



<b>DISPATCH</b>	CLASSIFICATION <b>S E C R E T</b>	PROCESSING	
		PROPOSED <b>X</b>	ACTION MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO <b>Chief, Task Force W</b>	<del>P R I O R I T Y</del>		ACCOMPLISHED
INFO.			NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM <b>Chief of Station, JMWAVE</b>			ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT <b>Operational/GYROSE/KUCAGE Plans of Central American Countries for Action Against Cuba</b>			ABSTRACT MICROFILM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES  
**FYI**

- References:
- A. WAVE 1636
  - B. WAVE 2413
  - C. WAVE 2461
  - D. UFGA 2528

1. At the Punta del Este Conference in January 1962 it was readily apparent that the only Latin American countries sincerely interested in taking a firm stand against Castro were the Central American nations. Others were primarily concerned with their own internal situations and the possible repercussions locally if they should give an anti-Castro vote; others were cajoled and apparently bought off to obtain a vote favorable to the U.S. position. The Central American countries at one point were aggravated to such a degree by the turn of events during the discussion period that they even threatened to walk out en masse from the Conference. It appeared at that time that if any kind of assistance were required for positive action against Castro, the Central American countries might well be prepared to provide such assistance.

2. During the last three months, a number of reports have come to our attention which indicate quite clearly that some kind of action is contemplated by some or all of these countries, either individually or collectively. A number of these have been reported to Headquarters (see references). In addition to that information (and other data undoubtedly available to Headquarters from sources within the countries involved) additional information on some of the meetings held in relation to this planned action is forwarded herewith and is combined into one report for the sake of completeness.

**CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM  
RELEASE IN FULL 1998**

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DATE TYPED <b>20 April 62</b>	DATE DISPATCHED <b>APR 25 1962</b>
	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER <b>UFGA-3806</b>	
	HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER <b>100-9-14</b>	
	CLASSIFICATION <b>S E C R E T</b>	

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3. Reference A of 28 February 1962 reported that AMCLATTER-5 had received word from Eduardo \*GARCIA (owner Garcia Lines) N.Y. a few days previously that he had talked with Gen. Anastasio \*SOMOZA during his recent trip to the U.S. about the willingness of the SOMOZASS to permit the training of anti-Castro forces in Nicaragua. SOMOZA supposedly expressed interest in such a venture, but did not make a definite agreement on the subject. It was however decided that GARCIA, along with representatives of exiled Cuban armed forces, would go to Nicaragua to exploit this possibility further. GARCIA told AMCLATTER-5 that he wanted him to represent the Naval forces and intended to have Col. Angel \*SANCHEZ Mosquera represent the ground forces. GARCIA said he would arrive in the WAVE area shortly and would fill in the details. AMCLATTER-5 was instructed by his Station case officer to monitor the above matter and keep us advised on developments.

4. On 14 March 1962 a report was received from AMCLATTER-5 concerning a meeting held the previous evening attended by Eduardo GARCIA, Col. Angel SANCHEZ Mosquera and AMCLATTER-5 on the subject of GARCIA's talks in Washington with General Anastasio SOMOZA, head of the Nicaraguan Armed Forces. According to GARCIA, SOMOZA told him in strictest confidence that he had held discussions with "high government officials" on the Cuban problem and its solution. (From the conversations, it was assumed that these were Pentagon officers.) GARCIA was instructed by SOMOZA, who is a long-time friend, to effect contact with responsible elements of the Cuban Armed Forces with a view toward organizing a Cuban military group in Central America. This Cubangroup, plus military groups of other countries would undertake the liberation of Cuba. SOMOZA commented that the Pentagon would handle the military aspects and CIA would handle the intelligence ramifications. No other details on this aspect were provided by SOMOZA, but he did add that "I cannot go to a failure...Fidel would finish me". SOMOZA then asked GARCIA to create a commission of responsible, clean officers of the Army, Navy and Air Force and impressed upon GARCIA the strict security measured that should be exercised in discussing this matter with the officers. Once the commission were established, SOMOZA was to be notified in order that visas could be issued and further discussions held in Managua.

5. On 13 March GARCIA, SANCHEZ and AMCLATTER-5 made up a Commission consisting of the following individuals:

- A. Col. Ange! SANCHEZ Mosquera
- B. Capt. Oscar \*ALFONSO Carol, ex-Cuban army officer and first chief of the training camps in Guatemala
- C. Comandante Orlando \*ENRIZO Martinez, ex-Army officer
- D. Comandante Luis \*PEREZ Escandon, ex-chief of the combat squadron of the Cuban Air Force
- E. Capt. Antonio \*GONZALEZ Torrecilla, ex-officer Cuban Air Force
- F. Miguel \*ALVAREZ Jimenez, civilian, but a member of the cadre that founded the training camps in Guatemala
- G. AMCLATTER-5
- H. Gustavo \*PONZOA, pilot of Cubana Airlines and also a pilot of the Cuban Liberation Forces in Guatemala and Nicaragua. PONZOA was also a member of the 26th of July Movement in its fight against BATISTA. (known to Edward D. KNAPMAN)
- I. Commander Armando \*RODRIGUEZ Alonso, ex-Cuban Naval officer

6. All of the above (except PONZOA and RODRIGUEZ, who were out of town) met at AMCLATTER-5's house on 14 March at which time GARCIA briefed the group; all concurred. A letter to SOMOZA was being drawn up giving the names of the Commission. The representatives who were to go to Nicaragua had not yet been selected at that time, but a meeting was to be held soon to pick these individuals. These persons would be accompanied by GARCIA, whose only function would be to introduce these officers to SOMOZA. The delegates' only function in Nicaragua would be to discuss with SOMOZA the possibility of creating a Cuban Armed Forces. It was to be made clear that although they are on the Commission, it does not necessarily follow that they would be the commanders of the respective forces in the future. (AMCLATTER-5

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was hopeful that he would be named to group going to see SOMOZA and was told by his JMWAVE case officer to try for the assignment since it would be in our interests. AMCLATTER-5 and his companions apparently want to be assured by SOMOZA that this project is a serious attempt against Castro and also that ODYOKE is behind this venture since they feel that a project of this magnitude could only be sponsored by ODYOKE.) AMCLATTER-5 is optimistic in general, and feels confident over the choice of the military commission since they are "honorable officers" who have a genuine backing and enjoy the sympathy of their forces.

7. As of the writing of this dispatch, there has been no further action by this group and no meeting involving these principals has been held in Nicaragua.

8. On 20 March an AMOT-2 sub-source reported a new development related to Central American activity vis-a-vis the Castro regime. General Joaquin \*BONILLA, Guatemalan Consul General in Miami, who claimed to be the personal representative of President Miguel \*YDIGORAS Fuentes of Guatemala (who has the support of the Presidents of Nicaragua, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras and Panama) invited certain Cuban exiles to a meeting with President YDIGORAS in Guatemala on the Cuban problem. Those invited were Jose \*MIRO Cardona, Aureliano \*SANCHEZ Arango, Ricardo Rafael \*SARDINAS, Eusebio \*MUJAL, Carlos \*MARCUEZ Sterling and Julio \*GARCERAN de Vall. The purpose of the offer as stated was that they go to Guatemala and there establish a government or junta representative of the Cuban anti-Communist cause; that there they could count on bases and arms for the training of Cuban army of 5,000 men who, in time, would be joined by 30,000 others for an invasion of Cuba. In the event that MIRO Cardona did not want to attend, BONILLA stated that he had instructions to invite Engineer Carlos \*HEVIA in his place. (MIRO did not want to attend if the other individuals mentioned were also to be there; see reference D). The invitation to HEVIA was made through the Asociacion de Colonos de Cuba en el Exilio and HEVIA replied that he would need time to meditate and study the offer, but did not show himself either for or against the idea.

9. On 21 March AMCHEER-1 stated that Jose \*ARIAS, in charge of intelligence for Dr. GARCERAN de Vall, said that they were very optimistic because Dr. GARCERAN was to be designated as the integrator of all sectors, movements and revolutionary anti-Castro organizations in exile, with or without representation in Cuba, because a secret pact had been signed by which MUJAL, MARCUEZ Sterling and SARDINAS would support GARCERAN to preside over the Cuban Government-in-Exile and support the Constitutional Thesis for a Provisional Government. He added that MIRO had not been able to go to Guatemala with the others, but that he had agreed to make the trip one or two days later. The meeting in Guatemala would be presided over by YDIGORAS (who had stated that his government was in perfect control of the political situation in Guatemala and that more propaganda than it deserved had been given to the situation so that the government would have justification for special measures to eliminate Communist elements). Guatemala would be the provisional seat of the Cuban Government-in-Exile which would be formed by the union of all sectors. As soon as that was established, four Central American Republics (with the aid also of Paraguay) would give their "full" support to this government to attack Cuba. According to ARIAS, camps have already been established for these objectives, at least in Guatemala, and Cubans and other Latins were already training there as if they were forces of the Guatemalan Army. He added that ODYOKE was supporting all this from behind the scenes. In response to a question, ARIAS said that as far as he knew General PEDRAZA was not included in this planning.

10. The meetings with President YDIGORAS were held the latter part of March in Guatemala and were attended by SANCHEZ Arango, SARDINAS, GARCERAN and MUJAL. MIRO excused himself through a number of phone calls to YDIGORAS on the grounds that he was very busy with the question of the Playa Giron prisoners. MARCUEZ Sterling excused

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himself through means of an extensive letter to YDIGORAS in which he designated MUJAL as his representative at the meeting. References B and C reported the salient points of information received on this meeting from AMCLATTER-5. These reports, plus others available on the same subject are elaborated below in order that Headquarters be apprised of all information currently available to the Station on this matter.

11. On 27 March AMCLATTER-1 provided the following information which he received from Carlos \*PELAEZ who had talked with MUJAL upon his return from Guatemala. MUJAL told him that they had decided to back MIRO Cardona if that were the desire of ODYOKE since they did not care who would head the Provisional Government as long as something was done to liberate Cuba. Also that there are four (unnamed) Central American countries who are strongly united and Mujal said that if ODYOKE cannot undertake open war against Cuba, then these countries are willing to go ahead and produce something and perhaps make ODYOKE help in some way.

12. On 30 March a report was received from AMCRACKLE-1 which he had gotten from AMPALM-4.

a. The latter stated that on 28 March MUJAL had visited him and during four hours had given him a wealth of details about his trip to Guatemala and his talks with YDIGORAS. The Cuban invitees were requested through an envoy of YDIGORAS not to make any public declarations. SANCHEZ Arango did not heed this request and made some comments to a reporter which displeased YDIGORAS who took up this matter at the first meeting. This lead to a verbal exchange between YDIGORAS and SANCHEZ Arango which showed in general terms not only displeasure, but also a certain dislike by YDIGORAS of SANCHEZ Arango. YDIGORAS justified the absence of Carlos PRIO with pretexts, although MUJAL thinks the true reason for his absence was the memory which remains in Guatemala regarding the aid of ex-President PRIO to the governments of AREVALO and ARBENZ.

b. During the meeting YDIGORAS put special emphasis on the fact that he represented not only Guatemala, but also the presidents of other Central American countries. Essentially the meeting developed in the following stages: a meeting of all the Cubans with YDIGORAS; a meeting of the Cubans themselves; and a private meeting of each of the Cubans with YDIGORAS. According to MUJAL he attended two meetings alone with the President. YDIGORAS' proposal was to offer an invitation to unite for the struggle in Cuba. In the event that he could count on the union of the Cuban factions, he promised to provide a Central American army of 10,000 men, for which he declared he could count on the acquiescence of the other Central American countries. Also, he said he could count on another army of Europeans, essentially French, of about 10,000 soldiers. The Cubans should contribute 40,000 men and ODYOKE would supply the same number. YDIGORAS declared that these proposals would be discussed with GPIDEAL during the next visit he made to ZRMETAL. All those present took part in the discussions and MUJAL stated that SARDINAS made some very timely remarks. MUJAL said he personally offered a vote of absolute confidence and unconditionally supported the efforts of YDIGORAS and said that he would accept the proposals of the Guatemalan President regardless of what the terms or conditions were.

c. MUJAL added that when the Cubans met by themselves, they drew up a document on unity which they all signed. This document is so general that everyone could sign it without objecting to or disputing anything. The original is in the hands of YDIGORAS and each participant promised not to publish it. (MUJAL promised to let AMPALM-4 read it.) MUJAL said that as a continuation of the discussion, editing and signing of this document he was obliged to put his vote of confidence in YDIGORAS in writing. He invited

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the rest to sign it; SANCHEZ Arango put up an argument, but finally signed. Then everyone had to sign another document accepting the efforts of YDIGORAS and whatever conditions he might impose. For example, the signers would accept his proposals even though it might mean their absence from their implementation. Later, upon the delivery of these documents, each Cuban had a confidential and private interview with YDIGORAS. (MUJAL did not provide any information on his interview.) In the general meetings there was a discussion about the possibility of holding a mass meeting in Miami with YDIGORAS (en route to ZRMETAL) as the only speaker. No agreement was reached on this point, but they agreed to inform him of their decision prior to 10 April. Also in the general discussions, YDIGORAS said there was no reason to worry about the necessary resources since ODYOKE would supply the means and would take charge of collecting from the Cubans later on.

d. MUJAL went on to tell of a meeting he attended with YDIGORAS outside of Guatemala, El Salvador to be exact. YDIGORAS was accompanied by officials of the Guatemalan Army. The meeting was held for the representatives of the General Staffs of the other Central American nations, each of which had two or three representatives. It was attended also by the president of the Junta of El Salvador. On returning to Guatemala, YDIGORAS invited MUJAL to dine with the PBPRIME Ambassador on the pretext that the Ambassador had said to YDIGORAS that MUJAL was responsible for not having unseated Batista a year before he was thrown out inasmuch as MUJAL was the Secretary of the CTC. MUJAL did not tell source about his conversation with the Ambassador, but did mention that the latter was up to date on the development of the events discussed above. (The Station is asking AMCRACKLE-1 to follow up on this point.)

e. MUJAL stated that during the entire proceedings, YDIGORAS expressed himself ironically, not to say disrespectfully, of MIRO and Antonio VARONA as well as of the Council and the Frente. MUJAL ended by saying that he cannot say that any of those who took part in the meeting will head up any possible action, but that his understanding is that action is inevitable.

f. Of special interest is the information given by MUJAL that at the final meeting (presumably in Guatemala) an ODYOKE official attended, although he does not know in what capacity. However, the officer did give him his card in which he appeared with the rank of Colonel or Lieut. Colonel. MUJAL did not offer the name of the Colonel, or the theme of the meeting. (AMCRACKLE-1 will be advised to attempt to obtain this information.)

13. On 28 March AMCLATTER-5 provided additional information from GARCERAN upon the latter's return from Guatemala, on 26 March. GARCERAN said he was advised by YDIGORAS that there was a Central American plan to overthrow Castro and although the details were not spelled out, GARCERAN was left with the impression that ODYOKE would supply the air arm and also that the military plan would be carried out very soon. He said YDIGORAS has sworn him to secrecy and that he could not give AMCLATTER-5 any more details. GARCERAN said he planned to return to Guatemala within the next few days and would visit Nicaragua and El Salvador with the President of the Guatemalan Congress who will act as a special representative of YDIGORAS to GARCERAN and introduce him to high officials in the countries visited. GARCERAN is reportedly preparing a military plan for YDIGORAS re training his fifty-man commando team, which he intimated YDIGORAS would pay for.

14. a. On 29 March AMCHEER-1 provided the following information which he obtained from conversations with GARCERAN, MUJAL and SARDINAS. President YDIGORAS expressed a desire to keep confidential the matters which he and the Cubans were to discuss. The cover story he suggested for the meeting was that they were trying to obtain work for Cuban technicians for specialized jobs in Guatemala. The Cubans stated that this explanation would not be believed since all Cuban exiles were awaiting news of political

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meeting, agreements were made and YDIGORAS informed them of future plans culminating in joint action for which they already had the secret support of four Central American nations. Other points of interest were: (1) the participants got the impression that General PEDRAZA was not included in these plans at all; (2) jet combat aircraft are being received little by little in Guatemala and apparently also in the other countries involved; and (3) the disturbances in Guatemala were purposely exaggerated (for example the announcement about the peasants' concentration in Guatemala City was not completely true) as part of a large plan so that the presence of foreigners or non-inhabitants in leading cities and the capitol will pass unnoticed.

b. The report continued by saying that President YDIGORAS will visit Miami in April during which time he will attend a large rally held in Bayfront Park and will accompany Dr. GARCERAN to give him support and recognition as the legitimate Constitutional Provisional President of Cuba-in-Exile, or will publically give his support to GARCERAN and his Thesis group in a similar manner. He expects that by that time the leading political factions will be united. Dr. GARCERAN agreed to include in his Cabinet all those leading factions which are now fighting each other.

c. Dr. GARCERAN stated to a group of close friends that when President YDIGORAS made his proposals he told them not to worry about other Latin American nations because that was his problem and he would have all the necessary support. He continued by saying that he had already discussed these matters in his last trip to ZRMETAL and that they had the support of PBPRIME although it was not convenient to give that appearance for reasons of international politics.

d. AMCHEER-1 continued his report by relating some points which came up at a meeting attended by Dr. GARCERAN, GARCERAN's son, Jose ARIAS (in charge of intelligence matters) and AMCHEER-1. Dr. GARCERAN stated that the following was of utmost secrecy and should not be divulged to other persons. That YDIGORAS entrusted to him the accomplishment of the following project with the purpose of augmenting the file of documentary evidence against the Communist GOC, and also to perform a round-up of the leading Guatemalan Communists or Communists resisting in that country. This project was put into effect that night (29 March) and involves the preparation of letters, books, newspapers or publications which must be forwarded to persons whose names appear on a list prepared for this purpose. These letters, etc. are to contain ciphered letters written in invisible ink and they must be prepared in such a manner that these incriminating messages can be deciphered. They are to involve the present GOC, the CP and to include plans of espionage, subversion, rebellion and information on war materiel, Communist propaganda in general with regard to the Cuban Revolution. These messages are to be forwarded from Miami by alleged and apparent Castro agents obeying orders from Cuba and should even mention that they are sent from Miami to avoid suspicion. The Guatemalan Government would then be given advance notification about these messages and will be waiting to seize the correspondence, decipher the messages and act accordingly.

e. The following points of interest were obtained by AMCHEER-1 on the meeting of the leaders of the "Tesis Constitutional" which took place on 29 March: (1) dismissal of Colonel Oscar \*DIAZ as head of the Military Advisory Board; (2) designa-

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tion of Colonel Angel SANCHEZ Mosquera, by unanimous approval even by those elements who were his revolutionary enemies, to head and be in charge of the entire military operation; and (3) consideration of all participants as a plain and initial Working Commission until it is possible to departmentalize responsibilities through the general merger. Some of the participants at this meeting were SARDINAS, MUJAL, Ernesto \*AZUA Font, Dr. Francisco \*ALABAU Trelles, Jesus \*ARTIGAS and others totaling about twenty.

f. Also on the afternoon of 29 March at the request of GARCERAN and Jose ARIAS, AMCHEER-1 drove them at about 6pm to an appointment which they described as important. They asked to be dropped off at the corner of SE 1st Street, between 1st and 2nd Avenues in downtown Miami from where they walked towards the main entrance of the Pan American Building next to the Pan American Bank. When they came out about a half hour later, GARCERAN would not say anything at all about this visit, but Jose ARIAS mentioned the following to AMCHEER-1 on a confidential basis: (1) they no longer had any doubts about ODOYKE being behind the plan proposed by YDIGORAS because the PBPRIMERS knew about it and he (ARIAS) and GARCERAN had learned that much through their conversations; (2) ARIAS mentioned some names, but not all, of persons not looked well upon by the PBPRIMERS including Colonel Oscar DIAZ and Ruben de LEON. He then mentioned other names of persons who were in the good graces of the PBPRIMERS for inclusion into the military cadres including Colonel \*MONTEAGUDO, Colonel SANCHEZ Mosquera and others. ARIAS then asked AMCHEER-1 for names of honorable, decent and pro-PBPRIME military men who could be included in the latter list.

g. The end of this report by AMCHEER-1 gives a list of "organizations or movements who support the "Tesis Constitucional" group, that is, who are pro-Cuban Constitutional Government" (see attachment). The support of these organizations has been obtained through letters signed by the leaders of each of these organizations and are classified as follows: revolutionary organizations, political sectors, military organizations, student organizations, labor organizations, civic organizations and clandestine organizations.

15. a. On 31 March AMCLATTER-5 provided additional information, most of which was forwarded in reference C. In more detail, this report is as follows. AMCLATTER-5 and Colonel SANCHEZ Mosquera were summoned urgently by Dr. GARCERAN to his office at 17th Terrace NE, Miami. In the strictest confidence he advised them that he "had been ordered by the Pentagon" to conscript or recruit personnel. The exact purpose, target or specific assignment of these men was not revealed by GARCERAN, but he indicated that it was one more step toward the ultimate creation of a hemispheric army to overthrow Castro. (AMCLATTER-5 understands that these orders were received on 30 March. When he inquired whether these orders were from KUBARK or the Pentagon, GARCERAN asserted once again "from the Pentagon".)

b. AMCLATTER-5 continues by saying that immediately after this private meeting GARCERAN held a larger, but still private, meeting with about 14 persons including himself and SANCHEZ Mosquera, all of whom were unknown to AMCLATTER-5 except for Dr. Jose IRIARTE (CTC labor official) and the Director of the Policemen's Club in Exile (name unknown to source). These persons, all civilians except those indicated, were said to be the military coordinators of the different political organizations which make up the GARCERAN group. Without disclosing the Pentagon "order" or the YDIGORAS relationship, GARCERAN informed the audience that he was beginning the inscription of personnel for the purpose of taking stock of what was available in the event something should come up later on. Those individuals accepted would receive paramilitary type training in Miami in courses directed by a "Training Academy" under General SANCHEZ Mosquera. AMCLATTER-5 was named to make up the recruitment questionnaires. Persons filling in the PRCs would not be told of their true significance, but an oath to be taken at the time of signing.

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out the obligation each has to respond to a formal call to arms.

c. At this meeting GARCERAN called for, and received, an unconditional and unanimous "vote of confidence" giving him complete authority to call up the men at any time without answering to anyone or being restricted in any disposition of the troops he deems necessary.

d. In his report AMCLATTER-5 said that SANCHEZ Mosquera told him that he (SANCHEZ) had been most active in the past weeks contacting elements of the professional army ~~USDA~~ in Miami, New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, etc. He said he also realized that if this venture is to become a reality, members of the Rebel Army must also be included in the planning. Consequently, working toward this end, SANCHEZ has begun contacts with ex-Rebel Army Comandante PANEQUE fnu, aka "Diego". Although nothing definite has been reached as yet, it is presumed that if PANEQUE and SANCHEZ agree, PANEQUE would be the "coordinator" of Rebel Army groups in the new GARCERAN forces.

16. On the 6:45 pm radio program "Noticiero de Norman Diaz" on 31 March 1962 the following announcement was made: Dr. Julio GARCERAN del Valle, announced that beginning Monday, 2 April 1962, at 222 NE 17th Terrace, Miami, the recruitment program of the Pro-Constitutional Government of Cuba will begin. The hours are 10-12 am, 3-5 pm and 8-12 pm.

17. On 4 April AMCLATTER-5 provided a sample of the recruitment, or PRO form, of the GARCERAN group which is entitled "Control de Personal". This is forwarded as Attachment .

18. On 2 April a report was received from AMCHEER-1 (who at the instructions of AMOT-2 is cooperating with GARCERAN) to the effect that the secret writing and intercept program outlined by YDIGORAS and mentioned in paragraph 14 above has begun. A secret message will be forwarded to Professor Victor Manuel \*GUTIERREZ in Guatemala (who was the first name on the list provided GARCERAN in Guatemala) in a book sent from Miami. In order to alert the Guatemalan authorities, a letter containing all the necessary information on the name of the addressee, the title of the book, the pages on which the secret message is written, the text of the message, etc. has been forwarded to the proper persons in that country. This letter was sent to Dr. Manuel \*ORELLANA, Federacion Anticomunista Centro Americana, 10 Avenida No. 9-49, Zona 1, Guatemala. (The text of the letter as well as the secret message is on file at the Station. The method used in this first effort is by means of perforations under the desired letters on unevenly numbered pages.) The letter for the Guatemalan authorities was written 1 April; it is planned that the book in question will be mailed on 12 April.

19. On 5 April BARR 0387 was received at JMWAVE and has been forwarded to Headquarters with our comments. This informs us that Avelino \*ROJAS, Key West distributor of Prensa Libre, reported the following to a local Customs Agent on 4 April 1962: FIGUERES, BETANCOURT and YDIGORAS met with SANCHEZ Arango, MUJAL, SARDINAS, and GARCERAN recently to discuss possible exile action against Castro. The war plans which this group will present to ZRMETAL on 17 April will call for Guatemala to declare war against Cuba. YDIGORAS will arrive in Miami on 27 April to receive final orders. SANCHEZ Arango left on 2 April for New York to meet with other exile leaders. JMWAVE's comments stated that to our knowledge FIGUERES and BETANCOURT did not attend subject meeting. Also, according to AMGORRILLA-1, SANCHEZ Arango was planning to go to New York on about 5 April, but primarily for medical reasons (SANCHEZ Arango told him in strictest confidence that he has cancer of the neck and that that was the main purpose of his trip.)

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20. Also on 5 April a report (FOB 4017) emanating from the KUJUMP office here provided information on the Guatemala meeting. The source of this report was Jose ARIAS (see paragraph 9). The source's information follows very closely that given above, but he adds that YDIGORAS said that AMBUD-1 has agreed to join with the other groups in accomplishing the unity of the Cuban exiles. Also, this source continued by saying that YDIGORAS announced that he will be in ZRMETAL as official guest of GPIDEAL on about 28 April at which time he plans to present the following plan to GPIDEAL: the establishment of a Cuban Government-in-Exile located in Guatemala (the chairmanship of this government will be rotated among the following Cuban leaders: Dr. Carlos \*PRIO Socarras, Dr. Jose MIRO Cardona, Carlos HEVIA, Dr. Julio GARCERAN, Dr. Carlos MARQUEZ Sterling, Aureliano SANCHEZ Arango and Ricardo Rafael SARDINAS). YDIGORAS will also present a military plan which calls for the training in Guatemala of 10,000 men furnished by the Central American Republics, 10,000 men from Spain, France and other Western European countries and 40,000 Cubans. Inasmuch as Guatemala does not have the capabilities to finance this project, YDIGORAS hopes that ODYOKE will assume that responsibility. In the event that GPIDEAL does not want to get involved in this plan, YDIGORAS and his allies will seek help from friendly governments and corporations affected by the GOC position.

21. a. AMCLATTER-5 met again privately with GARCERAN on 2 April. Colonel SANCHEZ Mosquera was to have attended also but was ill. GARCERAN wanted their professional advice on the logistics problem related to setting up in Guatemala a base for "commando type" action against Cuba. Reportedly YDIGORAS had asked for specific equipment requisites for such a base and AMCLATTER-5 provided a list of military items which would be for 40-50 men, including both naval and commando personnel and personal equipment. GARCERAN will personally draw up the proposed plan and told AMCLATTER-5 that they are the only ones to know of this operation. GARCERAN will present this plan to YDIGORAS with the understanding that it is in lieu of any "greater venture" (continental army); its basic purposes would be to: destroy military objectives in Cuba; obtain intelligence directly from the source (from commandos taking part in action, personnel infiltrated and picked up later, capture and kidnapping of enemy personnel on raids) and to lift the morale of Cubans inside and outside Cuba. GARCERAN will ask YDIGORAS for a base on Guatemala's Atlantic side from which to operate. In discussing the distance involved from there to Cuba several alternate plans were entertained (use of "mother ships"). Although GARCERAN has not selected the personnel for this operation, he asked AMCLATTER-5 if he would go to this base when it is formed. The latter answered in the affirmative, but asks for Station counselling on this issue. AMCLATTER-5 was asked to try to determine from GARCERAN if he has asked, or plans to ask, for a Pentagon or KUBARK cadre to train or guide his forces. GARCERAN told AMCLATTER-5 that the two young Americans (Korean War veterans) who had attended previous meetings when Colonel Oscar DIAZ was presiding had been separated from the organization along with Colonel DIAZ. AMCLATTER-5 plans to see GARCERAN regularly during the next few days, especially now that the questionnaires are to be distributed and the problem of "recruitment" will become more active.

b. AMCLATTER-5 added that in these last few days he also saw Eduardo GARCIA (Garcia Lines) who is still waiting for General Anastasio SOMOZA to answer their letter. GARCIA telephoned SOMOZA in Nicaragua a few days ago and was told he would be out of town for three or four more days. GARCIA told AMCLATTER-5 that he is impatient with the situation and is trying to set up contacts in the shipping business. He plans to go to Honduras during the weekend 7-9 April to attempt to rent some merchant ships during which time he will also probably drop in on SOMOZA to activate matters. AMCLATTER-5 was told that if GARCIA's business venture were realized he would have an officer's berth open for him on the ships. GARCIA says he plans to go back into the shipping business because his personal funds were getting low.

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22. The last report we will include in this dispatch is a report from AMCLATTER-5 dated 4 April in which he stated that he talked with Eduardo GARCIA on the night of the 3rd who informed him that through the Nicaraguan Consul in Miami he (GARCIA) learned that General Anastasio SOMOZA is expected in PBPRIME between 15 and 20 April. The purpose of this trip and his itinerary are not known. In connection with the GARCERAN organization, AMCLATTER-5 says that the "Military Commission" has not been formally integrated, but he believes it will include, among others: Colonel SANCHEZ Mosquera, AMCLATTER-5, ex-Rebel Army Commander PANECUE, aka "Diego" and ex-Rebel Navy officer fnu \*VIDAL Santiago. AMCLATTER-5 has been selected to teach the courses in "Map Reading" at the proposed "Training Academy". He has not been able to determine from GARCERAN if this Academy will include "PBPRIME elements" as professors; however, GARCERAN reiterates that he has no KUBARK backing or instructors, but does have a Pentagon OK.

23. There are other reports received after the writing of this dispatch and they will follow. We realize that this is a rather lengthy dispatch, but we feel that it is important that Headquarters have a chronological and detailed summary of the information available to us at this time, especially since we feel that it is quite probable that this Central American proposal might take on increased importance within ODYOKE during this month, especially if, as reported, both President YDIGORAS and General SOMOZA arrive in ZRMETAL at the same time. (As Headquarters is aware YDIGORAS has postponed his planned April trip to PBPRIME.)

24. We suggest that Headquarters might want to give some thought to the potential of this proposal for the following reasons: (a) the Central American countries have openly demonstrated their sincere opposition to Castro and their desire to take whatever action feasible to change the situation (i.e. Punta del Este Conference), (b) the word is out in the exile community here that something is in the wind in regard to possible action through YDIGORAS and/or the Central American nations, (c) the exiles are becoming more and more discontented and disillusioned partially due to what they consider a lack of positive action on the part of ODYOKE, (d) this desire for action is sufficiently strong that pro-Batista or other groups which are not in the best interests of PBPRIME and/or groups over which we have no control, might well become the rallying point for the exiles as the only alternative open to them and (e) the implementation of ODYOKE positive planning through these neighboring hemispheric nations would provide a basis for multilateral action (if unilateral action is not deemed desirable) and could also be used as cover for our activities.

25. Additional information on this subject will be obtained from our various sources and will be forwarded as received. JMWAVE would appreciate being advised of any information received by Headquarters on this subject from its field Stations concerned, as well as any information or comments on this subject from ODEARL, ODACID and GPIDEAL's office. Since we receive data of this nature only from source in the WAVE area, it is otherwise difficult to make a truly educated analysis of this matter or to provide it with an accurate frame of reference.

END OF DISPATCH

ATTACHMENT: Herewith

- A. Organization of Supporting Constitutional Thesis
- B. Recruitment Form

DISTRIBUTION:

✓3 - Addressee w/atts. as stated above

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