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PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
ARAB STATES

Submitted by the

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Concurred in by the

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

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PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ARAB STATES

THE PROBLEM

To analyze basic trends in the domestic and foreign affairs of the Arab states, and to estimate probable developments through 1956.¹

CONCLUSIONS

1. Political instability, both regional and national, in the Arab states may be expected to extend into the foreseeable future. Area political problems mainly grow out of the unresolved conflict between Western culture and the traditional values and institutions of the Arab world. The Arabs have not yet found a native solution to this conflict, but they have found expression for their discontent and frustration in nationalist and other movements, which, at least in the short run, increase general instability. Another factor contributing to political instability is the intense preoccupation of Arabs with the Arab-Israeli conflict.

2. Indigenous leadership has shown little ability to cope with the problem of in-

creasing production sufficiently to meet the requirements of growing populations and the need for improved standards of living. It is probable that economic maladjustment will become an increasingly important factor for social and political instability. As economic problems assume greater importance relative to or become identified with political problems, there will be an increasing tendency to seek extremist solutions of the right or left.

3. The governments of the Arab states will continue to be unstable and subject to change. The most serious threats to their tenure will come from the extremist elements of the right and left. The key to the maintaining of a degree of governmental stability in the area during the period of this estimate is the power of the established governments to maintain control of the armed forces and to prevent the moderate opposition from joining with the extremists.

4. While current conditions and trends in the Arab world on the whole are adverse to the continuation of special military, political, and economic positions for the West, settlement of the Suez issue with the UK and prospects for US military and economic assistance may provide a new

¹ For purposes of this estimate the Arab states include Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, the principalities of the Arabian Peninsula, and the Sudan. The Sudan is included, although only its northern half is Arab and Moslem, because of its special relationship with Egypt. Libya is omitted because it is covered in NIE 71-54, "Probable Developments in North Africa."

Note: (a) NIE-73, "Conditions and Trends in the Middle East Affecting US Security," 15 January 1953 and NIE 30-54, "Prospects for Creation of a Middle East Defense Grouping and Probable Consequences of such a Development," 22 June 1954 deal with subjects related to this estimate.

(b) Appendix I contains comparative data on the principal Arab states.

basis for Arab-Western collaboration. However, Arab collaboration with the West will be influenced by the extent to which Western policies are brought in line with the most fundamental Arab desires; e. g., the elimination of the British position in the Near East currently based on "unequal" treaties, further change in US treatment of the Arab-Israeli question, and, to a lesser extent, change in France's policy towards its North African possessions. Arab resentment of British "imperialism" and the reduction in the British world power position will continue to limit the effectiveness of British influence.

5. The petroleum producing countries are likely to press the Western oil companies for further benefits, but such pressures are not likely to lead to nationalization during the period of this estimate, except possibly in Saudi Arabia.

6. Official relations between the Arab states and the Soviet Bloc have been increasing, but most Arab governments are probably not anxious to engage in closer relations with the Bloc. However, they might do so on occasion if they believed they could thereby bring pressure upon the Western Powers.

7. Communist activity in the Arab states has increased noticeably over the past year, and continued instability in the area will favor a further increase in Communist activity and strength. However, within the period of this estimate it is not likely that Communists will take control of the government of any Arab state. Improved relations with the West would probably eliminate some of the political appeal of Communist and pro-Soviet propaganda and improve the ability and willingness of Arab governments to at-

tempt to correct the conditions which contribute to Communism's appeal. However, the elimination of factors aiding Communism and pro-Soviet attitudes will be a slow process.

8. The idea of Arab solidarity against the rest of the world exerts a strong appeal among Arabs, but the Arab League will probably continue to function effectively only for such negative purposes as opposition to Israel. Moreover, there are serious rivalries among the Arab states, and Egypt and Iraq are vying for leadership. Effective military cooperation among the Arab states is unlikely during the period of this estimate, even under their own Arab Collective Security Pact.

9. The Arab states will probably continue the economic and political boycott of Israel and will refuse to meet with Israel for the purpose of negotiating a formal peace settlement. However, in dealing with specific problems of Arab-Israel relations short of a general peace settlement, some Arab leaders have recently appeared less intransigent. On the other hand, the Israeli policy of "active defense" and the redeployment of Arab troops to border areas increase the danger that border incidents could lead to extensive armed conflict. If such conflict took place during the period of this estimate, it is probable that the comparative military capabilities of the two antagonists would prove to be much the same as they were at the time of the Palestine War of 1948-1949.

10. The Egyptian Revolutionary Command Council's (RCC) short-term prospects of maintaining itself in power are favorable. The Wafd Party and the Moslem Brethren will remain capable of causing serious trouble for the regime, and any such efforts would probably be aided

by the Socialist and Communist groups. Moreover, the RCC faces serious political and economic problems upon the solution of which will depend its longer term tenure.

11. Iraq's traditional ruling oligarchy will probably remain in power during the next two or three years, but its effectiveness would decline if Nuri Said were removed from the scene. Iraq's policies toward the other Arab states will continue to be influenced by the conflict between its ambitions to achieve Arab leadership against the opposition of Egypt and Saudi Arabia and its desire for continued Arab soli-

arity. Iraqi leaders are aware of the Soviet threat and favor joining some sort of regional defense organization which the US would support.

12. Saudi Arabian relations with the US Government and ARAMCO deteriorated over the past year. There are current indications that Saudi Arabian relations with the West are undergoing a change for the better. However, if the general deterioration of relations which took place during the past year should continue, the US Government might have difficulties when the Dhahran airbase agreement comes up for renewal in 1956.

DISCUSSION

I. REGIONAL PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

13. Area political problems mainly grow out of: (a) the social and historical relationships in the Arab world itself, and (b) the unresolved conflict between Western culture and the traditional values and institutions of the Arab world. This conflict is reflected in the century-old struggle on the part of the Arabs to strengthen themselves in order to prevent their political, cultural, and economic submergence by alien forces. The psychological state created in the process has given rise to ambivalent attitudes toward Europe and the US which are reflected in the general attitude toward the Soviet Bloc and the West.

14. There are certain trends and conditions common to most of the Arab states.² For at least three decades, society in all but the most remote parts of the Arab world has been undergoing an increasingly profound and occasionally violent revolution. The political, economic, and cultural impact of the West has led to the decaying of traditional Arab values and institutions and is a basic factor in Arab world instability. Arabs have become increasingly resentful of the special interests and

privileges of Western nations in Arab countries. Moreover, with the end of British and French tutelage, the responsibility of leadership has shifted to indigenous elements often ill-prepared to assume it. Finally, the backward economies of the Arab states have felt for some time the disruptive effects of contact with Western commerce and industry. The Arabs have not yet found a native solution to the conflict between new conditions and old systems that would restore the foundations of stability.

15. Despite their common Islamic religious and cultural heritage, diversity is a stronger characteristic than uniformity among the Arab states. Their political development varies widely, from the Arab traditionalism of Saudi Arabia's absolute monarchy to the partially Westernized governments of Iraq and Lebanon and the reform-minded military regime in Egypt. In addition, there are great differences between the states with respect to their social and political stability, economic resources and needs, and military and strategic importance.

16. The widespread discontent and frustration in the Arab world have found expression in nationalist movements. The doctrines

² See NIE-73, "Conditions and Trends in the Middle East Affecting US Security," 15 January 1953.

of nationalism are not well-defined, and different nationalists emphasize different aspects. In general, however, the nationalists seek: (a) the removal of the last vestiges of imperialism and the recognition of the complete sovereignty of the Arab states; (b) social and economic reforms in the interest of public welfare and the increase of national strength; (c) cooperation among all Arab states and peoples for common ends, including satisfaction of Arab grievances against Israel; and (d) a revival, in varying degrees, of their past glories.

17. Nationalism is strongest among the members of the growing Westernized middle sector of Arab society — urban intellectuals, students, military officers, small businessmen, and government employees. It also has considerable mass emotional appeal, especially in the cities. Its influence on government policies is most apparent in states like Egypt and Syria, where the governments are susceptible to the influence of public opinion and mass pressure tactics.

18. Nationalist movements espouse both parliamentary and authoritarian political forms. In all states, however, the spread of nationalist doctrines has tended to weaken the traditional power of the landlords, tribal leaders, and wealthy merchants who previously dominated most Arab governments with the support of interested Western powers, in most cases the UK. At least in the short run, this trend increases the likelihood of instability.

Internal Problems of the Arab States

19. *Political stability.* The governments of the Arab states will continue to be unstable and subject to frequent change. The key to the maintaining of a degree of governmental stability in the area during the period of this estimate is the power of the established governments to maintain control of the armed forces and to prevent the moderate opposition from joining with the extremists. Long-range prospects for stability will depend upon the success of Arab leadership in satisfying popular aspirations by moderate and constructive reforms and in providing relatively efficient government.

20. The most important threat to political stability will come from the fanatic anti-Westerners and the Islamic traditionalists on the right and from left-wing elements often under Communist influence. In some cases these extremist groups may unite against the conservative or moderate nationalist leadership, and may even be joined by disaffected members of the old ruling class. While such an alliance is unlikely to be durable, it might gain control temporarily in some states.

21. *Economic problems.* Serious and in many cases apparently insuperable economic problems will contribute to instability in all Arab states during the period of this estimate. In most of the Arab states, production is inadequate to support the growing population; in some, such as Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon, the production potential is so severely limited that future prospects are discouraging. Even those countries which get substantial revenues from oil are finding it difficult to adjust themselves to new techniques, machinery, social changes, and opportunities rapidly enough to satisfy the sometimes exaggerated expectations of the public.

22. Indigenous leadership has shown little ability to cope with the problem of increasing production sufficiently to meet the requirements of growing populations and the need for improved standards of living. While considerable attention has been paid to the need for development planning, governments have allowed themselves to be diverted by excessive preoccupation with such political issues as anti-imperialism and the Israeli problem. A shortage of technicians and competent administrators is also an important limiting factor.

Communism in the Arab States

23. International Communism has in the past made a comparatively small effort in the Arab states and has as yet won only a small foothold. Communist parties are illegal, and Communists operate clandestinely or through front organizations. During the past year, however, there has been a noticeable increase in Communist activity in the area. The strongest national organizations are to be

found in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. The Syro-Lebanese group is the key party in the area. The Communists in Iraq have been very active recently, but government countermeasures may reduce their strength. The Jordanian party, although very small, has shown increasing strength during the last few months. Several Communist groups operate in Egypt, but there appears to be no unified party there. Palestinian and Jordanian Communists had a part in the strike of Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO) employees in Saudi Arabia in October 1953. The leaders of the strike were Saudi Arabs, none of whom are known to be Communists. There is no evidence that an organized Communist party exists in that country. Arab Communists receive support from the Soviet Bloc through Soviet and Satellite diplomatic missions, with those in Cairo and Beirut being the most active.

24. On the whole, the strength of the Communist movement in the Arab states lies not in the appeal of its ideology but in its ability to relate itself to existing dissatisfactions and adjust its propaganda to exploit nationalism and the grievances of ethnic and religious minorities. Communists rely heavily on the successful agitation of the general hostility toward vestiges of Western imperialism, distrust of the established authorities, and widespread dissatisfaction with prevailing economic and social conditions.

25. Local and international efforts to expand Communist influence in the Arab states during the next few years will almost certainly continue to encounter numerous difficulties. Arab governments and peoples will continue to regard Communism as an alien and hostile influence. Strong family, tribal, and religious ties will make difficult the organization of a popular front against existing regimes and Western influence. Although Communism's chances of acceptance are greater among the Westernized elements, it is precisely here that it has to compete most strongly with nationalism, where the foreign orientation of Communism is a serious disadvantage.

26. At the same time continued instability in the area will favor some increase in Commu-

nist strength. The Communists may be expected to continue to seek "popular front" alliances with various nationalist or minority opposition groups. They will emphasize Communist and Soviet support of nationalist opposition to Israel and to Western "imperialism"; they will join in attacks on the corruption of the traditional ruling class; and they will exploit the grievances of minorities and the poor. Local opposition groups will probably seek and receive Communist support in efforts to oust existing regimes but, if successful, would probably attempt to disassociate themselves from the Communists. Within the period of this estimate the Communists will have some capability to incite, abet, and influence mob demonstrations and other mass pressures on weak or vacillating governments. In the longer run, the Communists may be able to gain a stronger political position by developing a substantial following in the ranks of the intelligentsia, industrial labor, and certain religious and ethnic minorities.

27. Future Communist prospects will be greatly influenced by relations between the Arab states and the West. The effectiveness of Communism's attempt to arouse hostility toward the West among non-Communist Arabs would almost certainly decline if relations between the West and the Arab states improve. Improved relations with the West would probably eliminate some of the political appeal of Communist and pro-Soviet propaganda and improve the ability and willingness of Arab governments to attempt to correct the conditions which contribute to Communism's appeal. However, the elimination of factors aiding Communism and pro-Soviet attitudes will be a slow process. Nationalist distrust of the West is sufficiently strong that any Arab cooperation with Western powers will provide some propaganda capital to the Communists and furnish the USSR with added incentives to step up its effort in the Arab world.

Relations Among the Arab States

28. The idea of Arab solidarity against the rest of the world exerts a strong appeal among Arabs. The principal expression of Arab

unity is the Arab League, a loose association of the Arab states (except the Sudan and the Arabian sheikhdoms) which functions as: (a) a meeting ground for the representatives of the Arab states; (b) a center from which to promulgate a common Arab line on matters of external policy that jointly concern the Arab governments; and (c) a secretariat for the implementation of Arab policy toward Israel, particularly the Arab boycott. Egypt has sought to maintain the character of the League as an association of sovereign states; Iraq, on the other hand, has shown interest in federation or union. Egypt has also tried to assume the position of leader, but it is unlikely that the League will become the instrument of a single state or that it will develop into a federation or superstate of any kind. As in the past, it will probably be unable to act where differences exist among its member states and will continue to function effectively only in areas of agreement — chiefly opposition to Israel. Its activities are likely, therefore, to continue to be largely negative in character.

29. The member states of the Arab League (except Libya) are also associated in the Arab Collective Security Pact which provides that an attack on the territories or troops of any of the signatories will invoke a meeting of the member states in which a decision passed by a two-thirds majority vote will be binding on all members. The Pact specifically states that any armed aggression against one signatory would be considered as directed against them all, but it does not provide for automatic mutual defense. Attempts have been made to unify defense efforts, and in September 1953 a hierarchy of committees was established.

30. However, it is unlikely that the Arab Collective Security Pact will lead to effective joint military organization or to joint war or defense planning. The original motivation for the Pact was political rather than military. The objective of its founders was to convince the Arab public that the Arab governments were taking action to counter the Arab defeat in the Palestine War. Subsequently the Pact has been advanced by the Arabs as an alternative to the organization of regional defense

under Western sponsorship. Despite its almost complete lack of military significance, the Pact may prove to be an obstacle to the organization of regional defense under Western sponsorship. Arab leaders who are anxious to maximize Arab control over any regional defense organization will probably continue to urge that the Arab Collective Security Pact be made the basis of all future regional defense organizations.

31. In practice the Arab states have been unable to cooperate effectively on any issue, except on the boycott of Israel, because the divisive forces in the Arab world have generally proven stronger than the unifying factors. Although Arab leaders will continue to support the idea of unity in public, their actual policies toward other Arab states and outside powers will be dictated by their own differing national and dynastic interests. Thus the dynastic rivalry between Hashemite Iraq and Saudi Arabia will almost certainly continue to hinder cooperation among the Arab states. It also appears likely that Iraq and Egypt will engage in increasingly bitter rivalry for leadership of the Arab states, which will have an important bearing upon any effort to organize regional defense.³

Arab Relations with Israel

32. Hatred and fear of Israel will continue to be a fundamental force in Arab thought and conduct, and the question of relations with Israel will have high priority in Arab foreign policy. The Arab policy toward Israel is based on: (a) the argument that the Western Powers created the Jewish state and must solve the resulting problems themselves, and (b) the growing conviction that time is on the Arab side. The latter belief is strengthened by exaggerated ideas of the harm which the boycott inflicts upon Israel, and by the view that US policy is becoming pro-Arab and that US military aid to the Arab states will eventually give them military superiority over Israel and the power to achieve a settlement favorable to the Arabs.

³ See NIE 30-54, "Prospects for Creation of a Middle East Defense Grouping and Probable Consequences of such a Development," 22 June 1954.

33. Arab leaders are likely to be extremely cautious about offending public feeling on the Israeli question and will probably not be willing for some time to risk negotiation and compromise on the most important issues. Arab policy toward Israel will probably continue along the lines developed in the Arab League since 1949. The Arab states will probably continue the economic and political boycott of Israel which has been and probably will continue to be the outstanding example of unified Arab policy. They will refuse to meet with Israel for the purpose of negotiating outstanding issues unless Israel meets conditions — acceptance of existing UN resolutions as a basis for negotiation — which the Arabs are reasonably sure Israel will never agree to.

34. In dealing with specific problems in Arab-Israeli relations short of a formal peace settlement some Arab leaders have recently appeared less intransigent. Examples of this have been recent Arab reception of proposals on the regional development of Jordan Valley water resources and of Tripartite recommendations for improving the border situation. The Israelis have not, however, shown a like tendency to reasonableness and compromise.

35. In line with their general policy of playing for time, as well as out of fear of Israel's military superiority, the Arab states have consistently sought to avoid border clashes with Israel which might lead to war. The Arab governments, however, and particularly Jordan, have been unable to control their borders and considerable infiltration of Israeli territory has taken place. Israel's policy has been one of "active defense," including reprisal raids into Arab territory by sizeable Israeli military forces. There is no evidence that any present Arab Government is supporting or countenancing the infiltration of Israeli territory or plans to initiate an armed attack on Israel within the foreseeable future. However, recent large Israeli raids have led the governments of bordering Arab states to deploy their military forces in such a way as to make them available for an immediate counterattack against any Israeli raid. In the prevailing state of tension, a minor border

incident could lead to extensive armed conflict.

36. In the event of extensive armed conflict between Israel and any of the Arab states, the latter would employ all diplomatic means to persuade the signers of the Tripartite Declaration (US, UK, and France) to intervene against Israel, and Jordan, if attacked, would seek to invoke its treaty of alliance with the UK. The signatories of the Arab Collective Security Pact would probably vote to take joint military action against Israel, but little substantial or effective united military action would be likely to follow. The Arab states would probably declare war on Israel, mobilize their own forces separately, and deploy them in defensive positions near the Israeli frontier. Most Arab states, with the possible exception of Jordan, would probably seek to avoid committing their troops in offensive action against Israel.

37. If extensive armed conflict took place between the Arab states and Israel during the period of this estimate, it is probable that the comparative military capabilities of the two antagonists would prove to be much the same as they were at the time of the Palestine War of 1948-1949. Since the Palestine War Israel has concentrated on improving its armed forces through reorganization, intensive training (both of regular and reserve units), and a build-up of reserve stocks of military supplies. The Arab armed forces have improved in some respects and declined in others. It is unlikely that they would be able to cooperate more effectively than they did in the Palestine War.

Arab Relations with the West

38. The Arab attitude toward the West is and will continue to be an ambivalent one. Some Arabs, many of them in high position, are appreciative of Western values and institutions and believe that the best chance for the advancement of the Arab states lies in cooperation with the Western Powers, although these men are aware of the popular suspicion of the West and hesitate to express their views publicly. Most Arabs are profoundly influenced by the anti-imperialist and neutralist

doctrines of nationalist movements and blame the Western Powers for the existence of Israel and for most of the other ills of the Arab world. They are continually drawn in the direction of a neutralist policy by the belief that the struggle between the West and the Soviet Bloc is a contest for world domination in which small nations have no part and by the parochial and exclusive character of Arab culture. Yet many Arabs who are convinced anti-Westerners are none the less anxious to obtain for their countries the advantages of cooperation with the West.

39. While current conditions and trends in the Arab world on the whole are adverse to the continuation of special military, political, and economic positions for the West, settlement of the Suez issue with the UK and prospects for US military and economic assistance may provide a new basis for Arab-Western collaboration. However, the extent of Arab collaboration with the West will be influenced by the extent to which Western policies are brought in line with the most fundamental local desires; e.g., the elimination of the British position in the Near East currently based on "unequal" treaties, further change in US treatment of the Arab-Israeli question, and, to a lesser extent, change in France's policy towards its North African possessions.

40. US prestige and influence are currently greater in the Arab world than those of any other great power, despite the stigma of the US relationship with Israel and the two "imperialist" powers, the UK and France. The potential availability of US economic and military aid, and the reputation of US technical, industrial, and military competence provide strong bases for the preferred position of the US in the area. However, US relations with the Arab states will be determined primarily by political factors. An important consideration will be the degree to which the US supports individual Arab states against their rivals or aids such rivals.

41. Arab attitudes toward the European nations are strongly influenced by the past and present activities of those nations in the Arab area. The UK retains military facilities, commercial enterprises, and financial investments,

and exerts important influence in Iraq, Jordan, and the Arabian principalities. However, Arab resentment of British "imperialism" and the reduction in the British world power position have greatly reduced the effectiveness of British influence in the Arab states. Completion of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement on the Suez Canal Base and the revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, perhaps along similar lines, will lessen Arab hostility but will not restore the UK's former prestige. France's influence in the area is negligible, even in Syria and Lebanon, and its North African policies contribute to anti-Western sentiment. On the other hand, West Germany's position in the area is improving rapidly. Arabs generally admire German industrial and commercial skill and are not apprehensive of German political designs.

42. Western oil companies operating in Arab states will almost certainly be subjected to growing pressure to enlarge the Arab share of profits. Reactivation of the Iranian oil industry will cause concern in the Arab states lest it lead to reduced production in Arab oil fields. The Saudi Government will probably lead the way in demands for revisions, including a modification of the profit sharing agreement, and it is likely to use threats of nationalization as a means of obtaining its ends. Iraq and Kuwait are unlikely to attempt to change drastically the present agreements within the near future, but any modification of the agreement with Saudi Arabia will almost certainly have to be matched by the oil companies operating in the other Arab states.

Relations with Asian and African States

43. Arabs feel an affinity for the peoples of Asia and Africa and many believe that the Arab states should seek to cooperate with Asian and African states in the UN and in other fields of international politics. While many Arabs respect Pakistan because it is a Moslem state and because of the evidences of vigor and strength it has shown since it became independent, there has been little direct contact between Pakistanis and Arabs and many of their problems and interests differ. Pakistan's adherence to a defense agree-

ment with Turkey favored by the West has, however, made the whole idea of a regional defense organization slightly more palatable for most Arabs.

44. Most Arabs feel a grudging respect for Turkey but few like the Turks or look to Turkey for leadership. Many distrust Turkey because of its former domination of the area, its recognition of and trade relations with Israel, its secular institutions, and its close relations with the West. Turkey's strength and prosperity are, however, a potent lesson to the Arabs on the advantages of cooperation with the West.

45. India's Prime Minister Nehru is respected in the Arab states, where his neutralist, Asia-for-Asians doctrines have a strong appeal. Nehru will continue to have some influence among the Arabs, but Arab interests and policies are likely to remain provincial in character and to be influenced only peripherally by India.

46. The Arab states will almost certainly increase their efforts to help nationalist causes in North Africa, especially through continuing efforts to obtain favorable UN action on the Tunisian and Moroccan cases. The small resources of the Arab states will limit their capabilities for material assistance, but they will probably help North African nationalist exiles, provide increasing financial aid, and assist in smuggling arms.

Relations with the Soviet Bloc

47. No official Soviet relations are maintained with Jordan, the Sudan, or the Arabian Peninsula. Soviet diplomatic missions are maintained in the remaining Arab states, and Cairo is the principal Arab center of Soviet Bloc representation. Egypt is the only Arab state which has sought closer economic relations with the Soviet Bloc, and it has done so as a result of the decline of the Western market for Egyptian cotton and as part of a general drive to lessen economic dependence on the UK. Most Arab governments are probably not anxious to engage in closer relations with the Bloc, though they might do so on occasion if they believed they could thereby bring pres-

sure upon the Western Powers. The two recent Russian vetoes in the UN Security Council of resolutions favored by Israel and opposed by the Arabs impressed many Arabs as evidence of Soviet opposition to imperialism and friendship for peoples who had suffered from it. The Arab response has also been favorable to recent Soviet efforts to improve relations on the diplomatic level, as well as to Soviet talk of increased trade between the Bloc and the Arab states. Trade between the Soviet Bloc and the Arab states has not, however, been significant in the past, except for exchange of Bloc wheat for Egyptian cotton. The Arab states would probably be receptive to Soviet Bloc trade proposals. It is unlikely, however, that any of the Arab states would welcome a Soviet program for aid and development, and the Arab states would probably discourage any closer relations with the Soviet Bloc than they deemed necessary to put pressure on the West.

II. PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN EGYPT

48. *Internal affairs.* The members of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) have acquired political experience rapidly during their two years in power. As political novices, however, they have had to resort frequently to extemporization and have made frequent tactical shifts. They have relied upon authoritarian methods and have resisted a return to parliamentary government largely because the principal opposition groups — the old-line nationalist Wafd Party and the Islamic traditionalist Moslem Brethren — have better organized popular followings. The RCC has not had notable success in developing its political party (the Liberation Organization) into a strong organ of popular support. In recent months the RCC has made a serious effort to build up support for its policies among urban laborers and the peasantry, but at best it will be some time before it can rely upon its supporters to defeat the opposition at the polls.

49. The RCC's short-term prospects of maintaining itself in power are favorable because of: (a) its control of the armed forces, the police, and all media of communication; (b)

the credit it gained by the recent agreement with the UK on the evacuation of the Suez Base — the long-time goal of Egyptian nationalism; and (c) popular hope that the RCC's reform program will ameliorate the poverty and end the corruption and ineffectiveness associated with the former monarchy. However, the RCC faces serious political and economic problems upon the solution of which will depend its longer term tenure of power and the continuation of a relatively stable situation in Egypt.

50. Egypt's fundamental economic problem — the inadequacy of the country's resources to the demands of its large and rapidly growing population — will become an increasing burden. The RCC is placing great emphasis upon a program of land reform and has made partial plans for and some start on economic development programs which include a high dam above Aswan, land reclamation on the Delta fringes, and industrialization. While these measures may eventually result in an increase in Egypt's gross national product, they are inadequate to make possible a rising standard of living, and will probably not prevent a declining one in the period through 1956.

51. The Wafd Party and the Moslem Brethren will remain capable of causing serious trouble for the regime, and any such efforts would probably be aided by the Socialist and Communist groups, as in February-March 1954 when opposition groups united behind President Nagib. If the RCC cooperates with the Western Powers for regional defense and other common purposes and accepts aid from the US, the Wafd will be able to arouse opposition among the extreme nationalists who are opposed to any kind of collaboration with the West. The RCC's secular policies and its refusal to accept the guidance of the Moslem Brethren will keep the Islamic traditionalists in the opposition camp. All opposition groups will agitate for popular elections and will gain support from elements, such as professional groups and students, which want a return to parliamentary government. Any regime which replaced the RCC would probably be a coalition, including military elements, and

would reflect the outlook and experience of the growing middle group in Egyptian urban society.

52. *External affairs.* Egypt will endeavor to maintain its position of leadership among the Arab states and will seek to extend its influence to the south and west on the African continent. Egypt has less direct interest in the Arab-Israeli problem than have some other Arab states, and is likely to become more amenable to the regularization of relations with Israel if and as a final agreement on the British evacuation of the Suez Base is implemented, and US aid becomes a reality. It will probably not assume leadership in urging further intransigence, and in the case of Jordan Valley development will probably urge the Arab states directly involved to adopt a policy of "realistic" bargaining. Nevertheless, Egypt is likely to continue to resist any formal peace settlement with Israel, if only to avoid alienating the other Arab states.

53. The July 1954 Anglo-Egyptian agreement in principle on the Suez Canal Base, will, if formalized and implemented, associate Egypt with Western defense plans for the area and may result in cooperation with the Western Powers for regional defense and other purposes. The extent of Egyptian cooperation will depend largely upon the smoothness with which the Suez settlement is implemented and upon the nature and extent of US and other Western military and economic assistance to Egypt. The period of this estimate will be a difficult and delicate one in Egyptian relations with the West. Egypt will not only seek advantageous terms for itself in such matters as foreign aid, but will also attempt to influence Western arrangements with other states of the area in such a manner as to preserve or promote Egyptian leadership of the Arab states and secure Arab military superiority over Israel. For example, Egypt will probably seek to make the Arab Collective Security Pact the basis for the organization of regional defense.

54. The RCC will probably continue to believe that Egypt's advantage lies in cooperation with the Western Powers. This belief is based

more upon a calculation of the comparative advantages likely to be attained than upon ideological preference for the West or acceptance of the need for defense against the Soviet Bloc. Egypt will seek to increase its trade with the Soviet Bloc, particularly to increase exports of cotton, but Egyptian relations with the Bloc will be fundamentally cautious. More extensive relations with the Bloc, even if mainly in the commercial sphere would seem certain to raise the morale of the few thousand Egyptian Communists and Communist sympathizers and provide opportunities for Soviet espionage.

III. PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SUDAN

55. Sudanese stability faces severe tests during the remainder of the 1953-1956 period of transition from Anglo-Egyptian condominium to self-government and to self-determination of the Sudan's future status. Considerable progress has been made to date: (a) in effecting the transfer of executive power from the Governor-General to the Sudanese cabinet and parliament, elected in late 1953, and (b) in replacing British administrative personnel with Sudanese. The process can probably be completed without a constitutional breakdown, although frictions will probably develop and serious crises are possible.

56. Among the sources of tension is the conflict between the opposition Umma Party, political expression of the Ansar sect of Islam, which favors Sudanese independence with some UK ties, and the incumbent National Unionist Party, supported by the Khatmiyah (orthodox) Moslems, which inclines toward closer relations with Egypt. The struggle between these two groups, involving both political and religious rivalry, has led to violence before and, especially as the restraining influence of the British is withdrawn, could result in serious instability or even civil war.

57. Another source of tension is the deep cultural, ethnic, and religious cleavage between the Moslem, Arabized North, and the pagan, Negroid South. The backward South fears Northern domination as it loses the protection heretofore given it by the British administrators.

58. The clash between Egyptian and UK ambitions for influence in the Sudan may also create serious problems. The UK would like to have the Sudan opt for independence and conclude defense and commercial agreements with the UK. The UK is prepared to continue its orderly withdrawal, although it will seek to maintain existing commercial and cultural ties. It may also attempt to counter Egyptian influence by encouraging those Sudanese elements which oppose Egyptian dominance. Egypt would prefer complete integration of the Sudan with Egypt, but such a relationship is opposed by practically all Sudanese elements and would arouse the violent hostility of many. Although the likelihood of serious UK-Egyptian conflict over the Sudan will decrease as the UK continues to relinquish control, both nations' hopes for special position in the Sudan may embroil them, and their respective Sudanese proteges, in contests over the Sudan's future status and orientation.

59. We believe that the Sudan is likely to choose independence, although commercial, cultural, and military relations with Egypt are likely to become increasingly close, and the Sudan will probably tend to follow Egypt's lead in intraregional and foreign relations. The present Sudanese Government would probably wish to maintain friendly relations with the UK but refuse a formal treaty designed to maintain the UK's special position.

IV. PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAQ

60. *Internal affairs.* Iraq's traditional ruling oligarchy, composed primarily of tribal leaders, landlords, wealthy businessmen, and professional politicians, will probably remain in power at least during the next two or three years. Prospects for evolution toward a more progressive government in Iraq were improved by the Throne's support between September 1953 and April 1954 of a relatively progressive and reform-minded government under the leadership of Dr. Fadhil Jamali, but Jamali's government fell for want of organized political support, and the Old Guard appears to be back in control. The conservative policies of Nuri Said and his colleagues in the ruling

oligarchy will probably intensify the opposition of moderate reform-minded elements and may increase the likelihood of mass demonstrations and other pressure tactics by extremists of the right and left.

61. However, no opposition party or combination has yet shown sufficient strength to threaten Nuri Said's personal following in Parliament. The National Front, which combined the forces of the extreme nationalist Istiqlal and the Communist-infiltrated National Democrats for the June 1954 elections, appears to be in process of dissolution. Should the aging Nuri Said be removed from the scene, the effectiveness of the old ruling group would greatly decline.

62. Iraq's economic prospects are the brightest of any Arab state because of its large oil reserves and extensive tracts of unused but potentially arable land. Seventy percent of Iraq's oil revenues, expected to average about \$112,000,000 yearly over the next five years, are earmarked for the Iraq Development Board. Despite manifold political pressures, the Board appears to be moving ahead with a reasonable and far-sighted program. Over the long run, this program is capable of significantly improving economic conditions and thereby lessening some popular grievances. In the short term, however, the fact that most of the big development projects cannot produce rapid and easily perceived results will limit the program's effectiveness as a stabilizing factor.

63. *External affairs.* Iraq's policies toward other Arab states will continue to be influenced by the conflict between: (a) its ambitions to achieve Arab leadership against the opposition of Egypt (and Saudi Arabia), while strengthening itself militarily by ties with the West, and (b) its desire for continued Arab solidarity on the issues of Israel, imperialism, and colonialism in North Africa. Iraq will support publicly the Arab League and Arab Collective Security Pact, vigorously oppose settlement with Israel, and perhaps lead in Arab-Asian efforts to bring the French-North African problem before the UN. Iraqi leaders will probably continue to foster the idea of Arab union or federation, which often leads

to tampering with the internal politics of Syria and Jordan.

64. Iraq will be less influenced by the concepts of neutralism than any other Arab government. Iraqi leaders are aware of the Soviet threat and favor joining some sort of regional defense association which the US would support. However, they will approach this move slowly and cautiously from fear of the popular reaction at home and opposition from the other Arab states. This attitude is evident in Prime Minister Nuri Said's latest proposal for broadening the Arab Collective Security Pact to include non-Arab countries. Iraqis believe that the US shows undue favoritism toward Israel, but look increasingly to the US for support. The present ruling group, however, takes a realistic view of the need for some UK support, and will almost certainly seek a modification and extension of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of alliance (due to expire on 3 October 1957). If the attempted extension is to have any chance of success, however, it will have to go at least as far as the Suez agreement in meeting the aspirations of the Iraqi nationalists.

V. PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN SYRIA

65. *Internal affairs.* We believe that Syria will continue to be politically unstable. Although the overthrow of Shishakli in February 1954 led to reinstatement of civilian government after four years of military control of Syrian affairs, conflict between the civilian authorities and the army is a constant danger.

66. The continuation of moderate civilian regimes will depend in large part on the ability of the two major conservative parties, the Populists and the Nationalists, to maintain a working alliance. Conservative prospects are weakened by the lack of a strong leader acceptable to all conservatives, the resulting struggles for power among lesser figures, and the long-standing cleavage between the interests of Northern Syria, especially Aleppo (stronghold of the Populists), and those of Damascus (center of Nationalist strength).

67. The Syrian Army, which played a decisive role in politics from 1949 to 1954, remains a

serious potential threat to the civilian regime. The probable role of the Army is difficult to estimate, since no single leader now appears dominant and the Army itself is divided into factions somewhat parallel to civilian political divisions. However, an army coup is possible, particularly if decisive civilian leadership fails to develop. In addition, the Army's power gives it a tacit veto in major political decisions. For example, an effort to form a Syrian-Iraqi union, which many Populists favor, would probably result in firm counter-measures or possibly another coup by the Army.

68. Conservative disunity has enhanced the appeal and bargaining position of extremist elements drawing support from the discontented, politically conscious urban middle group. The most significant of these is the left-wing, strongly anti-Western Arab Socialist-Resurrectionist Party of Akram Hawrani, which advocates social and political revolution. Hawrani, who accepted the support of Syrian Communists, also enjoys the support of a number of influential army officers and has the sympathy of at least a few leading members of the volatile Druze community in southern Syria. With this support, Hawrani has a fairly good chance of increasing his power and influence in a government of divided conservatives. He would, however, have to have Army support to seize control of the government.

69. Syria's living standards are low, but there are no immediately critical economic problems, and it has an economic resource in undeveloped and unused land.

70. *External affairs.* Syria is a prize in contests between other Arab states to expand their influence, rather than itself a major force in Arab affairs. Syrian policies and stability have been generally affected by: (a) the internal conflict between Syrian nationalism and Arab unity, and (b) the overt and covert attempts of Iraq and Saudi Arabia to win Syria to their respective sides. During the period of this estimate Syria will probably waver between the Iraqi and Saudi-Egyptian camps. Although Syria would almost certainly join the other Arab states against Israel

if war broke out, it fears Israeli military superiority and is not likely to initiate hostilities. However, if confronted with unilateral Israeli resumption of the Jordan River diversion project in the demilitarized zone at Banat Yaacov, Syria would almost certainly feel compelled to take strong measures short of war to protect its water interests, and might be driven to desperate steps which could easily bring on hostilities.

71. Syria's policy toward the US and UK, including its attitude toward cooperation in a regional defense arrangement, is likely to be determined by what Iraq and Egypt do in this respect. While many of the old-line Syrian leaders privately favor cooperation with the West, their present weakness in the face of nationalist pressures and Arab League policy will probably continue to prevent the government from making pro-Western moves unless and until the stronger governments of Iraq and Egypt take the lead. French influence in Syria is now limited to the cultural field and will have little effect in determining Syria's relations with the West.

72. Syria has recently been more responsive to Soviet diplomatic and commercial moves. The Soviet Union has expanded its diplomatic and propaganda activities in Syria and Soviet Bloc countries have stepped up commercial efforts, particularly since the present regime came to power. The conservative leadership is likely to continue to maintain the present superficially cordial relations with the Bloc, partly for reasons of trade and partly to improve Syria's bargaining position with the West. However, the conservatives' basic fear of Communism and of the USSR would almost certainly limit relations with the Bloc. Seizure of power by some combination of extremists might make Syria more receptive to Soviet influence, and would probably increase neutralist tendencies. However, the Army, without whose support such a regime could probably not last, would be likely to oppose any strongly pro-Soviet policies.

VI. PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN LEBANON

73. Relative political stability is maintained by means of a delicate balance of power be-

tween Moslem and Christian religious groups. The Lebanese will probably continue to accept the present *modus vivendi* for the next few years. The rigidity of the system, however, and the fact that the Moslem population is increasing faster than the Christian will eventually endanger political stability. In common with other Arab states, Lebanon faces the problems resulting from a decaying traditional structure in conflict with the rising political consciousness and power of restless urban elements. The latter are now politically fragmentized, but their resentment of the old-line leadership, whose monopoly of wealth and power has seriously impeded social and economic progress, has contributed to extremism of the right and left.

74. Lebanon's strong desire to be accepted as part of the Arab world, its military weakness, and dependence on regional trade will continue to influence its policy in favor of close relations with the other Arab states and at least a superficial adherence to Arab League solidarity. Lebanon is anxious to avoid involvement in inter-Arab disputes, such as the Hashemite-Saudi struggle, in order to keep friendly relations with all. The Lebanese are more tempted than other Arabs by the commercial possibilities of an Arab-Israeli settlement, but they will continue to follow the general Arab line in this respect.

75. Lebanon's large Christian population, and its cultural and commercial ties with the West also make it the most strongly pro-Western of the Arab states, and it feels the need for Western support to protect its peculiar position. Consequently, while its outlook will continue to be somewhat ambivalent, its present leaders would probably welcome a general development of closer Arab-Western relations and would be glad of the opportunity to follow the lead of Iraq or Egypt in securing US military and economic aid.

VII. PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN SAUDI ARABIA

76. Saudi Arabian stability depends upon the maintenance of the personal authority of King Saud, who lacks the prestige, skill, and strength of character of his father, whom he

succeeded in 1953. King Saud is maintaining most of his father's domestic policies. In the short run, at least, Saud can probably retain the support of the numerous royal princes, the chief officials, and the tribal leaders if he is able to continue the costly subsidies on which their loyalty depends. However, his administration is weakened by inefficiency and corruption, an extreme dependence on oil royalties for its revenue, and failure to recognize growing resentment of the profligacy of the royal family and government officials.

77. Saudi Arabia exerts a peculiar influence in the Arab world because it possesses the most important Moslem holy places, because it is the last stronghold of certain aspects of traditional Arab culture, and because the King has personal control of substantial revenues with which he subsidizes elements in other Arab states on behalf of Saudi interests. King Saud is ambitious to play a leading role in Arab affairs and has been actively attempting to forestall Iraqi expansion and the increase of Iraqi prestige. He has sought to maintain Arab intransigence on the question of Israel, and prevent Arab states from becoming too closely associated with the Western Powers. He will probably try to obstruct moves to regularize the relations of Arab states with Israel. However, King Saud probably overestimates his influence among the Arab states, and he will probably not be able to persuade any other Arab state to make a move which it does not independently consider advantageous.

78. Partly influenced by his anti-Western advisers, Saud has been generally less friendly toward the West and particularly toward the US than was his father. Saudi relations with the US deteriorated seriously in the past year, as evidenced by Saudi rejection of a standard MDAP agreement with the US and termination of US technical assistance to the kingdom. Saudi relations with ARAMCO also deteriorated as a result of the government's demands for increased oil revenues and services from the company, and its conclusion of an oil tanker arrangement with the Argentine-Greek shipowner, A. S. Onassis, which violates the terms of the ARAMCO concession.

79. There are current indications that Saudi Arabian relations with the West are undergoing a change for the better. However, if the general deterioration of relations which took place during the past year should continue, the US Government might have difficulties when the Dhahran airbase agreement comes up for renewal in 1956 and ARAMCO might find it difficult to maintain satisfactory relations with the Saudi Government. The Saudis might consider nationalizing their oil industry, but extreme dependence on large and uninterrupted oil revenues would probably make them hesitate to nationalize, even if their relations with ARAMCO do not improve.

80. The strike of October 1953 gave evidence of a considerable increase in group-consciousness among the employees of ARAMCO and the USAF Dhahran airbase in Eastern Saudi Arabia, where tribal values are being more quickly destroyed than in other parts of the country. Another strike, perhaps accompanied by violence, is a strong possibility. The Saudi Government has established a labor committee in Dhahran and may be preparing a revised labor law for the kingdom. However, these new arrangements probably would not stand up under the strain of serious labor trouble.

81. Saudi relations with the UK may improve somewhat as a result of the recent agreement on a solution for the Buraimi boundary dispute. In addition, an influential element in the Saudi Government hopes to introduce British oil interests into the kingdom as a lever against ARAMCO.

VIII. PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN JORDAN

82. Jordan's political atmosphere will be dominated by tension between political leaders of the relatively well-educated and half-Westernized former Arab Palestinians and the old-line leaders of Transjordan. The Palestine Arabs will probably continue to increase their power within the government. They will attempt to orient the government toward extreme Arab nationalism and away from UK influence.

83. However, British influence will probably remain strong in Jordan because of UK subsidies to the impoverished kingdom. The Anglo-Jordanian Alliance (a twenty-year mutual assistance pact signed in March 1948) is likely to remain in effect as the cornerstone of Jordan's external relations. Jordan will continue to lack confidence in Great Power guarantees or the UN machinery as effective barriers against Israeli attack. Anti-British feeling is growing, as is the tendency of Jordanian government leaders to act more independently, but neither government nor opposition leaders have found any practical substitute for the UK subsidy which in 1953 constituted 54 percent of the country's total revenues. The whole relationship, however, would probably be wiped out should Israel attack in force and the UK fail to respond to a Jordanian appeal under the treaty, or if the Arab Legion were restrained by its British officers from contesting a major Israeli incursion with sufficient vigor.

84. Almost half of the nearly one million Arab refugees from the former territory of Palestine which is now in Israel live in Jordan. Unlike the smaller refugee groups in other Arab states, who lack influence in the host countries, the refugees in Jordan constitute a source of serious political and social unrest. They will continue to constitute a major political problem and an economic factor in Jordan.

85. Jordan will continue to need and desire US economic and technical aid. However, the Jordanians, especially the former Palestinians, deeply resent past US support of Israel and continue to believe that a truly impartial US policy is impossible because of US internal political pressures. US efforts to maintain peace in the area and to strengthen the Arab states may eventually lessen this resentment but, for the present, Jordanians suspect US motives and feel that an attitude which approves the *status quo* — less favorable than the UN partition plan of 1947 — is actually favoritism toward Israel.

86. A number of regional rivalries, often discussed but of indeterminate strength, center around Jordan. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and

Israel — each for its own reasons — are determined to prevent amalgamation of Jordan with Iraq, and the ex-mufti of Jerusalem is intriguing to keep Jordan isolated in line with his personal ambition to establish a separate state in Arab Palestine. The Palace and the British maneuver to keep the *status quo*. Within Jordan itself the Palestinians are more receptive than are the Transjordanians to talk of amalgamation with a neighboring state.

IX. PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN YEMEN
AND ARABIAN PENINSULA
PRINCIPALITIES

87. Yemen seems likely to remain the most isolated and the least influential of the independent Arab states. The Imam Ahmad will probably be able to control such opposition as the "Free Yemeni" movement, but assassination is always a possibility. There will probably continue to be friction with the UK, stemming mainly from border disputes with Aden.

88. *Kuwait*. While Britain's legal position in Kuwait is unlikely to change, British prerogatives have not been firmly exercised in recent years and the trend seems likely to continue. The outlook is not favorable for the development of a capable and responsible Kuwaiti ruling group able to fill any vacuum left by contraction of the British position. There are a few manifestations of nationalism, mainly

insistence that Kuwaitis should have a bigger share in the control and benefits of business in Kuwait. The scale of Kuwait royalties in relation to population is many times that of neighboring oil-producing countries and will continue to play an increasingly important role in the economy of the country. Such revenues provide the present weak but benevolent and pro-British ruler with a unique opportunity to mitigate the effects of many of the social and economic problems contributing to political instability. However, Kuwait cannot in the long run escape the upsetting effects of radical economic and social changes on a conservative Arab society, and Communist propaganda is already increasing in Kuwait in an attempt to exploit the situation against the West.

89. *Other British-controlled Arabian areas*. The UK position will continue to be the key to short-run stability in the principalities of the Arabian Peninsula. The British will continue attempts to strengthen their position, particularly in the Aden Protectorate and the Trucial Sheikdoms. With British backing, the ruling families of the principalities will probably be able to maintain themselves in power. The UK will also probably continue to defend vigorously the interests of its client-rulers against Saudi Arabia and Yemen. The construction and operation of the new refinery in Aden will assist the local economy, and in some principalities economic benefits may also result from continued oil explorations.

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APPENDIX I

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>Egypt</u>	<u>Iraq</u>
Area	386,000 sq. m.	188,000 sq. m.
Population	21,941,000 (1953)	5,100,000 (1953)
Annual Population Growth	2.5 percent	2.1 percent
Agric. Land Per Capita *	0.3 acres	2.6 acres
Main Crops	cotton, wheat, corn, rice, millet, clover	wheat, barley, rice, cotton, dates, tobacco,
Main Industries	cotton processing, textiles, veg. oils, cigarettes, food processing	food processing, cotton ginning, petroleum,
Main Exports	cotton: \$334 million; 86 percent of total (1953)	petroleum products: \$352 million; 86 percent of total exports (1953)
Per Capita GNP	\$114 (1952)	\$110 (1952)
Literacy Rate	18 percent	15 percent or less
Railroads	5,236 miles	1,200 miles
Roads	7,167 miles	surfaced, 1,373 miles
Signif. Basic Resources	No signif. developed resources. Small quantities petroleum, phosphate rock, manganese and other minerals produced.	About 10 percent world crude oil reserves (1953-4 percent world production). Small scale production salt, cement, sulphur, bitumen, gypsum, sandstone, and marble.

* Currently usable agricultural land.

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<u>COUNTRY (continued)</u>	<u>Jordan</u>	<u>Lebanon</u>
Area	37,000 sq. m.	4,000 sq. m.
Population	1,330,000 (1952) includes 450,000 Palestine refugees	1,340,000 (1953)
Annual Population Growth	2.5 percent (UNRWA est. 1954)	2.4 percent
Agric. Land Per Capita *	1.5 acres (excluding refugees)	0.4 acres
Main Crops	wheat, barley, maize, millet, tobacco, olives, grapes, other fruits, vegetables	wheat, barley, olives, tobacco, fruits, and vegetables
Main Industries	small industries processing agricultural products, cement	cement, textiles, and other consumer goods, oil refining
Main Exports	limited quantities of agricultural products, phosphate rock	citrus fruit, apples, onions
Per Capita GNP	\$100 (1952)	\$285 (1952)
Literacy Rate	15-30 percent	50-60 percent
Railroads	226 miles	363 miles
Roads	all-weather roads, 550; other, 1,650 miles	surfaced, 1,812 miles; other, 412 miles
Signif. Basic Resources	Some minerals — phosphates, iron ore, man- ganese, and gypsum — these far from markets and isolated by lack of transportation. Dead Sea source potash and chromium.	Deposits low quality lignite. Evidence iron ore deposits. Major natural resource; Litani River, which can be developed for water and power.

* Currently usable agricultural land.

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<u>COUNTRY (continued)</u>	<u>Saudi Arabia</u>	<u>Sudan</u>
Area	927,000 sq. m.	987,500 sq. m.
Population	3,500,000 (1953 est.)	8,972,000 (1952)
Annual Population Growth	2.3 percent
Agric. Land Per Capita *	Agric. land less than 5 percent area
Main Crops	dates	cotton, sesame, peanuts, gums, tobacco
Main Industries	petroleum production and refining	cotton processing, food processing
Main Exports	total exports 1953 \$526 million, almost entirely petroleum products	cotton, cottonseed, gum arabic, peanuts
Per Capita GNP	\$86 (1952)
Literacy Rate	3-5 percent
Railroads	350 miles	2,001 miles—1946
Roads	passable roads connect the larger towns
Signif. Basic Resources	12 percent world reserves crude oil. (1952—7 percent world production). Gold mined in small quantity; iron ore deposits reported.	copper, gold, salt, and other as yet untapped mineral resources.

* Currently usable agricultural land.

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
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<u>COUNTRY (continued)</u>	<u>Syria</u>	<u>Yemen</u>
Area	70,000 sq. m.	75,000 sq. m. (est.)
Population	3,835,000 (1953)	3,500,000 (est. 1953)
Annual Population Growth	2.4 percent
Agric. Land Per Capita *	2.4 acres	(90 percent pop. engaged in agric.) Shortage cultivable land.
Main Crops	wheat, barley, grapes, cotton, olives, tobacco	coffee, grain
Main Industries	consumer goods: cotton yarn, textiles, glass-ware, cigarettes, wine, alcohol, flour, soap	none
Main Exports	raw cotton, wool, grains	coffee
Per Capita GNP	\$110 (1952)
Literacy Rate	20-25 percent
Railroads	670 miles	none
Roads	hard surfaced, 2,212 miles; earth or gravel, 3,649 miles	very few
Signif. Basic Resources	No developed mineral resources. Indications of phosphates, lead, copper, antimony, nickel, and chrome.	possibility of oil

* Currently usable agricultural land.

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THE ARAB STATES

Scale true only at 22° North.

