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DD/P STAFF MEETING MINUTES - 11 May 1961

- PRESENT: ✓ Mr. Bissell [Redacted] ✓ Mr. Helms [Redacted] (b)(3)
 ✓ Mr. Critchfield ✓ Mr. Lloyd ✓ (b)(3)
 ✓ Mr. Tweedy ✓ Mr. Bross (b)(3)
 ✓ Mr. [Redacted] ✓ Mr. Maury [Redacted] (b)(3)
 ✓ Mr. George ✓ Mr. Aurell ✓
 ✓ Mr. Roosevelt ✓ Dr. Gottlieb
 ✓ Mr. Stewart ✓ Mr. Timm
 ✓ Mr. [Redacted] ✓ Mr. Harvey (b)(3)
 ✓ Mr. [Redacted] ✓ Mr. [Redacted] (b)(3)
 ✓ Mr. [Redacted] ✓ Mr. [Redacted] *Fitzgerald* (b)(3)
 ✓ Mr. Parrott ✓ Mr. Collins (b)(3)
 ✓ Mr. [Redacted] ✓ Mr. [Redacted] (b)(3)
 ✓ Mr. [Redacted] ✓ Mr. Turner (b)(3)
 ✓ Mr. [Redacted] ✓ Mr. Hunt (b)(3)
 ✓ Mr. King [Redacted] (b)(3)

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- Special Meeting on Personnel. Mr. Bissell said he desired to have an Executive Session concerning the surplus personnel program on 18 May 1961. In addition to the normal Executive Session attendants, those Panel members who would not otherwise be represented at an Executive Session would be invited to attend.
- Cuban Aftermath. Mr. Bissell said he had seen a draft of General Taylor's report. Mr. Bissell said this report was, in his view, objective but somewhat rambling. The report attempts to deal with the long standing subject of how to bring all pieces of Government machinery to bear on situations such as Cuba. Mr. Bissell said he thought this subject matter would be very much up for discussion in the next few weeks. Although there will be an emphasis on paramilitary matters, the discussion will not be limited to them.

Mr. Bissell raised the question of whether it would be useful for him to summarize the lessons to be learned from the Cuban operation at a meeting of Branch chiefs. It was decided that such a discussion should be postponed for a time.
- Presidential Task Force on Iran. Mr. Critchfield discussed in some detail his participation in a Presidential Task Force on Iran. Mr. Critchfield gave the impression that this particular Task Force was in such a

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hurry it was in danger of running into itself. The estimative machinery of the intelligence community was summarily dispensed with and the Task Force broke into sub-Task forces whose jobs were simultaneously to estimate and to plan for contingencies.

Mr. Bissell said he had had a somewhat similar experience with the Cuban Task Force formed after the Cuban operation. Mr. Bissell said he could draw some conclusions from these experiences:

- a. Estimating should be done by estimators.
- b. Agency field representatives called home to participate in Task Forces should remain physically and organizationally within the Agency and not be detailed to other departments.
- c. Mr. Bissell would like to see all papers other than estimative before they are cast in concrete.
- d. There should be no covert annexes to Task Force reports. (Covert annexes in this sense are tentative plans for covert action.)

Somewhat allied with the above discussion, Mr. Bissell mentioned that there was a strong move afoot to merge Joe Scott's office in State with that of Roger Hilsman.

[Redacted Signature]

Assistant to the DD/P

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