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THE MILITARY BUILDUP IN CUBA

A Report Prepared by an Ad Hoc
Committee of the United States
Intelligence Board

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
MILITARY BUILDUP IN CUBA

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THE PROBLEM

To assess the extent of Sino-Soviet Bloc military collaboration with the Castro regime, to examine in detail the Cuban military buildup since Castro came to power, to estimate the intentions of the Castro regime with regard to this buildup.



I
CONCLUSIONS

1. The Bloc has already extended considerable military assistance to Cuba in the form of more than 30,000 tons of military equipment and some military and economic technicians and advisers. Thus far, some ^{MIG} 10 helicopters, 12 Czech piston trainers, and a wide assortment of armaments ranging from small arms thru heavy tanks have been positively identified. An estimate of the total quantities and types of equipment received thus far is shown in Annex 1. [There is no hard evidence that Cuba has as yet received MIG aircraft, nor is there firm evidence] that [any other sophisticated weapons] have been received in Cuba. Bloc assistance is likely to be continued and expanded, though it is highly unlikely that Soviet nuclear weapons or the [latest models of major military items] will be included in the foreseeable future. Military training of Cubans in the Bloc is continuing and some may have already returned for duty in Cuba. Soviet Bloc military technicians are in Cuba. No Chinese Communist military personnel have been identified as being in Cuba at this time.

2. No Sino-Soviet Bloc country is likely to conclude a formal mutual defense agreement with Cuba committing it to active participation in military operations in defense of that country, or to establish military bases there. Khrushchev's statements implying Soviet military support for Cuba in the event of a US attack have been qualified and were calculated to create a presumption of Soviet intentions rather than an actual Soviet commitment. At the same time, these statements opened the way for the Soviet Union to claim credit for deterring an attack by anti-Castro forces. We believe it highly

[REDACTED]

unlikely that the USSR would consider the survival of the Castro regime so important as to require it to pursue courses of action that would risk war with the US.

3. There is currently no evidence that any Sino-Soviet Bloc country has dispatched or is organizing a "volunteer" force for military service in Cuba. Moreover, it is unlikely that any Bloc country would seriously contemplate the development of such a force for deployment to Cuba, in view of the difficulty in supporting such a force logistically and the risk of having such a force become involved in a conflict with the United States under circumstances disadvantageous to them.

4. The Sino-Soviet Bloc has nevertheless gone a long way toward identifying itself with the maintenance of the Castro regime. Its economic assistance is considerable. The successful Soviet effort to provide Cuba with all its petroleum needs has been at considerable expense and disruption to its normal tanker operations and the Soviet Union has given priority to other Cuban needs even on occasion at the expense of other trading partners.

5. The Sino-Soviet Bloc's support for the Castro regime is part of its larger efforts to isolate the United States and to weaken and eventually destroy its influence throughout the world. The Soviets desire to establish Cuba as a secure base of operations for furthering their aims throughout Latin America. The Castro regime has already become an effective instrument of the Bloc toward achieving these ends in Latin America and, to a lesser extent, among underdeveloped and emerging nations throughout the world.

[REDACTED]

In short, for most practical purposes, the present Cuban Government can be regarded as Communist, and its military dependence on the Bloc is steadily increasing. Cuba, under the present Communist control, provides a better base of operations for subversion and propaganda throughout Latin America than the Soviets have ever had. The strongly anti-United States and pro-Soviet regime of Castro's serves their purposes well; it gives a native color to Communist agitation and limits the risk of a hemisphere-wide reaction against outside Communist intervention.

6. The Soviet Bloc military equipment already shipped to Cuba, as well as prior military purchases by Castro from Western sources, have contributed to a large buildup of forces there. As a result, the Cuban ground forces are probably now better equipped than those of any other Latin American country, with the possible exception of Brazil, though the Cubans may have some initial maintenance difficulties and, over the longer run, some spare parts problems. The Cuban military buildup is reflected in the great expansion of personnel in the Cuban military and militia forces. Before Castro, the ground forces consisted of a 21,000-man army and a national police force of 7,650. The present Cuban ground forces consist of the Revolutionary Army of approximately 32,000 the Revolutionary National Police of 9,000, and the militia estimated at more than 200,000. [The combat capabilities of the army and the militia are still low, but increasing steadily. The navy and the air force have generally deteriorated in capabilities, and are to be considered as ineffective combatant units.]

[REDACTED]

7. Initially, the purpose of Cuba's military buildup was self defense. Anti-Castro guerrillas have been active in several areas inside Cuba and exile groups pose a constant invasion threat. However, the current sharpening and strengthening of all the instruments of police state control suggest that the related motive of tightening the dictatorship is an equal, if not presently the prime, purpose of the military buildup. The regime, which has set out to impose a thorough socio-economic revolution on the country at a faster pace than almost any other government in history, evidently estimates that its domestic objectives can be achieved only through the regimentation of the Cuban people under a police state. This clearly parallels the objectives of the Cuban Communist Party and thus furthers the aims of the international Communist movement.

8. The militia is a primary instrument of the state in strengthening and extending its control. Drawn from rural and urban lower income groups, a hard core of the militia is well-equipped and is organized with increasing efficiency while a larger portion is undergoing regular part time military training. Some militia units have been assigned to duties normally carried out by the armed forces. The militia provides the government with a substantial armed force with which to control the populace as a whole and subjects a relatively large number of Cubans to military discipline and political indoctrination. At the same time, it contributes toward solving the serious unemployment problem. Communist influence in the militia is extensive. [On the other hand, militia fighting capability has not really been tested and the

[REDACTED]

fact that large numbers of militiamen have been pressured into service may be a factor in the many desertions of militiamen to date.

9. The Castro regime is convinced that the Cuban revolution is the vanguard of "the anti-imperialist rebellion" that will inevitably sweep all of Latin America. It is actively encouraging and covertly assisting Communist and Communist-influenced revolutionary groups in other Latin American countries at every opportunity. Its methods include intensive propaganda supported by the Castro-subsidized international news agency that has close working ties with Sino-Soviet Bloc news agencies and reflects the propaganda line of Moscow

Communist-oriented student and labor groups with propaganda material and financial assistance. ^{Scientific} The arms buildup in Cuba will permit the Cubans to supply weapons to pro-Castro groups in other countries. Receipt of Bloc military equipment permits Cuba to furnish Western-manufactured arms now in their possession for this purpose. The reshipment of Bloc arms to other Latin American countries will probably be avoided for some time in order to remove the unfavorable implications that might arise from their discovery.

10. Cuban subversion is further supported by the Castro-subsidized travel to Cuba of numerous Latin Americans who are exposed there to further political indoctrination and, according to frequent reports, given military training.

11. Direct Cuban intervention against another government in the form of a large scale Cuban-based invasion force does not appear likely at present. Cuban assistance to rebel movements in

[REDACTED]

other countries will probably continue, however. Under certain circumstances, only a small quantity of weapons would be sufficient to seriously threaten a government already weakened by internal subversion. Cuban arms aid is likely to be limited for the most part to Communist or Communist-influenced groups and provided when Cuban leaders estimate that the planned revolution has a reasonable chance of success. There is as yet no evidence of direct Cuban involvement in the various Central American outbreaks in mid-November.

[REDACTED]

policy by trying to suppress the Cuban revolution," and charged "Eisenhower's government" with supporting reactionary forces not only in Cuba but also in Laos and the Congo. Despite the belligerent tone of his remarks, however, Khrushchev continued to be vague in pledging Soviet support and promised only that the "Cuban people can always count on the support and aid of the Soviet people." [REDACTED]

4 January 1961

The Panamanian government recalled its ambassador to Cuba for urgent consultations. According to a usually reliable source, the ambassador was to return immediately to Havana and notify the Cuban Foreign Office that its ambassador in Panama had been declared persona non grata. The same source reported that Panama would delay approving any replacement for the Cuban ambassador for a period of at least two or three months pending further determination regarding a possible break in diplomatic relations. [REDACTED]

6 January 1961

In a speech to party leaders, published as a Kommunist article on 17 January, Khrushchev said that "solidarity with revolutionary Cuba is the duty not only of the people of Latin America; it is also the duty of the socialist countries, of the entire international Communist movement, the proletariat of all areas of the world." [REDACTED]

7 January 1961

Bucharest announced that a 1961 protocol to the five-year Rumanian-Cuban trade agreement had been signed. Provision was made for Rumania to supply Cuba with industrial goods under a \$15 million credit agreement. [REDACTED]

7 January 1961

Soviet Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Kuzmin stated in Moscow that the USSR would ship 4.4 million tons of petroleum and petroleum products to Cuba in 1961 as well as 200,000 tons of mineral fertilizers. Agreements for these

[REDACTED]

commodities were signed during Kuzmin's trip to Cuba. [REDACTED]

9 January 1961

"Che" Guevara, reporting on his tour of the Bloc, revealed that "various socialist countries" had concluded a multilateral payments agreement with Cuba under which Havana can sell to one country and buy from another. The arrangement is unique in Sino-Soviet trade relations with non-bloc countries and it again underscores the special position Cuba occupies vis-a-vis the Bloc. Altogether Bloc countries are scheduled to take 4,000,000 tons of Cuban sugar in 1961--about two-thirds of the expected crop--at a fixed price of four cents a pound. [REDACTED]

12 January 1961

After long deliberation, the Uruguayan National Council of Government decided to declare the Cuban ambassador to Montevideo and the first secretary of the Soviet embassy there as persona non grate. Both diplomats presumably were involved in the pro-Castro demonstrations and street fights which had led to a government raid on Communist headquarters and the arrest of 139 persons on the previous day. [REDACTED]

13 January 1961

Under the terms of a five-year technical assistance agreement signed by Cuban and Bulgarian officials in Sofia, Bulgaria agreed to accept 20 Cuban students in its universities as well as one hundred workers for "technical training." "Che" Guevara reported on 7 January that similar agreements reached during his tour of nine Bloc countries provided for the training of 2,700 Cuban technicians in Bloc countries. [REDACTED]

13 January 1961

A large number of mobile radar stations have been observed in the vicinity of the Cuban naval base at Mariel, according to a usually reliable [REDACTED]. He also reported that Cuban military personnel are being trained in the operation of these radar stations by Czech instructors, and part of the

[REDACTED]

training program consisted of identifying commercial aircraft flying to and from Havana. [REDACTED]

14 January 1961

A group of 16 Salvadorans who had attended the Cuban revolutionary celebrations in Havana returned to El Salvador. They were believed to be armed with new plans and instructions for pushing the provisional Salvadoran government further toward the left and allegedly returned with \$500,000 from the Cuban government. A second report, which originated from an untested source, stated that Fidel Castro had personally informed the Salvadoran visitors in Havana that he would assist in defeating the Salvadoran army should that group attempt to take over the Salvadoran government.

[REDACTED]

16 January 1961

A five-year trade and payments agreement between Cuba and Albania was signed in Tirana on 16 January. With this agreement Havana completed its current round of economic negotiations with the Bloc and now has signed formal economic pacts with all twelve countries of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Under these agreements, a total of \$245 million in long-term credits has been extended by the Bloc to Cuba.

[REDACTED]

20 January 1961


The American embassy in Moscow reported that "solidarity meetings" in Soviet factories, as described by a number of press reports, featured pledges of support by Soviet trade union groups for the Cuban revolution. Accounts of these meetings usually featured the "warning" that in the event of a US attack on Cuba, the Cuban people would have the support of all peoples, "and first in line will be the heroic working class of the Soviet Union."

[REDACTED]

25 January 1961

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

DISCUSSION

Sino-Soviet Military Collaboration With The Castro Regime

1. Following the seizure of power by the Castro regime in January 1959, intermittent Cuban military contacts were made with Sino-Soviet Bloc countries--notably Czechoslovakia--but these apparently did not result in firm military aid commitments until the early summer of 1960. As Cuba's efforts to purchase military goods in the Free World became increasingly difficult throughout 1959 and early 1960, Cuban arms purchasing missions traveled to the Bloc to investigate new sources of supply. Discussions reportedly covered a whole range of equipment

2. These preliminary contacts may have crystallized during First Deputy Premier Mikoyan's visit to Cuba in February 1960, when Moscow abandoned its policy of aloofness toward the Cuban revolution and publicly announced its support of the Castro regime. Mikoyan's visit signaled the beginning of a series of trade and aid agreements between Cuba and nearly all countries of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. As political and economic contacts were established, it became apparent that the Bloc intended to back up its propaganda support for Cuba with a major campaign of material assistance.

3. Soviet activities in exploiting the rapid deterioration of US-Cuban relations, however, were inhibited during the spring of 1960 by the impending summit conference and President Eisenhower's scheduled visit to the USSR. With the collapse of the summit in May and the cancellation of the President's trip, these inhibitions were removed and the Bloc launched a more intensive drive to expand its influence over

[REDACTED]

the Castro regime. In the post-summit period this campaign has included public attacks on the validity of the Monroe Doctrine and assurances of Soviet support in the event of economic or military measures that the US might undertake against Cuba. These assurances--including the ambiguous references to retaliation with missiles--have been phrased broadly enough to cover the supply of military equipment and technical assistance without committing the USSR to specific military action in support of Cuba.

4. Soon after the summit collapse in May, Cuban military negotiations apparently were undertaken with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. Czech-Cuban talks in Havana during May and June were immediately followed up by a trip to Prague and Moscow by Cuban Minister of Armed Forces Raul [REDACTED] to provide for future deliveries of Bloc arms.

5. During the summer of 1960, probably in early July, at least one partial cargo of Czech small arms and ammunition was delivered to Cuba, along with five Mi-4 HOUND helicopters. Shortly thereafter, about 60 Cuban military personnel were sent to Czechoslovakia to receive military training, including flight and artillery instruction. By the end of August nearly 150 Cubans were receiving military training in Czechoslovakia.

6. Further military talks during July and August probably were held concerning detailed arrangements for the delivery of Soviet Bloc arms, accompanied by military technicians to provide the necessary training. Not until September 1960, however, did major shipments get under way. Since 8 September 1960, there has been delivered more than 30,000 tons of military materiel to Cuba. Additional deliveries are expected in the near future.



7. Because of the stringent security precautions surrounding the off-loading of military cargoes in Cuba, information on the exact total quantities of Bloc material is fragmentary. Shipments have consisted of helicopters and piston trainer aircraft, a complete range of land armaments, including tanks, field and antiaircraft artillery, military vehicles, and large quantities of infantry weapons and ammunition. In addition, radar and communications equipment may have been delivered. Total estimated value of these shipments is about \$50,000,000. Considering the type of equipment and estimated Bloc deliveries, the Cuban ground forces are probably now better equipped than those of any Latin American country, with the possible exception of Brazil. They will probably experience some initial difficulty in providing adequately trained maintenance personnel for this equipment. Over the long run some spare parts problems may arise. These estimated Bloc deliveries provide the Castro regime with suitable armaments for defensive purposes against external invasion by non-nuclear forces, as well as being very useful for Cuban internal security needs.

8. Reports persist that MIG jet fighters are already in Cuba, but these have not been confirmed. Soviet vessels have delivered crates which could accommodate fighter aircraft, but the observed dimensions of these crates do not correlate with those used to deliver jet fighters to other areas. Moreover, it is believed that Castro would have displayed such military items during the 1-2 January anniversary celebrations along with other Bloc military equipment for prestige purposes and as evidence of Cuba's military strength. Numerous reports have been received of the establishment of Soviet missile bases and the presence of Soviet rockets in Cuba, but none of these have been confirmed. In early January, a source of the



[REDACTED] reported that an unknown quantity of rockets, 17 hydraulic launchers and six Soviet rocket experts had arrived in Havana. The source submitted more detailed technical data concerning these rockets than has been contained in previous reports. A thorough technical analysis of the information reveals no known Soviet missile fits the dimensions or details reported, and that no missile, in fact, would be operable given the technical details included in this report.

9. Bloc military deliveries to Cuba thus far have significantly assisted the Castro regime in its attempts to develop a greater military capability. Despite a long build-up, the Cuban army had almost no anti-aircraft defense capability, and artillery and armored support was negligible before the arrival of this type of Bloc equipment. In addition, the considerable quantities of modern Bloc small arms and ammunition have enabled the regime to establish and maintain an expanding civilian militia. If the Soviet Bloc follows its pattern of furnishing military equipment to non-Bloc countries, it is very unlikely that Cuba will be provided with nuclear weapons, missiles, highly advanced aircraft other than MIG-15's and 17's^{19's} and other sophisticated weapons.

10. Several small groups of Cuban military trainees reportedly were sent to the Bloc prior to the summer of 1960, but no information is available to confirm these reports. In July and August, however, two large groups of Cubans were sent to Czechoslovakia and their mission probably involved military instruction, including artillery methods and training as pilots and ground crews. Altogether, at least 150 Cubans have probably been receiving military training in Czechoslovakia, and perhaps a small number in the USSR. } While there is no evidence

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that the pilots have completed their training, some of the ground force trainees may have already completed their training and returned to Cuba. It appears likely that cadets sent for pilot training in the Bloc had little previous military experience. If so, these student pilots may be receiving only preliminary flight instruction in Czechoslovakia and they may return to Cuba for jet transition training on Bloc aircraft which if not already delivered, can be expected to arrive by the time this training is completed.

11. Precise information is unavailable on the numbers and activities of Bloc military technicians in Cuba. Based primarily on Bloc military technical assistance to other non-Bloc countries and the estimated arms shipments to Cuba thus far, it is believed that from 100 to 200 Czech and Soviet technicians currently are working in military capacities for the Cuban government. Other reports have indicated that this number may be somewhat larger, but we believe that most of these have tended to be exaggerated. No Chinese Communist military personnel are believed to be in Cuba, although the possibility cannot be entirely discounted.

12. Soon after the arrival of the first large Bloc arms shipment in September, Czech and Soviet technicians reportedly were assisting the Cuban military in assembling equipment and installing such weapons as anti-aircraft batteries. They are employed also as instructors in military courses and as advisors to individual military units.

13. There is no evidence that Soviet Bloc or other nationals are being trained in the Bloc for military duty in Cuba. There is no evidence that any Sino-Soviet Bloc country has dispatched or is organizing "volunteer" forces for military service in Cuba. Moreover, it is unlikely that any Bloc country would seriously contemplate the

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

development of such a force for deployment to Cuba in view of the difficulty in supporting such a force and the risk of having such a force become involved in a conflict with the United States.

14. Cuba's military forces have been drastically altered since 1 January 1959. The traditional forces remaining in Cuba following the fall of the Batista regime have been weakened through the replacement of many experienced career men with untrained recruits who were judged to be more loyal to the Minister of Revolutionary Armed Forces, Raul Castro. Further, the regime has transferred many of the responsibilities of the conventional armed forces to the newly-created Revolutionary Militia, which the government considers to be a politically more reliable military force.

15. The ground forces under Batista consisted of a 21,000-man Army and a National Police Force of 7,600 who were relatively well-trained and well-disciplined by Latin American standards. Following Castro's victory, virtually all elements of Batista's ground forces were gradually removed. About one-fifth of the present Revolutionary Army of some 32,000 men were active in guerrilla operations against Batista, and the remainder is composed of personnel who joined the Revolutionary movement when its success had been assured. A similar situation is believed to exist in the 9,000-man Revolutionary National Police organization. Much of the Army effort since 1 January 1959 has been devoted to non-military activities; personnel assigned to public works projects account for the troop strength increase over Batista's army.

16. Recent efforts toward increasing training and improving the discipline and appearance of troops appear to have had considerable

[REDACTED]

success. Arms shipments from Free World and Soviet Bloc countries have largely eliminated previous shortages of field and antiaircraft, armor, and close support weapons. The increased emphasis on training and the presence of Bloc military advisers in Cuba is alleviating the present shortage of personnel trained in the effective utilization of these weapons. Training of various units has progressed to the point that they are capable of handling, transporting and firing assigned weapons; unit firing exercises have been conducted. No combined arms training is known to have taken place. Tactical communications and military transport facilities continue to be inadequate for modern combat. However, deliveries of large amounts of Bloc military transport vehicles are being made, thus increasing the mobility of Cuban ground forces. It is expected that the combat capability of the army will increase steadily.

17. The civilian Revolutionary Militia represents the major increase in the size and capability of Castro's ground forces over those available to Batista. It is estimated to have more than 200,000 members. First appearing as early as November 1959, loosely-organized units of students, workers, and farmers were officially established in early January 1960. Training varied widely from unit to unit and reflected the initiative and energy of individual commanders. In general, however, militia training has been more uniform and extensive than that conducted by the Army. While a sizeable proportion of the militia are volunteers, there have been large numbers of young men and women pressured into service in the militia. This factor may indeed be behind the many desertions of militia men to date and also may adversely affect the loyalty and fighting capability of the militia when the chips are down.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

18. During 1960, militia units gradually assumed many duties which formerly were exclusively performed by the Army and National Police. They effectively performed crowd control duties, such as at the time of the Cayo Cruz ammunition dump explosion, and they have acted as security forces in port areas while Soviet Bloc arms shipments have been unloaded. In addition they have effected the take-over of intervened businesses and are used in guarding vital industries and utilities against possible sabotage efforts.

19. Beginning in November 1960, a reorganization was initiated with the design of producing better organized, more closely controlled battalions, commanded by Militia officers who were graduates of rugged OCS-type training. Uniforms and modern Soviet Bloc small arms are being issued all Militia units. Additionally, training of the Militia units on heavier Bloc equipment, and organization of Militia mortar and artillery units were started in early November. Personnel in these units function as full-time active duty militiamen; they are between 18 and 30 years of age, are volunteers to the maximum possible extent, and are drawn largely from the company-size units. Their level of training is equal to that of equivalent Cuban Army units. Full-time active duty Militia infantry units now bear the brunt of counter-guerrilla operations. [Nevertheless, their fighting capabilities have not really been tested; and in fact, they seem still to be ineffective in counter guerrilla operations now going on in the Escambray mountains.] Militia schools for officers have been established in Pinar del Rio, Matanzas, and Oriente Provinces.

20. The Cuban Navy has progressively declined in combat capabilities since the fall of the Batista regime. Total personnel strength has declined from a pre-Castro figure of 6430 to an esti-

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[REDACTED]

ated 4000-5000 at the present time. The Naval Air Arm was dissolved by the government in July 1960 and its functions and equipment transferred to the Air Force. The 31 US Navy-trained pilots who had completed training during the past seven years were discharged. The Navy was drastically purged after the discovery of an anti-Castro conspiracy in August and virtually all ships were deactivated. In the meantime, navy personnel have been assigned to duties of a non military nature, such as working for the National Institute of Agrarian Reform, serving as administrators in intervened businesses, and assisting in the construction of public works projects. In October and November, as a result of the government's fear of the possibility of an invasion, all naval ships and craft were hastily reactivated, partly with old crews and partly with ill-trained recruits. Since November regular patrols have been maintained off the north and south coasts of Pinar del Rio and Habana provinces and off the Isle of Pines, while sporadic patrols by small craft have been maintained off the remainder of the coastline. At present the Cuban Navy's patrol capability is fair; its combat capability is negligible.

21. At the time of the takeover from Batista, the Cuban Navy consisted of the following: 3PF, 2 PCE, 1 PGM, 2 AG, 2 ATR, 9 YAG, and 29 YP. No additional ships have been acquired since that time, although Cuban purchasing missions have unsuccessfully sought to buy 15 high-speed Coast Guard craft, three motor torpedo boats, and two buoy tenders from West European countries after funds were budgeted for this purpose in July 1959.

22. The capabilities of the Cuban Air Force have deteriorated sharply since the downfall of the Batista regime. It appears that the

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primary mission of the Cuban Air Force in the pre-revolutionary period was to support the ground forces in maintaining internal security. The Air Force never had acquired a good offensive or defensive capability against the forces of other nations, and it probably would have been able to offer only token resistance in such an action.

23. The loss of personnel through systematic purges and numerous pilot defections since January 1959 have reduced the combat capability of the Cuban Revolutionary Air Force (CRAF) almost to nil. In June 1959, a drastic purge of the Air Force--which probably was in response to orders from Raul Castro--resulted in the dismissal of most of the force's rated pilots. The continuing defection of civil air lines pilots will lessen this source of bolstering the number of pilots available to the Air Force.

24. The total personnel strength of the CRAF remains unknown. At the present time, it is estimated that approximately 100 Air Force personnel are now undergoing training in Soviet Bloc countries--probably including pilot and maintenance training--but there is no confirmation of this estimate. Some training is probably being conducted in Cuba, but the types of training, instructors, and numbers participating are unidentified.

25. Although the total inventory of CRAF aircraft has increased from 63 to 111 since 1 January 1959, there has been little change in totals of combat-type aircraft. The serviceability rate of the CRAF aircraft is presently estimated at 15 to 20%. The increase is reflected mainly in helicopters, piston trainer and transport aircraft, with the latter probably representing expropriations of aircraft from private owners, since no information is available concerning

[REDACTED]

acquisition from other sources. The Cuban government has tried unsuccessfully to acquire Hawker Hunters from Belgium and the UK, helicopters from the UK and the US, Vampires from Italy and Canada, F-86's from Canada, Fiat G-91's from Italy, and Provost jet trainers from Austria. No aircraft are known to have been delivered from Free World sources during 1959. (See Annex 2 for a breakdown by type of Cuban military aircraft in 1958 and at the present time.)

26. In Cuba there are 10 airfields, excluding the USN airfield on the Guantanamo Naval Base, with hard-surface runways 6,000' or more. All of these fields have runways that are capable of supporting jet fighter (MIG-15 and 17) operations. Parking and fuel facilities are generally limited at most of the airfields. This air facility system is more than adequate for the CRAF and would support a major increase therein. (See map, Annex 4)

27. Since early 1960, the Castro regime has made a serious effort to augment Cuban air facilities capabilities. Several new airfields have been built and many of the already existing facilities have been significantly improved. This construction is summarized as follows:

a. Managua--At Managua (23-02N/082-19W), 10 nautical miles SSW of Havana, a new runway is under construction; it is estimated that it will be 5,000' x 120' upon completion. Present dimensions are approximately 3,350' x 120', and the surface is probably packed earth or crushed rock.

b. Sigüanea--Sigüanea airfield (21-37N/082-55W), on the Isle of Pines, has one runway which has recently been extended to 6,000'; its width is 100'. The surface is crushed marble over marble

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Base. Construction appears to be temporarily suspended.

c. Cayo Largo--A natural-surface landing strip 2,040' x 135' has recently been prepared at approximately 21-37N/081-33W. A cleared area 1,050' long is believed to be a possible extension to the landing strip.

d. New Santa Clara airfield--a new airfield is under construction at 23-31N/079-55W, about 8 nautical miles NNE of the old Santa Clara airfield. Present dimensions of grading work are estimated to be 9300' x 280'. The runway is not completed but is usable.

e. Baracoa--The runway at Baracoa airfield, 23-01N/082-38W, formerly referred to as Domingo Rosillo, has been extended to 5,450'.

f. San Blas--The landing strip at San Blas airfield at 22-17N/081-08W has been extended from 5,500' to 6,700'. Its surface has been reported as probably hard packed sand and gravel. Considerable clearing and excavation at the SW end of the strip has been reported which could indicate preliminary preparation for additional construction and enlargement. A new airstrip is under construction near Jaquey Grande at 22-29N/081-08W. Dimensions are approximately 4,000' x 150', and the surface appears to be packed sand or gravel, which is ready for either macadam or concrete surfacing. A new airstrip is under construction in the Playa Giron at 22-04N/081-02W, and Cayo Ramona area at 22-09N/081-02W. Approximate dimensions are 4,400' x 100'; surface is probably rolled and crushed rock. About 3 miles West of San Blas at 22-07N/081-00W, an unidentified installation is under construction which may be a possible HF/DF site. The site consists of a circular depressed cleared area

[REDACTED]

approximately 390' in diameter, which has four equally spaced lines of approximately 100' in length each. There are grading and clearing activities in the general area. This area suggests early stages of HF/DF construction.

g. Antonio Maceo airfield at 19-58N/75-52W--Concrete extension is underway at both ends of each runway. Upon completion, the main runway will probably have a total length of 7,430'. The secondary runway will probably have a total length of 4,485'.

h. Jaime Gonzalez airfield at 22-10N/080-24W--Concrete extension is underway at both runways. The main runway is being extended to approximately 4,400' and the secondary runway is being extended to approximately 3,300'.

28. The principal objectives of the current military buildup are self-defense, internal security, and to a lesser extent the export of arms and trained men to other Latin American countries for revolutionary and subversive purposes. Given the Cuban emphasis on guerrilla warfare, a civilian militia, and subversion, the arms the Cubans have been receiving--especially the large quantities of small arms and automatic weapons--lend themselves to use in connection with all of these objectives. The weapons employed for defense against attack from abroad can be used with equal facility against internal subversion and anti-Castro rebel forces, to arm the militia, or to supply revolutionary groups located in or moving into other Latin American countries. It does not appear that the current arms buildup will place the Cubans in a position to attack any of their neighbors with an organized, overt military force within the foreseeable future.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

29. Cuba's efforts to strengthen its military posture have resulted, at least initially, from a genuine fear of foreign-based invasion. Various Cuban statements indicate that Castro views an invasion of the island by anti-government Cubans, supported indirectly or covertly by the United States, as a probability. (The Castro regime claims that rebel groups are presently being organized in both the United States and Guatemala, with the knowledge and support of both governments.) It is probable that the Cuban government views a direct attack by US armed forces as a possible but less likely event. The caution with which they have treated the question of Guantanamo--their obvious desire to avoid provoking direct US military intervention--is evidence that they consider such action a definite possibility. They are also aware of the serious threat to the security position of the United States posed by Cuba's move into the Soviet camp--a threat which increases with the Cuban arms buildup.

30. In addition to reflecting a genuine fear of invasion, the heated and continuing Cuban charges of an imminent US-supported invasion have been part of a major propaganda effort to villify the United States. This effort is designed to enlist world sympathy for the cause of the Cuban David against the US Goliath, and to draw the attention of the Cuban people away from the economic difficulties which they now face and to prepare them for further sacrifices.

31. A well-equipped military force (with special emphasis on an elite, politically reliable hard core within the revolutionary militia) would serve two principal functions in maintaining order within Cuba. First, it would enable the regime to deal effectively with the anti-

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Castro rebels within Cuba who pose a threat to its stability. Second, it would provide Castro with a means of extending government control over Cuban society--a policy which is presently considered at least of equal importance as the objective of self-defense.

32. [Anti-Castro groups currently active in Cuba, principally in the Sierra Escambray area, are not strong enough to pose a significant threat to the stability of the Castro regime. However, large military forces are being used in the Escambray area in an effort to eliminate the growing active anti-Castro guerrilla forces.] Although the armed opposition within Cuba presently remains largely unorganized, is not unified, and lacks leaders with widespread public appeal, the history of the 26th of July Movement itself demonstrated the ultimate potential of such forces. Further, opposition elements located outside Cuba are seeking to combine their forces and may, in the future, be in a better position to provide support to those rebels who have remained in Cuba. This in turn makes it incumbent on Castro to attempt to maintain his forces at a level sufficient to enable him to meet any foreseeable counterrevolutionary move from within Cuba.]

33. The current buildup in arms may now be directed primarily toward extending the Castro government's control over Cuban society and institutions. The major tool of control is the Revolutionary Militia, which serves several purposes. It provides the government with a substantial armed force through which the Cuban populace as a whole can be controlled, and it promotes loyalty to Castro by subjecting a relatively large number of Cubans to military discipline and political indoctrination under the leadership of people dedicated

[REDACTED]

to the revolutionary government. If necessary, it can also provide Castro with a counterpoise to the regular Army, whose political reliability may still be questionable as the result of Castro's efforts to reduce its influence. Finally, the militia offers the government an organized work force for use in economic development and military construction projects, and to reduce the high unemployment which is plaguing the Castro regime.

34. Since Fidel Castro's assumption of power, Cuba has been involved in several attempts to overthrow other Caribbean governments. During 1959, the Castro regime sponsored or gave indirect support to invasion attempts against Panama, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and Haiti. The military buildup provides Cuba with an increased ability to furnish military aid to Communist and pro-Communist revolutionary groups in these or other Latin American countries in the future. Soviet Bloc military equipment now in Cuba permits the use of older, Western-made equipment which would be difficult to trace, for these purposes. There is as yet no evidence of direct Cuban involvement in the outbreaks in Guatemala, ^{Cuba} Nicaragua and Costa Rica in mid-November.

35. Cuban leaders and propaganda media repeatedly refer to the Cuban revolution as the vanguard of the anti-imperialist revolution that will "inevitably sweep" the rest of Latin America. Private statements of Fidel Castro reveal his conviction that the United States is "finished" as a great power and that Cuba must therefore side with the "socialist countries which will win the current ideological struggle." "During its present confused state," the United

[REDACTED]

States must be kept on the defensive, Castro told an old friend last September. The Castro regime has become an effective instrument of the Sino-Soviet Bloc in its drive to weaken and eventually destroy US influence in Latin America as well as in other underdeveloped and emerging nations.

36. The Castro government has made no secret of its antipathy toward most of the governments of the other Latin American republics, charging that these governments do not represent the will of the people. It is clear that Cuba is determined to export its revolution to the rest of the hemisphere. However, direct Cuban intervention in the form of large-scale Cuban-based invasion forces does not appear likely at the present time. The reaction against Cuba throughout Latin America would be too strong at a time when Cuba needs Latin American sympathy in its struggle with the United States. Further, the Cubans probably fear that such action might provoke US or OAS intervention in Cuba--something they wish to avoid.

37. It can be expected, however, that Cuba will intensify its efforts to weaken and subvert other Latin American governments, particularly in the Caribbean area. In addition to its all-out propaganda effort, Cuba will probably furnish arms, training, financial, and other covert assistance through pro-Castro groups and the Communists apparatus throughout the area to dissident and insurgent Latin American elements. Direct military aid is useful when the climate for rebellion is ripe within a given country, however, and the larger part of Cuban energies in the other Latin American countries will probably be expended in promoting such a climate.

[REDACTED]

38. The Cuban government is engaged in organizing, financing, and training of revolutionary movements. One facet of Cuban assistance in the training of potential revolutionaries against other Latin American governments is the Castro regime's subsidization of travel to Cuba of numerous Latin Americans for purposes of ideological and military indoctrination. Numerous delegates to the Latin American Youth Congress in Cuba last summer, for instance, remained to participate in the international Communist-financed "International Work Brigade." The week-long congress of the youth section of the Cuban Popular Socialist (Communist) Party last April also brought delegates from a number of Latin American countries, as did the ceremonies in March marking the "Week of Solidarity with the Struggles of the Latin American Peoples." The latter event, sponsored by the Communist-controlled labor arm of the Castro regime, ended with a manifesto calling for the initiation of an "anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution in all of Latin America." This manifesto did not include any call for an open Communist revolution. It has frequently been reported that Latin Americans from various countries have received military training as well as political indoctrination in Cuba after participating in these events. Also frequently reported are instances where representatives of various Latin American Communist and pro-Communist organizations who are sent to Sino-Soviet Bloc countries for training spend a period of time in Cuba on the outward or the homeward leg of their journeys.

39. A major effort to overthrow a Latin American government was the attempt in June 1959 to oust the unpopular Trujillo

[REDACTED]

dictatorship in the Dominican Republic. In this case the Cubans underestimated the strength of the Dominican regime. The two forces which landed in the Dominican Republic from Cuba--one by air and the other by sea--were trained and armed in Cuba and led into battle by officers of Castro's army. The group that landed on the Dominican coast was escorted there by units of the Cuban Navy. The invading forces, primarily composed of Dominican exiles, included a heavy sprinkling of Communists.

40. The abortive "invasions" of Panama in April 1959 and of Haiti in August of the same year were by small groups from Cuba who evidently did not have high-level Cuban officials support but in the Dominican case at least the expedition's preparations and departure probably took place with the knowledge and approval of some Cuban authorities. Of the numerous rebel raids into Nicaragua, a few were equipped with weapons from Cuba and led by Nicaraguans who had sought Cuban support for their adventures. However, none of these efforts is believed to have been directed or fully supported by Cuba. In fact, Cuban leaders are known to have had difficulty with the highly factionalized Nicaraguan exile groups that had sought support in Cuba. The Cubans had difficulties in deciding on a "trustworthy" Nicaraguan group which at the same time had any significant revolutionary capability. Several Nicaraguan, as well as at least one Panamanian and one Haitian exile group, have been jailed in Cuba as they were preparing "invasions," evidently either because they were considered the "wrong" exiles or because their chances of success were estimated to be nil.

[REDACTED]

41. There is evidence that Cuban officials estimate that Guatemala may be a country now ripe for revolution and that they have therefore decided on a program of support for the Guatemalan Communist and pro-Communist revolutionaries. A usually reliable source with high level contacts in the Cuban government reports that "Che" Guevara has offered arms and money to the Guatemalan Communist party and to a Communist-influenced Guatemalan revolutionary group on the condition that the Guatemalan Communists have the principal directing role in the revolution. Ex-president Arbenz of Guatemala [and former Guatemalan Communist leaders Fortuny and Pellecer are] in Cuba and probably will be utilized in the Cuban plans. In the case of Guatemala, as with other Latin American countries, the Cubans maintain that a genuine revolution can be achieved only after the regular armed forces are destroyed and the "masses" are armed, as in Cuba. In his frequent speeches in Cuba, Arbenz has repeatedly said that his greatest mistake was in not arming the people--an omission which permitted the "militarists," bought with "imperialist money," eventually to seize power and destroy the revolution.

42. The government of Venezuelan President Betancourt, (now under heavy domestic pressure from strong Communist and pro-Castro political forces) is another target for Cuban subversive action. Leftist Venezuelan deputy Fabricio Ojeda, who has spent considerable time in Cuba in recent months, is reported to have secured official Cuban support for an armed revolt in Venezuela.

43. Castro agents, of both Cuban and foreign nationality,

[REDACTED]

are traveling from Cuba to Latin American countries to promote revolutionary activities. Their objectives range from courier missions to organizing of student, labor, and revolutionary groups and the carrying out of sabotage missions. Hector ALDAMA Acosta, head of Cuban intelligence activities in Mexico, is charged with the coordination of all revolutionary activities in Central America. The use of Cuban ambassadors to control these activities has been proven in a number of Latin American countries.

44. Intensive Cuban propaganda is furthered by Cuban diplomatic missions which in numerous cases, such as in Bolivia, Honduras, Panama, and El Salvador, have provided Communist-oriented student and labor groups with propaganda material and financial support. Numerous reports connect the Cuban embassy in most Latin American countries with the distribution of anti-US and pro-Castro propaganda and financial support to local "Friends of Cuba" societies and leftist organizations.

45. The Cuban revolutionary line is also spread throughout Latin America through the facilities of the Castro-subsidized international news agency Prensa Latina, which has close working ties with the news agencies of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. This propaganda organization which has offices established in nearly every Latin American country disseminates the propaganda line of Moscow and Peiping throughout Latin America. It frequently has distorted news stories so as to reflect unfavorably on the local government--a course which has evoked protests from the officials of several Latin American countries, including Mexico and Costa Rica.

[REDACTED]

46. The activities of Castro agents throughout the hemisphere have frequently resulted in countermeasures being taken by security and diplomatic authorities in many Latin American countries. In a number of cases, blatant attempts to undermine the sovereign rights of other Latin American governments have resulted in the arrest of pro-Castro agents and the expulsion of Cuban diplomatic personnel.

III.

CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS SINCE 18 November 1960

18 November 1960

A source described as reliable reported seeing four new two-seater piston engine Czech trainer aircraft--later identified as Z-326 planes--flying at San Antonio de los Banos airbase. The source reported further that the pilots of the aircraft were "very experienced," putting the aircraft through difficult maneuvers. The pilots were allegedly Czechs or Russians.

19 November 1960

reported that Soviet military equipment arriving at San Antonio de los Banos airbase during the six-week period prior to 12 October included: 8 long-range guns of an estimated 105mm; several heavy-type guns; 4 Oerlikon-type guns mounted on rotating mobile platforms, 3 new "Stalin" tanks (later shipped to an unknown destination); and 7 or 8 crates approximately 23 feet long and 8 feet wide, one of which allegedly contained a tubular section resembling part of an aircraft fuselage or rocket section. The same source reported seeing no evidence as of 12 October confirming rumors of the presence of a squadron of MIGs or Czech or Russian pilots or maintenance personnel at the base.

20 November 1960

ambassador to Havana expressed his extreme concern to a US embassy officer over the Castro government's acquisition of a huge store of arms, which he was convinced were destined for distribution to Castro-type extremist groups throughout Latin America. He expressed the opinion that the entire continent is facing a grave hour and that action must be taken very quickly to eliminate the danger posed by the Castro regime.

21 November 1960

Brazilian police seized 30,000 Cuban propaganda booklets as they arrived in Rio de Janeiro in a diplomatic pouch

from Havana addressed to the Cuban embassy. Authorities said that Cuban propaganda material was being passed on by the Cuban embassy to two Communist publishing houses.

28 November 1960

The US Army Attache in Havana received a report that junior officers of the Revolutionary Army at the Managua army base were plotting against the Castro regime. The officers, who were said to believe that only an army uprising had any chance of success in ousting Castro, allegedly planned to concentrate their efforts on seizing Havana after taking over the Managua base.

29 November 1960

One type of Bloc weapon received in quantity by Cuba was positively identified as a Czech quad 12.7-mm antiaircraft heavy machinegun SDH K, according to the US Air Attache in Havana. Known locations of these weapons were given as Campo Libertad airfield and San Antonio de los Banos airbase, but the attache commented that most major military installations probably had the weapon.

30 November 1960

Cuban National Bank president "Che" Guevara signed a new Communist Chinese-Cuban economic cooperation agreement at the conclusion of his visit to Communist China. Under the agreement, the Chinese were to provide Cuba with a \$60 million interest-free line of credit from 1961 to 1965, and China agreed to import one million tons of Cuban sugar in 1961--double the amount agreed upon in the July 1960 agreement between the two countries. A joint communique signed the same day by Guevara and Communist Chinese Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien declared that both countries would "unswervingly support the peoples of Latin America, Asia, and Africa in their just struggles to oppose imperialism and colonialism, strive to

[REDACTED]

safeguard national independence and develop their national economy and culture, and that they will fight unremittingly in defense of world peace.... The Chinese side...reaffirms the unshakable stand of the Chinese Government and people that they will do everything possible to support and assist the Cuban people's just struggle."

[REDACTED]

30 November 1960

[REDACTED] told US Embassy officials he had been reliably informed that Castro had deposited \$200,000 in a Houston bank some three months before the late October coup against the Lemus regime. The funds allegedly were transferred to the Banco Salvadoreno and were dispersed under the direction of ex-president Oscar Osorio, reputedly the organizer of the coup. A [REDACTED] report of 10 December stated that new transfers of Cuban funds increased the total to \$350,000.

[REDACTED]

November 1960

An untested source reported that during his visit to Moscow in early November, Ernesto "Che" Guevara had a half-hour talk with Premier Khrushchev, in the course of which Guevara asked for Soviet missiles. Khrushchev flatly refused, according to the report, promising instead some automatic weapons dating from World War II. Upon his arrival in Peiping later in the month Guevara allegedly hinted that he was very annoyed, not only by Khrushchev's refusal to give missiles to Cuba, but also by the Soviet leader's tone. He complained that Khrushchev did not take the Cuban revolution and its potentialities in Latin America seriously.

[REDACTED]

1 December 1960

The Russian freighter Deputat Litsky unloaded four Soviet helicopters in Havana, and some arms may have been included in the shipment, according to the US Naval Attache.

[REDACTED]

1 December 1960

Two Cubans who had been operating a powerful shortwave radio transmitter were arrested by Venezuelan forces during the leftist-inspired rioting against the Betancourt government. Although the Venezuelan government did not charge the two men with being Castro agents, it did indicate it was aware that some connection between the Castro regime and the Venezuelan uprisings existed, but authorities said they were not prepared to present evidence to this effect. Reports that insurgents had used Cuban-supplied Czech arms were still unconfirmed as of 3 December.

2 December 1960

A Cuban delegation to Hanoi signed agreements between Cuba and North Vietnam establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries at the ministerial level and agreeing upon an economic and technical cooperation pact.

6 December 1960

A joint communique issued at the end of "Che" Guevara's visit to North Korea contained an unqualified demand for US withdrawal from the Guantanamo Naval Base and harshly condemned the United States as the "common enemy of the people of the world and a sworn enemy of the Korean and Cuban peoples." In addition, the two governments signed a series of trade, payments, banking, technical cooperation, and cultural exchange agreements.

7 December 1960

After leaving Hanoi, the Cuban delegation headed by Deputy Secretary for Foreign Affairs Hector Rodriguez Llompart, made arrangements in Ulan Bator for the establishment of diplomatic relations between Cuba and Mongolia.

21 December 1960

According to informed sources, anti-Castro forces who raided the Cuban embassy in Lima, Peru earlier in

December seized a number of documents purportedly establishing ample grounds for the breaking of diplomatic relations between Peru and Cuba. The documents allegedly contained proof that the Castro regime, through its ambassador in Lima, paid out "hundreds of thousands of dollars" to promote a favorable attitude toward the Cuban revolution and to assist Peruvian Communist organizations and activities.

26 December 1960

An untested source reported that 75-mm anti-aircraft guns of Communist Chinese manufacture had arrived at a military camp near the airport at Santiago de Cuba. The AA guns were deployed in 12 four-gun units, according to the report, and Chinese-manufactured [redacted] were also [redacted] used by the troops.

29 December 1960

The Peruvian government broke relations with Cuba when the former felt that an anti-Castro editorial campaign in Lima newspapers and the publication of some of the correspondence seized in the raid on the Cuban embassy by anti-Castro elements had aroused sufficient popular backing for such a move. Prior to its 29 December action Peru had been exploring the possibility of obtaining Colombian and Argentine agreement for a joint rupture in diplomatic relations with Cuba.

30 December 1960

[redacted] Chinese Communist officials who received Swiss transit visas for their trip to establish the Chinese Communist embassy in Havana. A [redacted] estimated to be fairly reliable added that the above nine officials were included among the 30 to 39 Chinese Communists scheduled to arrive in Havana before 1 January 1961.

31 December 1960

[REDACTED]

Khrushchev sent a congratulatory telegram to Fidel Castro on the occasion of the second anniversary of the Cuban revolution in which described Cuba's successes as "successes for national liberation all over the world." The Soviet premier also pledged the "solidarity and support of the Soviet people" in the struggle of the Cuban people for independence and economic development.

[REDACTED]

1 January 1961

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is working on plans which call for some unspecified action on the part of the Castro regime against the US Naval Base at Guantanamo, according to a fairly reliable source. [REDACTED] has divulged no details of his work, but he allegedly has repeated several times that action materializing from his planning will take place sometime in February or March 1961. [REDACTED]

2 January 1961

The Castro regime celebrated the second anniversary of its assumption of power by staging the greatest show of military strength ever seen in Cuba. The parade was highlighted by the display of weapons recently acquired from the Soviet Union and other Bloc nations. According to press accounts, about 50 heavy JS-3 and JS-4 tanks were included in the parade, as well as an undetermined number of 55-mm and 105-mm cannon, truck drawn field artillery, mortars, six-barrel rocket launchers, four-barrel anti-aircraft guns, and anti-tank guns. Militia units were equipped with automatic rifles, machine guns, bazookas, and mortars of Bloc origin. [REDACTED]

2 January 1961

At an anniversary reception at the Cuban Embassy in Moscow, Khrushchev made a speech sharply critical of US policy particularly in regard to foreign bases, and he labeled as "foul slander" reports that the Soviet Union had set up rocket bases in Cuba directed at the United States. The Soviet premier warned that the present US Government "is pursuing an extremely dangerous

ANNEX 1

ARMS AND EQUIPMENT OF CUBAN ARMY

Item	On Hand 1 Jan 1959	Received from Free World Sources since 1 Jan 1959	Bloc Deliveries	
			Identified 1/	Total Estimated 2/
1. Armored Vehicles				
a. Medium Tanks, T34 (Bloc)			15	104
b. Heavy Tanks, JS-2 (Bloc)			15	21
c. Assault Guns, SU- 100 (Bloc)			19	50
d. Armored Personnel Carriers, BTR-152 (Bloc)				150
e. "Dutch" (US)				
f. Lt Tk M3A1 (US)	12			
g. Med Tk M4A1 w/76-mm Gun (US)	7			
h. Med Tk Comet w/77-mm Gun (UK)	15			
i. Scout Car, M3A1, White (US)	19			
J. Armored Car, M8 (US)	20			
2. Motor Transport				
a. Trucks, 1/4-T 4x4 (Bloc)				500
b. Trucks, 2-T 4x4 (Bloc)				600
c. Trucks, 4.1/2-T 6x6 (Bloc)				200
d. Trucks, 3.5-6T 6x6 (Bloc)				100
e. Trucks, 10-T 6x6 (Bloc)				25
f. Sedans (US)	175			

1/ Types and quantities reported by reliable sources and verified in photographs.

2/ The figures in this column are based on an analysis of tonnages, types and quantities of materiel delivered by the Bloc to other countries, the size and composition and organization of the Cuban military forces, and reports received from Cuba. The estimated figures are a rough order of magnitude.

Item	On Hand 1 Jan 1959	Received from Free World Sources since 1 Jan 1959	Bloc Deliveries	
			Identified 1/	Total Estimated 2/
2. Motor Transport (Continued)				
g. Jeeps (US)	599			
h. Trucks (US)	158			
i. Busses (US)	28			
j. Ambulances (US)	19			
k. Cmd Recon Car 3/4-T (US)	4			
l. Motor Cycles (US)	149			
m. Special Purpose Vehicles (US)	19			
n. Trailer, 1/4-T(US)	30			
o. Trailer, 3/4-T(US)	3			
p. Trailer, 1 1/2-T (US)	6			
q. Trailer, 1 1/2-T water tank (US)	1			
3. Field Artillery				
a. 57-mm Anti Tank Gun M1943 (Bloc)				72
b. 76-mm Field Gun M 1942 (Bloc)			78	120
c. 85-mm Field Gun D-44 (Bloc)			9	24
d. 122-mm Howitzer M 1938 (Bloc)			4	36
e. 122-mm Gun M-1931/37			4	18
f. Multilaunch Rocket Launchers (Bloc)				18
g. 25-mm Hotchkiss AA Gun (Fr)	16			
h. 37-mm Gun M6 (US)	9			
i. 57-mm Gun, Salute Gun (UK)	6			
j. 75-mm Pack Howitzer (US)	8			
k. 105-mm Howitzer, Pack (It)		4		

1/ Types and quantities reported by reliable sources and verified in photographs.

2/ The figures in this column are based on an analysis of tonnages, types and quantities of materiel delivered by the Bloc to other countries, the size and composition and organization of the Cuban military forces, and reports received from Cuba. The estimated figures are a rough order of magnitude.

Item	On Hand 1 Jan 1959	Received from Free World Sources since 1 Jan 1959	Bloc Deliveries	
			Identified 1/	Total Estimated 2
4. Mortars				
a. 82-mm (Bloc)			50	200
b. 120-mm (Bloc)			2	72
c. 160-mm (Bloc)				18
d. 60-mm M2 (US)	17			
e. 81-mm	14(US) 72(It)			
5. Antiaircraft Artillery				
a. Quad 12.7-mm AAMG (Bloc)			108	122
b. Twin 30-mm AAA Gun M 53 (Bloc)				30
c. 37 MM AAA Gun M 1939 (Bloc)			4	90
d. 25-mm AAA Gun M 1939 (Bloc)				36
6. Rocket Launchers				
a. Launcher, Grenade Cal 30 M7A3 (US)	75			
b. Launcher, Grenade M 8 (US)	60			
c. Launcher, Rocket 3.5" M2	28(US) 70(It)			
7. Recoilless Rifles				
a. 57-mm M 18 (US)	9			
b. 75-mm (US),	4			
8. Machine Guns				
a. Browning Cal.30, M1919A6 (US)	103			
b. Browning Cal.30 M 1917 (US)	110			
c. Browning Cal.50 M2 (US)	90			
d. Colt Cal.30 (US)	69			
e. Lewis, Cal.30	6			

1/ Types and quantities reported by reliable sources and verified in photographs.

2/ The figures in this column are based on an analysis of tonnages, types and quantities of materiel delivered by the Bloc to other countries, the size and composition and organization of the Cuban military forces, and reports received from Cuba. The estimated figures are a rough order of magnitude.

Item	On Hand 1 Jan 1959	Received from Free World Sources since 1 Jan 1959	Bloc Deliveries	
			Identified 1/	Total Estimated 2/
8. Machine Guns (Continued)				
f. Vickers, Cal.30	11			
g. MAG, Light, 7.62mm		500(Bel)		
8 A. Rifles, Carbines and Submachine Guns				
a. Rifles & sub- machine guns			60,000	200,000
b. Thompson Cal 45 (US)	1,098			
c. Steyr-Solothurn 9-mm (Aust)	40			
d. Manek-English 9-mm	25			
e. UZI FN 9-mm	25	1,500(Bel)		
f. Rifle, Cal.30 M1	5,700(US) 22,000(It)			
g. Rifle, Cal.30 Springfield 1903	17,400			
h. Rifle, Cal.30 Mauser	1,000			
i. Rifle, Cal.30 Enfield	7,800			
j. Rifle, Sniper, Cal.30 M1903A4	27			
k. Rifle, Cal. 22 Mossberg	243			
l. Rifle, 7.62-mm FN	26,000 (or more) (Belg)			
m. Rifle, assorted (held by Castro forces)	4-6,000			
n. Rifle, Automatic Browning, Cal.30	177			
o. Rifle, Automatic Mossberg, Cal. 22	20			
p. Carbine, Cal. 30 M1 (US)	3,100			

1/ Types and quantities reported by reliable sources and verified in photographs.

2/ The figures in this column are based on an analysis of tonnages, types and quantities of materiel delivered by the Bloc to other countries, the size and composition and organization of the Cuban military forces, and reports received from Cuba. The estimated figures are a rough order of magnitude.

Item	On Hand 1 Jan 1959	Received from Free World Sources since 1 Jan 1959	Bloc Deliveries	
			Identified 1/	Total Estimated 2
8 A. Rifles, Carbines and Submachine Guns (Continued)				
q. Carbine, Cristobal automatic, Cal.30 (D.R.)	8,000			
r. Carbine, Kragg Cal.30	4,800			
9. Pistols & Revolvers				
a. Pistol, Colt M1911A1, Colt 45	1,120			
b. Pistol, Star Cal.45 (Sp)	300			
c. Pistol, Remington Cal. 45	206			
d. Pistols, Assorted	200			
e. Revolver, Colt Cal.45 (US)	10,750			
f. Revolver, SW, Cal.45 (US)	340			
g. Revolver, Colt Cal (US)	100			
h. Revolver, SW Cal.38	45			
i. Revolver, Assorted	200			
10. Ammunition				
a. Assorted				6000-15000 tons
b. Cartridge, Cal 7.62		52,000,000 (Bel)		
c. Cartridge, 9-mm		3,000,000 (Bel)		
d. Cartridge, Cal.30		2,734,000 (Norway)		
e. Cartridge, Cal.50 Ball		1,920,000 (Norway & It)		

1/ Types and quantities reported by reliable sources and verified in photographs.

2/ The figures in this column are based on an analysis of tonnages, types and quantities of materiel delivered by the Bloc to other countries, the size and composition and organization of the Cuban military forces, and reports received from Cuba; The estimated figures are a rough order of magnitude.

Item	On Hand 1 Jan 1959	Received from Free World Sources since 1 Jan 1959	Bloc Deliveries	
			Identified 1/	Total Estimated 2/
10. Ammunition (Continued)				
f. Cartridge, Cal.50 APIT&T		580,000 (It)		
g. Shell, Mortar 81-mm light		20,000 (It)		
h. Shell, Mortar 81-mm heavy		12,000 (It)		
i. Shell, Mortar 81-mm smoke		8,000 (It)		
j. Rocket, 3.5" Heat		8,000 (It)		
k. Rocket, 3.5" practice		3,000 (It)		
l. Round, howitzer 105-mm, M2A1		16,000 (It)		
m. Handgrenades, Mark II		20,000 (Norway)		
n. Antitank grenades		65,000 (Bel)		
o. Handgrenades, assorted		15,000 (Bel)		
11. Communications Equipment				
a. Telephone, EE-8	24	140 (It)		
b. Telephone, types unknown	1,423			
c. Switchboard SB-18/GT	7			
d. Switchboard SB-22/PT	1			
e. Switchboard Type unknown	41			
f. Switchboard (10 line)		12 (It)		
g. Switchboard (63 line)		3 (It)		
h. Radio Set, AN/GRC-7	1			
i. Radio Set, AN/PRC6	39			

1/ Types and quantities reported by reliable sources and verified in photographs.

2/ The figures in this column are based on an analysis of tonnages, types and quantities of materiel delivered by the Bloc to other countries, the size and composition and organization of the Cuban military forces, and reports received from Cuba. The estimated figures are a rough order of magnitude.

Item	On Hand 1 Jan 1959	Received from Free World Sources since 1 Jan 1959	Bloc Deliveries	
			Identified 1/	Total Estimated 2
11. Communications Equipment (contd)				
j. RadioSet, AN/PRC- 10	31			
k. RadioSet, AN/VRC- 10	1			
l. Radio Sets, Misc	116			
m. Remote Control Eq, AN/GRC-11	2			
12. <u>Miscellaneous</u>				
a. Radars, fire control (Bloc)				6
b. Radars, AA (Bloc)				4
c. Binoculars 6 x 30 (It)		2		
d. Binoculars 8 x 30 (It)		25		
e. Compass, MK III		60		
f. Plotting Board M10	10			
g. Riot Gun, Gas	73			
h. Mines, HEAT M6	122			
i. Flame Throwers (It)		7		
j. Aiming Circle M1		3		
k. Very Pistol (US)	56			
l. Pyrotechnic Pro- jector, Hand, M19	17			
m. Mine, AP		24,000 (Belg)		

1/ Types and quantities reported by reliable sources and verified in photographs.

2/ The figures in this column are based on an analysis of tonnages, types and quantities of materiel delivered by the Bloc to other countries, the size and composition and organization of the Cuban military forces, and reports received from Cuba. The estimated figures are a rough order of magnitude.

Annex 2

Cuban Air Force Equipment

	<u>1958</u>		<u>1960</u>	
	<u>Prop</u>	<u>Jet</u>	<u>Prop</u>	<u>Jet</u>
FIGHTER				
F-47	14		3	
F-51			1	
Sea Fury			<u>14</u>	
Sub Total	14		18	
Lt Bmr				
B-26	<u>17</u>		<u>13</u>	
Sub Total	17		13	
TBM-38			<u>6</u>	
Sub Total			6	
Transport				
C-47	10		8	
VC-53	1			
C-46			4	
C-54			<u>2</u>	
Lockheed-Lodestar			<u>1</u>	
Sub Total	11		15	
Helicopter				
H-19			1	
HOUND (MI-4)USSR			6	
HARE (MI-1)USSR			4*	
H-13			9	
UH-12			<u>2</u>	
Sub Total			22	
Trainer & Miscellaneous				
PA-18	5			
N-2S			6	
T-33		8		7
T-6	7		6	
T-7	1			

* Possibly as many as 10 MI-1's may have been delivered.

1958

1960

	<u>Prop</u>	<u>Jet</u>	<u>Prop</u>	<u>Jet</u>
Trainer & Miscellaneous (Continued)				
Cessna 310			2	
PBY-5A			2	
C-45			1	
L-20			1	
ZLIN-326 Trener-Master (Czech)			<u>12</u>	
Sub Total	<u>13</u>	<u>8</u>	30	7
Grand Total	55	8	104	7

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ANNEX 3

SOVIET BLOC POLICY TOWARD CUBA

1. The Sino-Soviet Bloc has gone a long way in identifying itself with the maintenance of the Castro regime. Following a relatively long period of temporizing, Moscow first moved to establish close relations with Havana last February through the visit of First Deputy Premier Mikoyan. The joint communique issued at that time provided the outline for future Cuban political support of the Bloc in the international arena in return for substantial Soviet economic assistance to Castro. Soviet activities in exploiting the rapid deterioration of US-Cuban relations, however, were inhibited at that time by the impending summit conference and President Eisenhower's scheduled visit to the USSR.
2. With the collapse of the summit in May and the cancellation of the President's trip, these inhibitions were removed and the Bloc launched a more intensive drive to expand its political and economic influence in the Castro regime. Exploitation of the Cuban situation became a prominent element in Khrushchev's aggressive post-summit campaign to isolate the US and brand it before world opinion as openly pursuing a policy of aggression and provocation. Khrushchev's acceptance on 3 June of an invitation to visit Havana symbolized the new boldness of Moscow's moves to demonstrate the USSR's ability to breach the Monroe Doctrine and challenge the

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U.S. in its own backyard. Missions by key Cuban officials to the Bloc presaged further important gains in Bloc influence over the Cuban economy and Soviet willingness to move ahead with military assistance. The new and aggressive phase of Soviet support was highlighted in July by a series of public statements pledging Bloc aid against any economic or military measures that the US might undertake against Cuba.

3. In a speech on 9 July, Khrushchev declared, "figuratively speaking, Soviet artilleryists, in the event of necessity, can with their rocket firepower support the Cuban people if the aggressive forces in the Pentagon dare begin intervention against Cuba." A communique signed by Khrushchev and Raul Castro on 21 July stated that the USSR "would use every means to prevent US armed intervention against Cuba." These pronouncements were designed to deter any military intervention by anti-Castro forces and to place the USSR in a position to claim credit for having protected Cuba if such intervention does not occur. Khrushchev, however, has carefully avoided any binding public commitments to take military actions in the event of an external attack on Cuba. When asked about his "rocket threat" at a press interview on 25 September, Khrushchev said "you needn't worry.... Since America does not intend to attack Cuba, this means that there is no danger whatsoever." There is no evidence of a formal mutual defense treaty between the USSR and Cuba and it is unlikely that

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Moscow would be willing to undertake any commitment of this nature. Khrushchev's interview with Cuban journalists on 22 October showed his reluctance to be drawn into too precise a reiteration or elaboration of his 9 July statement. In response to a request by the Cubans to comment on the "imperialist" contention that the "rocket threat" was "purely symbolic," Khrushchev said, "I should like such statements to be really symbolic, as the enemies of the Cuban revolution say." He added that it is "essential that the imperialists' threat of intervention" does not materialize so that there will be no assistance to the Cuban people against aggression." In an apparent effort to avoid any impression that he was retreating from his July statement, Khrushchev assured the Cubans that Soviet rockets were ready in case of need.

4. The statements in July were coupled with official attacks on the validity of the Monroe Doctrine and a significant expansion of Bloc relations with Cuba. For the first time Khrushchev also injected the USSR into the issue of the US naval base at Guantanamo Bay by charging that a "treaty without a time limit on terms enslaving to a small nation is sheer iniquity," and pledging Soviet support for Cuba should the US undertake "aggressive action" against the Castro regime, in reply to any further "legitimate" demand by Havana. Following a vigorous US reaffirmation of the Monroe Doctrine, a TASS statement dismissed it as "long defunct" and charged

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the US with using it as a cover to meddle in Latin American affairs. The Soviet UN delegation also provided full support for Cuban charges against the US in the Security Council.

5. In the past five months the Bloc has further solidified its position--all Bloc countries have signed economic agreements with Cuba and all except East Germany have now established formal diplomatic relations. The USSR and some other members of the Bloc have apparently gone to considerable lengths to grant Cuban economic requirements top priority. They have also continued to maintain their support for Castro through statements and extensive propaganda agitation.

6. Moscow's support of the Castro regime and its exploitation of tense Cuban-American relations has been part of its larger and more extensive effort to discredit and isolate the US in the post-summit period. Cuban complaints against the US in the UN offered the ideal vehicle for advancing Moscow's own objectives and provided Soviet charges with greater credibility and non-Bloc support. Over the past several months, one of the principal bloc objectives has been to exploit the situation to discredit US policy and arouse neutralist sentiment against the US in the UN. There is ample evidence that Moscow hoped to encourage neutralist action by fostering the impression that a US invasion of Cuba was imminent and that the USSR might be compelled to intervene. As early as July, when the US reduced the Cuban sugar quota, the USSR began to put pressure on

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neutralist states for support of Cuba by drawing parallels with the Suez crisis. The limited success of this tactic was apparent in the UN General Assembly in November when Cuba's proposal to refer its complaint against the US to the plenary instead of a committee received only 29 votes, including 15 neutrals. In exploiting the latest Cuban complaint against the US, however, the Bloc failed to stimulate any support although both the Bloc and Cuba have carried on an extensive psychological warfare campaign claiming that a US attack was imminent.

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Bloc in an area of traditional American predominance was reflected in the proceedings and results of the Moscow conference of 81 Communist parties in November. The Cuban Communist delegation reportedly was one of 14 non-Bloc parties participating in the work of a preparatory commission which developed an initial draft of the 6 December Statement of Communist parties. The Cubans also reportedly co-sponsored a proposal that all intra-Bloc disputes be resolved by majority vote--a move which strongly supported the Soviet position in the debates with Peiping. Bloc interest in Cuba was further reflected in the Statement's doctrinal innovation on "national democracies." The Statement defines a "national democracy" as a state which pursues an anti-imperialist foreign policy and "makes possible the struggle for carrying out agrarian reform and implementing other democratic and social reforms."

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East German party leader Ulbricht made it clear in a speech in mid-December that the term "national democracy" was invented with Cuba in mind. He stated that "undoubtedly the revolution of the Cuban people has created a national democratic state which has already fulfilled the task of national liberation and democratic revolution and which is now waging a struggle for further social progress." He differentiated between this situation in Cuba and the UAR, which was still economically dependent on capitalism and had not yet developed a "democratic order" internally. In explaining the definition of a "national democratic revolution" he implied that Cuba had reached the stage when it would be possible to carry out a "direct transformation from original conditions to a socialist revolution avoiding the long road of capitalist development." While the Communists thus have made clear their view of the "national democratic state" as one which could serve as a "peaceful" transition to Communist rule, they have been equally clear in differentiating between such a state and a "people's democracy" or Communist state. Thus the Moscow conference had the effect of placing an ideological stamp of approval on Cuban internal policies, but at the same time implying that the Communists there should continue to wield their influence behind nationalist leaders rather than attempt an open seizure of power in the near future. As Khrushchev put it in a 6 January speech, published

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as a Kommunist article, it is the "duty" of socialists to support such national democratic revolutions.

8. In the face of a change of administrations in Washington, Soviet statements on Cuba have reflected the Soviet leaders' awareness that heavy exploitation of the Cuban situation after 20 January could jeopardize Khrushchev's efforts to improve Soviet-American relations as the prelude to top-level negotiations. While Soviet propaganda took advantage of the period between the US elections and the inauguration to give full support to Cuban charges against the US, in early January Khrushchev went out of his way to shift all blame for the situa-
.....
ception at the Cuban Embassy in Moscow on 2 January, while sharply critical of US policy, he carefully directed his charges against President Eisenhower's administration. Both TASS and Pravda emphasized that the break in diplomatic relations was the responsibility of the Eisenhower administration and attempted to create the impression that the new President had disassociated himself from the action.
9. During the past two months the Bloc continued to build up its economic position in Cuba. While Cuba continues to import foodstuffs, vital machinery, and spare parts from non-Bloc countries, the new agreements concluded during Cuban National Bank President Guevara's recent trip through the Bloc clearly indicate that Havana is planning to depend almost entirely on the Bloc as a source of supply. The Yugoslav counselor in Moscow reported, however, that the Soviet Union rejected

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Guevara's request first for \$300 million, then \$150 million, then \$100 million and finally agreed to supply hard currency only for those items required in constructing the specific plants promised by the Soviet experts in Cuba. Moscow's reported attitude may reflect the Soviet leaders' confidence that the economic penetration of Cuba has sufficiently progressed to a point that it can impose its own terms on Castro and gain greater control over Cuban policy. Bloc assistance now is an essential feature of the Cuban economy and future plans for industrialization and expansion rest almost solely on Bloc assistance. The extent of Bloc efforts was evident in Communist China's \$60,000,000 credit--at that time the largest Peiping had yet offered to a non-Bloc country.


10. The existence of an openly anti-US regime in Latin America provides the USSR with some documentation for its claim that US power and influence is declining. The close relationship between the Bloc and the Castro government also serves to demonstrate the Communist claim that the Monroe Doctrine is invalid and that, as Togliatti put it, "no international problem can be treated without taking into account the existence of the socialist nations. Cuba, the Congo...are all problems that must be examined and resolved in light of this new balance of power." Cuba provides a better base of operations for subversion and propaganda through Latin America than the Soviets have ever had. The Communist parties will

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probably avoid seeking an open seizure of power in Cuba or elsewhere. A strongly anti-American and pro-Soviet but not avowedly Communist regime like Castro's serves their purpose far better; it gives a native color to Communist agitation and limits the risk of a hemisphere-wide reaction against outside Communist intervention. At the present stage, the main Soviet aim will be to help the Castroist movement and its imitators throughout Latin America to win a mass following, primarily in order to pressure governments toward anti-US stands. The Soviet leaders realize that, because of the history of the inter-American system and past US preeminence in diplomatic, economic, and military affairs, setbacks for the US in Latin America will be doubly injurious to the US world position.

CUBA

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ANNEX 5

Dates of Diplomatic Recognition of the Castro Regime by Selected Countries

United States -----	January 7, 1959
United Kingdom -----	January 7, 1959
France -----	January 7, 1959
Belgium -----	January 7, 1959
Canada -----	January 8, 1959
USSR -----	January 10, 1959
Czechoslovakia -----	May 17, 1960*
Poland -----	June 15, 1960*
North Korea -----	August 29, 1960*
Communist China -----	September 28, 1960*
Bulgaria -----	October 8, 1960*
Rumania -----	October 26, 1960*
North Vietnam -----	December 2, 1960*
Mongolia -----	December 7, 1960*
Albania -----	December 15, 1960*
Hungary -----	December 18, 1960*

*The dates given are those on which the respective Bloc countries announced their intention to establish diplomatic relations with Cuba.

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ANNEX 6

Countries Which Have Suspended or Broken Diplomatic Relations with
the Castro Regime

Dominican Republic ----- relations broken June 26, 1959
Haiti ----- relations suspended August 29, 1959
Guatemala ----- relations broken April 29, 1960
Nicaragua ----- relations suspended June 1, 1960
Paraguay ----- relations suspended December 5, 1960
Peru ----- relations broken December 29, 1960
United States ----- relations broken January 3, 1961