

JUL 20 1961  
 201-018/

<b>DISPATCH</b>		CLASSIFICATION <del>SECRET</del>	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. UFGA-1699
TO Chief, WHD			HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201-
FROM Chief of Base, JMWAVE			DATE
SUBJECT Operational/JWAVE AMCLATTER-5 Meeting with AMDIP-1 and Other Related Matters			RE "433" - (CHECK "Y" ONE)
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
ACTION REQUIRED None, for information and files			INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
REFERENCES Reference: WAVE-6-41			
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>On 28 May 1961 AMCLATTER-5 reported to Gerald L. GARDYNE the results of his private meeting with AMDIP-1 on 27 May 1961.</li> <li>A-1 said he wanted to talk with A-5 about the reports that the pilot's association under A-5 was going to break away from AMBUD. A-1 said he had heard that Aurelio SANCHEZ Arango and others had expressed interest in accepting the pilots into their own independent organization.</li> <li>A-1 said that he himself could not approve or accept "the designation of personnel by a military organization being made to a civilian group". A-5 said A-1 did not fully understand either A-5's position or the position of the pilot's association. A-5 explained that the pilot's association (the reorganized Cuban Air Force) was not basically a military group, but a civilian organization which was democratically formed and that the leader had been elected by democratic process. A-5 said the pilots had not voted on withdrawing from AMBUD (A-5 privately told the Case Officer that many of the pilots objected to AMBUD, to AMBUD-1, AMDIP-1, etc., but their sentiments were more personal than official). A-5 said he told A-1 that under the new reorganization of the air force in exile, it had gained strength as it now had five jet pilots among its members. A-5 told A-1 that the pilots did not want a seat on AMBUD, that the air force group was not a political body and it would not enter into politics. A-5 said the pilots would submit a list of officers and its staffing to AMBUD for AMBUD's decision and acceptance. A-5 said that the air force was opposed to the designation of air force staff and leaders by AMBUD and felt that as a unit they had the right to select the best men for staff positions.</li> <li>A-5 asked A-1 to let the pilot's organization prove its worth to AMBUD since it now represented a united body. A-1 allegedly replied to A-5 that it was alright to continue with the organization as such for the time being. A-1 said he would contact AMBUD-1 and discuss the matter with him. A-1 said that AMBUD-1 had already talked with President Kennedy and had received from the President the assurance of full backing for AMBUD-1 and AMBUD.</li> <li>A-5 said he had expected much more opposition from A-1 (known locally as "The Mule") and felt that the initial conversation had gone quite well. A-5 said that they (the air force group) would remain loyal to AMBUD. A-5 said he would willingly resign his position in the group if AMBUD refused to acknowledge his appointment.</li> </ol>			
FORM 10-57 53	USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE	CLASSIFICATION <del>SECRET</del>	PAGE NO. 1



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6. On 31 May 1961 GARDYNE again met with A-5 for the purpose of debriefing Subject on his current activities. The Case Officer gave A-5 \$200.00 for his May 1961 services.
7. A-5 was queried again about his 27 May meeting with AMDIP-1. A-5 said he did not receive the impression that AMDIP-1 thought that the air force group wanted a seat on AMBUD. A-1's opposition was based on the consideration that AMBUD-1 should have the authority to appoint his own leaders and not be required to accept the selection of such a leader by a military group. A-5 said he explained that the air force group was not military and was comprised of civilians, as previously reported. A-5 had the impression that A-1 was more considerate and willing to listen to reason. A-1 said A-5 could continue his reorganizational efforts for the sake of unity.
8. A-5 said the air force group had selected the following for air force staff positions:
  - Chief, Air Force - Alberto XALBERTI G.
  - Assistant Chief - Rene XGARCIA
  - Intelligence (A-2) - XPEREZ Escandon (fnu)
  - Personnel - Leonardo XSEDA
  - Cuartel Maestro (Supply) - XCABALLERO (fnu) former Air Force officer
  - Operations - Joaquin XVARELA, Naval aviator
  - Assistant Operations - XTORRECILLA (fnu) captain in the Air Force and jet pilot
  - Asuntos Civiles (Public Relations):
    - No. 1 - Luis XFERNANDEZ Ardoiz (civilian)
    - No. 2 - William XALEXANDRE
    - No. 3 - Eduardo XWHITEHOUSE (former CAA head during the Batista regime and also in the training camps for the fight against Fidel CASTRO).
9. A-5 reported that the following persons attended the special meeting called by Eduardo GARCIA of "Garcia Lines" on 27 May 1961: A-5, Hector LAMAR and his brother (possibly Agustin), who represented infantry elements; Sylvio XPEREZ, who was in charge of the landing crafts at Bahia de Cochinos; Miguel XALVAREZ, member of the infiltration teams; NAVARRO (fnu), a former member of the Mayor of Habana's staff; a Luis (lnu), a former Representative from the Oriente under BATISTA and one of the men who survived the fifteen days at sea on a raft and came to New Orleans after the invasion failure; and another man (name not heard) who was former FDR recruiting chief in Miami, described as about 45, bald and wearing a mustache.
10. At the meeting GARCIA said that the overall principle should be that all the "groups" should back AMBUD. However, GARCIA suggested three different positions regarding the agreed principle to back AMBUD:
  - a. That all present members of AMBUD should be replaced by new officers,
  - b. that AMBUD-1 and AMDIP-1 should be fully backed (no changes), or
  - c. to decide to enlarge AMBUD to include on it more representation from all the united groups. This would include representation for economic advisors, workers, and students.

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11. GARCIA told the group he had excellent contacts in Washington, D. C. and would advise Washington as to the recommendations made by this group at the meeting. It was agreed to meet again on 2 June 1961. A-5 said that GARCIA felt that the men assembled at this meeting represented a cross section of all anti-CASTRO groups and that their decisions were important. LAMARS represented the infantry; ALVAREZ, the infiltration teams; A-5, the pilots; and PEREZ, the Navy. No decisions were taken at this meeting.

End of Dispatch

9 June 1961

Distribution:

3 - WH Division

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