

CIA Presentation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff,  
30 July 1963

I. SOVIET MOTIVES IN THE TEST BAN

In your third question, you suggest a number of factors which may have led Khrushchev to agree to a limited test ban at this time. I want to give you our views on the probable working of these factors in the Soviet decision, beginning with the question of proliferation.

Proliferation

We regard the desire to halt the spread of nuclear weapons as a significant but not overriding motive for the Soviet switch on a test ban. (The Soviets see no advantage to themselves in proliferation.) They want to have a nuclear monopoly in their own camp. Outside their camp, they see certain dangers to themselves in proliferation, especially when they contemplate the prospect of a nuclear-armed West Germany. The Soviets are very susceptible to fears on this score, and they probably hope that a test ban will raise the obstacles against this possibility. The relationship is an indirect one; they hope, beginning with the present agreement on

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Date 30 OCT 1997

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testing, to create a political climate in which greater pressures can be mobilized against any of the ways by which the Germans might move toward a nuclear capability--an independent effort, cooperation with France, or participation in a multilateral force. This, however, is part and parcel of a large set of political objectives which the Soviets are seeking, and to which I will return later.

Beyond the German matter, Khrushchev almost certainly recognizes that while he can now berate the French more effectively, he cannot [hardly hope to] halt de Gaulle's nuclear program. With respect to Communist China, the Soviets took a big step in 1959-60 when they cut off their aid to the Chinese nuclear program. Since that time, however, they have really had only one direct means of affecting this program: the use of force against Chinese nuclear installations, which they would regard as a momentous and dangerous undertaking. Certainly, Khrushchev understands that any test ban negotiated with the West will not dissuade the Chinese from pursuing an independent nuclear capability.

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The Sino-Soviet Conflict

Communist China enters <sup>his</sup> calculations in another way, however. At the present stage of bitter conflict, the Soviets have an interest in proving what the Chinese deny: that a Communist state can reach agreements with capitalist countries which are not capitulations but in fact advance the cause. A limited test ban can be represented in this way, and from Khrushchev's viewpoint it is particularly appropriate because he can relate it to his side of the Sino-Soviet polemic over nuclear war. Furthermore, he has now set up a situation in which the Chinese, when they come to stage their first detonation, will have to appear in a worse light among those for whose loyalty Moscow and Peiping are contending.

Soviet Detente Tactics

I come now to what we consider Khrushchev's chief immediate concern: the political gains he hopes to achieve in Europe by bringing about a general relaxation of tensions. These center in the first instance on Germany, where four years of threats and pressure have failed to

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yield any lasting returns. He begins with the desire to get Western endorsement of East Germany, and most of his current proposals, such as the non-aggression pact and those relating to military forces in the two Germanies, are designed to this end. But he also knows that if he can induce the West to acknowledge and accept the division of Germany, he sets up tendencies in the Federal Republic toward a questioning of present alliances and thereby creates the preconditions for drawing West Germany away from NATO.

This is only one of the specific objectives which Khrushchev hopes to move forward on by bringing about a general atmosphere of detente. He probably has considerable hopes for this course of action, which he has not seriously exploited since the Camp David era that ended in May 1960, for he realizes that in the meantime new potentials--such as de Gaulle's aspirations for France and the new fluidity in German politics with the departure of Adenauer--have accumulated in the meantime.

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It can be taken for granted that, in pursuing this line, Khrushchev intends to strengthen the case for various Soviet proposals in the field of arms control, such as nuclear-free zones, and to encourage a general relaxation of NATO military efforts.

In this connection, we should be mindful of the unhappy fact that it is easier for the USSR to sustain military programs in an atmosphere of reduced tensions than it is for the West. During the coming period, the Soviets will go forward in incorporating into their nuclear stockpile the design advances made in their 1961-62 tests. They will continue a vigorous program of research and development in advanced weapons. It may be that this effort will bring them to what they see as the threshold of some important military advance, say in the anti-missile field, which requires nuclear testing for its consummation. In this case, they would be tempted to find a pretext for withdrawing from the treaty. Their decision at such a time would depend upon a complicated weighing of military, political,

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and even economic factors in circumstances which, unfortunately, we cannot now foresee.

Further Possibilities

You have asked yet a further question: does Khrushchev's agreement to a limited test ban signify a genuine desire for detente with the West? If by this is meant, has Moscow made a new determination of fundamental policy to close out the cold war and accept the present limits of Soviet power and influence, our answer is a quick and emphatic no. But if we ask whether Moscow may be coming to see the competition in a more complicated way and reappraising the USSR's methods and prospects in that competition, no such short answer is sufficient.

China

First, I want to return to the question of Sino-Soviet relations. We are persuaded that the division is real and deep and that it arises not only from ideological differences, which might after all be narrowed or eliminated by a change of mind or leadership on one side, but from national rivalry and a straightforward power struggle for control of the international

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Communist movement. We think that the Soviets fully understand this, particularly now that the Chinese have raised the question of national borders unjustly imposed on China by the Russian tsars.

This being so, we believe that China's stance and its success in extending control over other Communist parties in Asia, must eventually make inroads on some of the fundamental Soviet conceptions about world politics. The proposition that international affairs is essentially a bipolar struggle of two social systems, that one must eventually prevail and extinguish the other, is becoming increasingly unrealistic, and the Soviet Union is a realistic power. As these conceptions get blurred, the Soviet leaders will find it difficult to refer to a dogmatic ideological framework in order to determine, on each new issue, who is the enemy and who shares a common interest with them. Already they must be aware of the danger of isolation between two hostile fronts, East and West.

Economic Pressures

We do not know how far this process has gone in Khrushchev's mind, but we think it plays a

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greater role in Soviet thinking than was the case during the last period of detente tactics. There is, however, a second factor involved in the question of genuine detente which is not quite so conjectural. This is the impact of military and space spending on the Soviet economy. Five years ago, Khrushchev seemed supremely confident that the economy could provide a military force which would be capable of wringing political concessions out to the West, and at the same time support a big investment program and regular, tangible increases in consumer welfare. Little of this has come to pass. Soviet military capabilities have been greatly strengthened, but West Berlin still stands and Khrushchev found the US readier than he to fire the first shot in the missile crisis last October. Meanwhile, Soviet economic growth has distinctly faltered; the growth in GNP has slowed down in recent years, investment increases have been smaller and smaller, and agriculture remains virtually stagnant. Our analysis indicates that military and space spending have been the most important single cause of this general slowdown.

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(We note, for example, that military production is having important effects on deliveries of machinery and equipment to the economy. These civilian deliveries, which were rising at about 14 percent per year in the years before 1958, when production for the military was stable or declining, have since grown at an annual rate of 9 percent or less while military production has been increasing by about 13 percent per year.) ]

Thus the economic case for a check to the arms race has been gaining strength in the USSR for the past few years. Last winter, however, our evidence on economic policy suggested that the response to the Cuban crisis was to be a reaffirmation, and perhaps even a strengthening of the primacy of defense over other economic needs. This was at a time when our political information indicated that Khrushchev's stock among his colleagues was relatively low. Since about April, we have noted a steady gain in his political authority, and at the same time a shift in economic policy pronouncements. *men directed to revise*  
Those <sup>^</sup>revising the 1964-65 economic plan have

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been directed to give primary attention to the consumer and agriculture by upward revisions in the chemical industry. Grandiose plans for fertilizer production have been announced, and even though they will not be met on schedule, a serious beginning on them can scarcely be made without some general readjustment of other sectors. Khrushchev has told Western officials that the USSR is "over the hump" in military spending and can now direct new resources into agriculture.

This is not conclusive proof of a major turn in economic policy. We think it possible, however, that these developments reflect a reappraisal of priorities which is closely related to the test ban. If Khrushchev wishes to check military spending for the sake of investment and consumption, he is under some constraint to bring about a reduction of international tensions, lest he endanger Soviet security or give the appearance of doing so. In this case, his present intention is probably to sustain the detente line for a considerable period. I stress "his present intention" because, even if this argument is correct, future changes

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within the Soviet leadership or a new crisis, arising for example out of Cuba, could greatly alter the circumstances.

We are not trying to suggest that, if Khrushchev's Chinese problem and economic problem make his present move toward detente more serious than previous phases of this sort, he will come to us with any sort of acceptable overall settlement of East-West issues. Indeed, he would in this case pursue the same sort of tactics on Germany and arms control questions as I set out earlier, with only this difference-- that he would be ready to come somewhat closer to Western terms on particular agreements, or that he would be willing to let these issues lie on the negotiating table for a prolonged period without resorting to new tensions.

Reduction of Soviet Forces

One final point about Soviet policy is the matter of reduction of military manpower. Khrushchev's reassertion of authority in the Presidium, plus the emergence of a detente line in foreign policy, automatically forces us to reconsider this possibility. Khrushchev has never been convinced of the need for ground forces of the

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the present size, and he suspended the previous reduction program in 1961 only because of steady pressure from his marshals, combined with the crisis generated by his Berlin demands. So far, we have only rumors, accompanied by very little evidence, of a project to withdraw Soviet forces from Hungary, but we would not be surprised at the announcement of a new unilateral force reduction, undertaken both for economic reasons and <sup>to</sup> put further impetus behind current detente tactics. Such a move might possibly involve a reduction of Soviet forces in East Germany, although Khrushchev may wish to hold this card in reserve for bargaining purposes.

II. EFFECT ON THE NUCLEAR POLICY OF OTHER COUNTRIES

Aside from the three signatories, the countries most immediately concerned with nuclear programs are Communist China, France, and Israel. I have discussed the Chinese earlier. France will [almost certainly] not sign the partial test ban agreement, at least until it has a thermonuclear warhead for medium range missiles. If de Gaulle were given complete designs and materials for producing such a warhead, he might possibly then agree to the test ban. However, de Gaulle

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is as interested in the political effects of being known as a thermonuclear power as in the military significance of the weapons. He would be reluctant to forego the test which would demonstrate that he had produced a thermonuclear weapon.

Israel has embarked on a nuclear program which is heavily dependent on French aid, and we have estimated that Israel would attempt to produce a nuclear weapon some time in the next several years. In the new situation, we think that Israel will probably sign the test-ban treaty but continue its development program up to the testing stage. This would put it in a position either to test underground if it felt the need to do so, or perhaps even to withdraw from the treaty and test in the atmosphere, if a situation developed in which the Israelis believed themselves threatened by Arab military superiority.

Elsewhere in the world, a limited test ban agreement would be a political and psychological deterrent to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by countries other than the three already mentioned. Except for the few Communist

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Bloc nations which back the Chinese Communist position in the Sino-Soviet dispute, <sup>Virtually</sup> all other countries will probably support the partial test ban. Once having signed, they will find it difficult to renounce the pact at a later date if they should decide that new conditions made it desirable for them to have nuclear weapons.

India is a special case, however, due to its border conflict with China. Nehru has announced that India will adhere to the treaty. But once China explodes a device, and particularly after Nehru has gone, India will be under strong domestic pressure to embark on a weapons program. Whether the government would bow to this pressure, would depend on a number of factors, but most crucially on the course of Sino-Indian relations.

### III. EUROPEAN REACTIONS TO TEST BAN AND DETENTE

Whether or not the partial test ban has a divisive effect within NATO, or pushes the French and West Germans closer together in a nuclear weapons program, depends as much on the forthcoming discussions about European political issues as on the test ban itself. While all NATO countries except France support the test ban,

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there is considerable opposition in some of them, especially West Germany, to any arrangement which implies a freezing of the status-quo in Europe.

Both West Germany and France will almost certainly oppose a non-aggression treaty which requires individual NATO and Warsaw Pact nations to sign it, arguing that such a procedure would be tantamount to recognizing East Germany. West Germany and France will probably also oppose any other non-aggression arrangement--such as a simultaneous declaration by NATO and Warsaw Pact commanders--unless the West at the same time gets additional concessions on the Berlin question or on the broader issues of European security. The French government probably also believes that by supporting West Germany on the non-aggression issue, its own isolation on the test ban question may be reduced.

If West Germany and France come to feel that they are being pressed into an unsatisfactory non-aggression arrangement by the US and the UK, they may feel compelled to make common cause on this and other policy questions to a much greater degree than they have yet done under the Franco-German treaty. One field where they might get

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together in the future is obviously that of nuclear weapons. (I should emphasize that we have no reliable evidence that joint Franco-German activity on nuclear weapons is underway at this time.) To the extent that US or British motives in the non-aggression talks actually do differ from French and West German motives, therefore, the talks may accelerate divisive tendencies within NATO. [The impact in Europe of the test ban and the future non-aggression talks thus quite clearly depends in large measure on US policy in coming months.]

Beyond the non-aggression agreement, of course, are the other subjects on which Khrushchev has said he is willing to negotiate with the West. In the prolonged period of discussions with the Soviet Union which we may now be entering, [problems affecting the future of both Germanies and Berlin are likely to be constantly in the spotlight.] The West German government will be acutely worried that any steps toward settling Central European problems will be taken at West Germany's expense or will make the German goal of reunification even more unattainable than it is at present. Bonn's confidence in the United States and the NATO alliance

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probably will face very severe trials. Throughout the negotiating process, France will presumably be ready to benefit from any West German disillusionment with the US or NATO.

It is obvious that the test ban agreement and the relaxation which the Soviets intend to introduce in East-West relations will generate a great deal of optimism in the West. It is probably safe to predict, however, that the French government, and the West German government under Adenauer, will not be fooled into thinking that the USSR's long-term goals have changed. Even after Adenauer, the German government will, for the near term, at any rate, probably take a hard-headed view of Soviet policy. Elsewhere, in NATO, and especially in Great Britain, there may be a much stronger tendency to believe that long-term Soviet goals actually have changed, and that everything possible must be done to encourage the thaw in Soviet relations with the West. Similar feelings will be more widespread outside official circles in most NATO countries than within the governments themselves. As Khrushchev hopes, an

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atmosphere of detente will, for example, make it more difficult for West European governments, perhaps even including the French government, to maintain their defense establishments at planned levels.

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