



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THE EMERGENCY CAPABILITIES OF THE GERMAN RAILWAY SYSTEMS



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THE EMERGENCY CAPABILITIES OF THE GERMAN RAILWAY SYSTEMS

SUMMARY

The capabilities of the German railways have been drastically reduced as a result of war damage, loss of equipment, and general deterioration. With the systems operating nearly at capacity in 1948, German railway traffic amounted to only 63 percent of the 1937 tonnage, though it represented approximately 67 percent of the 1937 ton-kilometer total. Even at this curtailed level of operations, however, the railways of Germany have a capacity which would considerably exceed the minimum requirements of the civilian population in an emergency.

The latent excess capacity of the German railroads would be adequate to sustain relatively large-scale military movements. The present German rail system has a capacity about 20 percent greater than that which would be required to move a volume of traffic equal to that of the depression year 1932, in which the modern German economy probably reached its lowest prewar level. This surplus in excess of 1932 traffic amounts to at least 8 billion ton-kilometers annually, or roughly 130,000 metric tons daily on the basis of the 1948 average haul. As almost all of the surplus capacity would be available in Western Germany, western systems would be capable of supporting a far greater increase of military traffic at any reduced civilian standard of liv-

ing than would the railways of the Soviet Zone.

The most important factor now limiting the capabilities of the German railways is their shortage of serviceable rolling stock and motive power, the effects of which have been most severe in the Soviet Zone. Whereas the Soviet Zone has less than 60 percent of its prewar freight car and locomotive inventories in operation, the Bizonia has over 70 percent of its prewar serviceable inventories available.

The present capabilities of the German railways as a whole or of any particular zone could be increased by provision of additional rolling stock and motive power. Because of dismantling and general deterioration, however, any considerable and sustained increase in the present traffic of the Soviet Zone would require concurrently extensive rehabilitation measures. Since such rehabilitation would be slow, the added military traffic in an emergency would probably absorb any expansion of rail capacity in the Soviet Zone, leaving little capacity which could be used for building up local industrial traffic. In the Western Zones, on the other hand, it is probable that with added rolling stock the railways could support not only a large-scale increase in military traffic over a more prolonged period, but might at the same time carry an increased volume of industrial traffic.

Note: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Navy, and the Air Force have concurred in this report; for a dissent by the Intelligence Division, Department of the Army, see Enclosure A, p. 13. This report is based on information available to CIA as of June 1949.

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THE EMERGENCY CAPABILITIES OF THE GERMAN RAILWAY SYSTEMS

The German railways transported in 1948 an estimated 276.5 million metric tons of freight, an increase of 17 percent over the tonnage hauled in 1947 (see Table A of the Annex). It is probable that the 1948 performance represented the approximate total capacity of the German rail systems with existing equipment and line facilities, although they undoubtedly retain a small reserve capacity, particularly in the Bizonal area. The substantially reduced emergency capabilities of the German railways are apparent when the 1948 traffic figure is related to Germany's rail performance in 1937, a year of increasing activity in preparation for war. The railways carried approximately 499 million metric tons of freight in 1937. An estimated 12 percent of this total traffic, however, was hauled over lines in East Prussia and in the area east of the Oder and Neisse Rivers now under Polish administration. The traffic in that part of prewar Germany corresponding to the present boundaries, therefore, amounted to about 439 million tons in 1937. In relation to this tonnage, the approximate 1948 capacity of the German railways represents only about 63 percent of their activity in 1937.

Expressed in terms of ton-kilometers, which provide a more accurate index of railway activity than tons hauled, German rail traffic in 1948 was also considerably below the 1937 performance. It is estimated that the ton-kilometers performed by all German railways in 1948 may have totaled as high as 47.25 billion. The 1937 ton-kilometer traffic, again excluding 12 percent of the total to account for territorial losses, amounted to about 70.19 billion for an area comparable to postwar Germany. The 1948 performance, therefore, represents about 67 percent of the adjusted 1937 traffic.

The present potential reserve capacity of the German railways would be the surplus above the irreducible minimum of civilian requirements. Although the minimum civilian

level of railway traffic cannot be accurately determined within the scope of this study, it is nevertheless pertinent to examine the lowest modern level in railway traffic on record. In order to estimate the minimum surplus capacity which would be available in an emergency, therefore, the following paragraphs analyze 1948 traffic in relation to that of the depression year 1932, in which the modern German economy probably reached its lowest prewar level and in which the prewar level of railway traffic also reached its lowest point. Even at that low level, however, the German standard of living was relatively high compared to many other European countries, and it was appreciably higher than that accorded the German civilian population during the latter stages of World War II. In a serious emergency involving large-scale military movements in Germany within the foreseeable future, the civilian standard of living would probably be reduced by the power or powers controlling the area to a level which would be considerably lower than the 1932 level.

Ton-kilometers performed over the German railways in 1948 (estimated at 47.25 billion) exceeded the 1932 performance for the corresponding area (about 39.14 billion) by about 20 percent. Even if civilian requirements for railway traffic were not reduced below the volume prevailing in 1932, therefore, the German railways would additionally be capable of performing at least 8 billion ton-kilometers annually of occupational or military traffic, irrespective of the small reserve capacity retained by the railways in 1948. This represents roughly 22 million ton-kilometers a day which, on the basis of the 1948 average haul of about 170 kilometers, would provide a potential capacity of about 130,000 metric tons daily which could be devoted to the objectives of the military authorities.

(The following estimate is advanced merely to suggest the order of magnitude of the estimated potential surplus railway capacity involved in this analysis. No attempt is made

in this study to evaluate either the need for such reserve railway capacity or the ability of the controlling authorities to exploit such capacity under any given set of circumstances. Past US experience in the European theater indicates that an average of about .03 metric tons of supplies per man per day is necessary to maintain basic divisions and requisite service and air support forces. It appears, therefore, that a daily railway surplus of 130,000 metric tons, if fully exploited, would represent a capacity equivalent to the supply requirements of about four million basic US personnel and supporting forces, excluding initial equipment. This volume of traffic, however, could undoubtedly sustain a considerably larger Soviet force.)

As related to 1932, furthermore, the bulk of this over-all surplus capacity would be presently available in the Bizone. Of the total annual 8 billion ton-kilometer differential between the two years, over 7 billion ton-kilometers apply to the Bizone alone, where railway traffic was an estimated 28 percent greater in 1948 than in the corresponding region in 1932. It is not possible to determine from presently available data the proportion of the remaining 1 billion ton-kilometers to be attributed to the French and Soviet Zones, respectively. Their combined increase over 1932 traffic, however, amounted to only 7 percent. It seems reasonable to assume that the pattern of railway traffic in the area now constituting the French Zone would have closely approximated in prewar years that of the Bizonal region, since the two areas included the great Rhineland industrial complex. The actual disparity, therefore, between Western Germany's capacity in excess of 1932 requirements and that of Eastern Germany is probably even greater than indicated by the foregoing statistics.

This analysis demonstrates that despite the very substantial reduction of the present over-all capacity of the German railways from normal peacetime levels: (a) the German railways as a whole are now capable of transporting sufficient traffic to accommodate relatively large-scale military movements and simultaneously to support a civilian standard of living above the subsistence level; and (b) the railways of Western Germany are now

capable of sustaining a far greater volume of military traffic without reducing the standard of living below the subsistence level than are the railways of Eastern Germany. The latter conclusion is strengthened by the fact that a larger share of current railway traffic is undoubtedly already allocated to military requirements in the Soviet Zone than in Western Germany, in view of the greater strength of occupational forces and the large volume of freight moving out of Germany to the East.

The most important factor limiting the capabilities of all German railways has been their shortage of serviceable rolling stock and locomotives. The effects of this shortage have probably been most severe in the Soviet Zone, where the railways were operating in 1948 with only an estimated 57 percent of their prewar (1937) serviceable freight car inventory (see Table B). In the Bizone, on the other hand, the serviceable freight car inventory was restored to almost 75 percent of prewar. With respect to locomotives, the most serious shortage of motive power is also in the Soviet Zone, where the number of available locomotives for German requirements is probably about 58 percent of the prewar inventory (see Table C). In contrast, the Bizone probably had over 70 percent of its prewar motive power in operation.

It is undoubtedly true that the present capabilities of the German railways as a whole or of any particular zone could be increased by the provision of additional locomotives and freight cars. The abilities of Western and Eastern Germany's railways to accommodate substantial and sustained increases in the present level of transport requirements, however, vary considerably. While dismantling and general deterioration of the Soviet Zone system have reduced its efficiency, it is still somewhat superior in relative density to other Eastern European networks. At present, the Soviet Zone railways are undoubtedly capable of easily accommodating and dispatching to any part of the Zone the maximum traffic which can now be handled by the change-of-gauge transshipment stations on the Polish-Soviet border. Any large-scale military effort by the Soviet Union in Europe which required a sustained increase in the present rail performance of Eastern Germany, however, prob-

ably could not be supported by the railways of the Soviet Zone without substantial quantities of repair materials, equipment, rolling stock, and locomotives. Moreover, even if this material were allocated to Eastern Germany, the system probably could not also sustain any significant industrial activity in the area. In any event, owing to the deteriorated condition of the present Soviet Zone system, a considerable and continued increase in its present traffic could only be realized by extensive rehabilitation measures.

In the Western Zones, the system is also far below its prewar capacity and efficiency. The

rolling stock situation is not, however, so critical as in the Soviet Zone. There has been no extensive postwar dismantling or general deterioration, and maintenance and operational standards have been considerably higher. As a result, and assuming foreign assistance in materials and rolling stock to meet the increased requirements of an emergency, it is probable that the railways of Western Germany could support not only large-scale military movements over a more prolonged period, but might also be capable of sustaining a relatively higher level of industrial traffic than in the case of the Soviet Zone rail system.

ANNEX

HISTORICAL, ADMINISTRATIVE AND STATISTICAL BACKGROUND

The Prewar Rail Network.

For many years prior to World War II, Germany possessed one of the most complex, efficient and best maintained railroad systems in the world. Because of its exceptional development and its central location along continental trunk routes, the German rail system was an important factor in European transport. Prewar Germany was traversed by numerous international rail routes linking France and the Low Countries with Central Europe and the Balkans on one hand, and Italy and Switzerland with Scandinavia and the North Sea on the other. Despite the international significance of the German railroads, however, the system was primarily domestic in character. For example, internal freight traffic in 1937 accounted for 92 percent of total railway freight moved in Germany. Moreover, the German rail system was by far the country's most important transport medium, although Germany also possessed highly developed inland waterways and highways. The German railways carried an estimated 76 percent of all German freight traffic moved in 1937, as compared to approximately 21.5 percent carried by inland waterways and 2.5 percent on highways.

Historically, control of the German railways was originally separated among the seven constituent States which, from 1871, began nationalizing those railways hitherto privately owned. In 1919, under the Weimar Republic, the separate State railways were amalgamated under the central government and in October 1924 the German State Railway Company (Deutsche Reichsbahngesellschaft) was constituted with the exclusive right to operate the State railways. With the incorporation of the Reichsbahn into the political structure of the Third Reich in 1937, control of the railways was further centralized and virtually all German railways were operated by that or-

ganization until the surrender and occupation of Germany.

At the time of its reorganization in 1937, the Reichsbahn comprised approximately 54,000 route kilometers. The system ranked second in density in all of Europe, with about 12 kilometers of track per 100 square kilometers of national territory. Although Berlin was an important center of rail activity, there were several other areas of Germany, such as the Ruhr Valley, which also had extensive rail networks of a density seldom found in other European countries except in the immediate vicinity of the various national capitals. Approximately 40 percent of the Reichsbahn system consisted of double or multiple-track lines and about 4 percent of it was electrified.

In spite of the density of the German rail network, however, its extent was little more than that existing at the end of World War I. Apart from double-tracking of existing routes, less than 650 kilometers of track on new routes was laid in the intervening years. On the other hand, for both economic and strategic reasons, a substantial program of improvement and modernization of the system had been carried out. Technical improvements in the permanent way and in the design of steam, electric, and Diesel locomotives resulted in greatly increased speed and efficiency of operation of the German railways.

Effect of World War II.

The German railway system bore the major portion of the country's military transport burden and probably reached its peak performances in 1943. The system was under continual strain from the beginning of the war, however, as a result of traffic disruptions caused by military requirements, damage from sporadic air attacks, shortages of critical materials, excessive wartime traffic without adequate maintenance, and the declining efficiency of the labor force. Railway operations

deteriorated rapidly following the beginning of heavy and continued Allied air attacks late in 1944, and the consequent disruption of transportation was a major factor in the final collapse of the German economy.

The region now occupied by the Western Powers suffered particularly severe damage from the concentrated air attacks on the heavy industry throughout the area. For instance, more than 10 percent of the railway bridges in Bizonia were completely destroyed or heavily damaged. The capacity of the marshalling yards was reduced to 40 percent of normal by the end of 1944 and to about 20 percent by the end of the war. Almost all of the marshalling yards located in the US-UK zones were subjected to heavy and repeated attacks which greatly impeded the operation of through rail traffic by the close of the war. The signal and telecommunications systems were in effect inoperative, and railroad operations in general had been reduced to a primitive state.

In the present Soviet Zone of Eastern Germany, about 980 major railway bridges were destroyed. As was the case in Western Germany, key marshalling yards and traffic centers were high priority targets, although the damage, in general, was neither as severe nor as lasting as in the Bizonal area.

As a result of the foregoing, German railway operations had been brought to a virtual standstill by the close of the war. Central control of traffic broke down completely and operations became a matter of purely local expediency. Although there had been only temporary shortages of locomotives and freight cars early in the war, which were largely overcome by 1941, part of Germany's rolling stock and motive power was dispersed over much of Europe by 1945, part had been destroyed or damaged, and that equipment remaining in Germany, much of which was of foreign origin, was in deplorable condition. The German railway system had been reduced by war from a superior operating condition to a battered and deteriorated skeleton unable to accommodate adequately even the vastly reduced transport requirements of Germany's immediate postwar economy.

Postwar Organization.

With the end of the war in Europe and the division of Germany into four zones of occupation, the German railway system was arbitrarily dismembered to conform with the zonal demarcations. This was effected irrespective of existing administrative or operational divisions. Furthermore, approximately 12,300 kilometers of the Reichsbahn (over 20 percent of the total German system) located in the Polish-administered areas east of the Oder-Neisse line and in the portion of East Prussia transferred to the USSR, were severed from the German system and are no longer considered or operated as part of it. (These portions of the former German system are not included in this study.)

When Germany came under occupational control, a four-power Transport Directorate was established as part of the Allied Control Council in Berlin. Under its direction was the over-all German Administration for Transport, which, in turn, included the administrative instrument for operational control of the German railways, the Central Railway Administration. Quadripartite control of the railways was only partially effective, however, since each of the occupational powers retained final jurisdiction over the lines in its zone. The progressive deterioration of four-power administration of occupied Germany has now resulted in the completely separate operation of the Soviet Zone system. The systems of the US and UK Zones are operated on a bizonal basis and the French Zone system, while independent, is coordinated with that of the Bizone.

In the Bizone, over-all transport policy is determined by the occupational authorities through joint transport advisers. Transport activities are under the general supervision of the Bizonal Transportation Administration, which directs the railways in coordination with other forms of surface transport. The Central Railway Administration, which is responsible to the Transportation Administration, maintains direct operational and administrative control and is relatively independent in its direction of the subordinate administrative offices or Reichsbahndirektionen. Plans have been announced, but not yet im-

plemented, for the merger of the French Zone transport administration with that of the Bizone to establish joint direction of all transport activities in Western Germany.

Transportation in the Soviet Zone is organized in a similar fashion. Over-all policy control is exercised by the Soviet Military Administration (SMA) through the Soviet Transport Administration. All transport activities are coordinated by the General Transportation Administration and the railways are operated under the immediate supervision and direction of the Central Railway Administration. Unlike the Bizone, however, the USSR has stationed military officers throughout the Eastern German rail organization, even in many railway stations. Moreover, all Soviet traffic over the German rail system is moved under direct SMA control by special civilian crews each commanded by a Soviet officer. There are two types of such units, one including personnel for the operation of trains solely within the Soviet Zone and a second made up of crews used in long-distance traffic outside of Germany. Another agency subordinate to the Soviet Transport Administration is the German-Soviet Transport Corporation (Derutra), a Soviet foreign-trade unit with Soviet representatives at all levels to supervise reparations and transit shipment accounts.

Postwar Occupation Policy and Rehabilitation.

The immediate railway problem throughout Germany at the end of hostilities was the resumption of operations on a scale sufficient to provide the minimum transport capacity necessary to discharge occupational requirements and accommodate reparations and dismantling shipments. This required the mustering of serviceable rolling stock and the restoration of a minimum number of essential lines, installations and bridges. Following this initial restoration, the degree of further rehabilitation of the German railways has, in general, reflected the policies of the occupational powers with respect to the over-all rehabilitation of the German economy.

In the Western Zones, rail rehabilitation started slowly because of the extensiveness of war damage to the rail network and the early Allied occupation prohibitions which re-

stricted Germany's economic revival. The extent of Western Europe's dependence on the German economy soon became increasingly apparent, however, and over-all European requirements have caused a gradual modification of the stringent occupation policies. As a result, the railway systems of Western Germany have benefited from an increasingly favorable rehabilitation policy, which has generally matched the rising level of the over-all economy.

The current status of the Bizonal railway system, in terms of equipment, installations, and facilities, is indicated below:*

1. Equipment.

Rehabilitation of motive power and rolling stock has proceeded slowly because of unrepaired repair installations, shortages of raw materials, undernourishment and low morale of the labor force, and other factors. About 75 percent of the repair installations have now been restored, however, and substantial progress in the repair of freight cars was made during 1948. Moreover, much repair work has been farmed out to neighboring countries. In addition, approximately 17,000 new freight cars have been purchased from other European countries with ECA-authorized funds for delivery to the Bizone during the fiscal year 1948-1949. The inauguration of freight car production within the Bizone earlier than anticipated will probably make available an additional 20,000 new cars by the end of 1949. At that time, the estimated annual rate of production will be 30,000 cars, although increasing tightness in investment funds may have a considerable retarding effect during the year. (Additional data concerning Bizonal railway equipment are given in Tables B and C.)

2. Bridges.

Only 181 railway bridges now remain completely unserviceable. Of the 2,477 bridges destroyed or heavily damaged during the war, 82 percent have been rebuilt, although many of these have been restored on a temporary basis.

* Available information concerning the French Zone system is included in the tables appearing at the end of this study.

3. *Marshalling Yards.*

The yards, in general, have been restored to a fair condition. The highly industrialized Ruhr area, which contained 30 percent of the marshalling yards of the Bizone, was one of the most heavily bombed districts in all of Germany. The Ruhr yards, however, have now been restored sufficiently to meet all normal service requirements.

4. *Communications.*

The signal and telecommunication system has been completely restored, with more than 50 percent on a permanent basis. Moreover, the special (Basa) telephone net, a fully automatic dial system for rail operations, is again in operation.

5. *Other Installations.*

An estimated 80-90 percent of other miscellaneous railway installations in the Bizones have been repaired.

The immediate prospect for the rail system of Western Germany is one of continuing gradual improvement. Although the system is still far below its prewar efficiency and capacity, it is generally adequate for the present level of the over-all economy and will not provide a serious bottleneck in any planned or foreseeable German recovery program.

In marked contrast to the rail situation in Western Germany is that of the Soviet Zone. The system of Eastern Germany has suffered extensively from Soviet occupation, in addition to the war damage and wartime deterioration experienced by all German railways. Principal among the consequences of the occupation in Eastern Germany have been the losses suffered by the railways as a result of the drastic dismantling and reparations program conducted by the USSR. For example, the route mileage of the Reichsbahn in the Soviet Zone has been reduced by an estimated 3,200 kilometers through Soviet dismantling, and now consists of about 7,000 kilometers of primarily single-track lines. (As previously indicated, about 12,300 additional route kilometers were lost to Poland and the USSR through postwar territorial changes.) About 90 percent of the formerly double-track lines in the area have now been reduced to single-track status. From the formerly elec-

trified lines in Central Germany, the USSR has also removed virtually all of the electric locomotives, equipment, and even the poles. Much of the heavy machinery in the repair shops, as well as signal and other equipment, has also been dismantled and removed from Germany to the East as war booty. The loss of this machinery has greatly retarded the freight car repair program of the Zone.

A second detrimental effect of the occupation upon the railways of Eastern Germany resulted from the Soviet blockade and the Western counterblockade. By cutting off the Eastern railways from their normal supply sources for repair and construction materials in the Western Zones, the blockade severely affected new construction, reconstruction, repair, and even normal replacement programs. Moreover, there has been no indication of a Soviet disposition to provide such materials in any significant quantity from its own or Satellite resources. Even the negligible quantity of rolling stock produced in the Soviet Zone since the war has not been made available to the German system, but has been requisitioned or transferred to the USSR as reparations.

Although the USSR has given considerable lip service to contemplated improvements and restoration programs, particularly under the so-called two-year plan, few of these appear to have been implemented. Tacit Soviet approval of German construction requests is often negated by failure to provide the requisite materials. Some restorations, however, have been made, or are in progress:

1. Of 980 major Soviet Zone railway bridges destroyed, about 80 percent have been repaired. Only 30 percent of the repaired bridges, however, have been permanently restored. The balance have been repaired on an emergency basis requiring crossings at reduced speeds and loads.

2. A portion of the rail connection between the ports of Rostock-Warnemünde and Berlin which was completely dismantled is probably now restored on a single-track basis to expedite movements in this area and to the south.

3. Restoration of dismantled second tracks on certain lines running out of Dresden is believed to be in progress. Although restoration of the entire Berlin-Dresden route to dou-

ble-track status is reportedly contemplated, it is unlikely to be accomplished in the immediate future because of shortages of construction materials.

4. A short section of line known as the Zossen cut-off is reported to have been completed, thus making it unnecessary for Soviet trains approaching Berlin from the south to transit the US Sector.

Because of Soviet indifference to German economic requirements, the railway system of Eastern Germany has been allowed to deteriorate gradually. Its line capacity in terms

of permissible weight per train, for example, is estimated to have been at least 25 percent below the prevailing capacity in the Western Zones in 1948. (Soviet Zone trains were reportedly limited to a weight of 900 tons, in contrast to 1,200-1,500 tons per train in the Western Zones.) Although the system will remain adequate for Soviet economic and military requirements, if they remain at approximately their present level, it will probably be subject to increasing strain in order to provide the transport requirements of even the greatly reduced economic level of Eastern Germany.

TABLE A

RAILWAY FREIGHT TRAFFIC (REICHSBAHN)

Tons Hauled

(millions of metric tons, excluding only railway service freight and livestock)

	1932	1937	1946	1947	1948
Germany	266.8 ¹	499.0 ¹	202.9	236.6	276.5
Bizone	277.0	138.0	148.4	176.5
Soviet Zone	170.0 ¹	44.9	65.2	75.0 *
French Zone	52.0	20.0	23.0	25.0 *

* Estimated.

¹ Includes traffic estimated at 32 million tons in 1932 and 60 million in 1937 hauled over lines in East Prussia and in the area east of the Oder-Neisse line now Polish-administered.

Ton-Kilometers Performed

(billions of ton-kilometers)

	1932	1937	1948
Germany	44.48 ¹	79.76 ¹	47.25
Bizone	25.16	47.27	32.25
Soviet Zone	10.20 *
French Zone	4.80 *

* Estimated.

¹ Includes traffic estimated at 5.34 billion ton-kilometers in 1932 and 9.57 billion in 1937 hauled over lines in East Prussia and in the area east of the Oder-Neisse line now Polish-administered.

Note: Early in 1949, freight car loadings were averaging 36-38,000 per day in the Bizone and an estimated 14,000 per day in the Soviet Zone.

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TABLE B
FREIGHT CAR INVENTORY
(thousands of cars)

	Germany	Bizone	Soviet Zone	French Zone
1937				
Total	578.3 ¹	342.5	165.7 ¹	70.1
Serviceable	554.2	327.9	159.1 ¹	67.2
1946				
Total	555.8	382.4	123.0	50.4
Serviceable	381.9	279.3	76.0	26.6
1947				
Total	462.1	320.7 ¹	92.3	49.1
Serviceable	335.6	235.2 ¹	62.8	37.6
1948				
Total	429.4	304.0 ¹	90.4	35.0
Serviceable	337.9	243.3 ¹	68.2	26.4

¹Probably reached a total of nearly 700,000 immediately prior to the war.

¹Includes East Prussia and the area east of the Oder-Neisse line; approximately 125,000 freight cars were used in the present Soviet Zone, of which an estimated 120,000 were serviceable.

¹As of December 1947.

¹As of November 1948.

Note: These figures are all estimates, with the exception of the Bizone statistics for 1948. Foreign rolling stock in use in the various occupation zones is included.

TABLE C
LOCOMOTIVE INVENTORY
(thousands of locomotives)

	Germany	Western Zones	Soviet Zone	French Zone
1937				
Total	20.7	13.3	7.4 ¹	
Serviceable	18.5	11.9	6.6 ¹	
1946				
Total	27.8	20.4	7.4 ¹	
Serviceable	N.A.	8.5	N.A.	
1947				
Total	23.5	16.5	7.0 ¹	
Serviceable	9.8	7.0	2.8 ¹	
1948				
Total	23.3	14.6 ¹	7.0 ¹	1.7
Serviceable	11.5	7.9 ¹	2.9 ¹	0.7

These figures are all estimates, with the exception of the Bizone statistics for 1948.

¹Includes East Prussia and the area east of the Oder-Neisse line; not more than 4,500 serviceable

locomotives are estimated to have been in the present Soviet Zone.

¹As of January 1946.

¹As of March 1948, there were an estimated 7,018 locomotives in the Soviet Zone. Of these, 2,535 were completely unserviceable, either because they were damaged beyond repair or because their repair was impossible as a result of existing conditions (this figure includes 1,148 foreign locomotives). Another 1,656 were under repair, 425 were used exclusively by Soviet Brigades for reparation shipments, and 350 were set aside as a reserve for winter traffic, leaving a balance of about 2,050 locomotives (including 102 foreign) to meet German traffic requirements.

¹As of October 1948.

¹As of December 1948, there were an estimated 7,007 locomotives in the Soviet Zone, of which 2,522 were completely unserviceable, 1,565 were under repair, 250 were reserved for Soviet Military Administration use only, and 69 were held in reserve for emergency requirements. This left about 2,600 serviceable locomotives for German requirements.

TABLE D
DISTRIBUTION OF REICHSBAHN ROUTE
KILOMETRAGE

Area	1937	1948
Germany	54.0	38.5
Western Zones	31.9	31.5
Soviet Zone	9.8	7.0 ¹
East Prussia and area east of Oder-Neisse line	12.3 ²

¹Excluding an estimated 3,200 kilometers dismantled by the USSR.

²Including 11,000 kilometers in Polish-administered territory in East Prussia and east of the Oder-Neisse line, and 1,300 kilometers in Soviet-administered East Prussia.

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ENCLOSURE A

DISSENT BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Although this study embodies a useful summary of the German civilian economy insofar as the German railway systems are concerned, it appears to be deficient in treatment of the railway operational factors involved. The lack of adequate basic assumptions, combined with unconvincing statistical support, leads us to the opinion that the study, although excellent in many respects, is inadequate for the determination of the potential under emergency conditions, of the German railway systems.

In estimating the annual potential capacity (8 Billion Ton-Kilometers) of the German railways which could be devoted to the objectives of the military authorities, it appears that the basic traffic analysis contained in this study is based on 1932 statistics. We believe this a rather unrealistic approach to the problem of determining the emergency potential of the German transportation system and suggest that possibly an analysis and comparison of conditions around 1937 would more accurately present the relative positions of civilian and military transport capabilities.

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