

prices in the field of apprehending war criminals is strictly free lance and commercial. According to [] Aldouby obtained advances of money from important magazines -- such as Der Stern, Paris-Match, and possibly Look -- which he would use in setting up the operation. Katz, almost certainly at the behest of the Israeli embassy in Brussels, asked [] to persuade Aldouby to call off the entire operation, and even promised that the Israeli embassy would reimburse Aldouby for advances he would have to return to his backers.

4. As [] notes, this put [] somewhat in a quandry. On the one hand, the Israeli disavowal of Aldouby doubtless brought home to him the caution which we have been urging that he adopt toward Aldouby and the entire operation. On the other hand, [] stood to gain much from the project if it worked out. Moreover, he must have calculated that the main concern of the Israeli's was to avoid becoming embarrassed by another incident during the course of the Eichmann trial, particularly since Degrelle, as a Belgian war criminal and collaborator, has very little interest for them. He did not, therefore, urge Aldouby to call the project off, nor did he withdraw himself. At the present moment he is awaiting a call from Paris which will summon him to a hideout probably on the Riviera to which Degrelle will be brought from Spain. [] has made arrangements in Brussels for the use of a car and a house in bringing Degrelle back to Belgium. He spent some of his own money to set these arrangements and, after receiving a rubber check, has finally been reimbursed by Aldouby.

5. The two new, and extremely interesting elements, are, of course, the presence in Spain of [] and the fact that [] is aware ~~is aware~~ of the plan. In discussing the case with [] [] mentioned that the first person who put him on the scent to Degrelle in Spain was an old Brussels friend and colleague, whom he did not name. We thought at first that this may have been de Trixhe or perhaps another member of the Belgian services; [] himself works in a sinecure in the Ministry of Justice and has longstanding contacts with the Belgian internal services. [] description of his friend, however, seems to rule out our initial hypothesis: his friend is a long-term resident in Spain who went there following the tragic death of his son.

The interest of the Belgian services in the Degrelle case -- if indeed, [] was in Spain on this matter -- could be explained in one of two ways. [] old friend in Spain may himself be a member of the Belgian services and reported Degrelle's presence both to [] and his employers. Or, conversely, [] may have told some contact of his in the Belgian government of his plan -- perhaps to assess what legal questions might be involved -- and the story may have worked its way back to elements interested enough to send an agent to Spain to look into the matter.

6. The fact that [] has gotten wind of the plan is, from our vantage point, more difficult to explain. We know that one of Aldouby's backers in the venture is supposed to be Der Stern, and we know that the Israeli embassy told Katz that it disapproved of Aldouby because he dealt with Der Stern, which had "Nazi backers." It may be that someone at Der Stern heard Aldouby's proposal and tipped off Degrelle -- perhaps for old times' sake. [] might then have cited the "Jews around Der Stern" simply as a smokescreen. Of course, there are probably any number of other explanations unknown to us which could account for the leak equally well. One we would not overlook is the possibility that Aldouby himself, or one of his associates, sold the information to [] for a quick profit, rather than mounting the full, complicated and dangerous operation necessary to earn payment from the magazines.

7. Our attitude toward the entire matter remains unchanged. We would approve any involvement by [] which was reasonably safe and brought him the additional and important credit of having captured a war criminal. The operative work, however, is safe. To our thinking, the entire operation is admittedly journalistic and very probably amateur; we do not want [] who retains some adventurist tendencies from the old days in the resistance, to become exposed to legal or physical harm in the process. We told him, through [] that some rumors were already circulating about the project and that in all probability such rumors might reach the victim himself. (This is a reasonable statement given the fact that Aldouby, whatever clandestine rituals he observes, has talked to Par Stern and other publications to obtain backing, and has enlisted heaven knows who to work with him.) We told [] also that the entire affair smacked of amateurism, and that a great deal of unpleasantness -- including health hazards to Degrelle or his abductors -- could arise when untrained people attempted a tricky and dangerous mission. He fully agrees, having now lost much of his initial confidence in Aldouby's credentials as a professional Israeli intelligence agent. He has assured us that he will not set foot inside Spain himself. He agreed, also, that it might be well to bring a doctor along to insure that the "interrogation" of Degrelle in the South of France (to discover the whereabouts of other war criminals such as Bormann) does not lead to unintentional manslaughter. (We doubt that any of the agents knows the state of Degrelle's health.) Finally, he agrees with our assessment, that, in all probability, the plan will not come off. If he does receive the call to Paris, signalling the beginning of the operation, we have arranged that he will let us know immediately all the details made known to him (the date, location for hiding Degrelle in France, and so forth) and keep us advised as the operation progresses.

8. There are no Paris traces on [] We will report further any developments as they arise.