was used frequently for meetings by Andrade, "Julio," Bolanos, "Walter," "Pepe," Rivas, and Ismael Dimas.

98. (U) According to captured PRTC documents dating to approximately June 1988, Andrade did not have the full confidence of the PRTC Central Committee. A letter, written in code by the Central Committee Secretary to other committee members, complained about Andrade's behavior and made recommendations to "rehabilitate" him. Among other complaints, the letter listed the following:

- ◆ Andrade repeatedly threatened to resign from the party.
- ◆ Andrade does not have the PRTC's interest at heart.
- ◆ When all goes smoothly, Andrade is a good party member, but when there are problems, he flies off the handle.
- ◆ Andrade acts as an individual rather than a party member and takes personal credit for the work.

99. (U) Axel Armando Orellana Mena, PRTC Military and Political Commander and PRTC Central Committee member, was arrested on April 11, 1989, and voluntarily provided information about PRTC operations and members to Salvadoran authorities. Orellana's information led to the capture of seven insurgents and confiscation of weapons and explosive materials. He said the Zona Rosa attack was planned and executed by Andrade. According to Orellana, his information about Zona Rosa came from a report Andrade himself prepared. Orellana surmised that Andrade's motive

[REDACTED]

for the attack was the major role of the United States in the Salvadoran civil war. Orellana believed Ismael Dimas surveilled the Marines and designed the basic attack plan, a plan that Andrade refined. Orellana further reported that, immediately after the attack, Andrade helped the perpetrators escape the country. Andrade then fled to Mexico where he stayed for about one year. Orellana's information led to Andrade's capture by the Salvadorans on May 28, 1989.

100. [REDACTED] Immediately after Andrade's capture by the National Police, he stated that he would not talk unless three conditions were met:

- ◆ His capture was to be publicized;
- ◆ His family's safety and safe conduct to the United States were to be guaranteed; and
- ◆ He was to be permitted to talk with a representative of the U.S. Government.

The CIA Station in San Salvador speculated that the last condition was levied because Andrade wanted to divulge information about FMLN activities but feared the National Police was infiltrated by FMLN members or because he wanted to strike a deal with U.S. officials over his case. When subsequently pressed by Salvadoran police regarding precisely why he wished to talk with a U.S. Government representative, Andrade said this was no longer necessary.

101. (U) When Andrade was arrested, his wife and children were also taken into custody. This was consistent with Salvadoran practice. In exchange for their freedom, on May 30, 1989, Andrade led Salvadoran troops to the largest weapons cache ever captured in the history of the insurgency. At three different sites in San Salvador, police found a total of 343 AK-47 rifles, explosives and one-half million rounds of ammunition. Andrade claimed he would pass along equally important intelligence information, but he wanted guarantees from the Salvadoran Government that he would not be put on trial in the United States.

[REDACTED]

102. (U) Andrade's version was that he was one of four PRTC members who planned the Zona Rosa attack. He identified Jose Manuel Melgar, PRTC Political Commission member, as the primary organizer of the plan. Melgar went to San Salvador from Guazapa in May 1985 and began directing activity of the Mardoqueo Cruz cells. The Zona Rosa attack was Melgar's idea, said Andrade. Melgar collected information for the attack, including data on the Marines; coordinated with other perpetrators; and designed each team's tasks. Emerson Rivas, PRTC Political Commission member, was to obtain the weapons and set up the routes to and from the Zona Rosa. Ismael Dimas handled the operational planning and directed the attack itself. Andrade was assigned the responsibility for arranging support bases and contingent medical care.

103. (U) According to Andrade, he met with Ismael Dimas on June 15 or 16 and discussed security arrangements and the problems they were having in obtaining medical support. Ismael Dimas told Andrade that the safehouse arrangements had been taken care of, but there was still no medical support, and this aspect was vital because they were expecting a significant confrontation. According to Andrade, Ismael Dimas still did not tell Andrade any details of the operation being planned. Melgar met with Andrade on June 19 to discuss the need for medical services and directed him to meet with Ismael Dimas later that day. Andrade went to the *Café de Don Pedro* at 5:00 or 6:00 p.m. There, he met Ismael Dimas and told him he had not been able to acquire medical services for the group. Andrade claimed he still did not know about the operation that took place later that night.

104. (U) In addition to the four planners, Andrade named three men who actually took part in the attack: Ismael Dimas (whom he referred to by the alias "Cesar Guevara," an alias not known to other PRTC members), "Julio" and Misael Cruz. Misael Cruz may have been another alias for "Walter." All three of these men had died before Andrade was arrested. He did not mention any participation by the five individuals who had been arrested previously and charged as perpetrators.

[REDACTED]

105. (U) Andrade further told the Salvadorans that he talked with Melgar on June 20 when Melgar told him things had become serious and the group had gone too far. Melgar reportedly told Andrade that "Julio" had been wounded in the attack and taken by Ismael Dimas to the Red Cross for help. Melgar further advised that the PRTC would issue a communiqué concerning the operation and that Andrade should not contact any of the cell members until Melgar gave his approval.

106. (U) Andrade stated further that PRTC Political Commission member Jose Mario Lopez Alvarenga directed him to travel to Mexico in mid-July to discuss the Zona Rosa attack. While there, Andrade told Lopez that he did not know the details of the attack since he did not participate, and he referred Lopez to Melgar as the director of the operation. Andrade traveled to Cuba in August 1985 and met there with PRTC Leader Francisco Alberto Jovel Urquilla who also wanted to hear about the operation. Andrade said he told Jovel, too, that Melgar had gone to the metropolitan area and assumed the lead in carrying out the operation.

107. [REDACTED] On July 5, 1989, U.S. Embassy personnel arranged for Andrade to be subject to a polygraph examination administered by the Salvadoran Special Investigative Unit (SIU). San Salvador Station filed a report of the polygraph session in July 1989 with CIA Headquarters. The SIU had been trained in polygraph techniques by the FBI. The test included questions about Andrade's participation in the Zona Rosa attack and the roles of other perpetrators. The SIU polygraph results indicated that Andrade was being truthful when he said he did not secure weapons for use in the attack; he did not visit a safehouse on or about June 15 to prepare weapons for use in the attack; he recognized a picture of Rivas as being a PRTC member; and he did not recognize a picture of Garcia that was shown to him.

108. [REDACTED] Andrade's SIU polygraph results were judged to be "inconclusive" as to his responses that: he did not participate in planning the attack; he was not present during the shooting; and he

[REDACTED]

did not arrange for medical services or secure a safehouse for the operation. The SIU polygrapher qualified the test results by explaining that Andrade was recovering from a cold and still had a cough. Because of this, Andrade was scheduled to take a second test two weeks later. The SIU polygraph results were to be sent to the National Academy of Lie Detection for quality control review.

109. [REDACTED] A second polygraph examination was conducted by the SIU on July 20 to review the areas that were previously deemed "inconclusive." According to SIU information that was eventually provided to San Salvador Station, the results of this polygraph supported the truthfulness of Andrade's responses in the following areas: he was not present during the attack; he did not arrange for medical services or a safehouse for the operation; and he did not participate, individually or with others, in planning the attack. Thus, the SIU polygraph results concluded that Andrade was truthful in stating that he had not participated in planning the attack even though, according to Andrade's own statement to the Salvadoran police, he was one of four planners of the attack.

110. [REDACTED] In January 1990, the Agency's San Salvador Station reported that the Salvadoran Government had promised Andrade that the time he had already served in detention would be considered sufficient penalty for the crimes for which he had been arrested.¹⁸ This promise was contingent upon Andrade's full cooperation in debriefings regarding the FMLN and PRTC.

111. [REDACTED] In March 1993, the United Nations Truth Commission for El Salvador issued an unclassified report regarding its investigation into the Zona Rosa attack and 30 other acts of violence committed by both sides during El Salvador's civil war. According to the report, Andrade was tried in 1989 on charges of complicity in the Zona Rosa attack before the Third Court of Criminal

¹⁸ (U) These crimes did not include charges in connection with the Zona Rosa attack. Under Salvadoran law, the testimony of co-conspirators—Rivas, Garcia, Abraham Dimas—could not be used against Andrade because it was considered mere hearsay.

[REDACTED]

Proceedings.¹⁹ The report did not explain the outcome of the trial but stated that Andrade was freed under the 1987 amnesty.

112. [REDACTED] The Truth Commission report stated there was credible information that Andrade played a larger role in the Zona Rosa attack than he had admitted to, and that he personally selected the targets of the attack. The report concluded that Andrade was one of the planners of the attack based on the fact that he confessed in court to having prior knowledge of it. According to the Truth Commission report, Andrade admitted that he prepared a safehouse to provide medical treatment and shelter to individuals wounded in the attack. This contradicts both the statements Andrade made to the National Police and the SIU polygraph results that judged him to be truthful when he denied any involvement in the Zona Rosa attack.

113. (U) On June 28, 1990, Andrade traveled to Miami under a parole that was granted to him by the U.S. Government.²⁰ Information from other U.S. agencies indicates he currently resides in New Jersey with his wife and children.

114. [REDACTED] Romeo Gilberto Osorio/"Gerardo Zelaya." Romeo Gilberto Osorio came to the attention of the Agency's San Salvador Station within days of the Zona Rosa attack. On June 28, 1985, the Station requested that CIA Headquarters and the FBI run name traces regarding "Gerardo Zelaya," who had been identified in captured PRTC documents as a PRTC member from San Francisco, California. In response, the CIA and FBI [REDACTED] identified "Zelaya" as being an alias for Romeo Gilberto Osorio, an American citizen of Salvadoran ancestry who had served four years in the U.S. Air Force and was honorably discharged in 1970. Osorio, who was then the gallery curator at the Mission Cultural Center in San Francisco, had been arrested in connection with a take-over of the

¹⁹ (U) The Truth Commission's report that Andrade was tried for charges relating to involvement in the Zona Rosa attack contradicts information from the Embassy in San Salvador that Andrade was not tried for crimes relating to the attack.

²⁰ (U) Andrade's airplane ticket was prepared for travel on June 28, 1990, but no other evidence has been found to verify the actual date he entered the United States.

[REDACTED]

Salvadoran Consulate General in San Francisco in 1978. An Assistant U.S. Attorney had declined prosecution of Osorio at that time.

[REDACTED]

116. (U) In May 1995, Osorio appeared on a segment of the *60 Minutes* television show and discussed the role of U.S. military advisers in the Salvadoran civil war. Osorio described how the insurgents' fight against the government was made more difficult because of the U.S. military presence and said, "I mean it was them or us. So we made it a point to target some American servicemen in order to make a point to the Congress and to have them take a second look about what was going on." *60 Minutes* narrator Ed Bradley said during the broadcast that Osorio had helped plan the assassination of four Marines at an outdoor café in the Zona Rosa. Osorio did not state, however, that he participated in the Zona Rosa attack, either directly or indirectly, and no evidence has been found in CIA records to indicate that Osorio was involved.

Issue: "What role [CIA] has played in the investigation of the murders, and what priority has been placed on the investigation."

117. [REDACTED] CIA personnel reacted immediately to the Zona Rosa attack. Two minutes after midnight on June 20, 1985, a "Flash" precedence cable from San Salvador Station notified CIA Headquarters of the attack. This was the first report to Washington of the incident from any agency represented at the Embassy.

118. [REDACTED] The day following the attack, officers in the CIA Headquarters' Central American Task Force (CATF) participated in a Washington, D.C. meeting of the Regional Interagency Group. The

[REDACTED]

purpose of this meeting was to discuss each agency's response to the killings and to plan actions pertinent to President Reagan's June 20 statement pledging assistance to find and punish the killers and an anticipated National Security Decision Directive ordering that such assistance be provided. The CIA representatives explained the Agency's intentions to enhance and expedite intelligence support to the maximum degree possible. This would include information exchange with the Salvadorans, assistance in collection programs and training, including anti-terrorist capability training. The CIA participants reported that the Agency's San Salvador Station had already proposed several steps to enhance information collection to identify the perpetrators [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and assisting the Salvadoran services that were directly involved in the investigation.

119. [REDACTED] The Chief of Station (COS) of San Salvador Station at the time recalls that the killing of the American Marines galvanized Station personnel. Many Station officers were friends of the Marines and had a personal interest in finding the killers. Pursuit of the perpetrators became the absolute top priority of the Station. Everything else was put in second place. According to the COS, the Station's urgency in working on the Zona Rosa killings brought about needed cooperation among the various Salvadoran services, and between them and the Station. The COS says he also was able to arrange for extra help from the Defense Intelligence Agency's Central America Joint Intelligence Team (CAJIT); the U.S. Marine Corps; elements of the U.S. Southern Command; and CIA Headquarters, including the first assignment of a Directorate of Intelligence analyst to San Salvador Station.

120. [REDACTED] On June 21, a San Salvador Station cable sought Headquarters' support for its activities by requesting all available information concerning the PRTC, especially the Mardoqueo Cruz urban commandos. The Station cable noted that it wished to "leave no stone unturned in pursuing this organization." A subsequent June 25, 1985 cable advised Headquarters that the Station had formed a special joint PRTC Task Force to serve as a centralized analytical

[REDACTED]

and operational working group and obtain operational information leading to the capture of members of the PRTC Mardoqueo Cruz commandos.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] All Salvadoran intelligence services were persuaded by the COS to participate. As the senior U.S. intelligence officer and the DCI's representative, the COS also coordinated the San Salvador efforts of the other pertinent U.S. intelligence entities.

121. [REDACTED] For its part, CIA Headquarters coordinated closely with the State Department. State Department asked that the PRTC Task Force be the focal point and the channel for all U.S. support to the Salvadoran security services working on the Zona Rosa case. A CATF officer also ensured that the FBI, which had declined to participate directly in the effort in El Salvador, was provided with all CIA information regarding PRTC members who were believed to be in the United States.

122. [REDACTED] The PRTC Task Force maintained a high level of activity and kept CIA Headquarters closely informed of its work through a series of Task Force reports. The contents of these reports varied from a request for more aerial photographic coverage of suspected PRTC base camps to an announcement of the inauguration by El Salvador's Directorate of National Intelligence (DNI) of a database regarding PRTC members. Details concerning various PRTC leaders are also included in these reports. The reports included "Mario Gonzalez" (later to be identified as Andrade), who was noted as a PRTC Metropolitan Front member, and "Gerardo Zelaya" (eventually identified as Gilberto Osorio).

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

123. [REDACTED] Part of the PRTC Task Force was based in the Salvadoran DNI Headquarters. A Station officer assigned to the Task Force describes its work as follows:

On the Thursday [the day] following the Zona Rosa attack, I was in the office all day. Everyone in the Station began to work "flat out" in response to the attack. The Station set up the PRTC Task Force at the DNI. [CIA Directorate of Intelligence] analysts, intelligence officers from the U.S. Army [REDACTED] Military Intelligence Detachment, and U.S. Marine Corps analysts augmented the Task Force staff. Prior to the establishment of the Task Force, the Salvadoran services would not permit its officers to work on captured documents for fear they would be corrupted by Marxist propaganda. As a result, the documents, of which there were many, had not been used. The PRTC Task Force changed that philosophy into one of thoroughly exploiting the documents. Through analysis of documents, the Task Force was able to form an Order of Battle for the PRTC and "X"ed out the names of suspected perpetrators of the Zona Rosa attack and PRTC leaders as liaison and military action was successful against them.

124. [REDACTED] A CIA officer [REDACTED] [REDACTED] says that the COS made the decision to "go after the PRTC" and "pulled out all the stops" in this effort. All other work [REDACTED] stopped, and total concentration was directed at locating the PRTC base camps.

125. [REDACTED] On August 3, 1985, the COS provided Headquarters with a comprehensive report regarding the Zona Rosa inquiry as of that date. The report noted that, if the Station had not organized the PRTC Task Force, the Salvadoran surge effort never would have happened because of bureaucratic problems. The report described two dozen specific operational activities that had been generated mainly by the PRTC Task Force. Included were the investigations of "Mario Gonzalez"--i.e., Andrade--and of Gilberto Osorio, who was then thought to be living in Nicaragua.

126. [REDACTED] When Garcia was detained by the U.S. Border Patrol in August 1985, CIA Headquarters performed name traces for the FBI regarding him and all the perpetrators he implicated. San Salvador

[REDACTED]

Station also passed lead information provided by Garcia to the Salvadorans. Using this information, the Salvadorans raided the upholstery shop that was used as cover by the terrorists and arrested Rivas. [REDACTED]

127. [REDACTED] The Station, in pursuit of information regarding the Zona Rosa attack, reported to Headquarters on August 20, 1985 that it was pressing all its contacts for the fullest possible reporting of information the Salvadorans had derived from the debriefings of Garcia and Rivas. The Station also reported that it had arranged for a polygraph examination of Rivas to verify elements of the information he supplied regarding the Zona Rosa attack, including his claim of being an active participant.

128. [REDACTED] Throughout the period leading to, during and after the 1985 arrests of Garcia, Abraham Dimas and Rivas, the Station continued reporting to CIA Headquarters regarding the Salvadoran effort. In a review of the Station's performance for fiscal year 1985, CIA Headquarters commented that "[the Station's] ability to respond to crisis situations, such as the Zona Rosa attack, with surge reporting was particularly noteworthy."

129. [REDACTED] With the successful arrests of Rivas, Garcia and Abraham Dimas, the efforts of the Task Force slowed somewhat and were diverted to work on the kidnapping of Inez Duarte, President Duarte's daughter, which occurred on September 10, 1985. Aiding President Duarte in this regard was a high priority for the U.S. Government. However, the Station continued to collect information regarding the Zona Rosa perpetrators who had not been arrested.

130. [REDACTED] In a November 12, 1985 letter to Chairman David Durenberger of the SSCI, DCI William Casey noted that the CIA helped the Salvadoran Government establish a joint task force that "paid a significant dividend." An attachment to that letter mentioned that the PRTC Task Force had focused all available resources on the PRTC to bring the perpetrators of the Zona Rosa attack to justice.

[REDACTED]

The attachment further noted that the CIA's efforts had led to the arrest of three people involved in the Zona Rosa operation and the confiscation of a large number of documents and arms.

131. [REDACTED] In November 1987, a telegram from the Embassy in San Salvador to the State Department discussed the possible prosecution of the Zona Rosa killers. This telegram reported that the CIA Station "actually did the vast majority of the legwork in the Zona Rosa case."

132. [REDACTED] In January 1986, the Station reported the arrest of Vladimir Rodriguez, who provided a safe site for weapons used by the group. In January 1986, it reported the apparent deaths of "Walter" and Ismael Dimas in a bombing raid at Guazapa Volcano. No record has been found to indicate additional focus on the Zona Rosa attacks by San Salvador Station or CIA Headquarters between late 1987 and the arrest of Andrade by the Salvadorans in 1989. When Andrade was arrested, CIA Headquarters, at the request of the Assistant U.S. Attorney who was responsible for considering possible prosecution of the Zona Rosa case, instructed San Salvador Station not to have any direct part in actively collecting information from Andrade about the Zona Rosa case. The reason for this instruction was to avoid potential complications if any information obtained from Andrade were eventually to be used in a U.S. prosecution.

Issue: "What action has been taken by officials from [CIA] against the perpetrators/intellectual authors of the murders."

133. [REDACTED] CIA action directed against the perpetrators or planners of the Zona Rosa attack can be separated into two categories: actions involving the specific individuals who were involved and actions against the PRTC in general. Specific CIA actions were directed against only two individuals, Garcia and Rivas.

134. [REDACTED] Actions Regarding Garcia [REDACTED] CIA Stations [REDACTED] [REDACTED] were in contact with the U.S. Border Patrol, the Naval Investigative Service and the FBI when these organizations

[REDACTED]

were interviewing Garcia regarding the Zona Rosa attack. CIA Headquarters directed that the officer who met with representatives of the other agencies obtain as much information as possible without directly participating in a criminal investigation or being physically present during interviews. The purpose of this instruction was to avoid having [REDACTED] Agency officer listed as a witness in any future court action. A [REDACTED] case officer explored with the FBI and the Border Patrol the possibility of recruiting Garcia to operate as a penetration of the insurgency, but both the Border Patrol and the FBI pointed out that Garcia did not seem capable of such a role. [REDACTED] Station notified San Salvador Station that Garcia was returning to San Salvador on August 16, 1985. The San Salvador Station, in turn, notified the Salvadoran authorities, and Garcia was arrested when he landed at the airport in San Salvador. The Station was instrumental in Garcia's arrest both by providing the Salvadorans with information about his return and by energizing the Salvadorans to take quick action in this regard.

135. [REDACTED] **Actions Regarding Rivas.** The Salvadorans arrested Rivas on August 12, 1985. This action was based upon information provided to them from Garcia's revelations to the U.S. Border Patrol that had been provided to the Salvadoran service by San Salvador Station. The Station was further involved directly concerning Rivas on August 24, 1985, when CIA officers were allowed by the Salvadorans to interview Rivas and administer a polygraph examination to him to clarify his degree of culpability and the veracity of the information he had provided to the Salvadorans. The results of the examination, which was conducted with the knowledge and approval of CIA Headquarters, confirmed his guilt.

136. [REDACTED] **Actions Regarding the PRTC in General.** Other potential CIA actions against those responsible for the Zona Rosa attack were discussed immediately after the killings took place. At the June 21, 1985 interagency meeting in Washington, steps were discussed to implement President Reagan's statement promising U.S. assistance to the Salvadoran Government in finding and punishing the Zona Rosa terrorists. CIA representatives stated that the Agency would enhance and expedite intelligence support to the Salvadorans

CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1985

- June 19 The Zona Rosa attack occurs. Four Marines, two U.S. businessmen and six Latin Americans are killed by insurgents.
- June 21 The Central American Revolutionary Workers Party (PRTC) claims credit for the attack in a telephone call to a San Salvador newspaper.
- June 24 San Salvador Station forms a PRTC Task Force to work exclusively on the Zona Rosa incident.
- July 9 President Reagan signs a National Security Decision Directive in response to the Zona Rosa attack, including direction to the DCI to "undertake an expanded program of improved intelligence support to El Salvador."
- August 8 The CIA learns of U.S. Border Patrol apprehension of Juan Miguel Garcia Melendez and receives an initial debriefing on his knowledge of the Zona Rosa incident.
- August 12 Wilian Celio Rivas Bolanos and Jose Abraham Dimas Aguilar are arrested.
- August 16 Garcia returns to El Salvador and is arrested.
- September 2 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff presents President Duarte a letter from President Reagan congratulating Duarte on success against the PRTC.

1986

- January 17 A Salvadoran National Guard raid discovers the weapons used in Zona Rosa attack and captures Pedro Vladimir Rodriguez Guardado, who hid the weapons for the PRTC.

1988

- July 13 Juan Antonio Morales Lucero, who admitted participation in the Zona Rosa attack, is arrested.

1989

- May 28 The Salvadoran National Police captures Pedro Antonio Andrade Martinez.
- May 30 Andrade leads the Salvadoran military to the largest arms cache discovered in El Salvador.

1990

- March 28 State Department personnel at the Embassy request parole authorization from State for Andrade.
- April 25 State Department telegram to Embassy authorizes Andrade's parole.
- June 28 The probable date when Andrade leaves El Salvador and enters the United States.

1991

- May 4 Garcia, Abraham Dimas and Rivas are sentenced by the Salvadoran military court.

1993

- August 18 Morales is found not guilty of participation in the Zona Rosa attack after spending five years in jail awaiting trial.

[REDACTED]

to the maximum degree possible. This would include information exchanges, assistance in collection programs, and training, including anti-terrorist capability training. Existing legislative and Executive authorities for Agency programs were sufficient for these purposes.

137. [REDACTED] On June 21, 1985, immediately after the PRTC claimed credit for the Zona Rosa attack, San Salvador Station informed CIA Headquarters by cable that it would concentrate its resources "in making life difficult for [the PRTC]." The Station cable stated that Station personnel [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] would leave "no stone unturned in pursuing this organization."

138. [REDACTED] On June 25, 1985, the Station reported to Headquarters concerning the first meeting of the PRTC Task Force it had established to serve as the central analytical and operational focus of the effort to identify and arrest those who were involved in the attack. According to this report, Salvadoran elements of the PRTC Task Force were developing an all-source intelligence assessment regarding the PRTC as a basis for major Salvadoran armed forces military operations. These operations were to be targeted against PRTC field headquarters, training camps and logistical facilities with the intention of inflicting maximum damages in reprisal for the Zona Rosa attack.

139. [REDACTED] The Salvadorans, with encouragement and enhanced intelligence [REDACTED] services from San Salvador Station, conducted attacks on PRTC camps with air-mobile units, ground forces and bombings. This Salvadoran military activity reportedly resulted in increased rebel casualties, sufficient pressure to force the PRTC to move out of its main base area, the removal of PRTC members from San Salvador to the rural front, and the reported deaths of cell leaders Ismael Dimas and "Walter." The military actions also resulted in the deactivation of the Mardoqueo Cruz urban commandos and an affirmative decision by the FMLN leadership not to kill any more Americans.

140. [REDACTED] A CIA officer who participated in the PRTC Task Force recalls that the Salvadoran military, supported by intelligence analysis from the Task Force, was quite effective. Before the Zona Rosa attack, the PRTC reportedly had about 300 members. After the concerted intelligence and military effort, the CIA officer states that it was reduced to about half that number. The Salvadorans achieved more success against the PRTC than against any other insurgent group. Because of the small size of the PRTC, the CIA officer states that there simply would not have been such a large scale U.S. and Salvadoran effort against the group if it had not been for the Zona Rosa attack.

Issue: "What dealings, since the murders, [CIA] has had with the Government of El Salvador on this matter, and whether in the course of that relationship the Salvadoran government demonstrated an aggressive effort to identify, prosecute and incarcerate the perpetrators/intellectual authors."

141. [REDACTED] Traditionally, rivalry between the Salvadoran services had limited their effectiveness. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] When the Station acted to form the PRTC Task Force on June 24, 1985, it expended considerable effort to persuade them to cooperate in that forum. The services agreed to bring to the PRTC Task Force all of the records each had on the PRTC. Throughout the effort, the PRTC Task Force assigned leads to whichever of the Salvadoran services appeared to have the best chance of producing results.

142. [REDACTED] Station officer who was in charge of the Task Force says:

The Salvadoran cooperation was as good as one could expect [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The cooperation with the Salvadorans at this time was probably at its height [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

143. [REDACTED] The Station designed the PRTC Task Force so the Salvadoran services would cooperate to identify and arrest the perpetrators. The Salvadoran Government representatives on the Task Force were members of the DNI, the National Police, the National Guard, the *Estado Mayor*,²² and [REDACTED] the Treasury Police.²³ Each service made specific contributions as follows: the DNI Metropolitan Front Referent provided its Chief of Special Projects, the Chief of Analysis, a senior analyst, and two secretaries; the *Estado Mayor* assigned the Chief Analyst and the Chief of the Regional Document Exploitation Center; the National Police furnished its Chief from the Counter Subversive Branch; the National Guard assigned its Chief of the Intelligence Section.²⁴

144. [REDACTED] The Station made a series of almost-daily reports to CIA Headquarters regarding the Task Force operation, especially as regards the activities of the Salvadorans. For example, the following summary describing some of the Salvadorans' activity was included in the PRTC Task Force report covering the first day of its work, June 24, 1985:

The Task Force began by bringing together all available documentary materials on PRTC such as the Nidia Diaz²⁵ documents, National Police reports on interrogations of prisoners, and reports from various informants.

Identification of listings of PRTC members, including true names, pseudonyms, date and place of birth, positions.... Task Force is preparing report on the basis of which military region

²² (U) The *Estado Mayor* was the Salvadoran Armed Forces Joint General Staff.

[REDACTED]

²⁴ [REDACTED] CIA records do not indicate whether the Treasury Police actually contributed personnel to the Task Force effort.

²⁵ (U) "Nidia Diaz" was a top ranking member of the PRTC who was arrested by Salvadoran forces in April 1985.

[REDACTED]

commanders and public security forces can undertake investigation and arrest of PRTC members.

Intelligence on PRTC special forces base camps provided by three PRTC [insurgents] to Sixth Brigade is being provided to Task Force.

Documents captured with Nidia Diaz... being prepared in intelligence report format. Attempts underway to contact family members for debriefings....

Investigate interrogation reports that link ERP [another FMLN group] urban elements to the acquisition of information in San Salvador for specific assassination targeting and sabotage. Follow-up to include investigation to determine if ERP may have supported PRTC in 19 June [Zona Rosa attack].

Investigate document containing substance of PRTC Metro Front Regional Committee meeting in Nov 1981 which gives names of PRTC Metro Front attendees and leaders. Attempt to locate family members of these participants through public security service units.

Tactical exploitation: DNI's Chief of Analysis and the *Estado Mayor* C-II [the intelligence section] are developing an all-source intelligence assessment on PRTC as the basis for major military operations targeted against PRTC field headquarters, training camps and logistical facilities with intention of inflicting maximum damage as reprisal.

145. [REDACTED] During the month following this report, the Salvadorans engaged in a variety of activities focused on the PRTC and on locating the perpetrators of the Zona Rosa attack. Demonstrating the degree of Salvadoran Government interest in the Zona Rosa investigation, President Duarte visited the Task Force, accompanied by the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the Joint General Staff, for briefings on the Task Force's operations. The Salvadorans instituted a media campaign to enlist the public's assistance. Police sketches and written descriptions of three suspected participants in the Zona Rosa attack appeared in all the daily newspapers. A "hot line" number was provided along with a request for Salvadorans to call with information.

[REDACTED]

146. [REDACTED] Salvadoran leads developed during this period included the mention in captured documents of a "Gerardo Zelaya," identified as Gilberto Osorio, a PRTC member who, according to the documents, was from San Francisco, had received a grant from the Art Commission of San Francisco [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Salvadorans also captured documents that included a letter signed by "Mario Gonzalez" of the PRTC Metropolitan Front requesting that no more PRTC members be sent to the Front because of the excess of personnel there already. Former FMLN leader Napoleon Romero Garcia, alias "Miguel Castellanos,"—later assassinated by the insurgents for his cooperation with the Salvadoran authorities—helped in making a sketch of "Mario." According to Romero, "Mario" had attended a course with him in Vietnam and had been in San Salvador the previous December.

147. [REDACTED] As of August 1, 1985, six weeks after the Zona Rosa attack and just before Garcia was apprehended by the U.S. Border Patrol, the San Salvador Station COS made a formal report to Headquarters regarding the progress of the investigation. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

148. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

149. [REDACTED] The National Guard's intelligence section, second after the National Police in resources dedicated to the PRTC, made one officer and 12 enlisted men available to follow-up leads related to the Zona Rosa attack. In his report, the COS observed that the National Guard was quick to act in cases requiring the arrest of PRTC suspects

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

151. [REDACTED] According to the COS's report, immediately after the Zona Rosa attack, the DNI placed continuous coverage on known PRTC communication links and intensified efforts to identify PRTC communications elements. A Salvadoran forward collection team was placed in central San Vicente Department to provide enhanced coverage of PRTC tactical communications and radio direction finding efforts in San Salvador to locate PRTC elements in the capital. The urban direction finding effort was successful in determining the presence of numerous insurgent related emitters, but none had yet been confirmed as PRTC elements nor precisely located at the time of the COS's report. These operations were continued with the PRTC as the priority target.

[REDACTED]

152. [REDACTED] In an August 15 cable, San Salvador Station reported to CIA Headquarters that the National Guard had raided the upholstery shop, arrested Rivas and followed with the arrest of Abraham Dimas. Garcia was arrested by the Salvadorans when he returned to El Salvador as CIA reported in an August 18 cable. Illustrating the intensity and competitiveness of the Salvadoran services concerning the Zona Rosa investigation, the Treasury Police exerted considerable effort to "beat the National Guard to the airport" so it could make the arrest. The National Guard was assigned responsibility for Garcia, but the Treasury Police wished to claim credit for his apprehension. The Station noted in an August 20 cable to CIA Headquarters that the competition among the various Salvadoran services was intense as each wanted to be first with results.

153. [REDACTED] the Salvadorans suffered coordination problems through mid-August 1985, although they continued their fairly good collaboration as participants in the Station-led PRTC Task Force. The National Police was designated the lead agency in the Zona Rosa investigation even though the National Guard was traditionally responsible for investigating the PRTC. Consequently, the National Police did not receive complete support from the National Guard or exercise operational control over National Guard investigative efforts. In addition, the DNI, the 1st Brigade and the 5th Brigade pursued investigative leads independently and without always coordinating with the National Police.

154. [REDACTED] In early August 1985, President Duarte's security advisors informed him of the coordination problems in the investigation. On August 10, at Duarte's prompting, the Minister of Defense and Public Security General sent an order concerning the investigation to the Director General of the National Police. Copies of the order were also sent to the Directors General of the National Guard and the Treasury Police, the Chief of the Intelligence Section (C-II) of the Armed Forces Joint General Staff, and the Director of DNI. The order noted that it was

[REDACTED]

being issued in compliance with instructions from the President. The Zona Rosa case was described as of "singular importance because of the characteristics of the act, the different victims involved, and the terrorist affiliation of the perpetrators." The order directed that several organizational principles be followed, including centralized leadership, coordinated investigation at all levels, command management of informants, and "strict and total cooperation of all the units, of public security or military, regarding PRTC information or captures related to the case"

155. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Colonel Lopez quoted the August 10 Duarte order and announced that, in compliance, a unified command had been formed with the responsibility and authority to centralize, analyze, prioritize, direct, and assign missions to the individual security services in order to solve the case as soon as possible. To facilitate solving the case, Colonel Lopez ordered that all PRTC members in custody or subsequently captured were to be immediately turned over to the unified command along with any captured documents, weapons or equipment.

156. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Colonel Lopez held another meeting with Salvadoran officials who were responsible for the Zona Rosa investigation. He stressed the need for a concerted effort over the next five days because publicity over the capture of Rivas and Garcia would complicate the investigation. Other perpetrators would thereby be alerted to the advanced state of the investigation, complicating further progress. Colonel Lopez also ordered formation of a group to focus on Garcia's and Rivas' information, which included repeat searches of the safehouses, preparation and distribution of sketches of the perpetrators, analysis of interrogation reports of PRTC prisoners, and follow-up contacts with perpetrators' family members.

[REDACTED]

157. (U) On September 2, 1985, General John Vessey, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, passed a letter to President Duarte from President Reagan. The letter congratulated Duarte on the Salvadoran Government's success against the PRTC. Duarte, at this public meeting and as reported by the Embassy, responded that "the intensive effort both countries mounted to collect intelligence on the PRTC, and then go after them, was a more productive way to tackle the terrorist problem than simply to look for ways to viscerally lash out at them."

158. (U) The Salvadoran search for the perpetrators still at large continued. On September 10, 1985, however, President Duarte's daughter, Inez, was kidnapped by FMLN insurgents, creating a government crisis in El Salvador. The insurgents used her as a bargaining chip to obtain the freedom of imprisoned insurgent leaders. Salvadoran security and police services concentrated almost all their efforts on the kidnapping.

159. [REDACTED] For the next year, CIA records indicate pursuit of few new avenues by CIA and the Salvadorans regarding the Zona Rosa case. There was considerable continuing action concerning issues relating to the possible prosecution or potential amnesty of those who had been arrested. However, the U.S. Government's involvement in these issues was the principal responsibility of other U.S. agencies.

160. [REDACTED] In May 1989, the National Police arrested Andrade based upon information provided by Axel Armando Orellana Mena, a captured member of the PRTC Central Committee. The Salvadorans provided the Station with intelligence as it was derived from debriefings of Orellana. When Andrade showed where a significant arms cache was located, the National Police provided an inventory of the cache and also gave the Station information from the debriefing of Andrade regarding the source of arms and of PRTC plans to disrupt the inauguration of the new government. From the time of his arrest in 1989 through mid-1990, the National Police held Andrade in custody, cooperated with the Station by providing the

[REDACTED]

results of its debriefings of him, and made him available to the FBI and the Embassy Legal Officer²⁶ for interviews regarding the Zona Rosa attack.

161. (U) No evidence has been found to indicate continued CIA involvement with the Government of El Salvador on the Zona Rosa attack since 1990, when Andrade was allowed to depart El Salvador and came to the United States.

B. U.S. GOVERNMENT RELATIONSHIP WITH ANYONE KNOWN OR SUSPECTED OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE ZONA ROSA ATTACK

Issue: "What information [CIA] received from the perpetrators/ intellectual authors of the murders."

162. [REDACTED] With one exception, no record has been found to indicate that CIA received any information directly from the perpetrators or the planners of the Zona Rosa attack. That exception is information that was obtained during a San Salvador Station interview and polygraph examination of Wilian Celio Rivas Bolanos after his arrest by the Salvadorans. The Agency did obtain information indirectly from others who were implicated in the Zona Rosa murders in that U.S. Government entities and Salvadoran security and police services provided the CIA with intelligence derived from their interviews and debriefing of the perpetrators. CIA disseminated notable information it received from the Salvadorans in this regard to State, DIA and other U.S. Government intelligence consumers at the time.

163. [REDACTED] **Information Obtained Directly From Rivas.** On August 24, 1985, after receiving the permission of CIA Headquarters, San Salvador Station conducted an interview and polygraph examination of Rivas in order to clarify conflicting information he previously had provided to the National Guard. During the pre-

²⁶ (U) The Embassy Legal Officer in El Salvador was a Foreign Service Officer responsible for dealing with the Salvadorans on legal matters affecting the United States.

[REDACTED]

examination interview with an Agency polygrapher, Rivas recounted his involvement in the attack, identified others who had taken part in the operation and made a sketch of the murder scene. This information was essentially identical to what he had provided to the National Guard. According to the polygrapher's August 26, 1989 report, Rivas indicated no deception on the polygraph when he admitted that he personally participated in the Zona Rosa shootings. There were indications of deception on the polygraph, however, when he denied that Garcia participated in the attack, that Rivas provided false information regarding who took part in the attack, and that Rivas deliberately withheld information about the attack. There is no indication in Agency records that CIA officers had any contact with Rivas other than at this polygraph session.

164. [REDACTED] **Information Obtained Indirectly From Perpetrators.** From 1985 through 1990, CIA received information from various Salvadoran police and military agencies as they debriefed six Zona Rosa perpetrators and accomplices about the attack and other personnel who had information about it. In addition, CIA was provided with reports from the U.S. Border Patrol's interviews with Garcia in 1985.

165. [REDACTED] The most significant intelligence collected from any of the perpetrators or alleged perpetrators on subjects other than the Zona Rosa killings came from Andrade. During the year he was in detention, Andrade provided a large amount of information to the National Police. CIA was provided with this information by the National Police and distributed it to the U.S. intelligence community. Andrade provided most of this information only after the Salvadorans promised him that, contingent on his full cooperation, the time he served in detention would be construed as his penalty for the crimes for which he was arrested, that his family would be provided financial support during his detention and that he and his family would receive financial assistance to relocate outside of El Salvador. The information Andrade furnished the National Police was shared with CIA personnel and formed the basis for [REDACTED] intelligence reports that were disseminated by CIA to U.S. Government consumers.

[REDACTED]

166. [REDACTED] Immediately after his arrest, Andrade provided the National Police with his version of his role in the Zona Rosa killings. He admitted his alias was "Mario Gonzalez" and that he was involved in the planning for the Zona Rosa attack. About 10 days later, he furnished more details on his involvement, and these were passed to the Station by the Embassy's Legal Officer who was meeting and interviewing Andrade. The Station cabled the information to CIA Headquarters but did not submit it as an intelligence report because it was Embassy-acquired information. Andrade claimed four men planned the attack, with Jose Manuel Melgar being primarily responsible. Andrade was given the job of setting up safehouses and making medical preparations, neither of which he claims he did. He attended a meeting where other insurgents told him about a restaurant in the Zona Rosa where people of importance, including U.S. intelligence officers, met and where it was possible to carry out a "serious action." Andrade claimed not to have known the target of the planned action in advance, however. According to Andrade, two of the planners, Melgar and Emerson Rivas were close confidants of PRTC leader Francisco Alberto Jovel Urquilla. To protect his friends, claimed Andrade, Jovel put the blame for the attack on Andrade when he discussed the attack with FMLN members.

167. [REDACTED] Within two days of his capture, Andrade told the National Police about PRTC and FMLN plans for actions relating to the June 1989 inauguration of the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) government. These actions included attacks on the Salvadoran armed forces and sabotage of electric lines and a hydroelectric substation. Andrade also described a PRTC plan to attack the Legislative Assembly and the Supreme Court, and he gave details of the Mardoqueo Cruz group's command structure.

168. [REDACTED] Within a week of his capture, Andrade also provided the Salvadorans with information about the source of the materiel found in the arms cache to which he had led National Police on May 30. The arms cache contained rifles, pistols, one half million rounds of ammunition, and explosives and was the largest insurgent

[REDACTED]

arms cache discovered as of that date. Andrade said the weapons came from North Korea, Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Soviet Union. He described how they were transported overland on trucks that started out in Costa Rica and transited Nicaragua.

169. [REDACTED] Beginning in mid-March 1990, the National Guard began to provide the San Salvador Station with information based on both Andrade's written reports and oral debriefings. The Station worked closely with the National Guard by furnishing it with questions and requirements for use in debriefing Andrade. The first information that was acquired as a result related to the PRTC and FMLN infrastructure in Managua, Nicaragua. A couple of weeks later, Andrade amplified this information with more details about the location of PRTC and FMLN offices in Managua and the location of the radio used to communicate with PRTC units in El Salvador. In mid-April 1990, Andrade provided the Salvadorans with further details regarding the FMLN's presence in Nicaragua, including its use of computers, security practices and relations with the Sandinista leadership.

170. [REDACTED] Andrade also reported information to the Salvadorans regarding the PRTC's metropolitan structure as it existed when the National Police captured him in 1989. He said the Metropolitan Front, which was under the command of the PRTC's Modesto Ramirez Central Front, was divided into three areas of focus: military operations, political operations, and logistics. The military structure consisted of three urban commando teams and two militia teams, one of which was incomplete. The military structure also included front group self-defense forces in the San Salvador suburbs. Andrade also listed PRTC members who worked with front groups and those involved in logistics.

171. [REDACTED] The next report from Andrade that the National Police furnished the Station concerned Cuban support to the FMLN and Sandinista involvement in facilitating Cuban support. He said that Cuban support of the FMLN was handled through Cuba's General Directorate of Special Operations (DGOE). The DGOE planned, coordinated and supervised training and logistical support for the

[REDACTED]

FMLN and planned FMLN operations against strategic or special targets. Cuban diplomats in Mexico provided funds and documentation, such as visas and false identity papers, to FMLN members. The active involvement of senior Cuban and Nicaraguan officials had been instrumental in allowing the FMLN to continue hostile activities in El Salvador. While Cuba was the center for training, coordination and planning and for storing Soviet Bloc weapons destined for the FMLN, Nicaragua served as the bridge for the flow of materiel into El Salvador. Andrade provided the names of Cubans involved in the logistical support, the senior Cuban who coordinated support to the FMLN and the Cuban diplomat in Mexico with whom the PRTC had contact.

172. [REDACTED] Another of Andrade's reports to the Salvadorans stated that Cuban leader Fidel Castro gave \$1 million to the FMLN in 1988. The reported purpose of this payment was to improve the FMLN's infrastructures and transfer increased amounts of armament into El Salvador.

173. [REDACTED] In late March 1990, Andrade provided the National Police with information about the PRTC's presence and activities in Mexico. He said the PRTC operated a clandestine explosives workshop in Mexico City that produced an explosive similar to TNT. Some of the explosives that were found in the PRTC arms cache Andrade exposed were produced in that workshop.

174. [REDACTED] Andrade also provided information to the National Police regarding the general location of the PRTC Central Front Command Post and identified the staff assigned to the Command Post. He also furnished the names or aliases of the members of the FMLN Joint Central Front Command Structure, which included a senior member from each of the FMLN factions.

175. [REDACTED] In early April 1990, Andrade reported to the Salvadorans concerning FMLN and PRTC communications, especially radio communications and encryption procedures. He also offered insight into the FMLN's knowledge of El Salvadoran armed forces' efforts to intercept and exploit insurgent communications. He

[REDACTED]

stated that the location of the Salvadoran Communications and Information Processing Center was well known throughout the FMLN and that he had learned about the complex and its function from a Cuban operations officer while in training in Cuba. The FMLN General Command issued guidance as of early 1989, he reported, that the complex was not to be the target of attacks because of the presence of American advisors.

176. [REDACTED] In mid-March 1990, Andrade gave the National Police a detailed description of the PRTC's strategic logistical operation that supplied the PRTC with materiel from Nicaragua. This information included the routes traveled, the types of concealment devices constructed to hide the weapons, a description of the trucks used, and the names of the drivers and others involved in the transportation of the materiel.

177. [REDACTED] In April 1990, Andrade furnished information to the Salvadorans concerning the PRTC's finance system. The PRTC reportedly obtained most of its funds through project proposals submitted to international organizations. Funds received in this manner were deposited in bank accounts outside of El Salvador. He named two priests who assisted the PRTC by presenting project proposals in the United States and Europe and by collecting funds sent to El Salvador from international donor agencies.

178. [REDACTED] In the last report that the Salvadorans shared with the San Salvador Station, Andrade told the National Police about FMLN efforts to infiltrate the El Salvadoran armed forces and named a retired colonel who was recruited by the FMLN in the early 1980s. The colonel reportedly supplied the FMLN with information concerning the infrastructure and functions of the Salvadoran military. Andrade also identified another officer who he said had sold military weapons to the insurgents in 1982. The information on which this report was based was passed to the Station by the Salvadorans in mid-April 1990.

179. [REDACTED] In summary, the San Salvador Station received reports and new information from the Salvadorans between May 30, 1989

[REDACTED]

and mid-April 1990 that were the result of Salvadoran debriefings of Andrade. No evidence has been found to indicate that the Station ever had direct discussions with Andrade regarding these or any other matters. Reports prepared by the Station from Andrade's debriefings material were provided to CIA Headquarters. [REDACTED] intelligence reports based upon that information were disseminated by CIA to U.S. intelligence consumers.

Issue: "What relationship [CIA] had, either before or after the murders, with the perpetrators/intellectual authors of the murders or other individuals known or suspected to have been involved?"

180. (U) No evidence has been found to indicate that the CIA had any relationship with anyone considered to be a perpetrator or a planner of the Zona Rosa attack, either before, contemporaneous with, or after that attack.

181. [REDACTED] As explained earlier, Rivas, one of the shooters, was the subject of an interview and polygraph examination by a CIA officer shortly after he was arrested in August 1985. This was conducted with the permission of the National Guard, and Rivas signed a consent statement prior to the examination.

182. [REDACTED] Andrade quickly became a target in the search for the Zona Rosa killers because he was a member of the PRTC. Within a week of the murders, the Station identified Andrade (known then only by his alias "Mario Gonzalez") as a member of the PRTC. At that time, the Station's efforts to collect information concerning the Zona Rosa attack included finding out everything possible about all PRTC members whether or not there was any information specifically linking them individually to the killings. From captured documents, Andrade was identified as a member of the PRTC's Metropolitan Front, and he then became of more interest to the Station because a unit of the Front was known to have carried out the attack.

[REDACTED]

183. (U) After their arrests in mid-August 1985, Garcia and Rivas named "Mario" as the PRTC leader who directed the unit that carried out the murders. At the same time, a separate source identified "Mario Gonzalez" as the man who devised the plan for the Zona Rosa attack. From that point on, Andrade was a target of CIA efforts to bring the perpetrators to justice.

184. [REDACTED] The National Police captured Andrade on May 28, 1989. He immediately became of keen interest to CIA as a potential intelligence source. As mentioned earlier, he led the Salvadorans within days of his capture to the largest arms cache yet discovered. This indicated he had access to useful intelligence. Moreover, he admitted he had some role in the Zona Rosa attack although he did not give specifics at the outset.

185. [REDACTED] To prevent tainting any possible prosecution of Andrade, CIA Headquarters on May 31, 1989 directed the Station not to become involved in obtaining information from Andrade regarding the Zona Rosa attack. On June 1, 1989, Headquarters told the Station that DoJ had advised that, in preparation for any possible prosecution, the Embassy Regional Security Officer or Legal Officer should perform any debriefings of Andrade pertinent to the Zona Rosa case, and the Station should not participate or be present.

186. [REDACTED] The Station expressed a strong interest on June 1, 1989 in directly participating in debriefing Andrade on all topics other than the Zona Rosa attack. On June 2, 1989, the Station formally requested Headquarters approval to do so. Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) Richard Kerr approved the Station's request on June 2, 1989, under the condition that the Zona Rosa attack not be discussed with Andrade. If it were brought up by Andrade or others, Station participants were immediately to excuse themselves from the interview.

187. [REDACTED] The cable transmitting the DDCI approval for the Station to debrief Andrade also expressed the caution that anyone present at such a discussion potentially could be called as a witness if Andrade were to be tried in the United States. In response, the newly

[REDACTED]

arrived COS expressed concerns about the potential involvement of Station officers in a trial and deferred any direct participation for the time being.

188. [REDACTED] The Station also responded that it believed Andrade could provide significant intelligence, including perishable information, that might bring about a quicker end to the civil war and noted that it believed it was fighting against time in obtaining the information. According to the Station cable, Andrade was dealing with his Salvadoran captors on a quid pro quo basis and refused to cooperate unless he was offered something in return. Foremost in Andrade's mind was reportedly the possible prosecution for the Zona Rosa killings. Until the State Department, DoJ and the Salvadorans made a decision as to whether they intended to prosecute, reported the Station, his cooperation was in abeyance.

189. [REDACTED] In fact, Station personnel never did have direct contact with Andrade, but the Station contributed to certain actions in response to an arrangement Andrade worked out with the Salvadorans. This primarily involved the Station serving as the source of funds that were given to Andrade's family as one of the preconditions for his cooperation with the Salvadoran National Police.

190. [REDACTED] From the moment of his capture, Andrade placed conditions on his furnishing of information about the insurgency to the National Police. Initially, he refused to talk unless the National Police publicized his capture, guaranteed his and his family's safety and safe conduct to the United States, and permitted him to talk with a U.S. Government representative. By mid-September 1989, Andrade's demands had become more specific. He reportedly proposed to the Salvadoran Vice Minister of Public Security that he would divulge everything he knew about the FMLN and "publicly unmask the FMLN" in exchange for clemency, financial assistance for him and his family and a cash settlement of \$10,000. As part of the Station's effort in collecting information regarding the insurgency and the FMLN, on September 25, 1989, it proposed to CIA

[REDACTED]

Headquarters that a fund, not to exceed \$20,000, be created to support Andrade's family in relocating to another country.

191. [REDACTED] Andrade was also concerned about whether or not he would be prosecuted in a U.S. court. In late September 1989, the Embassy Legal Officer informed the Station that DoJ had no intention of prosecuting Andrade and the Salvadoran Government was, therefore, free to make a deal with him. The Station passed on this assurance to the Vice Minister of Public Security who then authorized the National Police to provide Andrade's wife with sufficient funds (\$1,500) to travel to Mexico to bring their children back to El Salvador. The money was paid from funds provided by the CIA to the Salvadorans.

192. [REDACTED] CIA Headquarters learned on September 27, 1989 (probably in a telephone call to DoJ) that the Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) had given a preliminary indication that he was unaware of any proposal for humanitarian parole or for the support of Andrade's family. CIA Headquarters informed the Station on the same day that passage of funds to Andrade's family as the Station had proposed on September 25 was not authorized until DoJ provided assurances it would not prosecute him. The Station was cautioned that CIA could not make any deals with Andrade while he was the subject of a DoJ investigation.

193. [REDACTED] On the following day, attorneys from the CIA's OGC met with the AUSA. According to an OGC memorandum dated October 3, the AUSA reportedly indicated that, at that time, DoJ had no plans to extradite, indict, prosecute, or call Andrade as a witness in the potential prosecution of other individuals involved in the Zona Rosa attack. The AUSA also made clear that, due to his past activities, DoJ was not willing to grant immunity to Andrade or allow him to be paroled into the United States. The AUSA reportedly indicated, however, that he would pose no objection to the CIA providing assistance to Andrade's family in exchange for any intelligence Andrade might provide.

[REDACTED]

194. [REDACTED] CIA Headquarters authorized the Station on October 2, 1989 to continue to provide funds to the Salyadoran National Police to assist in the resettlement of Andrade's family. In this regard, Headquarters authorized the Station to expend \$20,000 for the resettlement costs and temporary assistance to Andrade's family. The Station was told to refrain, however, from inducing Andrade to cooperate with the Salvadorans by having any other type of commitment made to him without prior Headquarters authorization.

195. [REDACTED] At a meeting in Washington, D.C. on October 5, 1989, the AUSA and representatives from the State Department and the FBI agreed there was no objection to the resettlement of Andrade's common-law wife, Ana Concepcion "Connie" Rivera Valladares, and his children in the United States or to the CIA providing relocation assistance to the family. All agreed the Station could debrief Andrade for foreign intelligence purposes but should refrain from discussing the Zona Rosa case with Andrade and from making any promises to him about coming to the United States. DoJ requested that the CIA not provide any relocation assistance directly to Andrade or pay him directly for any foreign intelligence. This request was based on a desire to avoid tainting Andrade's credibility as a witness if he were ever called to testify in a U.S. court.

196. [REDACTED] In early November 1989, the National Police gave \$3,000 in cash to Andrade's wife to support her and three of her children who were with her in San Salvador. The Station later reimbursed the Police for this amount. In late November, the Station arranged for Headquarters to send a direct deposit of \$3,000 for the family's assistance to the U.S. bank account of the Andrade's mother-in-law.

197. [REDACTED] In early January 1990, seven months after Andrade's capture, CIA Headquarters informed the Station of the results of separate reviews by OGC and the AUSA of information in the possession of CIA from 1985 regarding the Zona Rosa attack. Both reviews reportedly had concluded that Andrade was involved in the

[REDACTED]

planning of the Zona Rosa attack. OGC had also advised that the CIA should review the propriety and implications of any continued dealings with Andrade.

198. [REDACTED] In response, the Station stated in a January 19, 1990 cable to Headquarters that it had consulted with Headquarters and DOJ (through Headquarters) every step of the way on the case, and all actions it had taken were consistent with the limitations and specific authorizations it had received. The OGC and AUSA conclusions regarding Andrade's culpability, the Station argued, should not rule out intelligence debriefings nor fulfillment of the agreements that had been made previously to provide support to his family in exchange for the intelligence he provided. He had been told, stated the cable, that he would not be immunized from U.S. prosecution and that the U.S. Government had no plans at that time to try him and would not seek extradition unless evidence was obtained linking him to the Zona Rosa attack. The Salvadorans had also promised him that, contingent on his full cooperation, the time he served while under detention would be construed as his penalty for the crimes for which he was arrested, that his family would be provided financial support during his detention, and that he and his family would receive financial support to relocate outside of El Salvador based upon the sincerity of his effort and the value of the information he provided. The Embassy Legal Officer had told Andrade, reported the Station, that there was no assurance he could enter the United States, and it was possible his family might have to join him in another country.

199. [REDACTED] According to the Station, Andrade was ready to cooperate and, although most of the tactical information he could provide had lost its value because of the time lapse since his arrest, he was judged to still have important information. The Station asked for continuation of the authority to fund the family's support in order to encourage Andrade to provide further intelligence to the National Police. Headquarters advised the Station on January 23, 1990 that the OGC and AUSA conclusions regarding Andrade's culpability in the Zona Rosa attack did not preclude providing assistance to his family.

[REDACTED]

200. [REDACTED] On February 24, 1990, the Station requested that Headquarters arrange another transfer of \$3,000 into the New Jersey bank account belonging to Andrade's mother-in-law. The first intelligence report, based on information that Andrade prepared of his own initiative and without direction, was sent to CIA Headquarters on March 23, 1990. Station liaison officers worked closely with the National Police debriefers to provide intelligence requirements and questions for use in the Salvadoran debriefing of Andrade. On April 11, the Station requested that a third payment of \$3,000 be wired to the same New Jersey bank account for Andrade's family.

201. [REDACTED] During most of the time that Andrade was in Salvadoran police custody, he was held in a safehouse located just outside of San Salvador. He was moved there from the National Police Headquarters because the safehouse atmosphere was more conducive for elicitation and debriefings. Initially, Andrade shared the house with two other PRTC terrorists and police guards. Then, when Andrade's wife and children arrived in El Salvador from Mexico, the family stayed together in another house, also under police guard. Salvadoran police paid for the rental of the houses, food and household goods. Those costs, which totaled approximately \$22,400 for 12 months, were reimbursed to the National Police by the CIA. This was in addition to the \$20,000 fund that had been created to support Andrade's family in relocating to another country.

202. [REDACTED] The Station acquired the last intelligence report from the National Police debriefing of Andrade in mid-April 1990. In June 1990, a Salvadoran military psychological warfare and propaganda unit [REDACTED] completed a propaganda film that featured Andrade. The film was typical of propaganda media used by the Government of El Salvador at the time in which the insurgents urged their comrades to lay down their arms. Station officers were not directly involved in the filming but were knowledgeable of the film project and provided guidance and direction to the Salvadoran propaganda unit.

[REDACTED]

203. [REDACTED] With the completion of his obligation to provide intelligence information about the PRTC and FMLN and to participate in the propaganda film, Andrade was freed by the Salvadoran National Police to leave El Salvador. He, his wife and children departed El Salvador on June 28, 1990 for Miami. Andrade's airplane ticket to New Jersey was provided by the Station. In addition, the \$6,500 balance of the \$20,000 that was originally earmarked for relocation and assistance costs to the family was given to Andrade's wife in cash by the National Police. The \$6,500 was reimbursed to the Salvadorans by the Station.

C. ENTRY INTO THE UNITED STATES BY ANYONE KNOWN OR SUSPECTED OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE ZONA ROSA ATTACK

Issue: "What role [CIA] played in determining whether any of the known or suspected perpetrators/intellectual authors of the murders, or members of their families, were authorized to travel to or take up residence in the United States, and under what conditions and with what justification."

204. [REDACTED] As explained earlier, soon after his capture on May 28, 1989, Andrade told the Salvadorans he would provide information to the Salvadoran Government if it made certain concessions to him. One of those conditions reportedly included relocating his family to the United States. The Station advised Headquarters on May 30, 1989, that "The [National Police] guaranteed [Andrade's] family's safety and safe conduct to the U. S. where he has family and where he may have resident status." In addition, there was uncertainty at the time as to whether Andrade already had a legal right to enter the United States. When he was captured, he had in his possession several documents, including two U.S. social security cards, a California identification card, and a student body card for the Inglewood California Adult School. These suggested he might be a U.S. person—either a citizen, a permanent resident alien, or a legal immigrant. On May 31, 1989, CIA Headquarters informed San Salvador Station that the CIA could not be responsible for Andrade's entry into the United States, but that

[REDACTED]

Headquarters would discuss the matter with DoJ and advise the Station once further information became available.

205. [REDACTED] A week later, the Acting COS (ACOS) of San Salvador Station informed CIA Headquarters that Andrade reportedly was afraid of being released in El Salvador and wanted to be taken out of the country. The ACOS also advised that the Embassy's Legal Officer and an FBI Special Agent, who was serving as the assistant Legal Attaché in Mexico City, indicated they "would be willing to consider a 'deal' with Andrade for him to appear as a witness in prosecution of the other participants in the Zona Rosa case." According to a memorandum of this conversation, "the DoJ representative" (meaning perhaps the FBI Special Agent) had been in contact with the AUSA and discussed the possibility of a deal with Andrade if he were to testify in the United States.

206. [REDACTED] According to a June 8, 1989 cable from CIA Headquarters to San Salvador Station, it was agreed at a June 7 meeting in Washington attended by an attorney from the CIA's OGC and representatives from State Department, FBI, and DoJ, that it would be best if Andrade were to stand trial in El Salvador. A fallback position would be to send him to the United States for trial. The DoJ representative reportedly said he was exploring options and indicated a willingness to deal with Andrade, but the deal would not include a grant of immunity from prosecution.

207. [REDACTED] According to a June 21, 1989 OGC memorandum, the CIA had yet to receive any written request from the AUSA for CIA information relating to Andrade. At a meeting on June 7, 1989, the AUSA reportedly had reiterated his promise to send CIA a "requirements/laundry" list of questions he would need answered. The OGC memorandum stated that CIA information could not be shared with the AUSA until he informed CIA of his specific requirements.

208. [REDACTED] Subsequently, OGC received a letter, dated June 28, 1989, from the U.S. Attorney requesting an inventory of all documents and objects potentially relevant, all documents pertinent

[REDACTED]

to Rivas, Andrade and "Mauricio." As a result, a July 6, 1989 OGC memorandum notes the Directorate of Operations and the Directorate of Intelligence had been requested to conduct a records search for information regarding the Zona Rosa attack, including information on Andrade, which would be provided to DoJ for use in prosecution of PRTC members who had been incarcerated in El Salvador and allegedly were responsible for the killings.

209. [REDACTED] On July 12, 1989, OGC sent a letter to the AUSA detailing the status of CIA's cooperation with him and his predecessors, and the CIA's intent to provide relevant information to him. It noted that CIA records were being searched in response to his June 28 request for information:

.....

On 31 May, we met with you at CIA Headquarters to provide for your personal review CIA information identified by your predecessors in the U.S. Attorney's Office as that most pertinent to a U.S. prosecution of these individuals. It has been our understanding that you and your predecessors have been provided a fairly clear description of the extent of CIA's knowledge of the Zona Rosa incident and related matters. At that meeting, however, we asked you to provide us with a written list of information necessary for your prosecution and how this information might be used in order to guide us in our support to you. Your 28 June letter does provide such a requirement list but is silent as to use and purpose. Without more specific information in regard to how sensitive CIA information is to be used by you it is very difficult for this Agency to respond meaningfully to your request.

The letter also explained that the Agency would appreciate being informed about any specific plans that the AUSA had for use of Agency employees, assets (current or former), or Agency information that he might wish to use in prosecution of the case. The July 12, 1989 OGC letter to the AUSA made a further offer for the AUSA to review at CIA Headquarters all of the background material from which his predecessors had culled the documents he reviewed on May 31, 1989, plus any further information that may turn up in the records search that is responsive.

[REDACTED]

210. [REDACTED] A July 21, 1989 letter to OGC from the U.S. Attorney, but signed by the AUSA, stated "I have no specific plans for utilizing any past or present CIA employees or assets as witnesses either at the grand jury or at trial. This does not mean that I might not want to talk to them [in the future]." The AUSA explains that he never discussed with the CIA using CIA employees or documents at trial because his past experience led him to believe that such a request would be denied. The July 21 letter also stated that, although the AUSA's predecessors had reviewed CIA documents, the current AUSA needed to review the material personally. This was necessary, the letter explained, because he might evaluate the same information differently, and because there had been a considerable passage of time since prior reviews and there were recent developments, such as Andrade's arrest.

211. [REDACTED] The July 21 letter also presented the AUSA's synopsis regarding how he learned of Andrade's arrest from OGC. The letter explained that the AUSA met with OGC attorneys who informed him that "Mario Gonzalez" had been arrested and indicated that, if he could come to the United States, he could "finger" someone who had masterminded the Zona Rosa attack. The OGC attorneys also reportedly said "Gonzalez" might be involved in the Zona Rosa attack, asked for the AUSA's opinion regarding whether "Gonzalez" could be brought into the United States to provide testimony against Zona Rosa perpetrators and stated that CIA Station personnel were eager to debrief Andrade. The AUSA's letter continued, "Subsequent events have convinced me, that notwithstanding Andrade's current denial of involvement . . . , the CIA had correctly identified him as a planner of the attack." The AUSA now states that he felt CIA tried to mislead him in discussing the parole by withholding from him "Gonzalez's" involvement in the attack. However, the letter he wrote on July 21, 1989 shows that, at that time, CIA had presented to him the information it had concerning Andrade's involvement in the attack.

212. [REDACTED] CIA's OGC was advised by the Station throughout the summer and fall of 1989 that the Legal Officer was claiming the

[REDACTED]

AUSA could not make a final decision on Andrade until he reviewed applicable CIA documents. According to a July 22, 1989 cable to CIA Headquarters, the Embassy Legal Officer mentioned to Station personnel that the AUSA "smells a rat" because of CIA's position that it could not provide documents to him until it was advised how the AUSA intended to use them. OGC explained in a cable to the Station, dated July 28, that it had made a variety of relevant documents available to the AUSA and provided him with a summary of CIA information regarding Andrade's involvement in the attack. San Salvador Station later was advised by the Legal Officer, according to an August 9, 1989 cable to CIA Headquarters, that a senior DoJ officer believed CIA was withholding information concerning Rivas' polygraph examination that implicated Andrade in the attack.

213. [REDACTED] A September 12, 1989 Agency memorandum indicated that CIA was attempting to obtain the permission of other U.S. Government agencies to share Zona Rosa documents they had originated with the AUSA. An October 3 OGC memorandum records that on September 14, the AUSA again was advised that all CIA records were available for his review at any time. However, he declined to review them until CIA categorized the documents according to subject matter.

214. [REDACTED] According to a September 22, 1989 San Salvador Station cable to CIA Headquarters, the COS and the Station's Chief of Liaison met with the U.S. Consul General and the Legal Officer in San Salvador to discuss the Andrade case. The Station representatives asked if Andrade's request to be sent to the United States, which the Station had been advised Andrade had made earlier in the presence of the Legal Officer and the Salvadoran Vice Minister of Public Security, was feasible and what steps would be required to bring it about. The Consul General indicated that this matter would be the responsibility of the U.S. Attorney General and requested, before the Consul General took any action on it, that the Station ask CIA Headquarters to "test the waters" in Washington. The Consul General also reportedly suggested that CIA ascertain and, if possible, influence DoJ's reaction if a State Department recommendation were to be made that Andrade and his family be granted a parole. The

[REDACTED]

Consul General remarked that it would be helpful if he knew what State Department would have to demonstrate in this case "to ensure that Justice would have no problems when satisfying its reporting requirements before Congress." Accordingly, the September 22 Station cable asked CIA Headquarters to act on the Consul General's requests.

215. [REDACTED] In a September 25, 1989 cable, the COS reported to CIA Headquarters that the DoJ, the FBI representative from Mexico City and the Legal Officer at the U.S. Embassy in El Salvador all "are on board regarding possible humanitarian parole" of Andrade. The COS's cable also stated that the Station and the Embassy were asking CIA Headquarters to support the attempt to gain parole for Andrade, who was of "extremely high intelligence interest." Andrade had reportedly agreed to cooperate in providing information but would not do so until he had a promise of parole into the United States and immunity from prosecution.

216. [REDACTED] On September 27, CIA Headquarters informed the Station that the AUSA said he was unaware of the humanitarian parole proposal. The Station responded on September 27 that it had been assured by the Embassy's Legal Officer that DoJ had no intention of prosecuting Andrade. According to a September 28 cable from CIA Headquarters and an October 3 OGC memorandum, Headquarters representatives met with the AUSA on September 27 and were told by him that DoJ had no plans to extradite, indict, prosecute, or call Andrade as a witness in the potential prosecution of other individuals involved in the Zona Rosa attack. The AUSA also reportedly made clear, however, that DoJ was not willing to grant immunity to Andrade or allow him to be paroled into the United States. The Station was warned by Headquarters that, in the future, it should seek Headquarters guidance before acting on uncorroborated information provided by the Embassy's Legal Officer.

217. [REDACTED] The October 3 OGC memorandum contained information regarding the September 27 meeting between OGC and the AUSA that was not included in the September 28 cable to the

[REDACTED]

Station. According to that memorandum, the OGC representative informed the AUSA that the Station had:

...advised Headquarters that the Consul General at the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador was prepared to formally propose that humanitarian parole be provided to [Andrade]. This proposal was apparently prompted by an offer by [Andrade] to provide information of intelligence value to the CIA, if [Andrade] and his family were located to the United States and given of [sic] financial and other resettlement assistance, and if [Andrade] was granted immunity from prosecution by the governments of the United States and El Salvador for crimes arising out of the Zona Rosa incident.... [Andrade] refused to provide any information until these demands were met, but ... the intelligence that he could apparently provide was deemed to be of sufficient value to facilitate his demands.

The AUSA in reply reportedly explained his position on the questions of immunity and parole and noted that:

...if CIA wished to formally propose a grant of immunity to [Andrade] in exchange for intelligence, ... a written request for DOJ concurrence should be made through channels.

In his view, since DoJ did not contemplate prosecuting [Andrade], and also did not contemplate using him as a witness in other prosecutions, DoJ would not agree to paroling [Andrade] into the U.S. under its own authority. Accordingly, the only role his office and DoJ could play in enacting [Andrade's] proposal would be in granting immunity from prosecution. Since at least some evidence, albeit insufficient to prosecute, implicates [Andrade] in the murder of the Marines, a grant of immunity would be contrary to [his] understanding of DoJ policy.... [The AUSA] mentioned that Congress and the press would likely portray such action in unfavorable terms.

The AUSA maintained that a final decision to prosecute Andrade could not be made until the AUSA had reviewed all of the CIA's information concerning Andrade.

218. [REDACTED] DoJ and State Department officials and the Embassy Legal Officer reportedly met in Washington on September 29, 1989 to

[REDACTED]

discuss the possibility of a parole for Andrade. The AUSA stipulated that, before he would approve of any proposal to bring Andrade into the United States, he would have to be granted access to relevant CIA documents. He also expressed a desire that CIA provide him with a written analysis of CIA intelligence reports concerning Andrade's involvement in the Zona Rosa attack. The CIA was not represented at the meeting, and no record has been found to indicate that Agency officials were informed of this discussion at that time.

219. [REDACTED] According to an October 6 CIA Headquarters cable to the Station, representatives from OGC and the Directorate of Operations' Latin America Division met on October 5 in Washington with the Legal Officer, the AUSA and representatives from State Department and the FBI to discuss Andrade. All reportedly agreed that the CIA could debrief Andrade for intelligence but should refrain from discussing Zona Rosa matters with him and also refrain from making any promises regarding his coming to the United States. Reportedly, no U.S. Government agency represented at the meeting appeared interested in bringing Andrade into the country, and neither State Department nor DoJ saw any advantage to such action. Both also indicated they would want to be assured that Andrade was not involved in the Zona Rosa attack before bringing him to the United States. In informing the Station of the outcome of this meeting, CIA Headquarters noted that it would appear to be premature to decide whether or not to bring Andrade to the United States. Such a step would not be considered, advised Headquarters, until it was determined how the debriefing for intelligence proceeded in exchange for financial assistance in relocating Andrade's family.

220. [REDACTED] An October 13, 1989 OGC memorandum contained information concerning the October 5 meeting that was not furnished to the Station in the October 6 cable. According to that memorandum, the Legal Officer from the Embassy in San Salvador stated at the meeting that, in his conversations with Andrade and representatives of the Salvadoran Government, Andrade's conditions for providing intelligence information did not involve immunity from U.S. prosecution but that his family be provided financial assistance and brought to the United States. Andrade also wanted to

[REDACTED]

be allowed into the United States, even though the possibility existed that he could ultimately be prosecuted. The meeting participants reportedly discussed the possibility of allowing Andrade into the United States. Three possibilities were i.) humanitarian parole by the State Department and the Immigration and Naturalization Service; ii) parole by DoJ in order for Andrade to aid in the Zona Rosa investigation or subsequent prosecution; iii) and use of the authority provided by Public Law 110 (50 U.S.C. §403(h)) for CIA, DoJ and Immigration and Naturalization Service to determine that Andrade's entry into the United States was "in the interest of national security or essential to the furtherance of the national intelligence mission."

221. [REDACTED] According to the October 13 memorandum, the State Department representatives were pessimistic concerning the possibility that State would agree to parole Andrade. A State representative reportedly said that he could not argue convincingly that the facts supported a humanitarian parole. He did offer that his opinion would change if Andrade subsequently provided a great deal of valuable intelligence, if no credible evidence was found to corroborate his alleged involvement in the attack and if Andrade provided credible information linking others to crimes prosecutable in El Salvador or the United States. The AUSA, according to the OGC memorandum, then offered his view of DoJ's position regarding a parole:

[The AUSA] said that at this time, there are no plans to either prosecute Andrade or use him as a witness in the prosecution of Rivas Bolanos or other individuals. Accordingly, DoJ did not plan to bring Andrade into the U.S. on its own behalf. Further, [the AUSA] presented his views concerning possible parole of Andrade at the request of CIA: 'if you (CIA) want Justice to concur in a recommendation for a parole, you have to explain to us why you don't think he is a murderer.' [The AUSA] said that in the past, CIA characterized Andrade as being involved in the planning of the Zona Rosa incident. However, now that Andrade is perceived by the CIA as a source of foreign intelligence, Andrade's role in Zona Rosa is being downplayed by the CIA. [Two OGC lawyers] disputed this characterization, noting that CIA has not adopted a position on Andrade's guilt or innocence, but has only collected and reported information bearing on that issue. [The AUSA]

[REDACTED]

then remarked that he was unable to come to a determination until he had been given an opportunity to review all CIA records relating to Zona Rosa and Andrade. [The AUSA] was reminded pointedly that as of 14 September CIA records were available for his review. [Emphasis added.]

222. [REDACTED] The possible use of Public Law 110 was also addressed in the October 5 meeting, according to the OGC memorandum:

The possibility of CIA bringing Andrade into the U.S. under P.L. 110 was raised by [a Justice representative] and briefly discussed. CIA representatives made it clear that CIA was not contemplating such an action at this time, which would entail a lifelong commitment by CIA to support Andrade if necessary. Under the circumstances, such actions did not appear appropriate.

The final sentences in the OGC memorandum summarized the consensus of the group:

It was also clear that State and Justice were similarly not willing at this time, for policy reasons, to commit to any direct support to Andrade, including his parole into the U.S. The meeting concluded with a general agreement that any proposal for the parole of Andrade into the U.S. would require further interagency discussions.

223. [REDACTED] A December 21, 1989 OGC memorandum concerning Andrade described the Agency's relationship to Andrade and the parole issue in the following manner:

At one time the [Directorate of Operations] considered the provision of assistance to Andrade including his possible parole into the U.S. if the information [he] provided ... proved to be of sufficient value to the U.S. Government. However, *this tentative proposal from our Station was put on hold by Headquarters* after failing to receive any support from State and after the U.S. Attorney's Office raised substantial objections. [Emphasis added.]

224. [REDACTED] A December 22, 1989 OGC memorandum recorded the fact that OGC and the AUSA had each conducted a review of

[REDACTED]

information in the Directorate of Operations' files relating to Andrade. The memorandum stated:

The AUSA believes that CIA documents dating from August 1985, which include the statements of other Salvadorans either allegedly involved in the incident or aware of Andrade's PRTC activities, as well as Andrade's own statement, contain sufficient evidence to conclude that Andrade was involved in the planning of the Zona Rosa massacre.

Eleven days later, on January 3, 1990, a CIA Headquarters cable informed the Station of the AUSA and OGC reviews and their conclusions that Andrade was culpable to some degree in the Zona Rosa attack. A January 23 Headquarters cable stated that the OGC review was independent of the AUSA review and "points to Andrade as masterminding the Zona Rosa slayings"

225. [REDACTED] The Station responded on January 19, 1990, stating that all its actions had been consistent with limitations imposed by Headquarters. Further, it was of the opinion that the conclusions regarding his involvement in the attack should not rule out debriefing Andrade for intelligence purposes. It also noted that the Embassy Legal Officer had reportedly told Andrade there was no assurance he could enter the United States.

226. [REDACTED] The COS recently put the situation in perspective when he said that the 1985 reports were not available to the Station, even though the data originated in San Salvador, because Station records had been required to be pared to the barest minimum necessary to perform its current mission. [REDACTED]

Thus, the Station did not have direct access to all the intelligence concerning Andrade's role in the attack. No evidence has been found of a response by Headquarters to the Station's query regarding the delay in arriving at a conclusion of Andrade's involvement in the attack.

[REDACTED]

227. [REDACTED] No evidence has been found of any further communication to or from the Station or CIA Headquarters regarding the Andrade parole question between January 19 and March 28, 1990 when the Embassy transmitted a parole request regarding Andrade to the State Department.²⁷ The Central American Task Force at CIA Headquarters, but not OGC, received a copy of the cable indicating that it was for information purposes only and not for any action on the part of CIA. Information on the cable showed that a copy had also been sent to the FBI. The cable also listed offices at the Embassy with which the cable had been "cleared,"--that is, had been allowed to review the cable before it was transmitted--and offices that received information copies only after the cable was sent. The Station was identified on the Embassy copy of the cable as an "info" addressee only and not as having "cleared" the cable in advance of it being sent. No evidence has been found to indicate Station personnel saw the Embassy message or were afforded the opportunity to comment on it before it was sent.

228. [REDACTED] The then-Consul General now says he is positive that he would have instructed the junior Embassy officer he assigned to draft the cable to bring the cable to the Station's attention before it was sent. He also says that the computer program in use at that time only allowed a limited number of offices to be listed as having seen a cable before it was sent. Thus, he says that it was theoretically possible that the Station had seen the cable but had not been included on the list of those that "cleared" the cable before its transmittal. The junior Embassy officer, however, says that it was standard procedure in subsequent years to show such cables in draft to the Station, but such coordination was not routine at the time of the Andrade parole cable. Further, he does not remember whether he "cleared" the Andrade parole request with the Station or not.

²⁷ [REDACTED] Station activities from the fall of 1989 through spring of 1990 were disrupted by an insurgent urban offensive that began in November 1989. During this period, the Station and Embassy's primary concerns were holding the Salvadoran Government together and coping with daily threats to American lives, including their own. The home of the COS was demolished by insurgent explosives, for example, minutes after he was rescued from it by Salvadoran forces.

[REDACTED]

229. [REDACTED] The then-U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador says that he assumed that there were meetings at the Embassy to discuss the formal parole request for Andrade that was sent to the State Department by the Embassy in March 1990. Participants in such meetings, he believes, would have included the Legal Officer, the Consular Section and the Station. Neither the Ambassador nor the then-Consul General, however, recalls specific meetings that were held to consider the Andrade parole request cable. The Legal Officer recalls no such meetings but says that he too assumes the Consul General would have coordinated the parole request with the Station. The COS says he does not remember attending any meetings in 1990 to discuss the Andrade parole nor does he recall seeing the cable that was sent to Washington requesting the parole for Andrade until he received the information copy after the cable had been transmitted from the Embassy. Neither does the DCOS recall being asked to coordinate on the cable before it was sent. No evidence has been found to indicate that such discussions between Embassy and Station officers took place in 1990 concerning the parole request cable prior to its transmittal to the State Department.

230. [REDACTED] The then-U.S. Ambassador and the Legal Officer now maintain that the Station encouraged them to facilitate a parole for Andrade. The COS, insists, on the other hand, that the Station played no part and was not involved in the parole request in March 1990. The DCOS also insists the Station played no role in the parole request cable and states that the only role the Station played was to provide resettlement funding to Andrade's family. The DCOS also comments that there were third-country options, such as Mexico, that the Station could have pursued for Andrade's resettlement. The DCOS says that it is simply not true that the Station pressed the Embassy to request a parole to the United States for Andrade. No evidence to the contrary has been found in Station or Embassy records, records at CIA Headquarters, or in any records that have been made available from the State Department and DoJ, or from the records of interagency discussions on the issue at the time.

231. [REDACTED] No CIA correspondence on the parole issue has been found that dates from the end of March until the end of June 1990.

[REDACTED]

On June 26, 1990, the Station stated in a cable to CIA Headquarters that Andrade was leaving for the United States on June 28 as a result of a parole in the public interest that had been arranged by the Embassy through State Department in coordination with concerned U.S. agencies. CIA Headquarters replied on July 5 to other issues raised in that cable but did not comment regarding the reported parole of Andrade.

232. [REDACTED] According to a July 10, 1990 OGC memorandum, an OGC attorney discussed the Andrade parole with an officer in the State Department's Legal Advisor's Office. The State Department officer reportedly said that he had raised the issue with the State Department's El Salvador desk officer, who in turn said he had spoken (presumably by telephone) to the Embassy Legal Officer. The Embassy's Legal Officer reportedly had told the desk officer that the parole "was CIA's responsibility." The OGC attorney pointed out that the original cable requesting the parole contradicted that assertion and indicated that the Legal Officer was responsible for the parole.

233. [REDACTED] Subsequently, on July 16, 1990, CIA Headquarters sent a cable to the Station asking it to clarify its role in the Embassy's decision to pursue the parole. The cable also reported that a State Department officer had claimed CIA was responsible. The Station replied the same day, stating that the "Station played no role in influencing State's decision to authorize Andrade's humanitarian parole."

234. [REDACTED] On July 19, the State Department also sent a cable to the Embassy inquiring about Andrade's parole. The cable mentioned that CIA Headquarters wanted to know the reason for and circumstances of Andrade's parole and specifically asked the Embassy, "Who initiated the request for Andrade's parole into the U.S. (name of individual and agency)?" and "With whom was the parole request coordinated prior to its transmittal (names of individuals and agencies)?" An August 1 response memorandum bearing the Legal Officer's typed name and identifying him as its drafter reported to State that he, the Legal Officer, had been

[REDACTED]

responsible for requesting the parole for Andrade. Further, the Legal Officer's memorandum only identified the Consular Section at the Embassy as having coordinated in advance on the Andrade parole request. The memorandum also stated that no representations or assurances had been made to Andrade or his family regarding the parole. The Legal Officer's memorandum made no mention of any role by the Station or its personnel concerning Andrade's parole and did not state that the Station, the COS, the DCOS, or any individual serving with the Station influenced, initiated, or was even aware of the parole request cable before its transmittal.

235. [REDACTED] The AUSA recalls that the OGC lawyer with whom he had been dealing called him on July 10, 1990 to discuss the parole. According to the AUSA, the OGC lawyer was upset that the parole had been granted. The AUSA says he had the feeling that "CIA had pulled a fast one, and [the Legal Officer] helped them do it." The AUSA says he did not consider deporting Andrade because the AUSA felt "it was a CIA operation and nothing could be done about it." As indicated earlier, no evidence has been found to indicate that CIA had anything to do with the March 1990 parole request.

236. [REDACTED] The AUSA further states his belief that the Legal Officer did what he did because he was a CIA officer. All current and former CIA and State Department officers who have been asked about this allegation, including the then-Ambassador to El Salvador, the COS and the Embassy's Legal Officer himself, deny that the Legal Officer worked for CIA. CIA records indicate that the Legal Officer had applied to the CIA for employment in 1983 but was not offered a position. No evidence has been found to indicate that he had an employment relationship with the Agency at any time.

Issue: "In addition, whether or not any wrongdoing, negligence, or a breach of procedures occurred in allowing known or suspected Zona Rosa perpetrators/intellectual authors of the murders to enter or remain in the United States, and if so by whom."

237. (U) No evidence has been found to indicate any wrongdoing, negligence, or breach of procedures on the part of any CIA officer regarding Andrade's parole or his continued residence in the United States.

Issue: "If suspected perpetrators/intellectual authors of the murders are in this country illegally, or without current authorization, what is being done to correct the situation?"

238. (U) No information has been found in CIA records regarding this issue.

[REDACTED]

CHRONOLOGY: EVENTS RELATING TO PEDRO ANTONIO ANDRADE MARTINEZ

1985

- June 26 Station Task Force report notes "Mario Gonzalez" is a PRTC member.
- August 10 U.S. Border Patrol reports that Garcia said "Mario" was commander of several cells and was frequently mentioned by Ismael Dimas, the leader of the Zona Rosa attack group.
- August 15 Sub-Secretary General of the Communist Party of El Salvador identifies "Mario Gonzalez" as Chief of the Metropolitan Regional Committee of the PRTC, deviser of the plan for the Zona Rosa attack, and as saying that U.S. Marines in the Zona Rosa would make a good target.
- August 19 Garcia says that "Mario" was involved in casing the Zona Rosa, was the overall chief of the operation and devised the operation after noticing that Marines visited the Zona Rosa often.
- August 19 Rivas notes that "Mario" was the immediate PRTC supervisor of Ismael Dimas; ordered Ismael Dimas to undertake the Zona Rosa attack; and met the attack group at its rendezvous point but was not present at the attack. Ismael Dimas reportedly said that "Mario" had given a full description of where the North American targets were.
- August 30 At a press conference, Abraham Dimas says he knew in advance of the Zona Rosa attack and that "Mario," "Walter" and his brother, Ismael Dimas, were planning some action around June 19, 1985.

1986

- January 17 PRTC finance officer reports that "Mario Gonzalez" left for Mexico in August 1985.
- January 17 Vladimir Rodriguez reports that he hid weapons that "Mario" and Ismael Dimas brought to his house and that weapons were retrieved three days before the Zona Rosa attack.
- January 31 A San Salvador Station report based on a Salvadoran debriefing of PRTC member notes that "Mario Gonzalez" was chief of the PRTC Metropolitan Front and "intellectual author" of the Zona Rosa attack.

1989

- May 8 PRTC Central Committee member provides information that the Zona Rosa attack was planned and executed by "Mario Gonzalez."
- May 28 Andrade is captured and tells the National Police that he played a role in the Zona Rosa attack.
- May 30 Andrade leads the Salvadoran military to the largest arms cache yet discovered in El Salvador.
- May 31 At a meeting in Washington, CIA's OGC and DoJ agree that the Embassy's Legal Officer would debrief Andrade on the Zona Rosa attack, and CIA personnel would not be present.
- Headquarters advises Station that CIA could not be responsible for Andrade's entry into the U.S.
- June 5 Orellana states that PRTC leaders claimed Andrade was operating on his own in the Zona Rosa attack, and Andrade wrote a report about it.
- June 6 Station tells Headquarters Andrade is afraid of being released in El Salvador and that Legal Officer and Legal Attaché are willing to consider a parole for him.
- June 24 Andrade asserts that Jose Manuel Melgar bore primary responsibility, names three dead men as taking part in the attack, and says he was unaware of the details of the attack.
- July 5 Results of the Salvadoran Special Investigative Unit's first polygraph examination of Andrade are inconclusive regarding his role in the attack.
- July 12 Embassy reports that Andrade claims in four interviews with the Legal Officer and the FBI that he had no direct knowledge or involvement in the attack but only tried to acquire a doctor and safe houses for contingency purposes.
- July 20 SIU follow-on polygraph of Andrade concludes Andrade did not participate in or plan the attack.
- September 22 Station officers meet with the Embassy's Consul General and Legal Officer to discuss the Andrade case. Cable to Headquarters requests action on Consul General questions regarding possibility of Andrade parole.

[REDACTED]

September 25	Station requests CIA Headquarters permission to provide up to \$20,000 in exchange for Andrade's intelligence and going public against the FMLN; states that DoJ, Legal Attaché, and Legal Officer are in agreement for a parole for Andrade.
September 27	Assistant U.S. Attorney tells OGC he has no plans to prosecute Andrade but is not willing to grant immunity or allow him to be paroled into the United States. Headquarters cable notifies Station that AUSA was unaware of humanitarian parole proposal and was not in favor of parole, and warns Station to seek Headquarters guidance before acting on Legal Officer's information.
October 2	CIA Headquarters authorizes San Salvador Station to expend \$20,000 for assistance and resettlement of Andrade's family.
October 5	In Washington, CIA/OGC, CIA/LA Division, State, DoJ, the FBI, and the Embassy Legal Officer agree to the resettlement in the United States of Andrade's wife and children and that CIA may debrief Andrade for intelligence. There is no interest in bringing Andrade to the United States, and State and DoJ would want assurances he was not involved in the attack.
November 3	A Salvadoran service gives \$3,000 to Andrade's wife, later reimbursed by the Station.
November 27	Station requests CIA Headquarters arrange a \$3,000 deposit to the U.S. bank account of Andrade's mother-in-law.
December 21-22	OGC and AUSA conclude Andrade was involved in planning the attack.
1990	
January 3	Station is advised of OGC and AUSA conclusions that Andrade was involved in planning the attack.
January 19	Station requests CIA Headquarters authorization to proceed with debriefing and fulfillment of financial commitments to Andrade's family.
January 23	CIA Headquarters concurs in providing assistance to the family.
February 3	CIA Headquarters denies Station permission to debrief Andrade but welcomes any information Salvadorans might obtain from him.
February 24	Station requests a \$3,000 bank deposit for Andrade's family in the United States.

March 15	Approximate date the National Police furnish Station with first of 1990 reports based on Andrade debriefings.
March 28	Embassy requests parole for Andrade from State Department and INS. Station and CIA Headquarters receive information copies after transmittal.
April 11	Station requests a third deposit of \$3,000 for Andrade's family.
April 15	Approximate date last report of National Police debriefing of Andrade is received by Station.
April 25	State telegram to the Embassy authorizes Andrade's parole.
June 26	Station notifies Headquarters that Andrade leaves for U.S. on June 28.
June 27	Final \$6,500 given to Andrade's wife by Salvadorans, later reimbursed by Station.
June 28	Probable date Andrade leaves El Salvador and enters United States.
July 10	CIA's OGC discusses parole with AUSA.
July 16	CIA Headquarters asks Station to clarify its role in parole request.
July 16	Station replies it had no role in parole request.
July 9	States asks Embassy who requested the parole and with whom it was coordinated.
August 1	Embassy Legal Officer reports to State that he was responsible for the parole request, coordinated with the Consular Section and mentions no Station participation.

[REDACTED]

D. U.S. AND SALVADORAN ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO THE MURDERS

Issue: "What specific action and or information the [CIA] now has, or may have provided, regarding any reprisal for the Zona Rosa terrorist act."

239. [REDACTED] On the day following the Zona Rosa attack, President Reagan stated publicly that the United States would provide the Duarte government with whatever assistance, including intelligence, was necessary to find and punish those responsible for the Zona Rosa attack. On July 9, 1985, the President signed a National Security Decision Directive directing the DCI to undertake an expanded program of improved intelligence collection and support in El Salvador in order, among other things, to locate terrorist organizations so they could be "neutralized by appropriate forces."

240. [REDACTED] On June 29, 1985, the Station received a cable from the CIA liaison officer serving at the U.S. Southern Command asking for information on the "Latest location, disposition and strength of PRTC combat or command and control units operating in northern San Vicente and Northern Usulután province of El Salvador." The request noted that the "purpose of briefings is extremely close [sic] held but represents an initiative of [the Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff.]" The Station responded that it had previously forwarded the latest information on that subject.

241. [REDACTED] No evidence has been found to indicate CIA involvement in any use of U.S. armed forces for purposes of direct retaliation against the Zona Rosa killers, nor has any evidence been found in CIA records of any such actions by U.S. armed forces. Three CIA officers who were in El Salvador at the time remember that shortly after the Zona Rosa attack, a rumor circulated at the Station that consideration was being given to B-52 bombing attacks against the PRTC as punishment for the Zona Rosa attack. A CIA officer who had been assigned to Southeast Asia during the Vietnam war and had occasion to call in such strikes there says it was possible that he had been the source of the rumor because he may have discussed

[REDACTED]

the possibility with others in the Station. Senior CIA officials who were in El Salvador at the time do not recall such a rumor.

242. [REDACTED] No Agency officer who was asked to comment believes B-52 bombing attacks would have been appropriate in El Salvador because insurgent bases were almost always close to inhabited areas and any such attacks would have involved collateral civilian casualties. The *Chargé ad Interim* believes the possibility of the use of B-52 strikes was mentioned in a meeting between a Presidential envoy and President Duarte. However, the two other surviving participants in this meeting deny that the use of B-52s was ever mentioned. These two surviving participants disagree as to what was proposed to Duarte at the meeting in terms of U.S. direct action, but there is consensus among the three participants that Duarte expressed the view that no direct U.S. action was necessary.

243. [REDACTED] On June 21, 1985, the Station reported to CIA Headquarters that it would like to "concentrate its resources in making life difficult for [the Mardoqueo Cruz urban commandos]." In this regard, the Station planned to coordinate locally in support of Salvadoran armed forces military operations in the major PRTC stronghold of Cerros de San Pedro.

244. [REDACTED] The nature of the Station's support was amplified on June 25 when it noted in a cable to Headquarters that the PRTC Task Force had as one of its objectives the development of an all-source intelligence assessment of the PRTC. This would serve as the basis for major El Salvadoran armed forces' military operations targeted against PRTC field headquarters, training camps and logistical facilities, with "the intention of inflicting maximum damage as a reprisal for the [Zona Rosa] killings." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Salvadoran pressure was forcing the PRTC to move its base camps from the area north of the Pan-American Highway to areas further east that were less firmly in Salvadoran Government control.

246. [REDACTED] The Station also requested aerial photography [REDACTED] of suspected PRTC base camps for Task Force use. That data was included in an intelligence package for a DNI-Salvadoran Air Force team working in support of Salvadoran military operations.

247. [REDACTED] The CIA disseminated an intelligence report to U.S. consumers on June 29, 1985 regarding the initial results of the Salvadoran effort. According to this report, the Salvadoran Air Force attacked a PRTC camp in the Cerro Malarara area to bring back PRTC prisoners and documents in "the continuing search for those responsible for the Zona Rosa killings." The base camp had been located through analysis of PRTC documents, prisoner interrogation and [REDACTED] Salvadoran overhead photography.

248. [REDACTED] On June 29, 1985, the Station disseminated another intelligence report, this time concerning three fire fights that had occurred on the preceding day between the Salvadorans and insurgent forces--probably the PRTC. The PRTC Task Force report of July 1, 1985 described the location of four potential PRTC camps based upon aerial photography. The July 3 PRTC Task Force report stated that the Salvadoran Air Force planned an attack on a PRTC command post that day. By July 26, 1985, the Station had reported to Headquarters that it had received intelligence reports that the PRTC was relocating its base camps due to increased Salvadoran military pressure. According to this report, the PRTC considered this

[REDACTED]

relocation a strategic withdrawal in the face of increased Salvadoran military pressure it perceived as having been generated by "the assassination of U.S. military citizens in the Zona Rosa" In terms of direct impact on those responsible for the Zona Rosa attack, the Station later received intelligence reports indicating that Ismael Dimas and "Walter" had died as a result of Salvadoran Air Force bombing of a PRTC camp in November 1985.

249. [REDACTED] By November 12, 1985, DCI Casey was informing Chairman David Durenberger of the SSCI in a letter that the joint PRTC Task Force had paid a significant dividend. The attachment to the DCI's letter noted that one of the objectives of the PRTC Task Force was to provide the Salvadorans with positive intelligence to enable the Salvadoran military to conduct operations against the PRTC.

250. [REDACTED] In January 1986, a CIA assessment concluded that the Salvadoran campaign against the PRTC had led to increased rebel casualties. Increased Salvadoran Army pressure during the summer of 1985 had reportedly forced the PRTC to relocate from several of its traditional strongholds. A DIA assessment provided to CIA in February 1988 concluded that "the PRTC infrastructure had been virtually obliterated by early 1986, in part because of the Zona Rosa murders." A DIA analytical paper also noted in September 1989 that the Mardoqueo Cruz urban commandos were deactivated after the Zona Rosa attack due to the pressure by the Salvadorans.

251. [REDACTED] The last assessment of the Salvadoran retaliation effort that has been identified in CIA records is a comment that reportedly was made in a foreign policy Deputies Committee options paper for a meeting in January 1991. According to the paper,

After the Zona Rosa, CAJIT [Central America Joint Intelligence Team] was tasked to provide targeting information on the perpetrating faction, the PRTC. The Government of El Salvador was then pressured to react to the provided intelligence packages and dealt a series of crippling blows to the PRTC. Since 1985, the FMLN has not directly targeted U.S. personnel, primarily because of the price they were made to pay.

CONCLUSIONS

252. [REDACTED] **CIA Information About the Perpetrators.** CIA files contain information about the Zona Rosa perpetrators and accomplices. Information in CIA files, mostly based upon the statements of co-conspirators, indicates that Andrade was not present during the Zona Rosa attack but was involved in the planning and directed those who undertook the operation. The only person who can be considered knowledgeable of the events in question and states that Andrade was not involved in planning the attack is Andrade himself. He casts the blame on dead men and claims he was kept ignorant of the details of the operation. Separate reviews by the AUSA and CIA's OGC concluded that Andrade was culpable to some degree in the attack. Their conclusions contradict results of the two polygraph examinations administered by the SIU and the judgment of the Embassy Legal Officer that Andrade was not involved in planning for the attack.

253. [REDACTED] **CIA's Role in and Priority of the Zona Rosa Investigation.** The Station exerted its best efforts in 1985, within the scope of its mission, to help identify and apprehend the perpetrators of the Zona Rosa attack. Their pursuit became the Station's highest priority. The COS drove the Station to perform this mission and applied extensive pressure on the Salvadorans until there were results. Station personnel who were involved at that time deserve credit for their efforts.

254. [REDACTED] **CIA's Action Against the Perpetrators.** The Station performed properly in aiding the Salvadoran apprehension of Garcia, Rivas and Abraham Dimas. The Station polygraph of Rivas was lawful, properly approved in advance, conducted in adherence to regulation, and was within the scope of the Station's mission.

255. [REDACTED] **Efforts of the Salvadoran Government in the Zona Rosa Investigation.** The Salvadorans demonstrated aggressive efforts to identify and incarcerate the perpetrators. While the Salvadoran services' bureaucratic structure and rivalries sometimes

[REDACTED]

interfered, there appears to have been a genuine intent to succeed in this regard. There was great interest in the case at the highest levels of the Salvadoran Government, including President Duarte. This interest was translated into steps to resolve internal Salvadoran problems and remove obstacles to the pursuit of the investigation.

256. [REDACTED] Salvadoran military actions did severe damage to the PRTC as an entity, reduced its effective number of combatants by about half and appears to have resulted in the deaths of at least two of the known perpetrators of the Zona Rosa attack.

257. [REDACTED] **CIA's Relationship With the Perpetrators.** The Station coordinated fully with CIA Headquarters, and CIA Headquarters coordinated fully with other appropriate agencies-- State Department, DoJ and FBI--before providing financial relocation assistance to Andrade's family. The Station complied with the directions it had been given by CIA Headquarters not to meet directly with Andrade or to question him concerning the Zona Rosa attack. In fact, no evidence has been found to indicate that any CIA personnel ever met with him directly for any purpose, even when, early on in his debriefings by the Salvadorans, Headquarters had granted permission for the Station to do so.

258. [REDACTED] The purpose of providing funds to Andrade's family through the Salvadoran Government--to gain his cooperation in furnishing intelligence--was proper and fully within the scope of the Station's mission. In this regard, the Station properly coordinated with and obtained authorization from CIA Headquarters. CIA Headquarters, in turn, acted properly by discussing the payments with State and DoJ, neither of which raised objections to this action.

259. [REDACTED] **CIA's Role in Andrade's Parole.** Immediately after Andrade's capture, OGC became the lead CIA element in dealing with the case and coordinating with other agencies, especially with DoJ and the AUSA. The degree of Andrade's culpability in the Zona Rosa attack was a key element in many of the CIA's decisions. However, the Station was not advised of the conclusion that had been reached in this regard until about six months after Andrade's

[REDACTED]

capture, subsequent to many interagency meetings and several important decisions by the Station and Headquarters.

260. [REDACTED] Based on Andrade's request and the desire of the Consul General for guidance in the matter, San Salvador Station raised the question of a parole for Andrade with Embassy officials and CIA Headquarters soon after his capture in 1989. Subsequently, however, the Station appears to have treated this aspect of Andrade's case as the responsibility of the Embassy. OGC noted in December 1989 that the CIA's interest in a parole had been "put on hold." No evidence has been found to indicate that the Station played any role in, or was consulted in advance concerning, the parole request for Andrade in March 1990. The Legal Officer did not refer to any Station involvement in the parole process when he replied directly to a formal inquiry from State Department that specifically mentioned a CIA inquiry into circumstances of Andrade's parole, and the Station specifically denied at the time that it played a part in the parole

261. [REDACTED] **Reprisal for the Zona Rosa Attack.** No evidence has been found to indicate the CIA implemented, supported, or became aware of any U.S. reprisal for the Zona Rosa attack, including use of its own paramilitary mechanisms or any agents it controlled or directed. CIA intelligence may have been used by DoD for operational planning and CIA did, as part of the U.S. Government's reaction to the attack, provide intelligence to the El Salvadoran armed forces to use in operational planning for attacks on the PRTC.

A. R. Cinquegrana

CONCUR:

Frederick P. Hitz
Inspector General

Date