

OAS AND UN ACTION ON CUBA

The unanimous vote in the Council of the Organization of American States on 18 July for a meeting of foreign ministers to consider the "exigencies of the international situation" reflects general Latin American support of the western hemisphere's exclusive political system in the face of Khrushchev's ambiguous missile threat and Cuba's bypassing the OAS for the United Nations Security Council.

Both Venezuela and Cuba formally reserved their governments' positions on agenda and place of meeting, however, while Venezuela had an additional reservation on timing. Diversity of Latin American opinion on the Castro regime is revealed in the failure to cite Cuba by name, and many governments are constrained to modify their criticism of the Cuban Government by the strength of pro-Castro political movements within their countries.

The vote in the UN Security Council on 19 July postponed consideration of Cuba's complaint against Washington pending a report from the OAS. Jose Correa of Ecuador, president of the council, sharply warned the USSR, indirectly but clearly, that the principle of noninter-

vention has been "clothed with flesh and blood" and that Latin America will fight to preserve this principle. Correa's state-ment had unusual impact because over the past year he has several times taken a line at variance with Washington's, occasionally counter to instructions from his, government.

Argentina, Colombia, and Peru, despite internal pro-Castro pressures, have been willing to initiate some action on the Cuban The Argentine ambasproblem. sador last May invited Fidel Castro to hear Latin American ambassadors try to persuade him toward moderation. More recently, Argentina officially asked the Castro regime to repudiate Soviet support -- a request subsequently endorsed by Ecuador.

Colombian President Lleras Camargo--possibly influenced by his tenure from 1947 to 1954 as secretary general of the OAS--requested Colombian ambassadors in other Latin American countries to emphasize that Cuba was a hemisphere, not an exclusively US, problem and that Cuba's resort to the United Nations threatened the inter-American system. Peru, whose President Prado aspires to a historic role in world politics, drafted and presented the request for the OAS meeting.



OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

Page 6 of 8

PART II

NOTES AND COMMENTS

Page 1 of 25

PART III

PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES

Page 1 of 20

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

21 July 1960

Other influential Latin American governments are taking softer stands on Cuba. In Brazil, after considerable debate within the Foreign Ministry, the best that proponents of a strong stand could achieve was an affirmation of Brazil's intention to abide by its legal commitments. The conservative Chilean Government has been one of the most reluctant to agree to a foreign ministers' meeting and has strongly advocatedd a solution through Latin American mediation. Uruguay, hampered by indecisiveness in its nine-man bipartisan executive council, has remained silent as much as possible.

In Venezuela, where pro-Castro forces are stronger than anywhere else outside Cuba, and in Mexico, where demonstrating independence of the United States is a traditional foreign policy goal, important government figures have suggested that these countriess may support Cuba rather than the Unites States. Venezuelan President Betancourt himself is, however, known to be sharply critical of the Castro regime. The Central American countries generally advocate a strong stand on Cuba.

In Venissoela

DEVELOPMENTS IN CUBA

The Castro regime and the Communists continue to tighten their grip on Cuba. The Castrosponsored Latin American Youth Congress, scheduled to open on 26 July in Cuba's Sierra Maestra mountains and later to move to Havana, is certain to be Communist dominated. Designed to strengthen support for Castro in the other Latin American countries, the congress was first discussed at the Communist-front World Youth Festival! in Vienna last summer. Cubans have for months been traveling throughout Latin America, where, with the help of local Communists, they have stimulated the organization of delegations to the congress.

Although delegations to the congress are expected from most Latin American countries, the Peruvian APRA youth group and other anti-Communist youth organizations, including Catholic groups, have decided to boycott it. Representatives are also en route from the Sino-Soviet countries, including North Vietnam, and from Afro-Asian

countries, including a delegation of Algerian rebels. The congress is certain to be a major propaganda effort.

In a related development, Havana University now has become virtually a creature of the regime after a militant pro-Castro minority seized control and ousted "counterrevolutionary" professors. The Communist-infiltrated ruling student federation is discussing the recruitment of professors from other Latin American countries. Such a program would be almost certain to end in the establishment of a pro-Communist faculty.

The Communist press in Cuba received a significant boost on 14 July when, in what is described as a "simple but emotional ceremony," the Communist daily newspaper Hoy was given the printing plant recently vacated by the official newspaper of Castro's 26 of July Movement, Revolucion, which moved to a bigger plant. Hoy now will have a relatively modern plant and presumably will be able to increase



PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

Page 7 of 8

PART II

NOTES AND COMMENTS

Page 1 of 25

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

21 July 1960

its circulation, presently about 20,000 on weekdays and 40,000 on Sundays.

The government's moves have aroused protests from several important groups, and Ambassador Bonsal believes that Soviet Premier Khrushchev's declarations of support for Cuba have been, in general, a serious blow to the Castro regime. They have, done more, he believes, than anything else to clear up doubts among Cubans as to the Communist orientation of the government.

The Catholic hierarchy in Cuba, which has thus far vacillated in its public attitude toward the regime, will probably be impelled toward a stronger stand by the spontaneous anti-Communist demonstrations by Havana churchgoers on 17 and 18 July. Church leaders previously have admitted that they have only limited influence with the Cuban people and that, runless careful preparations are made, most Cubans would support Castro in the event of a showdown between him and the church.

Divergent attitudes toward Castro by the large number of Spanish-born priests in Cuba and the native Cuban clergy have also thus far hindered church unity on the question. The government's use of force in suppressing the 17 and 18 July demonstrations will, however, tend to bring about a unified stand. Ambassador Bonsal feels the recent incidents have created a tense atmosphere in influential Catholic lay circles and that serious repercussions may develop.

Fidel Castro's reaction to the anti-Communist demonstrations by churchgoers was prompt and bitter, indicating concern over evidence of church opposition to the government's growing economic and political ties with the bloc. He interrupted his convalescence to deliver a strong public blast against the "counterrevolutionary activities" of "Falangist" priests, whom he accused of being responsible for the demonstrations.

The joint Soviet-Cuban communiqué'issued after Raul Castro's interview with Khrushchev in Moscow on 18 July seems designed to define formally the har present relationship between the two countries. In the document, Khrushchev professed the "profound solidarity" of the Soviet people with the people of Cuba and called the Cuban revolution and its objectives a "common cause" for all independent peoples. He reiterated his pledge that the "socialist countries" can and will fully meet Cuba's requirements in oil and other goods.

The assertion that the Soviet Union "would use every means to prevent US armed intervention against Cuba," together with the absence of any statement committing the USSR to a specific course of action in such an event, are probably aimed at assuaging the world-wide apprehension which followed Khrushchev's rocket-rattling statement of 9 July. This formal expression of Soviet support of Cuba, however, will probably further alarm Cuban anti-Communists. nists.



PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

Page 8 of 8

PART II

NOTES AND COMMENTS

At I would state the second and a second as

Page 1 of 25