

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:	NO. DD/P-7049
	DATE 10/24/53

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. DD/P				FSW	<div style="text-align: center; font-size: 1.5em; margin-bottom: 10px;">① & ②</div> <p style="font-size: 1.2em; margin-bottom: 10px;"><i>Mr Sullen -</i></p> <p style="font-size: 1.2em; margin-bottom: 10px;"><i>I concur in and subscribe to Dick Helms' suggestions for your Naval War College address.</i></p> <p style="text-align: center; font-size: 1.5em; margin-bottom: 10px;">FSW</p> <p style="font-size: 0.9em; margin-bottom: 10px;">P. S. It has just occurred to me that you <u>may</u> wish to have some concrete example of the manner in which CIA operatives have collaborated with military operational personnel -- of relatively recent date, which would have particular significance to the Navy. If so, I should think that you could with propriety and security discuss some of the details of the story of the intelligence effort which lay behind the successful Inchon landings, for which CIA was officially commended by the Navy. The gist of this story is to be found in my memorandum of conversation with Bill Quinn, dated September 3, which I have had checked out and find to be in all respects accurate and supported by our own records -- the file is attached for your reference.</p> <p style="text-align: right; font-size: 1.1em; margin-top: 20px;">F. G. W. 10/26/53</p>
2. DCI		10/26			
3. ↑					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

DD/P 7049

Execu. Registry
4-7621

24 October 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Director's Speech at the Naval War College

1. Mr. Long, of your office, told me yesterday that you desired from me any thoughts I might have to be incorporated in the speech which you are to make in early November at the Naval War College, entitled "Major Problems of U. S. Intelligence". I have not discussed this matter with anyone on the FI Staff, since I assume that if you desire any additional ideas or information, you will communicate with Mr. Timm direct.

2. It would be my thought that since most of your remarks would deal with overall problems of intelligence, you would want to confine your discussion of clandestine work for this audience to the problems which we have in operating against the Soviet orbit. This clearly constitutes for us our major problem, and it is one which is not well understood in the Services or, for that matter, in the United States Government. I have heard you speak informally on this subject with considerable fervor backed up by detailed knowledge of the difficulties, so I will limit myself here to enumerating certain of the points which I feel you might include.

3. You will remember a document which the FI Staff prepared for the Jackson Committee and which you edited before it was forwarded. It covered in some detail the enormous emphasis which the Soviet Union and its satellites expend on counter-espionage and repressive measures. Never in history has there been a government, prior to that of the present Russian one, which has spent as much manpower, money, time, and effort on counter-espionage and counter-subversive police work. This fact needs highlighting. A simple example might be that of a Soviet soldier returning from duty in Germany to his homeland. For many months after his transfer home, he is surveilled, all his contacts are reported, and he is in effect a subject of major suspicion. That it takes great expense in time and effort to watch each of these returnees apparently makes no difference to the MVD. When this kind of precaution against the possibility that the individual might have been influenced by contact with the Western World is added to the fact that so few people in the Soviet Union have any information which would be of interest to the intelligence service of this country, we have presented, in oversimplified terms, the essence of the problem confronting us in trying to procure intelligence of a useful variety. For this reason and many

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

- 2 -

others, we are attempting to devise new methods of approach to this problem not only in the operational field but in the technical as well.

4. You might also want to touch on the paucity of information which the Soviet Union permits to appear in its publications or in speeches by its top officials. This might be compared with the fact that the Soviet Intelligence Service can procure almost all the information it needs on the United States by a careful review of our press and scientific magazines.

5. A word about defectors might be useful. It would be helpful if these naval officers understood how difficult it is to induce defections but how worthwhile in terms of intelligence take an informed Soviet defector can be.

[Redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

6. I don't know how helpful the foregoing will be to you since I am keenly aware that you have all these facts at your fingertips. I must say, however, that it would be helpful to the Agency and its mission if you were to cover these items since missionary work of this sort bears great fruit in our relations with naval officers the world over.

RH
Richard Helms
Chief of Operations, DD/P

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

INSERT

The Inchon Landings: an example of effective cooperation

Problem: to get best intelligence on Seoul-Inchon Area, as to landing sites, defenses, enemy troop dispositions, etc.



(b)(1)
(b)(3)

Radioed commendation from Admiral Joy: Your work in current operations Inchon-Seoul Area has been exemplary. Reports have been timely and information has proven to be most accurate. You have contributed immeasurably to the success of the Inchon landings. Admiral Joy sending.

(A)

After some difficulties in working out relationships, a true community was forged which gives us best intelligence machinery we have ever had, and, we hope, the best intelligence

The IAC, the specific embodiment of community spirit, is where problems are thrashed out

CIA's role in the community

Coordination, largely by agreement

IAC's key position

Evaluation and dissemination of national intelligence

CIA the coordinator, point of issuance, of a product truly community-built

Current intelligence

National estimates

Basic intelligence (NIS program)

Performance of services of common concern; e.g.

Cold war operations

FI operations

Overt collection in USA

Monitoring foreign broadcasts

Basic scientific and economic intelligence

Translation, library, and register services

The Central Problem: Intelligence on the Soviet Bloc

Reason for problem

Vast Soviet CE and counter-subversive outlay

E.G., surveillance of Soviet soldier "contaminated" by contact with West

Real "iron curtain"; relative isolation of orbit

Partial elimination of basic material (e.g., scientific and technological, economic) from overt sources

Contrast with liberality in what is published in U.S.

Solution lies in several directions and some of these produce in turn problems almost as important as the central one itself

New methods and techniques

Better handling of the intelligence we get

Better cooperation with other agencies of government

Review of certain of these sub-problems would be useful

This is not an exhaustive discussion of problems for they exist in all areas in varying degrees

The Sub-problems


- (1) New methods and techniques, a matter we are constantly working on. For example:

Physical tools and equipment (the TSS field)




(b)(1)
(b)(3)

New approaches to the problem of diminishing sources



(b)(1)
(b)(3)

New sources



(b)(1)
(b)(3)



(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(2) Better handling and exploitation of the information we get

Improvement in techniques and personnel and machinery
for collation and evaluation

A cost problem of growing expense in a day of
limited budget

There is a whole series of problems connected
with Budget which need only to be suggested

Carefully planned and directed long-range research and
intelligence production programs

Especially in economics, science

Better brains on the reasoning and speculative side of
producing better estimates

These solutions suggest a more fundamental problem: Personnel

Highly selective recruitment

Thorough training

Career service

(3) Better cooperation with other agencies of government

Much progress can be reported in the intelligence field

E.g. Duplication largely eliminated through efficient
division of labor within intelligence community

E.g. Cooperation in producing national intelligence
estimates is outstanding

The problem of relating intelligence estimates to war plans

E.g. Edwards and Bull Reports on Soviet capability to inflict damage on U.S.

Important in out-guessing Soviets in their reactions to U.S. policy

The Inchon Landing: an example of effective cooperation

Conclusion

Discussion has covered only some of more obvious problems which stem from the Soviet Bloc problem

This is not to be taken as indication that we are not concerned with other matters in other areas

Purpose of solving problem is to give greatest possible assistance to policy makers

Hereby hangs another problem: to get policy makers to use intelligence provided

But they're doing pretty well on this

MAJOR PROBLEMS OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE
(Proposed Outline for Naval War College Speech for November 1953)

Introduction

Pleasantries

General comment on the topic

A welcome one

Permits getting down to cases

Avoids stereotyped mission-function-organization approach

A formidable one, demanding much organization and rigorous selection

A host of problems confronts DCI in his position both in CIA and intelligence community at large

Can avoid administrative problems and the like (which are many and important)

Will seek to discuss those that are central to our problem

Pivotal problem is the immensity of the task of getting information on the Soviet Orbit

But an understanding of even this requires that it be placed in context

Context: A brief picture of the intelligence community

Origin

Arose from need to apply coordinated intelligence to policy

Wartime intelligence coordination experience was encouraging

Result: the National Security Act of 1947

Which, among other things, created CIA and provided basic charter for peacetime intelligence community