

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

DO/P-2-2837
Executive Registry
E.O. 62-4192

18 June 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Director's Meeting with the Secretary of Defense

1. At 11:30, 18 June, the Director met with Secretary McNamara and Deputy Secretary Gilpatric to report on his trip to Southeast Asia. The meeting lasted until 12:40. The Deputy Director (Plans) also was present.

2. The Director described in detail his long talks in Taipei with Chiang Kai-Shek. He indicated that Chiang seemed to be in good health at the time, although his hands shook when he drank tea toward the end of each meeting.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[Redacted]

3. After considerable discussion of Chiang's plan for a return to the Mainland, it became clear that there was some misunderstanding on the part of Messrs. McNamara and Gilpatric as to whether the United States had decided to withhold logistic support from any military effort which Chiang was planning to make. It also became clear that there was no consensus in the United States Government on what it conceives Chiang's role to be: a) whether it is solely to protect

(b)(3)

[Redacted]

COPY

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

SECRET NOFORN

- 2 -

Taiwan, or b) whether it is to attempt the liberation of China from the Communists at an appropriate time.

4. The Director advocated the equipping of five C-123 aircraft and the positioning of amphibious gear for use by the ChiNats with the understanding that it would all remain in United States hands pending a policy decision about its use. Secretary McNamara did not seem to feel that amphibious equipment should be stockpiled until it became clear that ChiNat intelligence-gathering missions demonstrated that an attack on the Mainland had some chance of success.

[Redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

5. The Director then discussed the places he had visited in South Viet-Nam and described in some detail the training installations which the Agency is running. He spoke of our desire to increase the number of training bases and to secure the services of sixteen Special Forces teams which would have three CIA personnel attached to each. Secretary McNamara indicated that he was favorable to this additional training effort and would give whatever support we believe we require. It was agreed that our proposal should be taken up through the Special Group. The Director concluded this part of the meeting by saying that although he did not want to depreciate the efforts being made in South Viet-Nam, he was not optimistic about the success of the whole United States program.

+919

COPY

SECRET NOFORN

SECRET NOFORN

- 3 -

6. After describing the places he visited in Thailand, the Director explained the training of Border Police and Royal Thai Army units by United States forces in Northeast Thailand. He underlined his belief that United States Military Forces in Thailand should have training as their basic mission, and touched on the problem the United States may have in maintaining them there if pressure is applied by the Communists for their withdrawal in the context of the Laotian settlement. He then discussed Prime Minister Sarit's concern about Burma's current political orientation and pointed out that the United States position in Laos was regarded by Sarit as being the prime factor in causing Burma's slide to the left. He stated that he feared Thailand would move toward neutralism and seek accommodation with the Communist camp if the United States position in the area showed additional signs of weakness.

7. The Director concluded the meeting by saying that he thought United States programs in Southeast Asia were essentially holding actions which would buy time. He said he did not think that they would succeed over the long run, pointing out that we were merely chipping away at the toe of a glacier from the North. He read the "General Conclusions" from the paper prepared at the end of our trip. Secretary McNamara commented that he did not feel it had yet been proved that United States actions were not capable of rolling back



SECRET NOFORN

SECRET NOFORN

- 4 -

the Communist push. It was agreed that the United States should continue to support programs and projects which would buy time.

RH
Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

Distribution:
Original & 3cc - DCI
2 - DDP



SECRET NOFORN