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15 December 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. ALLEN W. MILLES


Office of the DCI

SUBJECT:

Developments in the Willoughby Situation and Certain Recommendations

- 1. This memorandum is submitted in response to your request for a write-up of the information given to me orally by General Cabell on Friday, 8 December, immediately following his return from Japan where he had gone on a trip of brief direction with General Collins. I am including in this memorandum certain additional information concerning recent developments, all of which point up in my view to the conclusion that it would be most desirable for a very high ranking representative of General Smith, preferably yourself, to visit the Far Eastern Command in the relatively near future. This representative should bear with him the highest possible credentials in order to assure him of a good reception in the Far Eastern Command and guarantee that he will have the opportunity of working out a more satisfactory solution of the problems which are presently besetting the operatives of both OSO and OPC.
- 2. General Cabell reported that he and General Collins had two conferences with General MacArthur, General Willoughby having been present at the second conference but not the first. General MacArthur stated to General Collins that he recognized the importance of the mission of CIA and realized that in the discharge of its responsibility it was necessary for the CIA to do things that did not particularly appeal to him. He was prepared to be of assistance to the CIA, but he wanted to be certain that his staff was kept sufficiently acquainted with the activities of CIA in order to provide him with the necessary degree of protection to his own position, especially in his role as Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces (SCAP). In a private conversation between General Cabell and General Willoughby (which took place on the evening before the last meeting with General MacArthur) General Cabell had volunteered a statement to the effect that General Smith's arrival as Chief of the CIA was welcomed by all in Washington and that relationships between CIA and the military establishment should improve as a result of this development. Willoughby responded by saying he was very glad to hear of this, especially from General Cabell, but made no further comment at that time. On the occasion of the final meeting with General MacArthur, General Willoughby made some favorable comments about

General Smith



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General Smith, and General MacArthur urged General Collins to bring back with him and deliver to General Smith a most cordial invitation to visit the Far Fastern Command. He said that he wanted General Collins to assure General Smith of the warmth of the welcome which he would receive and to tell General Smith that he believed it should be possible to iron out any difficulties which might exist. General Willoughby insisted at this meeting that he had no thought or desire to curtail CIA operations but that he was only interested in coordinating and being on notice of what CIA is doing.

General Cabell stated that it was his own personal estimate of the situation that Willoughby would continue to insist upon CIA's furnishing to him fairly detailed statements of its plans and activities, and he said that we might as well be prepared to go along with this requirement. He further stated that it would do no good whatever for us to solicit any directives or instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff or other Defense Department officials to General MacArthur on the subject of the CIA relationship. Even if such a directive or instruction were to be sent from the Pentagon to FEC, it would not accomplish any useful result. The only way to get anything done would be for General Smith or a representative of very considerable stature to visit the theater in person. (General Cabell stated that the Air Force escape and evasion drop operations, toward which we made a contribution of trained personnel and about which I have been concerned lest General Willoughby take violent exception, now appear to be out in the open and accepted by General Willoughby. General Willoughby even went so far as to say that these operations could be cited as an example of what might be done with and after proper coordination. General Willoughby must have made this remark with his tongue in his cheek in view of the fact that the Air Force drove ahead with this operation without prior clearance or full approval from General Willoughby. The point is that the Air Force was absolutely insistent and completely adament on the grounds that these operations were essential for the protection of Air Force personnel and were a requirement which the Operating Commander of the Far Eastern Air Force refused to forego. He won his point.)

3. Attached herewith is an item from the 14 December issue of the Washington Post, which is a dispatch from Tokyo that was obviously based upon an interview with General Willoughby. It is his reaction to the Alsop column criticizing him and blaming him for the intelligence failure in North Korea. General Willoughby, in giving this interview, has divulged secret information concerning his own agents as well as CIA agent(b)(1) operations.

He has revealed other secret information and has shown a disposition to disregard the confidential character of information given to him by

CIA in accordance

CIA in accordance with his own demands. The item is worth reading and thinking about as to what it may portend for the future and what may be expected to happen to other secret information which may be given to General Willoughby by us if it should suit his mood or convenience to disclose it.

4. Our most recent messages from the field indicate that the situation is not improving very much and that our people work under extreme difficulties. (b)(1)Colonel Stilwell, who is the Chief of our (OPC) Far Eastern operations, is currently in Japan and has been authorized to (b)(3)discuss matters with Willoughby. I expect him to return shortly before Chris mas and he may have additional information and recommendations to report. are seriously concerned (b)(1)about the prospect of General Willoughby's interference with, or attempted (b)(3)control of, the operations which we have planned (b)(1) (b)(3)cannot possibly have any important results if they are interfered with by uncoordinated and probably conflicting operations by General Willoughby; and, moreover, our people do not feel that they can conduct operations effectively if General Willoughby should extend his strictures to cover these operations, as well as those which he has heretofore taken in charge. We do not yet know just how far General Willoughby considers his writ to run, but there have been rather definite indications that operations he will concern himself with intelligence (b)(1)(b)(3)

FRANK G. WISNER
Assistant Director for
Policy Coordination

Encl: 1 Newapaper clipping, Washington Post, 14 Dec. 1950

CC: DDCI

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