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


Director/Central Intelligence Agency



D/CIA Daybook

Monday, 19 June 2017 (as of 1130, 19 June)



(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)

Tab A

(b)(3) NatSecAct



Meeting and Photo Op with Senator Marco Rubio and the Bay of Pigs Veterans Group

Tab B

(b)(3) NatSecAct




Tab C

Tab D

Tab E

(b)(3) CIAAct
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Tab F

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(U) Meeting with Senator Marco Rubio and Bay of Pigs Veterans
19 June 2017

Scenesetter

(U//~~FOUO~~) You will have a courtesy call with Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL) and several Bay of Pigs veterans on Monday, 19 June, [redacted] The visit will include a group photo at [redacted] Director/OCA [redacted] will accompany you. (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6)

(U) Before your courtesy call, the group will receive a guided tour of the Museum and lunch.

(U) Please note: The group might take this opportunity to present you with a signed photo and book [redacted] Protocol has been informed. (b)(6)

Attachments:

- Sequence of Events
- List of Attendees
- Biographies
- Background on Bay of Pigs Invasion


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(U) Meeting with Senator Marco Rubio and Bay of Pigs Veterans

19 June 2017

Sequence of Events



Security Check-in and Photo at the Agency Seal

Museum Tour with Museum Director Toni Hiley

Lunch in

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Courtesy Call with D/CIA in the D/CIA Conference Room

Group photo with D/CIA in the D/CIA Conference Room

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(U) Meeting with Senator Marco Rubio and Bay of Pigs Veterans

19 June 2017

Attendees

Senator Marco Rubio

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

Veterans

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

[Redacted]

– D/OCA

[Redacted]

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Toni Hiley – CIA Museum Director

[Redacted]

– Chief/DS Legislative Liaison


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(U) Meeting with Senator Marco Rubio and Bay of Pigs Veterans


19 June 2017



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(b)(5)
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~**(U) Meeting with Senator Marco Rubio and Bay of Pigs Veterans**

19 June 2017

(U) Background on Bay of Pigs Invasion
Excerpts from 17 April 1961: The Bay of Pigs Invasion
 by CIA Chief Historian

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(b)(6)

Preparation

(U) CIA's proxy force of some 1,500 Cuban paramilitary fighters landed at the Bay of Pigs on 17 April 1961. Within two days, however, the Cuban military had repelled the invaders and humiliated the Agency and the Kennedy Administration. The failed assault was CIA's biggest operational failure to date and seriously discredited it in Washington.

(U) After three years of guerrilla warfare, Fidel Castro entered Havana on 1 January 1959 at the head of a ragtag army and forced Dictator Fulgencio Batista to flee the country. In February 1960, Cuba signed an agreement to buy oil from the Soviet Union. When the US-owned refineries in the country refused to process the oil, Castro expropriated the firms, and the United States broke off diplomatic relations with the Cuban regime. Castro established increasingly close ties with the Soviet Union, and he and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev signed a variety of pacts that resulted in large deliveries of economic and military aid in 1960. Within a year, Castro proclaimed himself a communist, formally allied his country with the Soviet Union, and seized remaining American and foreign-owned assets.

(U) At the White House's behest, CIA soon began developing plans to oust Castro based on the successful 1954 Guatemalan operation (PBSUCCESS). The initial plan called for the infiltration of 30 Cuban exiles to form resistance cells. After receiving President Eisenhower's approval for Project JMARC on 17 March 1960, the new Deputy Director for Plans, Richard M. Bissell Jr., greatly expanded the project's scope to include an amphibious assault by 1,500 men supported by B-26 bombers purchased from the US Air Force and piloted by Cuban exiles. CIA's proprietary airlines would loan additional aircraft. Operating with a \$13 million budget, CIA began training Cuban fighters in 1960 and 1961 in Guatemala and Nicaragua. The attack force was named Brigade 2506.

(U) Although President Eisenhower had followed the plan's progress, he never ordered that it be carried out. President-elect John F. Kennedy received a briefing on CIA's Cuba project in late November 1960 and an update during presidential transition briefings in January 1961. Yet as the invasion plans neared completion, several changes took place. CIA planners considered air strikes essential to destroy the Cuban air force and to provide close support for the invasion force. In mid-March, planners added a second air strike to the plan, to occur on the day Brigade 2506 landed. The site of the amphibious assault also changed from near Trinidad to the Bay of Pigs (ironically, Castro's favorite fishing ground), ninety miles south of Havana on Cuba's

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south coast. Near the Bay of Pigs lay the seaside town of Giron with an airstrip that could accommodate B-26, C-46, and C-54 aircraft. This change alone prompted wholesale revisions in the landing and supply timetables and in air and sea dispositions. D-Day was set for 17 April 1961.

(U) Any doubts that President Kennedy may have had in February or March were put to rest by Bissell, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. As Bissell recalled in his memoirs, *Reflections of a Cold Warrior*, the "Fear of cancellation became-absorbing....It is possible that we in the Agency were not as frank with the President about deficiencies as we could have been. As an advocate for maintaining the President's authorization, I was very much afraid of what might happen if I said, 'Mr. President, this operation might as well be made open because the role of the United States certainly cannot be hidden.'" In reality, preparations for the invasion were a badly kept secret, considering the involvement of 1,500 Cuban exiles--recruited openly by CIA in Miami, where Cuban agents were plentiful--and Alabama National Guard pilots. Further, on 10 January 1961, the *New York Times* ran a front-page article revealing the location and function of one of the Cuban brigade's training camps in Guatemala.

The Invasion

(U) Any remaining element of surprise was completely lost on 15 April 1961 when six (reduced from 16) Cuban-piloted B-26 bombers struck two airfields, three military bases, and Antonio Maceo Airport in a failed attempt to destroy the Cuban air force. The air strikes immediately became a matter of concern for the United Nations; and, with the increased attention, President Kennedy canceled the second air strike planned for D-Day and denied last-minute CIA appeals to get US Navy air cover for the invasion. Finally, pre-landing teams at the Bay of Pigs sent in to mark suitable landing spots discovered rocky beaches and coral reefs and then exchanged gunfire in the pre-dawn hours with Cuban militiamen, fully alerting Castro.

(U//~~FOUO~~) When the landing began on 17 April, the Cubans responded in force, and Castro's air force dominated the invasion beaches, disabling or sinking two supply ships. This resulted in the loss of an entire battalion of fighters, critical munitions and supplies, and communications equipment. Once the rebels landed, they quickly found that the expected popular support of the Cuban people never materialized; instead, the small invading force faced a fully mobilized Cuban military. Brigade 2506's pleas for air and naval support were refused at the highest US government levels, although several US Navy aircraft operated over the beaches on 18 April, while American contract pilots dropped munitions and supplies on 19 April (four died as a result). By the afternoon of 19 April, the battle was over. Of 1,500 men in the invading force, 114 were killed, and over 1,100 were captured (the remainder never landed). The Brigade 2506 prisoners were repatriated in late 1962 in return for a ransom of \$53 million in food and pharmaceutical products.

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~**CIA and the Fallout**

(U) The Bay of Pigs proved a major embarrassment for the new Kennedy administration and CIA. During the invasion, DCI Allen Dulles was in Puerto Rico to give a speech, and President Kennedy was at his country estate in Virginia. Both evidently assumed that their absence from Washington would enable them to deny any connection with the operation. Dulles was so completely cut off from events that he did not know the venture had failed until he returned to Washington. On 22 April, the president ordered General Maxwell Taylor to conduct an investigation of the fiasco and the practices and processes for paramilitary operations short of war. Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Admiral Arleigh Burke, and DCI Dulles rounded out the Taylor study group. The Taylor report, delivered to the president in mid-June but not circulated, criticized CIA conceptualization and planning, as well as the Joint Chiefs, who approved the operation after only casual consideration.

(U) Dulles ordered Inspector General Lyman Kirkpatrick to conduct CIA's internal review. Kirkpatrick delivered his 170-page report to the new DCI, John McCone, on 20 November 1961. The internal report was highly critical of the operations group that planned the assault, especially for neglecting to get appraisals of its prospects from other Agency offices with pertinent expertise. The Kirkpatrick Report proved highly controversial within the Agency itself, prompting a rebuttal from senior operations officers and an embargo on its dissemination.

(U) One explanation for the CIA's involvement in this debacle was given by the Agency's general counsel, Lawrence Houston, who cited the air of "cockiness" at CIA after its successes in the Iranian and Guatemalan ventures of 1953 and 1954. R. Jack Smith, a senior analytical manager at the time, stated that operations develop a momentum of their own, and once so many people have invested time and effort in a particular project, they become blind to its faults. Bissell pointed out that the three liaison colonels assigned by the JCS to CIA were privy to the scenario, helped plan the operation, and became emotionally committed to it. The JCS concluded from their report that the operation had a "fair" chance of success. In addition, little guidance was provided on what the brigade should do after landing, and no contingency plan was in place if the invasion went awry.

(U) Militarily, President Kennedy's cancellation of the planned second air strike allowed Cuban aircraft to shoot down two B-26 bombers of the invading force, sink two ships, and chase away the ship carrying the bulk of the exiles' ammunition. The planners also did not seek out data from the Navy or Marines about the presence of reefs at the landing site, which a U-2 had photographed. Lastly, with the exception of one US military officer, the planners of the operation had little or no experience in amphibious warfare.

(U) By November 1961, both Bissell and Dulles had left CIA at the behest of the president, and John McCone had been selected as the new DCI. Kennedy's disenchantment with CIA's handling of the Bay of Pigs operation prompted a significant

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) reorientation of the Agency's anti-Castro activities and a cutback in its paramilitary operations taking place elsewhere in the world, most importantly in South Vietnam. When the Kennedy Administration decided to resume efforts to oust Castro in Operation MONGOOSE, it put the operation under Pentagon management--specifically, counterinsurgency expert Brig. Gen. Edward Lansdale--using CIA assets and infrastructure and with Robert Kennedy as informal overseer.

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