

✓ 10
SNIE [redacted] 3/
5 August 1964

LBJ LIBRARY
Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 89-236
Document # 3

SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER [redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

Short-Term Prospects for the Tshombe Government in the Congo

Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
As indicated overleaf
5 AUGUST 1964

Approved for Release
Date 18 Jan 1990



No 2



The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, and NSA.

Concurring:

- Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
- Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
- Director of the National Security Agency

Abstaining:

The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

WARNING

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification





SPECIAL


NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER 

1.3(a)(4)

Short-Term Prospects for the Tshombe Government in the Congo





SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS FOR THE TSHOMBE GOV- ERNMENT IN THE CONGO

THE PROBLEM

To examine the prospects for the Tshombe government during the next six to nine months.*

CONCLUSIONS

A. In recent months, regional dissidence and violence have assumed serious proportions, even by Congolese standards, and produced the threat of a total breakdown in governmental authority. The difficulties confronting Prime Minister Tshombe are enormous. His greatest need is a military force which can handle the various rebellions. His political position will be threatened by other aspirants to power. We think the chances are about even that he will be able to remain Prime Minister over the next six to nine months. If Tshombe is able to avoid anarchy in the Congo, he will have scored a considerable achievement, but there is little prospect of establishing a central government which will have a substantial degree of authority throughout the country. (Paras. 1-6, 11-13, 15-16)

B. Should Tshombe fall, the prospects are dark. Extremists would be likely to gain increased influence in Leopoldville, secessionist regimes might break off and disorder would spread. (Paras. 14, 18)

C. We believe Tshombe will adopt a generally pro-West orientation within the confines of a *pro forma* non-aligned policy. He will probably remain close to the Belgians and susceptible to their influence; we believe he will cooperate with the US. Although still suspect by many African leaders, we believe Tshombe would become generally acceptable in Black Africa if he succeeded in providing a workable solution to the Congo's problems. (Paras. 21-23)

* Under the newly approved constitution national elections are to be held during this period.



DISCUSSION


I. INTRODUCTION

1. Prime Minister Moise Tshombe was long the principal adversary of those who were seeking to fashion a central authority in post-colonial Leopoldville. His appointment testifies to the kaleidoscopic nature of Congo politics and the extent of the desperation felt by President Kasavubu and General Mobutu in their efforts to preserve the Congolese entity. Political parties have little effect on the national scene, although they are often influential in areas of their tribal base. No man or party has a solid claim to a national political following. Only a handful of the country's political figures have any concept of the national interest or the responsibilities of national leadership. The central government has lacked the minimal instruments of power such as a loyal and effective military force and a reasonably competent bureaucracy.

2. These problems, plus the corruption, irresponsibility, and perhaps above all the inertia of the Congo's inexperienced politicians, both government and opposition, stymied Adoula's efforts to rebuild the administration, brought fledgling political institutions such as parliament into disrepute, and widened the gap between Leopoldville and the provinces. Although outside assistance and the UN presence preserved the Congo's basic territorial integrity, Adoula was able to exercise his authority outside Leopoldville only unevenly and sporadically, relying on financial subventions and the Congolese National Army (ANC). By and large, provincial officials were inept and often corrupt and did little to further national objectives. The ANC in many instances fed anti-Leopoldville hostility by acts of brutality and pillage. In time, local grievances and the deterioration of order sparked the growth of numerous, disparate rebellious groups in several provinces, notably Kwilu, Kivu, and North Katanga.

3. Many other reasons also help account for the rise of the rebellious groups. Longstanding tribal feuds, which had been repressed by the Belgians before independence, have revived in the absence of effective security forces. This has been the case particularly where one tribe dominated the government of a city or province which embraced other tribes as well. In areas where tribal disputes are not important, political discontent has arisen from such conditions as the absence of familiar consumer goods and food and the ineffectiveness of governmental authorities.

4. Rebellious outbreaks in the provinces have been encouraged and probably in one case started by exile groups based in Congo (Brazzaville) and Burundi. These groups are composed of some 150-200 extremist followers of Lumumba and Gizenga and have adopted the label of the Committee of National Liberation (CNL). Although the CNL is badly divided and its members lack political stature or a sizable following in their own right, they have been given small scale Soviet and Chinese Communist financial support.



5. The necessity of appointing an interim government at this time of widespread dissidence, the dwindling in the support for Adoula, the departure of the UN military force, and a threatened total breakdown of governmental authority were immediate considerations which led President Kasavubu to call on Tshombe to form a government of "national reconciliation." In addition, Tshombe, with access to the wealth and control of the votes of southern Katanga, was clearly a strong force to be reckoned with and if excluded from the national scene could have become a formidable threat.


II. THE TASKS FACING TSHOMBE

6. Tshombe's primary problem is to restore a modicum of internal order by checking tribal and local dissidence which has assumed serious proportions even by Congolese standards. He must rapidly demonstrate convincing leadership qualities and obtain an improved performance from the security forces while keeping the perpetually squabbling and divisive political factions at bay. To achieve the last of these objectives, he will have to make political truces and accommodations with rival or potentially rival leaders, particularly in Leopoldville. Many African leaders suspect that Tshombe is a puppet of Western imperialists and his domestic foes can probably count on the sympathy and political support of the more radical African states, e.g., Algeria and Ghana, and perhaps some subversive assistance. For all these reasons, Tshombe is under pressure to achieve some quick results.

7. In attacking these tasks, Tshombe can muster some important assets. He is widely known throughout the Congo and is sympathetically regarded by those regional leaders who favor a high degree of local autonomy. He is the dominant political figure in the economically important southern Katanga area. If only for a time, he is apparently receiving support from widely diverse figures in the central government, including Kasavubu, Mobutu, and Surete Chief Nendaka. Their continuing support, at least for the next few months, is virtually a prerequisite to his survival in office. Since no parliament can be installed prior to the national elections, now scheduled for early 1965, Tshombe cannot constitutionally be removed from office except by Kasavubu.

8. Tshombe's flair for politics may be his best resource. There is evidence that his return to the Congo was well received not only in Katanga but in several areas fed up with Leopoldville's bumbling and eager for a change. Tshombe is ambitious and usually adroit and is at ease in the ceaseless maneuvering characteristic of the Congo's political milieu: in the past he has not hesitated to make and break tactical alliances with conservative or radical groups, e.g., the CNL, for political gain. He has considerable personal charm and magnetism. He might be able to establish himself as a national figure with a colorful brand of personal leadership of the style popular elsewhere in Africa.

9. Tshombe has already set his personal stamp on the central government. Despite considerable enthusiasm for a broadly based government of national reconciliation, Tshombe has in fact formed a "Government of Public Safety."



with virtually all ministerial power residing in his hands or those of his long-time collaborator, Minister of the Interior Godefroid Munongo. President Kasavubu, who technically has authority over defense matters, Mobutu and Nendaka, are the only other important figures in the government.

10. In his initial moves as Prime Minister, Tshombe has concentrated on refurbishing his position in southern Katanga. Meanwhile, he has tried to bolster his popularity in other provinces and to win the support of some elements of the left. He has sent Munongo to crush the North Katanga rebellion which has spread as the ANC in that area has nearly collapsed. This effort has thus far been without results. He is assembling a force of former gendarmes, both from those who took refuge in Angola and those who remained in Katanga. He apparently found much opposition to his plan to incorporate these men into the ANC and may now be planning to merge them into the police system. Elsewhere, he has dismissed some of Leopoldville's worst appointees in the provinces, and has released a host of political prisoners, including Gizenga. These vigorous efforts to dominate the scene have of course evoked some concern among leaders of the various factions displeased at being excluded. It remains to be seen whether Tshombe can escape the fate of others who have previously sought or gained power, i.e., becoming the principal target of all other individuals and factions, irrespective of nominal party affiliation, which aspire to the manifold benefits which accompany public office in the Congo.

III. TSHOMBE'S PROSPECTS

A. Internal Security

11. Above all, Tshombe will probably seek to give the impression that he is effectively in charge in the Congo, and to convey to the Congolese people the impression of vigorous leadership and action. He has been attempting to resolve tribal insurgency by cheap and easy means, e.g., arranging for payments of arrears in salaries and engaging in palavers with tribal and provincial leaders. Nevertheless, intra-tribal animosities and local grievances are difficult to sort out, and while Tshombe was enthusiastically welcomed at Bukavu and Stanleyville, little other success is visible. He is turning to harsher tactics and he is likely to use such force as is available to him, including the ANC, his ex-Katanga gendarmes, and white mercenaries.

12. The crucial question is whether Tshombe will be able to achieve a significant improvement in the performance of the troops at his disposal before a major part of the Congo falls to the rebels. Mobutu and Tshombe are currently working together and Mobutu seems to recognize the necessity for more professional advice and training. Without competent leadership of the troops at the operational level, neither the demoralized ANC nor Tshombe's gendarmes will be able to deal with present and expected uprisings. Tshombe is seeking to furnish such leadership through the use of white mercenary officers. A few such mercenaries have already returned to the Congo and a good many more are ready in South Africa and elsewhere. We think Tshombe is willing to face




the unfavorable repercussions which will almost certainly ensue both in parts of the Congo and in other African states from the use of white mercenary officers leading Congolese troops. He will probably also be able to get additional military advisors and equipment from Belgium and elsewhere in the West, but we believe he plans to use such advisors in staff positions in support and planning functions.

13. The rebellious groups are generally unorganized, weak and are quite independent of each other. Their successes in most cases have been due to the absence of opposition rather than to their own abilities. It is probable that even small government forces, if disciplined and well led, could scatter the insurgents. Indeed, if Tshombe could give the impression of momentum in reasserting national authority and if his forces could score a decisive victory or two, there is at least a fair chance that the insurgent groups would lose heart and that insurgency would cease to be a critical threat to the government. On the other hand, there is practically no chance that sporadic outbreaks can be entirely eliminated.

14. If further reverses were suffered by government forces, however, there could easily be a virtual collapse of the discipline of the troops, and individual units might commit themselves to provincial political factions as they did in 1960-1961. In these circumstances, the situation could deteriorate into a multiplicity of small scale, uncoordinated revolts, causing disorder and marauding over much of the Congo. If Tshombe's difficulties persist, Congo extremists may be able to foment an anti-Tshombe civil war or establish an insurrectionary regime supported by radical African states and by Communist representatives in Brazzaville and Bujambura. This threat would mount if one of the larger cities in the eastern Congo, e.g., Stanleyville or Bukavu, fell to rebel forces. In such an extremity, Tshombe would probably ask the Belgians to intervene militarily.

B. Political


15. Although Tshombe would almost certainly prefer to run a one-man show, he is aware of the staggering difficulties of leading a government in the Congo, and we believe he has sufficient tactical flexibility to make deals with various groups. He has said that he intends to restore the prestige and authority of the chiefs in those regions where traditional patterns are especially strong, and he probably hopes that through subsidies and other means they will be able to control the wilder *jeunesse* (armed political youth) elements who have been responsible for much of the turbulence in the provinces. For the present, Tshombe probably believes he has little to fear politically from the still leaderless and out-manuevered left, though he may bring in additional individuals from the CNL should his administration falter or should he come to believe the CNL sufficiently important.



1.3(a)(4)
(a)(5)



1 B1(a)(4)
(c)(5)



17. If Tshombe is to accomplish even this much, he will need continued military and economic assistance. Professional military advice and some equipment will probably represent the most urgent needs, though Tshombe will also need considerable numbers of UN and Belgian administrative experts. He will also probably continue to require food and additional funds for stepped-up public works and subsidies in the provinces. As in Adoula's case, however, such support would offer no guarantee of success.


18. If Tshombe lost office either because of internal political intrigues or because he could not deal with the internal security situation, the likely consequences would be grim. Tshombe would probably withdraw to his Katanga stronghold, raising the threat of another secession attempt on his part. On the national scene, we believe extremists and pro-Communist figures would take advantage of widespread disillusion and apathy and gain considerable influence in what passed for a central government.

C. Economic

19. The bulk of the approximately 15 million Congolese people are dependent upon subsistence farming, hunting, and fishing, and will remain largely unaffected by wider economic considerations. Despite nearly four years of political turmoil, most of the modern sector of the economy still functions at approximately pre-independence levels. The large European-owned and -operated mining enterprises and plantations are self-sufficient and, although they have had some transportation problems, they have remained largely unaffected by widespread strife. They provide most of the Congo's badly needed foreign exchange, and they can probably continue to operate short of a further breakdown of public order. The most serious economic problems arise in urban centers where there is inflation and chronic unemployment, and in provincial centers where there are food and other shortages as a result of the dissidence and the consequent interruption of communications and transportation.

20. The Congo Government now receives annually some \$85-90 million in economic and technical assistance, including about \$23 million from Belgium, about \$45 million from the US, and about \$11 million from the UN. In addition, Belgium provides some \$35 million annually in debt services. Because Tshombe






recognizes that Belgium will probably continue to be his best source of technical and administrative aid, and because Belgian business interests in the Congo are likely to support his cause, we believe he will maintain close economic ties with the Belgians. Given present levels of external assistance, we believe that economic grievances will almost certainly not represent a major threat to the government during the next six months or so.

IV. FOREIGN POLICY

21. We believe that Tshombe will adopt a generally pro-West orientation within the confines of a *pro forma* non-aligned policy. In the past, he has shown a disposition to turn first to his contacts and friends in the West, particularly the Belgians, to help his cause. He feels at home in the West and is impressed by Western achievements and power. Since coming to office, he has taken some pains to suggest that he harbors no grievances over the West's hostility toward him and his former secessionist regime. Moreover, although Tshombe has flirted with the Soviets on occasion, it has usually been in the context of maneuvering for advantage on the Congolese scene or because he felt threatened by the West. He is almost certainly aware that he can hope for little support from the Communists, although he may permit the Soviets to reopen their embassy. By and large, we believe Tshombe will remain close to the Belgians and susceptible to their influence, but as evidence accumulates that they cannot meet all his needs, he will probably turn increasingly to the US and, perhaps, to France.

22. Tshombe almost certainly holds the US largely responsible for the UN military action which destroyed his Katanga regime. Now, however, he is aware of the Congo's present and prospective dependence on the US for aid and military equipment. He is likely to prove generally cooperative on matters in the UN and elsewhere, at least so long as he thinks the US is not actively opposed to him. However, should Tshombe come to believe that the US was reluctant to support his administration, he would react sharply and seek methods of exerting pressure on the US, e.g., by propaganda calculated to embarrass the US Government domestically.

23. Tshombe is still regarded with suspicion and hostility by many African leaders. This was demonstrated at the July Cairo meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). These feelings will be intensified if he gives other Africans cause to believe that he maintains friendly relations with the South Africans and Portuguese. He has, however, taken some steps to improve his acceptance in Africa, e.g., the release of Gizenga, and approval for Mrs. Lumumba's return to the Congo. We believe he will permit the Angolan Government in Exile to continue to operate in the Congo, although he will probably do little to facilitate its endeavors. Although Tshombe stands scant chance of rehabilitating himself sufficiently to receive the blessing of Ghana and Algeria, there is little these states can do at the moment that can seriously affect him. By and large, however, we believe Tshombe's eventual acceptance by most of the African



states will depend largely on his success at home. Most African states simply want a political solution which would avoid chaos in the Congo. If he can provide a workable answer to the Congo's problems, we believe he will obtain fairly general acceptance in Africa.

V. THE LONGER RANGE

24. We believe that Tshombe has almost certainly set his sights on the presidency, hoping thus to become the effective boss of the Congo. If, in the next six months or so, he can maintain a modest degree of economic stability and secure some improvement in internal security and administrative order, he will be in a strong position to consolidate his political position in the national elections. Beyond these considerations, no clear estimate of prospects in the Congo is warranted, other than that it will remain an area of chronic upset and of possible major crisis.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DISSEMINATION NOTICE

1. This document was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy is for the information and use of the recipient and of persons under his jurisdiction on a need to know basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments:

- a. Director of Intelligence and Research, for the Department of State
- b. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- c. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, for the Department of the Army
- d. Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), for the Department of the Navy
- e. Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
- f. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
- g. Assistant Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
- h. Director of NSA, for the National Security Agency
- i. Assistant Director for Central Reference, CIA, for any other Department or Agency

2. This document may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrangement with the Office of Central Reference, CIA.

3. When this document is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain it for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the document should either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be requested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69, 2, 22 June 1953.

4. The title of this document when used separately from the text should be classified: **FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

DISTRIBUTION:

White House
National Security Council
Department of State
Department of Defense
Atomic Energy Commission
Federal Bureau of Investigation