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Intelligence Information Cable

PRIORITY 1.5(c)3.4(b)(1)

COUNTRY

INDONESIA/MALAYSIA /CHINA

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TDCS-314/00496-65

DATE OF INFO. 8 JANUARY 1965

SUBJECT .

DISTR. 13 JANUARY 1965

PLACE &

INFORMAL VIEWS OF PRESIDENT SUKARNO ON GROWING POWER OF INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY AND CURRENT INDONESIAN ALLIANCE WITH COMMUNIST CHINA

1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

DATE ACQ.

REF

¹ 58579

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SOURCE AND APPRAISAL:

FIELD REPORT NO.

I. (SUMMARY: PRESIDENT SUKARNO, IN A FRANK AND INFORMAL SESSION WITH A GROUP OF RIGHT-WING POLITICAL LEADERS, WARNS THAT HE WILL NOT PERMIT ANY FORM OF ANTI-COMMUNIST ACTITIVY. HE EXPLAINS CURRENT INDONESIAN AFFINITY TO COMMUNIST CHINA AS STRAGEGY AIMED AT BUYING AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR INDONESIAN POLICIES WITH REGARD TO MALAYSIA. A WAR BETWEEN CHINA AND AMERICA IS EXPECTED WITHIN A FEW YEARS FROM WHICH INDONESIA WILL PROFIT.)

2. DURING AN ACCIDENTAL AND INFORMAL MEETING WITH PRES-

DENT SUKARNO.
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18 U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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TDCS -314/00496-65 PAGE 2 SERET 1.5(0)of 8 january, several OFFICIALS 3.4(b)(1) TOLD SUKARNO THAT THEY WERE FRANKLY DISTURBED OVER RECENT POLITICAL GAINS MADE BY THE INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PKI) 1.5(c) AND WERE UNABLE, TO ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLES OF 3.4(b)(1) MARXISM-LENINISM. SUKARNO REPLIED THAT HE PERSONALLY ALSO WAS NOT A MARXIST-LENINIST BUT THAT HE COULD NOT TOLERATE OPPOSITION TO THE PKI AT THE PRESENT TIME BECAUSE HE NEEDED THE SUPPORT OF THE PKI IN FACING THE MALAYSIA QUESTION. SUKARNO SAID "SOME DAY THE PKI'S TURN WILL COME", BUT NOT NOW. IN GROUPS MUST CONCERN THEMSELVES WITH FACING THE PKI. BUILDING THEIR OWN ORGANIZATIONAL STRENGTH AND GIVING THEIR 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1) FULL SUPPORT AND TRUST TO SUKARNO. IF THE GROUPS MAKE THE DECISION THAT THEY MUST CONTINUE TO OPPOSE THE PKI, THE PRESIDENT SAID, THEN THEY WILL BE GOING AGAINST SUKARNO'S POLICY. SUKARNO ADDED, "YOU CAN BE MY FRIEND OR YOU CAN BE MY ENEMY, IT'S UP TO YOU."

3. SUKARNO SAID THAT HE COULD EVEN ANTICIPATE THAT THE

GROUPS WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO SUPPORT HIM IN

VIEW OF HIS MOST RECENT MOVES. IN THE PAST, THE OPPOSITION

OF THE GREAT INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE OF THE

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. HOWEVER HE WAS NOW

DETERMINED TO CONTINUE IN THE DIRECTION HE WAS GOING EVEN IF

IT MEANS MAKING AN ENEMY OF THE WORLD, BOTH DOMES—

TICIALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY. HE SAID "MY NAME IS DOWN, IN

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
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THE INTERNATIONAL WORLD ANYWAY, AFTER OUR WITHDRAWAL FROM THE UNITED NATIONS." HE ADDED THAT INDONESIA WAS NOW A RENEGADE ("GILA") NATION WHICH WOULD CONTINUE ALONG THE COURSE CHARTED BY HIMSELF.

- 4. SUKARNO SAID THAT HE WAS DELIBERATELY ALLOWING THE PKI TO EXPAND ITS INFLUENCE AND DELIBERATELY BRINGING INDONESIA CLOSER TO COMMUNIST CHINA FOR ONE IMPORTANT REASON: HE EXPECTED COMMUNIST CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES TO BE AT WAR WITHIN A FEW YEARS, EITHER THROUGH AMERICAN ESCALATION OF THE VIETNAM WAR OR THROUGH A DIRECT AMERICAN ATTACK ON COMMUNIST CHINA. SUKARNO SAID HE IS CONFIDENT THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL BE SO WORRIED ABOUT INDONESIAN SUPPORT OF CHINA, SHOULD A WAR BREAK OUT, THAT IT WILL GO TO ANY LENGTHS TO BRING INDONESIA BACK INTO THE NEUTRAL CAMP. SUKARNO SAID HE BELIEVES THAT THE UNITED STATES MAY EVEN TURN ITS BACK ON MALAYSIA AND WITHDRAW SUPPORT TO THAT COUNTRY IN RETURN FOR AN INDONESIAN COMMITMENT TO PULL AWAY FROM COMMUNIST CHINA.
- 5. SUKARNO EXPLAINED THAT INDONESIA HAD ACHIEVED INDEPENDENCE IN THE AFTERMATH OF A GREAT PACIFIC WAR. HE BELIEVED
 THAT INDONESIA COULD ONLY BRING ABOUT THE INDEPENDENCE OF
 BRITISH-DOMINATED MALAYSIA IN THE AFTERMATH OF ANOTHER WAR IN
 THE PACIFIC AREA. HE SAID THE UNITED STATES IS THE KEY ELEMENT
 IN THIS CALCULATION. ITS PRODUCTION OF ARMAMENTS, WHICH
 HAD TO BE USED AT SOME POINT, COMBINED WITH CHINESE COMMUNIST
 OPPOSITION TO AMERICA'S AIMS IN ASIA WOULD INEVITABLY LEAD TO





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A CLASH ON A LARGE SCALE. THEN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT'S

ATTENTION WOULD BE SHIFTED FROM SUPPORT OF THE BRITISH IN

MALAYSIA TO THE LARGER CONFLICT AGAINST CHINA. SUKARNO REITERATED

HIS BELIEF THAT THE UNITED STATES COULD WEAKEN MALAYSIA'S

POSITION HOPELESSLY BY "PUSHING A BUTTON". IT MIGHT WELL DO

SO IF IT FELT THAT SUCH AN ACTION WOULD PULL INDONESIA OUT OF

AN ALLIANCE WITH COMMUNIST CHINA.

6. SUKARNO ENDED HIS DISCUSSION BY SAYING "FOR ME MALAYSIA IS NUMBER ONE. SOMEDAY I WILL TAKE OVER THE PKI BUT NOT NOW.

IF YOU WANT TO SHOW YOUR STRENGTH DON'T BE

ANTI-COMMUNIST---SHOW YOUR STRENGTH IN LOYALTY TO SUKARNO.

THEN THE PKI CANNOT HARM YOU."

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- CUSSION WERE AMAZED BY HIS FRANKNESS AND CAME AWAY WITH THE FEELING THAT THEY HAD BEEN GIVEN AN UNEXPECTED BUT SIGNIFICANT INSIGHT INTO THE PRESIDENT'S POLITICAL THINKING. SUKARNO SEEMED TO BE SPEAKING TO THOSE PRESENT WITH THE FRANKNESS RESERVED ONLY FOR PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS WITH FIRST DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER SUBANDRIO.)
- 8. COMMENT: IN THE PAST IT HAS BEEN NORMAL FOR SUKARNO TO UNDERPLAY HIS SUPPORT OF THE PKI AND COMMUNIST CHINA WHEN TALKING TO REPRESENTATIVES OF RIGHT-WING ANTI-COMMUNIST GROUPS. IT MAY BE SIGNIFICANT THAT IN THE ABOVE DISCUSSION SUKARNO DID NOT FEEL IMPELLED TO MINIMIZE HIS APPARENT INTERNAL SUPPORT FOR THE PKI AND HIS EXTERNAL SUPPORT

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FROM COMMUNIST CHINA. SUKARNO'S WILLINGNESS TO ADMIT THAT

HE IS PUSHING INDONESIA TOWARD THE LEFT, WHATEVER HIS RATIONALE,

MAY INDICATE THAT HE NOW FEELS LITTLE THREAT TO HIS POSITION

FROM THE DECIMATED RANKS OF RIGHT-WING, ANTI-COMMUNIST GROUPS.)

9. FIELD DISSEM:

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END OF MESSAGE