

upon information made available to me in my official capacity, upon advice and counsel of the CIA Office of General Counsel, and upon conclusions and determinations reached and made in accordance therewith.

2. Through the exercise of my official duties, I have become familiar with the Plaintiff's 29 May 1979 FOIA/PA request for all records on himself and his 27 November 1982 FOIA request for all records available on Janet Fraser Kimball, his deceased wife, and with the documents retrieved and treated in response to those requests. In response to Plaintiff's request, Defendant CIA conducted a thorough search for all documents retrievable by searches under the names of the Plaintiff and Janet Fraser Kimball. These searches resulted in the retrieval of eighteen (18) CIA documents. Of these eighteen (18) CIA documents, one (1) document was released in full, fifteen (15) documents were released in part and two (2) documents were denied in their entirety under designated FOIA and PA provisions. Additionally, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) located two (2) FBI documents containing CIA information, which were referred to the Agency. Some of the CIA information in these two (2) FBI documents was also withheld. In preparing this Declaration, I have carefully reviewed these documents to determine which information could be released to Plaintiff Kimball and which information must continue to be withheld. As a result of this review, I have

determined that certain information is exempt from disclosure and must be withheld from the requester.

3. The purpose of this Declaration is to explain why certain information contained in the documents retrieved in response to the Plaintiff's requests, and at issue herein, is exempt from disclosure under the FOIA and Privacy Act. Furthermore, I will explain why the claimed FOIA and PA exemptions apply to the information withheld from the Plaintiff.

4. For the Court's and Plaintiff's ease of reference, this Declaration will be divided into two sections. In the first section, I will discuss the general types of information contained within these documents, and withheld from Plaintiff, and the application of the appropriate FOIA/PA exemptions to such information. In the second section of this Declaration--the Document Disposition Index--I will discuss the information withheld on each individual document, cross-referencing the justifications to the appropriate explanatory paragraphs in the first section by means of the Letter Code List preceding the Document Disposition Index. To facilitate consideration of the deletions made on the CIA documents that were released in redacted form, copies of those documents are attached hereto in the Appendix with letter codes identifying each deletion. By comparing the letter code of the deletion to the Letter Code List, Plaintiff and the Court will be able to see exactly what type of information is represented by the deletion.

5. While the Agency believes the above procedure will adequately justify its actions, nonetheless the CIA is prepared to submit a classified affidavit or to make the full-text documents available for the Court's ex parte, in camera consideration should the Court deem such a submission appropriate.

6. As DO/IRO, I am responsible for the determinations set forth in this Declaration. After carefully reviewing the documents addressed herein, I have personally determined and affirm that the information withheld from Plaintiff may not be released because:

(a) The information is currently and properly classified pursuant to Executive Order 12356 as information requiring continued protection against unauthorized disclosure. Thus such information is exempt from release pursuant to FOIA exemption (b) (1) and Privacy Act exemption (k) (1);

(b) The information withheld, if released, could reasonably be expected to lead to the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sources and methods that the Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for protecting against unauthorized disclosure as set forth in 50 U.S.C. §403(d) (3). Thus, such information is exempt from release pursuant to FOIA exemption (b) (3) and Privacy Act exemption (j) (1); and/or

(c) Certain of the withheld information reveals facts about the organization, functions, names, official titles, or numbers of personnel employed by CIA, all of which categories of information are encompassed within 50 U.S.C. §403g. Thus, such types of information are exempt from release pursuant to FOIA exemption (b) (3) and Privacy Act exemption (j) (1).

Classification--FOIA Exemption (b) (1);
Privacy Act Exemption (k) (1)

7. Exemption (b) (1) of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. §552(b) (1), provides that the FOIA does not apply to matters that are:

(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and

(B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order.

Exemption (k) (1) to the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. §552a(k) (1), states that the head of any agency may promulgate rules to exempt any system of records within the agency from disclosure if the system of records is subject to the provisions of 5 U.S.C. §552(b) (1). In other words, an agency may exempt classified information from disclosure under the Privacy Act. The Director of the CIA has implemented exemption (k) (1) by promulgating regulations at 32 C.F.R. §1901.71(a) (1), which regulations exempt classified information from disclosure. Thus, Privacy Act exemption (k) (1) is the corollary to FOIA exemption (b) (1). As will be discussed below, Defendant CIA has invoked FOIA exemption (b) (1) and Privacy Act exemption (k) (1) to justify withholding of certain classified information at issue.

8. The authority of a CIA official to classify documents is derived from a succession of Executive orders, the most recent of which is Executive Order 12356 (47 Fed. Reg. 14874), which became effective on 1 August 1982. Section 6.1(c) of

that Order defines national security information as "information that has been determined pursuant to this Order or any predecessor order to require protection against unauthorized disclosure and that is so designated." National security information is synonymous with classified information. Executive Order 12356, §1.1(a). The documents that have been withheld, either in part or in their entirety, because of the classified information contained therein, were reviewed under the criteria established in Executive Order 12356. Thus, the standards of that Executive Order apply in evaluating the Agency's claim of exemption under exemptions (b) (1) and (k) (1).

9. As a senior CIA official and pursuant to a written delegation of authority from the Director of Central Intelligence, I hold original classification authority at the TOP SECRET level. I, therefore, am authorized to conduct classification reviews and to make original classification decisions. With respect to the information for which exemptions (b) (1) and exemption (k) (1) are asserted in this case, I have reviewed personally the determinations under the standards of Executive Order 12356 and have determined that such information is currently and properly classified. I also have determined that certain of these documents were properly classified under predecessor classification Executive orders and that these documents or segments of documents retain their

classified status at the CONFIDENTIAL or SECRET levels pursuant to Executive Order 12356.

10. Initially, I have determined that the kinds of information contained in the various documents concern one or more of the following general categories of classifiable information set forth in section 1.3(a)(4) of Executive Order 12356:

(a) Information that would reveal the identity of an intelligence source or disclose an intelligence method; or

(b) Information that would reveal intelligence activities and interests of the CIA.

I have determined further that unauthorized disclosure of this information, either by itself or in the context of other information, reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security. Executive Order 12356, §1.3(b). Accordingly, I have determined that the withheld information is properly classified at the SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL levels, as indicated. Because the information concerns classifiable categories of information, and because unauthorized disclosure of this information reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security, such information satisfies the substantive classification requirements of Executive Order 12356 and, thus, is properly classified. In this regard, I note that the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sources or methods is presumed to cause damage to the national security. Executive Order 12356, §1.3(c).

11. I have also determined that the official full-text copies of the documents containing information withheld on the basis of exemptions (b)(1) and (k)(1) are in conformity with the requisite procedural requirements of Executive Order 12356. Each such document containing classified information bears on its face a number identifying the classifying officer, the date of classification review, the date or event for the next scheduled classification review, information indicating the agency or office of origin, and the level of classification. Accordingly, such information satisfies the procedural classification requirements of §1.5 of Executive Order 12356. Since the information satisfies the substantive and procedural classification requirements of Executive Order 12356, such information is exempt from disclosure under exemption (b)(1) of the FOIA and exemption (k)(1) of the Privacy Act. In addition, and as I will discuss later, since much of this information concerns intelligence sources and/or methods, or CIA organizational and functional information, such information is coextensively exempt from disclosure pursuant to exemption (b)(3) of the FOIA and exemption (j)(1) of the Privacy Act.

Intelligence Sources or Methods--
FOIA Exemption (b) (3); Privacy Act Exemption (j) (1)

12. Exemption (b) (3) of the FOIA states that the FOIA does not apply to matters that are:

specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552(b) of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld.

5 U.S.C. §552(b) (3). Defendant CIA contends that there are two statutes that operate pursuant to FOIA (b) (3) to exempt certain of the information contained in the documents at issue. 50 U.S.C. §403(d) (3) requires the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. The provisions of this section are further implemented by virtue of 50 U.S.C. §403g, which provides that the CIA shall be exempt from the provision of any other law requiring the publication or disclosure of the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the CIA. Thus, information falling within the ambit of either of these two statutes is exempt from disclosure pursuant to exemption (b) (3) of the FOIA.

13. Exemption (j) (1) of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. §552a(j) (1), provides that the head of the CIA may promulgate rules to exempt any of CIA's records systems from any part of the Act, with certain exceptions that are specifically listed.

In accordance with this statutory authorization, the Director of the CIA has promulgated regulations, 32 C.F.R.

§1901.61(d) and (e), which exempt from disclosure those portions of all systems of records maintained by the CIA that:

(1) consist of, pertain to, or would otherwise reveal intelligence sources or methods; or

(2) consist of documents or information provided by foreign, federal, state, or other public agencies or authorities.

As can be seen from the above language, PA exemption (j) (1), as implemented, is the Privacy Act corollary to FOIA exemption (b) (3). As will be specified herein, Defendant CIA has claimed exemptions (b) (3) and (j) (1) as independent or alternative bases for withholding certain of the information contained herein. Accordingly, in discussing the categories of information withheld from Plaintiffs, I will specify when exemptions (b) (1) and (b) (3), (j) (1) and (k) (1) coextensively apply to the information withheld. Conversely, when a certain segment of information is withheld only on the basis of either (b) (1) or (b) (3), (k) (1) or (j) (1), I will so designate.

Intelligence Sources--FOIA Exemptions (b) (1) and (b) (3);
PA Exemptions (k) (1) and (j) (1)

14. Certain of the information has been withheld because its disclosure could reasonably be expected to lead to the identification of an intelligence source. Intelligence sources

can be expected to furnish information only when confident that they are protected from retribution or embarrassment by the absolute secrecy surrounding their relationship with the CIA. In other words, intelligence sources must be certain that the CIA can and will do everything in its power to prevent the public disclosure of their association with the CIA. For example, if an American businessman is willing to share information with the CIA that he obtains in the course of his everyday business, such an individual could suffer serious embarrassment and loss of business should the fact of his collaboration with the CIA be publicized. In the case of a foreign national abroad who has been cooperating with the CIA, usually without the knowledge of his government, the consequences of public disclosure are often swift and sure--ranging from economic reprisals to possible harassment, imprisonment, or even death. In light of the probable consequence of disclosure, individuals are understandably reluctant to cooperate with the CIA or with American intelligence unless they can be absolutely certain that the fact of their cooperation will forever remain secret. Moreover, intelligence sources who remain within their society are at all times subject to retribution if and when they are identified or, indeed, merely suspected of being CIA collaborators. This is also true of intelligence sources who may no longer actively cooperate with the CIA. In many cases,

the very nature of the information passed necessarily tends to reveal the source because of the limited number of individuals having access to the information. If such information is disclosed, the source may be perpetually vulnerable to discovery, and retribution may be a real threat for him and his family for many years.

15. Moreover, the release of information that would identify an intelligence source most likely would have a serious effect upon this Agency's ability to recruit other potential sources in the future. As stated previously, most individuals are reluctant to cooperate with the CIA unless they can be positive that their identities will be kept forever secret. If a potential source has any doubts about the ability of the CIA to preserve secrecy, i.e., if he learns that the identity of another source was disclosed by the Agency, his desire to cooperate with the CIA would naturally be quite small. In other words, individual sources, be they present or future, simply will not work for the CIA if they are convinced or believe that the CIA cannot protect their identities. The loss of such intelligence sources, and the accompanying loss in critical intelligence that they provide, would have serious effects upon the national security of this country.

16. The Supreme Court, in CIA v. Sims, recently affirmed the critical need of the CIA to protect its intelligence sources from public disclosure. The Court recognized that

compelled disclosure of a source's name or other potentially identifying information can cause a number of harms. First, it can subject the source himself to retribution or exploitation by our adversaries. Secondly, disclosure of one source will inhibit the willingness of other sources to work for the Agency, thus leading to a potential loss of critical intelligence. Finally, compelled disclosure of intelligence sources can help our adversaries pinpoint, and take steps to counter, the specific areas in which the Agency is interested. The Supreme Court fully realized that all of these probable consequences would greatly impair the Agency's ability to carry out its mission, and thereby harm the national security of this country. Observing that the CIA would be virtually impotent if it could not absolutely protect its intelligence sources, the Court stated:

In exercising the authority granted by Congress in Sec. 102 (d) (3) [50 U.S.C. §403(d) (3)], the Director must, of course, do more than simply withhold the names of intelligence sources. Such withholding, standing alone, does not carry out the mandate of Congress. Foreign intelligence services have an interest in knowing what is being studied and researched by our agencies dealing with national security and by whom it is being done. Foreign intelligence services have both the capacity to gather and analyze any information that is in the public domain and the substantial expertise in deducing the identities of intelligence services have both the capacity to gather and analyze any information that is in the public domain and the substantial expertise in deducing the identities of intelligence sources from seemingly unimportant details.

* * *

The decisions of the Director, who must of course be familiar with "the whole picture," as judges are not, are worthy of great deference given the magnitude of the national security interests and potential risks at stake.

CIA v. Sims, 53 U.S.L.W. 4453 at 4458, 4459 (U.S. April 16, 1985).

17. For the foregoing reasons, I have determined that unauthorized disclosure of information that would or could reasonably be expected to lead to the identification of an intelligence source would cause damage to the national security. Thus, such information is currently and properly classified and, therefore, exempt from disclosure pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(1) and PA exemption (k)(1). Coextensively, information that could lead to the revelation of an intelligence source's identity precisely falls within the ambit of 50 U.S.C. §403(d)(3) and thus is exempt from disclosure pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(1).

Intelligence Methods--FOIA Exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3); PA Exemptions (k)(1) and (j)(1)

18. Certain of the information has been withheld because its disclosure reasonably could be expected to lead to the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence methods. Intelligence methods are the means by which, and the manner in which, an intelligence agency accomplishes its business. Most organized

professions or businesses employ methods to accomplish their goals and objectives that are common to and, in some cases, unique to that business or profession. A bank, for example, uses accounting and financial recordkeeping methods, some of which are unique while others are common to all banks. The same general characterizations may be applied to an intelligence agency such as the CIA and the intelligence methods it uses. Many of the methods that CIA uses are unique to CIA among all of the intelligence agencies. Many of the methods are common to all intelligence agencies, and some methods that CIA uses are common to activities other than intelligence. The basic element in all of these variants is that they are methods used by the CIA in its conduct of intelligence activities. The use of such methods in that capacity provides them with a special character in CIA records that necessitates protecting the fact of their use, as well as the details of their use, from unauthorized disclosure.

19. Intelligence methods must be protected in situations where a certain capability or a certain technique or the application thereof is unknown to those individuals or entities, such as a hostile intelligence service, who would take countermeasures. Secret information collection techniques, analytical methods or technological devices are valuable from an intelligence gathering perspective only so long as they remain unknown and unsuspected. Once the nature

of an intelligence method or the fact of its use in a certain situation is discovered, its continued successful use is in serious jeopardy. In fact, once an intelligence method or its use is discovered, the method may be neutralized by hostile intelligence services either by denying the information flow via that method or using that method to provide false information. This result is true whether the intelligence methods are those used for the collection of intelligence information, the conduct of clandestine activities, or those techniques utilized in the analysis and evaluation of intelligence information.

20. It is significant to note that the term "intelligence methods" is not limited to sophisticated techniques and electronic devices. Rather, "intelligence methods" also includes the standard practices and procedures of an intelligence agency. Knowledge of or insights into such practices would be of invaluable assistance to those who wish to detect, penetrate, counter, or evaluate the activities of the CIA. In summary, it is the fact of the use of a particular intelligence method in a specific context that is the information that must be protected. Disclosure of this information would allow anyone in the public to determine the intelligence method at issue, thereby compromising the past and future value of this particular method. For these reasons, unauthorized disclosure of details pertaining to the

intelligence methods in question could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national security, through compromise of the method in question and a concomitant loss of intelligence produced by that method. Thus, such information is currently and properly classified and is exempt from disclosure pursuant to FOIA exemption (b) (1), and PA exemption (k) (1).

Coextensively, since release of this information could lead to the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence methods, such information falls within the ambit of 50 U.S.C. §403(d) (3) and is thus exempt from disclosure pursuant to FOIA exemption (b) (3) and PA exemption (j) (1).

Cryptonyms--FOIA Exemptions (b) (1) and (b) (3);
PA Exemptions (k) (1) and (j) (1)

21. Certain of the information withheld consists of cryptonyms. A cryptonym is an artificial word used as a substitute for the actual name or identity of a person or project. Cryptonyms are used to provide an added measure of security to minimize the adverse effects that would flow from the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence information, and as such, they constitute an intelligence method. Cryptonyms are used frequently in cables and other correspondence to disguise the true name of a person or project. When obtained and matched with other information, a cryptonym possesses a great deal of meaning for those who are able to fit it into the

proper cognitive framework. For example, the reader of a message is better able to assess the value of the information contained therein if the reader knows the nature or identity of the particular individual or project represented by the cryptonym. Similarly, the reader of a message also could take action to neutralize the intelligence value of a particular intelligence source if the reader knows the identity of the particular source represented by the cryptonym.

22. The mere use of a particular cryptonym can be an important piece of information to an informed observer of intelligence matters. While release or disclosure of isolated cryptonyms would not necessarily create a serious likelihood of damage to the national security, the disclosure of cryptonyms in the aggregate or in a particular context would make it possible to fit disparate pieces of information together and to discern or deduce the identity or nature of the person or project for which the cryptonym stands. Consequently, individual cryptonyms must be withheld to prevent the public accumulation of cryptonyms from which a pattern could be discerned concerning CIA intelligence methods and against which the significance of an individual cryptonym could be deduced.

23. Cryptonyms are intelligence methods used to provide a degree of protection for other intelligence sources and methods. Accordingly, information that would disclose cryptonyms is withheld under the authority of exemption (b) (3)

of the FOIA and (j)(1) of the PA as specifically exempted from disclosure by the statutory provision that the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods (50 U.S.C. §403(d)(3)). Because the disclosure of cryptonyms could jeopardize the individuals or projects to which they relate, disclosure of cryptonyms also would cause or reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security. Thus, such information currently and properly is classified pursuant to the criteria of Executive Order 12356. Accordingly, such information coextensively is exempt from disclosure under FOIA exemption (b)(1) and PA exemption (k)(1).

CIA Employee Names, Employee Identifiers,
Official Titles, and Organizational Data--
FOIA Exemption (b)(3); PA Exemption (j)(1)

24. Another statutory measure taken to protect intelligence sources and methods (Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. §403g) provides that the CIA is exempt from the provisions of any other law requiring the disclosure of information regarding the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency. On the basis of this statute, a number of CIA staff employees' names and other personal identifiers of individuals or information related to specific individuals (employee numbers, telephone numbers,

initials of employees, etc.) have been deleted from the documents at issue. Additionally, the titles or other organizational identifiers of a number of CIA internal organizational components also have been deleted. Such data have been deleted to prevent detailed knowledge of CIA personnel, structure, organization, and procedures from becoming publicly available and possibly being used as a tool for hostile penetration or manipulation. The names of CIA employees have been deleted because the Agency does not disclose the identity and affiliation of those employees who do not come into public view during the course of their duties. Such employees may have in the past served under cover or in sensitive positions or operations, may be doing so now, or may do so in the future. The public revelation of their affiliation with the CIA could well be used to compromise past, present, or future intelligence operations or activities; to impair the usefulness of such individuals to the Agency; and/or to place their lives, the lives of members of their families, and the lives of intelligence sources they have worked with in jeopardy. Since such information fits within 50 U.S.C. §403g, deletions from portions of the attached documents have been made pursuant to exemption (b) (3) of FOIA and (j) (1) of the Privacy Act.

Dispatch and Cable Numbers, Headquarters File Numbers,
Access Limiters, Notations and Filing Information
FOIA Exemption (b) (3); PA Exemption (j) (1)

25. Information in certain of the documents must be withheld because it would reveal internal file and control markings. Such data are withheld to prevent detailed knowledge of the CIA's structure, operations, and procedures in order to prevent hostile penetration of the CIA and concomitant disclosure of intelligence activities or intelligence interests. For example, certain file indicators within the documents at issue disclose methods used within the DO to keep track of those individuals the DO has an operational interest in the subject of the document. Disclosure of such file indicators would provide an adversary with useful information concerning the methods of the DO. Certain of the documents also contain "action indicators" that define which DO components are responsible for a particular program. Their disclosure would provide an adversary with useful information about the internal structure of the DO. Project file indicators also may reveal areas of geographic and functional interest. Such information, while an indispensable tool for managing an information retrieval system and for focusing resources on a particular area, can, when matched with other like information, endanger the security of CIA filing systems and expose internal CIA organizations and functions to scrutiny and countermeasures by hostile intelligence services.

26. For these reasons, information pertaining to the filing systems, and thus the structure, of the Agency itself, are intelligence methods exempt from disclosure under FOIA exemption (b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(1). It also should be emphasized that such organizational details are of the kind contemplated by 50 U.S.C. §403g, discussed previously, which is an exempting statute within the meaning of FOIA exemption (b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(1).

Segregability

27. After carefully reviewing the documents at issue, I have determined that there are no further meaningful segregable segments of information that can be released to Plaintiff. A release of any further information would risk compromise of the intelligence sources, intelligence activities, and methods sought to be protected. Any bits of nonexempt information would, in my judgment, be meaningless without details of the context in which they appear. Once exempt information is deleted, any nonexempt bits of information are meaningless.

Document Disposition Index

Preface

28. This index will identify all documents retrieved and reviewed for release in response to Plaintiff's FOIA/PA requests. A total of eighteen (18) CIA documents and two (2)

FBI documents containing CIA information are identified in this index and are assigned numbers corresponding, in part, to those used in Defendants' 28 July 1982 letter to the Plaintiff.

Documents treated after the date of this letter are assigned numbers following those numbers in that letter. The nature of the material withheld as exempt is identified and described to the fullest extent possible without disclosing information that must continue to be protected.

29. The Letter Code List that follows sets forth the various categories of information deleted from the documents. As to those documents that were released in part, letters designating appropriate categories in the Letter Code List have been placed on the released version of each CIA document to indicate the kind of information contained in each deletion. For example, the letter "C," where used in connection with a specific deletion, indicates that the information was deleted because it would disclose an intelligence method used in collection operations, analytical activities, or support of clandestine activities. The categories in the following Letter Code List also refer back to the paragraphs in the first part of this Declaration that explain the rationale for the particular category of information withheld. The list also provides, with each listed category, the FOIA and PA exemptions invoked for deletions of that category of information. When a document is discussed, each type of information denied will be

cross-referenced by means of a letter code to the first section of the Declaration where a full justification for withholding of the information is discussed.

Letter Code Listing

- A) Information concerning intelligence activities and interests that is properly classified; FOIA exemption (b) (1) and PA exemption (k) (1). (See ¶¶ 7-11.)
- B) Information concerning the identity of an intelligence source or circumstantial information that, in combination with other information, could lead to the identification of an intelligence source; FOIA exemptions (b) (1) and (b) (3) and PA exemptions (j) (1) and (k) (1). (See ¶¶ 14-17.)
- C) Information concerning an intelligence method; FOIA exemptions (b) (1) and (b) (3) and PA exemptions (j) (1) and (k) (1). (See ¶¶ 18-20.)
- D) Cryptonyms; FOIA exemptions (b) (1) and (b) (3) and PA exemptions (j) (1) and (k) (1). (See ¶¶ 21-23.)
- E) CIA employee names, salaries, identifying data (initials, employee numbers), official titles, telephone numbers and organizational data; FOIA exemption (b) (3) and PA exemption (j) (1). (See ¶ 24.)
- F) Dispatch and cable numbers, Headquarters file numbers, access limiters, notations and filing information; FOIA exemption (b) (3) and PA exemption (j) (1). (See ¶¶ 25-26.)
- G) Classification markings and related control markings; no exemption. Deleted for purposes of providing unclassified version for release.

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTIONS

Document No. 1

Undated biographic data (one page). This document was released in full.

Document No. 2

Memorandum (one page), 8 December 1958; classified "SECRET." Agency component designations, titles, initials, the name of an Agency employee and organizational data were deleted under PA exemption (j)(1) and FOIA exemption (b)(3) and are represented by letter code "E." The full-text copy of this document is properly classified because the entire document viewed with the deleted information concerning Agency components tends to reveal a classified Agency activity or interest. (See letter code "A.") Consequently, as indicated by the letter code "G," the classification marking "SECRET" has been removed to provide an unclassified version of this document.

Document No. 3

Name Check (two pages), 10 December 1958. The letter code "E" indicates where an Agency component and initials of employees were deleted under PA exemption (j)(1) and FOIA exemption (b)(3).

Document No. 4

Name Check (one page), 17 December 1958. The letter code "E" indicates where initials of Agency employees have been deleted under PA exemption (j)(1) and FOIA exemption (b)(3).

Document No. 5

Investigative Report (Synopsis and 21 page report), 15 December 1958; classified "SECRET." Information concerning classified intelligence activities and interests has been deleted on pages 9, 16, 17 and 21 of the report, as represented by the letter code "A," pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(1) and PA exemption (k)(1). As represented by letter code "B," classified information concerning intelligence sources has been deleted in the Synopsis and on pages 3, 4, 6-9 and 21 pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) and PA exemptions (j)(1) and (k)(1). As represented by letter code "C," classified information concerning intelligence methods has been deleted on page 21 pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) and PA exemptions (j)(1) and (k)(1). As represented by letter code

"D," cryptonyms have been deleted on pages 2 and 4-7 pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) and PA exemptions (j)(1) and (k)(1). As represented by letter code "E," information concerning CIA employee names, titles and identifying data have been removed from this report on pages 1, 2, 4-13, and 15-21 under FOIA exemption (b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(1). Finally, the classification marking "SECRET" has been removed on each page, as represented by the letter code "G," to provide an unclassified version of this document.

Document No. 6

Name Check Report (one page), 22 December 1958. The letter code "E" indicates where Agency operating and component initials have been deleted under PA exemption (j)(1) and FOIA exemption (b)(3).

Document No. 7

Record Check (one page), 22 December 1958. The letter code "E" indicates where initials of Agency employees have been deleted under PA exemption (j)(1) and FOIA exemption (b)(3).

Document No. 8

Passport Check (one page), 22 December 1958. The letter code "E" indicates where initials of Agency employees have been deleted under PA exemption (j)(1) and FOIA exemption (b)(3).

Document No. 9

Memorandum (eight pages), 25 September 1959; classified "SECRET." This memorandum contains classified information concerning intelligence activities and interests that has been withheld, as indicated by letter code "A," on pages 1, 2, and 5-7 pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(1) and PA exemption (k)(1). Information concerning intelligence sources, represented by letter code "B" on pages 4, 5 and 7 has been withheld pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) and PA exemptions (j)(1) and (k)(1). Information concerning intelligence methods, withheld on similar FOIA and PA exemptions, has been deleted on pages 1, 2, 6, and 7 as represented by letter code "C." Cryptonyms have been deleted on pages 1 and 5-8 pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) and PA exemptions (j)(1) and (k)(1) and are represented by letter code "D." Agency titles, components, employee names and initials and organizational information have been deleted on pages 1, 2 and 4-8 under PA exemption (j)(1) and FOIA exemption (b)(3) as represented by the letter code "E." Information identifying Agency files has been deleted pursuant to PA exemption (j)(1) and FOIA exemption

(b)(3) as represented by the letter code "F" on page 1. Finally, the classification marking "SECRET" has been removed on each page, as represented by the letter code "G," to provide an unclassified version of this document.

Other information in this document originating with the Department of State (State) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was deleted at the request of these agencies. The deletions requested by State (paragraphs a-e on page 3) and by the FBI (paragraphs 1-3 on page 4) will be addressed by those agencies.

Document No. 10

Memorandum (one page) with Attachment (three pages), 10 October 1959; classified "SECRET." Classified information concerning intelligence activities and interests and intelligence sources and methods was deleted in the final paragraph on page 3 of the attachment (represented by letter codes "A," "B," and "C") pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) and PA exemptions (j)(1) and (k)(1). A cryptonym, represented by letter code "D," was deleted from the cover memorandum pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) and PA exemptions (j)(1) and (k)(1). Information concerning the name of an Agency employee and Agency titles, components and organizational information has been deleted from the cover memorandum and page 3 of the attachment under PA exemptions (j)(1) and FOIA exemptions (b)(3) and is represented by letter code "E." The classification marking "SECRET" has been removed on each page, as represented by the letter code "G," to provide an unclassified version of this document.

Other information in the attachment was deleted at the request of State, the FBI and the Office of Naval Investigations (ONI). ONI requested the deletion of portions of the first three lines in the third subparagraph under paragraph "b" on page 1. The FBI requested the deletion of the remainder of that subparagraph on page 1. State requested the deletions on page 2 of the attachment. These deletions will be addressed separately by those agencies.

Document No. 11

Memorandum (three pages), 18 November 1959; classified "SECRET." Information concerning classified intelligence activities and interests has been deleted on pages 1, 2 and 3, as represented by the letter code "A," pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(1) and PA exemption (k)(1). As represented by letter code "B," classified information concerning intelligence sources has been deleted on pages 2 and 3 pursuant to FOIA

exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) and PA exemptions (j)(1) and (k)(1). As represented by letter code "C," classified information concerning intelligence methods has been deleted on page 1 pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) and PA exemptions (j)(1) and (k)(1). As represented by letter code "D," cryptonyms have been deleted on pages 1 and 3 pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) and PA exemptions (j)(1) and (k)(1). As represented by letter code "E," information concerning CIA employee names, titles, identifying data and organizational information has been removed on pages 1 and 3 under FOIA exemption (b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(1). File handling information has been deleted on pages 1 and 3 as represented by letter code "F" pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(1). Finally, the classification marking "SECRET" has been removed on each page, as represented by the letter code "G," to provide an unclassified version of this document.

Other information in this document originating with the FBI was deleted at their request. The information deleted at the request of the FBI (two deletions in paragraph #5 on page 2) will be treated by that agency.

Document No. 12

Memorandum (two pages), 18 November 1959; classified "SECRET." Information concerning classified intelligence activities and interests has been deleted on pages 1 as represented by the letter code "A," pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(1) and PA exemption (k)(1). As represented by letter code "C," classified information concerning intelligence methods has been deleted on page 1 pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) and PA exemptions (j)(1) and (k)(1). As represented by letter code "D," cryptonyms have been deleted on page 1 pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) and PA exemptions (j)(1) and (k)(1). As represented by letter code "E," information concerning CIA employee names, titles and identifying data have been removed on pages 1 and 2 under FOIA exemption (b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(1). A file number has been deleted on page 1 as represented by letter code "F" pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(1). Finally, the classification marking "SECRET" has been removed on each page, as represented by the letter code "G," to provide an unclassified version of this document.

Document No. 13

Memorandum (one page), 24 March 1960; classified "SECRET." A cryptonym has been deleted as shown by letter code "D" pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) and PA exemptions

(j)(1) and (k)(1). As represented by letter code "E," information concerning CIA employee names, titles, identifying data and organizational information has been removed from this memorandum under FOIA exemption (b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(1). Finally, the classification marking "SECRET" has been removed as represented by the letter code "G" to provide an unclassified version of this document.

Document No. 14

Memorandum, 1 July 1960 (one page); classified "SECRET." A cryptonym has been deleted as shown by letter code "D" pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) and PA exemptions (j)(1) and (k)(1). As represented by letter code "E," information concerning CIA employee names, titles and identifying data has been removed from this memorandum under FOIA exemption (b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(1). A file number has been deleted as represented by letter code "F" pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(1). Finally, the classification marking "SECRET" has been removed as represented by the letter code "G" to provide an unclassified version of this document.

Document No. 15

Form, 6 July 1960 (one page); classified "SECRET." This form was denied in its entirety. The specific purpose of this form, in this case, is to forward the 1 July 1960 memorandum (Document No. 14) to the responsible component for action. The form, itself, is classified "SECRET" in blank (i.e. without any classified information entered onto the form) because it reveals CIA's intelligence methods (See letter code "C") and contains detailed information concerning the organization and function of Agency components (See letter code "E"). The information entered on this form includes an exempt file number (See letter code "F") and references by component name to the 1 July 1960 memorandum, which component name was appropriately deleted from Document No. 14 pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(1). Consequently, as this form consists entirely of classified information concerning intelligence methods and contains information concerning exempt file numbers and Agency components, this document is denied in its entirety under PA exemptions (j)(1) and (k)(1) and FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3).

Document No. 16

Memorandum, 13 November 1958 (one page) with attachment (one page); classified "SECRET." Information concerning classified intelligence activities and interests has been deleted on the memorandum and the attachment, as represented by

the letter code "A," As represented by letter code "D," cryptonyms have been deleted in the memorandum pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) and PA exemptions (j)(1) and (k)(1). As represented by letter code "E," information concerning CIA employee names, titles and identifying data have been removed from the memorandum under FOIA exemption (b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(1). Finally, the classification marking "SECRET" has been removed on both pages, as represented by the letter code "G," to provide an unclassified version of this document.

Document No. 17

Memorandum, 10 February 1959 (two pages); classified "SECRET." Information concerning classified intelligence activities and interests has been deleted on pages 1 and 2, as represented by the letter code "A," pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(1) and PA exemption (k)(1). As represented by letter code "B," classified information concerning intelligence sources has been deleted on the pages 1 and 2 pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) and PA exemptions (j)(1) and (k)(1). As represented by letter code "E," the name of a CIA employee has been removed from page 2 under FOIA exemption (b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(1). Finally, the classification marking "SECRET" has been removed on both pages, as represented by the letter code "G," to provide an unclassified version of this document.

Document No. 18

Form, 20 May 1959 (one page); classified "SECRET." This form was denied in its entirety. This document is classified "SECRET" because of the information it contains concerning CIA's intelligence interests and activities (See letter code "A"), intelligence sources (See letter code "B"), intelligence methods (See letter code "C") and because of the detail it contains concerning the organization and function of Agency components (See letter code "E"). This document also contains an exempt file number (See letter code "F"). Consequently, as this document consists entirely of classified information concerning intelligence interests, sources and methods and contains information concerning exempt file numbers and Agency components, this document is denied in its entirety under PA exemptions (j)(1) and (k)(1) and FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3).

FBI Referral No. 1

FBI Memorandum, dated June 4 1959 (one page); classified "CONFIDENTIAL." The CIA requested the deletion of the information in the subject line of this FBI memorandum because

it pertains to a classified intelligence interest and activity (See letter code "A"), which is withheld pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(1) and PA exemption (k)(1).. The CIA information in the body of this memorandum would tend to reveal intelligence sources (See letter code "B") and is withheld pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) and PA exemptions (j)(1) and (k)(1).

FBI Referral No. 2

FBI Memorandum, dated 5/20/59 (two pages); classified "SECRET." The CIA requested the deletion of information in paragraphs 1 and 3 on page 1 of this memorandum because this information would tend to reveal intelligence sources (See letter code "B"). This information is withheld pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) and PA exemptions (j)(1) and (k)(1).

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States that the foregoing is true and correct.



LOUIS J. DUBE

DATED: 13 May 1985