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10 May 1961DEPUTIES' MEETING

Present: Mr. Dulles, General Cabell, Mr. Bissell, Mr. Amory,
Colonel White, Mr. Helms, Mr. Barnes, Mr. Abbot Smith,
General Balmer, Mr. Earman

MR. DULLES:

a. (b)(1)
(b)(3)

b. Noted an outgoing State Department Circular reviewing problems posed by the Castro regime, and asked that CIA Chiefs of Station at posts where this cable was received get in touch with their respective ambassadors with particular reference to paragraph 6.

c. Referred to the record of actions taken at the NSC meeting on 5 May 1961, and asked DD/P to follow up on any action required by CIA. Mr. Amory noted that a copy of the record of action in question had been sent to Mr. Bissell.

d. Noted there is a possibility the President may visit Montevideo, and asked DD/P to take a hard look at the security implications involved.

e. Stated that in his opinion there is a good possibility that Kong Le may come out as head of the military forces of Laos as a result of a peace settlement, and commented we should be thinking about ways and means to induce him to "redefect" should this come about. He remarked that Captain Lynch, who participated in the Cuban operation, knows Kong Le well and in fact had trained him prior to his defection to the Pathet Lao. Action: DD/P

f. Asked DD/P to draft a cable to Admiral Dennison expressing appreciation for his support during the Cuban operation.

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g. Stated he was not convinced that all is quiet in Algiers and will remain so, [redacted]

[redacted] Action: DD/P

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(b)(3)

GENERAL CABELL:

Noted a cable [redacted] reporting the possibility of a coup in Venezuela, [redacted]

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(b)(3)

[redacted] The Director concurred. Action: DD/P

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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MR. HELMS:

a. Reported that he had been advised by Jim Critchfield, CIA representative on the Iranian Task Force, that at its meeting yesterday Mr. Hilsman of State was of the strong opinion that a new estimate on Iran is needed and should be prepared by him and [redacted] CIA Station Chief, Teheran. Mr. Helms said that Mr. Critchfield had suggested to Hilsman that this was a matter of primary concern to the estimators, and Hilsman had replied that the estimative machinery was "too cumbersome" and all that was required was for him (Hilsman) and [redacted] to roll up their sleeves and produce the estimate in the shortest time possible. Mr. Bissell noted that in his opinion Mr. Hilsman's proposal is wrong and the Director should bring our feeling on the matter to his attention. He pointed out that the Board of National Estimates and the military should not be left out in the preparation of any estimate and, further, that requests for estimates on any subject should be channeled through the DCI. Mr. Amory remarked that our 28 February 1961 estimate on Iran is a good one, is valid, and that at the moment [redacted] of ONE is working with Mr. Talbot and others in State in bringing it up to date. Mr. Bissell again stated he could not too strongly recommend that Mr. Hilsman be advised that intelligence contributions to task forces appointed on a given area should be requested through the Director and handled by the established estimative procedures.

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b. Reported he had quite a lengthy conversation with Eric Timm yesterday regarding the President's visit to Paris and that both were concerned over the fact that at the moment no one dares get in touch with the rightist element in France. He said it is an established fact that the leaders' telephones are tapped, that [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted] and therefore it is almost impossible [redacted] to find out whether this element will organize or attempt to organize demonstrations during the time the President is in France. [redacted] The Director concurred.

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MR. BISSELL:

Reported that [redacted] an officer of the FE Division, had recently been in contact with [redacted] and at the end of this conference had indicated he was on his way to the White House to see Arthur Schlesinger in order to prevent "another Cuba." Mr. Bissell recalled that [redacted] is the individual who was guilty of a security violation in a letter to the White House seeking employment with the new administration and wherein he had revealed his activities with CIA to include [redacted] He said that while the contact [redacted] is not a security violation, it is a violation of CIA regulations requiring such contact be first cleared with [redacted] Mr. Bissell went on to say that [redacted] is an old friend of Arthur Schlesinger. After some discussion, it was agreed that DD/P would talk to [redacted] and make it clear to him that this recent instance was his second violation of rules and regulations of the Agency and any future such violations could cause his dismissal. The Director said Mr. Bissell should not tie this case to the contact with Schlesinger but, rather, [redacted] continued disregard of regulations that all employees of CIA are required to abide by. The Director also stated Mr. Bissell might advise [redacted] that if he is dissatisfied with employment here, we would make every attempt to find him a job elsewhere in government.

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MR. BARNES:

- a. Reported that he had seen Arthur Schlesinger to brief him and believes Schlesinger now has the information he desired.
b. Reported that the most recent [redacted] took the Cuban operation to task, stating it was particularly ill planned from the viewpoint of the invasion beaches selected. After some discussion, it was agreed that Mr. Barnes would take up this matter with [redacted]

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Handwritten initials 'JSE' with a flourish above them.

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