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OSMA/OSM/SD 90

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FIRST DETAILED INTERVIEW REPORT ON

XAR2-4365

~~STURMBAHNFUHRER Hans Wilhelm BOCK~~

This report contains information on Source's contacts with the SWISS Intelligence Service during the war; on the liaison between SCHLENKER and the head of this Service; on the relations existing between the Swiss Government and its General Staff; on Source's relations with the Japanese; on his part in the attempted surrender negotiations; and on personalities.

BP

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DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3020
 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
 DATE 2003 2005

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1. SOURCE

(a) Personal Details

Name
 Alias
 Rank
 Unit
 I.D. No.
 EP No.
 SS No.
 Home Address
 Captured
 Secret No.
 Interrogated

J. Gorman

~~FRANZ HANS WILHELM~~
~~FRANZ HANS WILHELM~~
~~FRANZ HANS WILHELM~~
~~FRANZ HANS WILHELM~~
 None
 None
 Forgotten
BRUNNEN, Zumbunnenstrasse 10, Garmisch
CHILSO, 3 Oct 43
 14/43
 CSMD, CAS, 12-20 Nov 43

(b) History and Career

Source is the son of a wealthy anti-semitic and business man and was born at WIMMINGEN (FRANCE) on 1 Jan 1914. He went to school in EMMORER, did a year's military service with the Reichwehr, and then went to University in MUNICH (1934/6) and MUNICH (1936/8) where he studied law. He joined the Nazi Party and at the same time the Allgemeine SS in 1935, claiming that it would otherwise have been impossible to continue his studies and general student activities. In 1936 he went into a textile firm in BADEN in order to get an insight into business methods and in 1937 did the same with a banking firm in HESSAU, finally taking up the management of his own family business (Kaufmanns-G.m.b.H.) in MUNICH (Kaufmannsstr. 12A) in 1938. This firm was an international import and export business dealing in various commodities.

At the outbreak of war Source was called to the colours as a Man on the Wehrmacht reserve and was posted to Regiment 9, then stationed on the West German frontier. In Mar 40, because of his experience in the import and export business, he was recalled from the Army and posted to the Landwehr (LWA), shortly afterwards being promoted to Officer of the SS Polenregiment as the result of a general order covering all Wehrmacht reserve officers serving in SS organizations. Source was transferred from the Wehrmacht to the Waffen SS with rank of Sturmfuhrer. He was promoted to SS Hauptsturmfuhrer in 43 and to SS Sturmbannfuhrer in 44. He worked with the WIA throughout the war and maintains that his contacts with intelligence were purely incidental. In the latter stages of the war he was instrumental in securing the release from COMANDY of the GRAND family (Mar 43) and the American General VANNSMAN. In Apr 45 he helped to prevent the blowing-up of the frontier bridge at HORNEN and after the German collapse remained in SWITZERLAND. In Jun 45 he was arrested by the Swiss authorities in connection with a charge brought against General Brigadier MARSON, the Head of the Swiss G.S. Intelligence, and subjected to prolonged interrogation. Nothing, however, could be proved against him and Source was released in Oct 45.

(c) Assessment

Source is the smooth, German business-man type who expresses a distaste for "balds" by stressing the "good old German family atmosphere", from which he comes and his preference for the Wehrmacht as opposed to the SS. He appears to have used his connections with the SS chiefly in order to further his own heart and his many useful contacts in SWITZERLAND to keep on good terms with the best "big shots" without becoming too involved himself. Although he seems to have been fully co-operative it is probable that he has told his story in such a way as to put himself in a more favourable light.

Reliability : Fairly Good.

(Interrogated by A.C.E.S.)

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2. LINK FOR PURCHASES/MAKERS (VIA) AND CONNECTIONS WITH AMT VI (VIA)

From Dec 40 onwards Source was employed by Amt VI (Beschaffungsmittel) of the VHA in negotiating purchases of material abroad for the Luftwaffe and in this capacity carried out the necessary liaison work between the VHA on the one hand and the Reichswirtschaftsministerium (RWM), which controlled the allotment of foreign currency for purchases abroad, and the Rohstoffamt which controlled the allotment of raw materials for such purchases on the other. As the officer chiefly concerned with negotiating foreign currency matters for the VHA, he was also entrusted with arranging for the payment of pensions, etc. to the relatives of Auslandsdeutsche who had been killed on active service and for this purpose also liaised with the Finanzamt. Similarly his work also led to a certain amount of liaison with the Reichswirtschaftsministerium (RWM) which acquired certain commodities from abroad. His principal contact at the VHA was SS Hauptsturmführer LOMMIGER. (His former work brought him into contact with Amt VI of the RWA, since all foreign contracts for the Luftwaffe received the personal approval of the Ambassador of AMT and later with SS Hauptsturmführer SCHNEIDER. Source, as representative of VHA, also got his passport and visas through this channel which was made more expeditious than the usual one through the Foreign Office. Source maintains that although he met various members of VHA in SCHNEIDER's waiting room and in the mess he had no official connections with the Luftwaffe as all.

3. CONTACTS WITH SWISS G.A. REPRESENTATIVES

One of Source's earliest business deals in SWITZERLAND was with the Swiss Timber Syndicate (Holzschicht) for the delivery of wooden huts to GUTMIL. There were considerable difficulties owing to the attitude of the German Industry Commission (IWD) which had stopped the delivery of certain raw parts necessary for the completion of the huts in order to try to enforce certain financial demands that the Swiss did not wish to meet as they considered them in conflict with agreements made with the Allies. The work on the huts was therefore at a standstill when Source came in this scene, but he was able finally to smooth out the difficulties between the IWD and the Timber Syndicate and get the contract completed. During these negotiations, which seemed him considerable respect from the Swiss, Source made the acquaintance of a certain Dr KREIBER (now known as "KOMMUNIZMANN") whom he later learned was Hauptmann MAVER of the Swiss General Staff Intelligence. It was apparently usual for the Swiss I.S. to have a representative present at all important negotiations between Swiss and foreign firms.

After the conclusion of these negotiations MAVER asked Source if he might be willing to render a service to SWITZERLAND and to something to improve the relations between the two countries which were not good at that time. Source agreed and was introduced to a "Press representative" who explained that it would help a lot if the German newspaper "IPA" published in SWITZERLAND could be allowed to run, since it was making violent attacks on the Swiss G.I.-s, General GUTHRIE. Source, who realised that these attacks were a clumsy attempt to lower the prestige of the Swiss Army among German-speaking Swiss and secure sympathy and possible recruits for the Wehrmacht, agreed to do what he could. He went to see the Chief of the SS Hauptamt, Hauptsturmführer BARKER and explained that the propaganda being carried out by "IPA" was having precisely the opposite effect of that intended and alienating Swiss sympathy. BARKER had the paper closed down.

Source subsequently learned that the "Press representative" was none other than Oberst Brigadier MASON, the head of the Swiss General Staff Intelligence. Both he and MAVER became friends of Source as a result of his work in connection with the suppression of "IPA" and Source was subsequently a frequent guest at MAVER's home at SCHLOSS WILFENSGEN.

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When later in 1941 SCHULZBERGER took over job VI at the USSR and Source among others was required to give the new chief an outline of his activities aimed for the FBI, he told SCHULZBERGER of the "YIP" circle and of the excellent good relations with MASSONI and WAZEL. SCHULZBERGER expressed his approval of this; some months later he began to show great interest in this circle.

4. RELATIONS SCHULZBERGER-MASSONI

The relations between SCHULZBERGER and MASSONI started about Christmas 1941. GURULI (the alias Otto-?) had asked MASSONI to try and secure the release of a Soviet agent named HENKERT who was imprisoned in GERMANY and MASSONI knowing that Source had direct access to SCHULZBERGER on account of his work in SCHULZBERGER's office, asked Source to see what he could do. Source put the case to SCHULZBERGER in WAZEL and the agent was shortly afterwards released and returned to SCHULZBERGER. The reason for this action was unknown to Source but he assumes from later happenings that the YIP member wished to set up a personal connection with the head of the Soviet General Staff Intelligence.

In fact in the spring of 1942 Source was asked to arrange a meeting between the two and it appeared that they had already discussed this, the intelligence coming from SCHULZBERGER. With the help of WAZEL the meeting was arranged and took place at WAZEL's on the German-Swiss frontier. Source was just present at the conversation but thinks it likely that the question of SCHULZBERGER's attitude in the event of a German attack was the main subject of the talks; he knows that the sales were at that time anxious to know why the Germans were holding a number of prisoners in the Black Forest and the German General Staff on their side wanted to assess the Soviet performance to resist. This was quite fixed and Source is certain that MASSONI made this clear to SCHULZBERGER. At the same time, from what he knows of MASSONI's attitude to WAZEL, Source is equally certain that there was no exchange of intelligence in this occasion.

A request to this meeting came at the end of 1943 when the Germans were planning to invade SCHULZBERGER and take over the railways and the transport system in order to facilitate the movement of troops and supplies to meet the Allied threat on the Italian mainland. At the last meeting in WAZEL before the final decision to do this was taken, SCHULZBERGER had declared that not only would the sales resist the invasion with all the means (as they disposed) but would also destroy their railways and important tunnels. This declaration and certain circumstantial considerations led to the abandonment of the enterprise. Immediately afterwards Source was contacted by SCHULZBERGER and instructed to inform MASSONI of what had occurred and to arrange another meeting. This was done and MASSONI and SCHULZBERGER met for the second time in May or May 43 at MASSONI's home at SCHULZBERG WITZBERG. Source again was not present at the conversation but cannot state with any certainty that was discussed, but thinks as before that any exchange of intelligence extremely unlikely.

In early 44 a rift was caused in GURULI by the forced landing in SCHULZBERGER of a new No 110 equipped with all the latest night-fighter devices which the sales had refused to return as not in accordance with neutrality. After a conference between representatives of the Luftwaffe, SCHULZBERGER and SCHULZBERGER, it had been decided to try to solve the problem by friendly approach and Source was entrusted with the task of negotiation. With the help of MASSONI he succeeded in arranging for the machine to be destroyed on the HUNTERING district in exchange for which however the sales asked to be allowed to buy twelve No 109s. On his return to GURULI Source was summoned to HALLER's HQ to report on the incident; this he did and secured the Reichsbank's agreement to the sale of the aircraft, six of these were delivered shortly afterwards for a price of 5,000,000 Swiss Frs and a further six were later for a similar sum.

It was also about this time (by 44) that SCHULZBERGER tried to obtain

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Information from MASSON on the Allied plan for the landings on the Continent and in particular when they were due to take place. Source was asked to try and get this information from MASSON and he approached the Swiss I.S. Chief in the matter; MASSON, however, refused to listen or give such a request consideration.

In the closing stages of the war the connections between MASSON and SCHULZBERG chiefly concerned the release of prisoners interned in GERMANY and subsequently for a number of years. In both of which matters Source was the intermediary. In early 45 MASSON was urging the release of the Belgian King, Paul HENRI and DE GAULLE's sister; SCHULZBERG, although sympathetic, was not willing to take responsibility for these actions owing to fear of KALLENBERGER. SCHULZBERG did, however, manage to secure the release of the GILMAN family and Source was entrusted with the task of bringing them from FURZENBERG and getting them over the frontier. In Apr 45 Source arranged out the American General V. JOHNSON; this had been another request of MASSON's to SCHULZBERG which the latter had agreed to without consulting KALLENBERGER or HILTZER.

The reasons for the continued contacts between SCHULZBERG and MASSON were, Source thinks, the following:-

- a) SCHULZBERG, supported by HILTZER and later by KALLENBERGER and HILTZER was anxious to absorb the French and get rid of GILMAN and by maintaining a connection with the Head of the Swiss General Staff Intelligence and outmaneuvered the French and had good material to reinforce the argument by its absurdity to the ISL.
- b) Further, in his plan for outmaneuvering HILTZER (whom HILTZER wanted to be replaced by a less powerful rival), SCHULZBERG planned to use the MASSON connection for opening negotiations with the Allies for a ceasefire etc. Such peace talks had been planned since the time of ROSENBERG and contemplated securing Allied support for a continued struggle against RUSSIA.
- c) MASSON for his part was interested in the connection with SCHULZBERG as it represented a means of securing advantages for SCHULZBERG not obtainable by other means; he was also interested in getting the French out of HILTZER (some of his reports on the alleged activities of foreign Intelligence Services had caused the Swiss General Staff considerable annoyance) and finally he was interested in seeing the war brought to an end and thought HILTZER sufficiently powerful to be able to effect something in this direction.

SCHULZBERG was of course always hoping to obtain intelligence of the Allies through MASSON but never met with any success, as MASSON insisted on strict neutrality.

GENERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN SWISS GERMANY AND NETHERLANDS

The contact between MASSON and SCHULZBERG had a certain effect on the relations between the Swiss General Staff, more particularly Gen GUYAN, at their headquarters. These were apparently strained, a state of affairs not dated from the time of the German invasion of FRANCE, since when GUYAN had kept up close personal contact with certain high-ranking French Generals, relations of German military operations. The Swiss Intelligence continued to German victory, reproached GUYAN with not maintaining neutrality and told him that he was a stumbling block to good relations between SCHULZBERG and GUYAN. The Swiss General Staff on the other hand, which, through SCHULZBERG, bore the brunt of combating German espionage activities in SWITZERLAND, had a sharp opponent of the Swiss Staff's extreme tolerance to GUYAN, which threatened itself in large scale alliances and agreement to the setting up of a Landwehrorganisation. However, GUYAN was very pro-Allied and Swiss forces, with few exceptions, were anti-German.

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In view of the above position therefore the Bundessert proved very much the opening of personal contact between MASSON and SCHWARZBERG and as a next of the appreciation voted for the position of MASSON from Oswald to Oetz's Director but at the same time decided to try and set up his own direct contacts with the BND. In the hope that more substantial figures than those secured by MASSON (representation of 'TIA' and information on the possible invasion of SWITZERLAND) might be obtained. Accordingly on the orders of Bundessert von KERNER (then Minister of Justice and now Bundessergentant) on the head of the Swiss Freischnepollizei, Dr KORNIG, went to BERLIN in early 43 to set up contact between the Swiss police and the BND. SCHWARZBERG however saw in this an undertaking of not a danger to his own contact with the Swiss General Staff and arranged that although KORNIG was to be contacted with the utmost carefullness he was to return to SWITZERLAND with his assistant UNTERKILLIG. The Bundessert made a second attempt in 1943 and sent Bundessert MUMER of the Bundessertantant to KERNIG with relative Maschke but once again SCHWARZBERG's interference.

The failure of these two missions caused von STRASSER to view the MASSON-SCHWARZBERG connection with a less favorable eye. At the same time the relations between OTTAVIO and the Bundessert became more tense, owing to the increasing hostility shown by the Swiss officer class to the Bundessert, and the great popularity of OTTAVIO both with the Swiss Forces and the civilian population, which was in marked contrast to the relationship between the Bundessert and the population.

To offset these developments throughout the Bundessert, in particular Bundessert KERNIG, made a third attempt to set up his own connections. On the cruise that he sailed not always be available either through ill-health or for service reasons, MASSON was told to put Lieutenant KERNIG, who was also 2/6 to MASSON in the Swiss F.A., in contact with Source. This was done and during the winter of 1943/4 Source met KERNIG several times. The latter was at pains to explain that the contact with MASSON would only be of value to OTTAVIO and SWITZERLAND as long as general mobilization detailed in SWITZERLAND and while OTTAVIO had full powers, but that when this status of affairs ceased and the Bundessert re-organized full powers be (KERNIG) in his personal capacity as a Politdeutsch would enjoy a greater trust of the Bundessert than KERNIG. In short, contact with KERNIG would be more profitable in the long run for all concerned.

Source did not accept this view of things and the contact did not stop. KERNIG, seeing that the plan of approaching SCHWARZBERG through Source was not successfully attempted to do so through the Swiss Military Attaché in BERLIN, Major KERNIGER, and put certain information on the Allied Forces at his disposal for passing to SCHWARZBERG. Source does not know what this information was exactly, since it was passed over his head but thinks it probably concerned Allied O of 3 in Italy and in PRUSSIA on one occasion (only) in about Oct 44. BERNHARDT gave Source a list with the divisional numbers of about ten British Divisions then in PRUSSIA for transmission to SCHWARZBERG. The latter accepted all the information offered but nevertheless did not alter his relations with MASSON or make references to KERNIGER.

When the outcome of the war became finally obvious and an Allied victory a certainty, the Bundessert changed its policy and ceased to seek any contacts with OTTAVIO. In an attempt to show the Allies that any previous contacts had been discontinued and only tolerated because of force of circumstances, representations were made to bring a cease against MASSON and he was deprived of his rank and forced to retire. Source was arrested shortly before he was due to return to BERLIN and for three months (Jul-Oct 45) continually interrogated in an effort to produce material. Those investigations were arranged by von STRASSER, KORNIG and KERNIG and it was intended to publish the results in the Swiss Press in order to turn public opinion against von OTTAVIO and in order to justify a lengthy imprisonment of Source. The inquiry, however, produced no such results and MASSON was reinstated in his rank and position, and Source released. KERNIGER on the other hand has now retired.

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6. SOURCE'S PART IN SURVEILLING OPERATIONS

During the latter part of 1944 during one of his visits to MAIER's home at SCHLOSS WILHELM, Source made the acquaintance of two American Vice-Consuls, Mr LOHMEYER and Mr JENSEN, who were also friends of MAIER. Discussion on the war situation with these Americans soon made it clear to Source that GEMMAY's only hope at that stage was to see for peace. During his next visit to SCHLOSS WILHELM Source reported on these conversations (which had been quite informal and not done on anyone's instructions) and urged SCHWELZBERG to see HIMMEL, SCHWELZBERG, however, was not willing to do this, since he would have to do it through KAUFMANN with whom he was on extremely bad terms and who would undoubtedly use the occasion to get rid of SCHWELZBERG. He therefore suggested that Source should try to see HIMMEL through Gruppenfuhrer JUNGNER, the Head of the NSD. This was done, but Source arrived at HIMMEL's HQ at an unlucky moment when the Reichshofmarschall was too tired to see him and only succeeded in getting the substance of his message conveyed by HIMMEL's AID. Source had no connection with the negotiations carried on by SCHWELZBERG by Obergruppenfuhrer WILLY.

7. RELATIONS WITH JAPANESE

In the early part of 44 during a visit to the Reichsministerium in connection with his foreign currency work, Source was introduced to General Director SCHMIDT, a Director of the Deutsche Reichsbank and President of the Japanese Committee in GEMMAY. SCHMIDT mentioned that the Japanese were anxious to repurchase contracts in SWITZERLAND for the purchase of nautical and other equipment and Source was asked to help. An invitation to dinner with the members of the Japanese Committee followed, here Source met RUDO SAKAI, Assistant to the Japanese Naval Attache, WALTER, and several other Japanese all of whom whom he has forgotten with the exception of a Col GENDEL. During conversation the Japanese showed great interest in Source's connections with the NSD and suggested that he might be able to locate Suda's friends for them. In return for this they suggested that they should be of service in starting negotiations with the Russians (the proposal of a German agreement with RUSSIA was very much in the air at that time) since SAKAI was still at peace with the Soviets.

Source referred these matters to SCHWELZBERG who was scared of the talk of negotiating with the Russians since he knew that if he were the first to talk openly of it at the NSD, it would cost him his head. He nevertheless encouraged Source to maintain the contact (as representative of the NSD) and keep him informed of any developments.

Source therefore continued to meet SCHMIDT and SAKAI from time to time. It was clear that the Japanese were convinced that GEMMAY had lost the war and were anxious to manoeuvre themselves into as favourable a position as possible with the Russians and secure as many economic advantages as possible from the impending collapse of GEMMAY. SCHWELZBERG made no move, but when in the summer of 44 SAKAI asked Source if he would call on General GENDEL in ZURICH, SCHWELZBERG told him to do this and see what he could find out. Source duly called on the General but found him seriously ill from a paralytic stroke and came away without recording any message or discovering for that reason SAKAI had asked him to call. (Source is certain that no Russian was mentioned in connection with this affair and maintains that he did not know that SAKAI was an Intelligence Officer).

8. REPORT VI/VII

Source was never employed by this Report but in the course of his contacts with VI met various members of it. Most of them were former employees in commercial firms who had got into the NSD in one way or another and helplessly unequal to the task they were supposed to do. The three successive Referenten, Gruppenfuhrer REISERLICH, SJ Stabschefuhrer WILNER and Professor SCHUBERT were of a better class but without experience

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in international commerce and therefore incapable of coping with the problems set them. The Report pointed at least ten involving others.

The progress of VI/MI was to carry out espionage through German business men with connections in foreign countries. Very few could be found who were willing to do this since their business depended on maintaining good connections with foreign countries. Attempts by VI/MI to bring pressure by interfering in the granting of passports and visa incurred the open hostility of Dutchmen and the fields that might have been achieved was ruined by these "petty policy" methods. The observations made by Source on the Report by business organizations were sought. SCHREIBER told Source that he had never come across any information of the slightest value from VI/MI. This fact and many others concerning SCHREIBER's Dept. Source points out, can be checked by referring to the two secretaries, FEL SCHINDL and FEL BOKLAGE.

FOR THE INSURER BRIDGE 7.8 MAY 50

In the last week of the war Source was at BERLIN on the German-Silesia frontier after getting the American Gen VILHELM into SCHREIBER. The area KREUZBURG-GERMANY-FRANCKEN, at first called "Forest", was actually subdivided a battle area by General BOWEN, who ordered the demolition of all BRIDGE bridges and frontier bridges between SCHREIBER and GERMAN. Source declares that he saw no sense in this order, particularly since it would mean that the living remains of BRIDGE camp and large numbers of wounded, which were coming through the area would be cut off from the care of the Silesia Red Cross services. He therefore decided to prevent the blowing up of the bridges, contacted his old contact on the Silesia frontier officers, BOB GARY, and asked him for a detachment of Silesia who would work under the direction of a trusted American frontier guard, Inspector OSWALD. Source claims that he kept the Local German guards in conversation and allowed a large number of refugees on to the bridge so that the Silesia were able to do the demolition damage without being seen and get back into SCHREIBER. Source and OSWALD followed them, just before leaving GERMAN. Source was accompanied by an escaped British PI Major named KING who asked for help. Source took him into SCHREIBER. The following night OSWALD went back in civilian clothes to bring his family to safety, was caught by German guards and shot on the orders of KOTZEL.

PERSONALITIES

LESTER

SS Hauptsturmfuhrer in Report VI/MI. Formerly

at BHL.
Age about 40.
About 1.75m tall, hair turning grey.
(BIRTH - early 45)
(cf. SMUG (UK)/RIB.1728)

BERGER

SS Corp./Inhaber. Head of SS Hauptamt.
Gave orders for suppression of "RPA" in 1940.
(cf. SMUG (UK)/RIB.1728 where he is said
to be a SA)

BREHME

Major, Silesia Military Attaché in BERLIN who
passed information on Allied O of B to SCHREIBER-
BAG for Politische Arbeit.

DAUBER, MAUS

PI,
Originally in unit VI, BHL, later Vice-Consul
in LAUBACH, until expelled in early 48.
Engaged the protection of SCHREIBER although
considered very inefficient. Contacts with
Source purely friendly.
(BIRTH - Nov 45)

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DOUG, British PW whom Source helped to escape from GERMANY into SWITZERLAND (see para 9).

REINARD, Pol

Secondary to REINARD.
Age about 29. Brown hair.
About 1.60m tall, thick set, blonde hair.
(OSMO - par 45)
(OSMO (DN)/ECR.1728)

COEZE

Major. Siles Cavalry officer who assisted Source in preventing the blowing-up of the ROBERT Bridge (see para 5).

GUTMAN

General. O-4n-0 Siles Army.

ROSLACH, Pol

Major in Siles General Staff Intelligence known to Source through WASSON and WILKE. Very anti-German as a consequence of German brutalities in SILESIA where ROSLACH had relatives. Shortly arrested in 1943 in SWITZERLAND when on a mission for Siles I.S. (OSMO - early Oct 45)

HOBE

Civilian employed in Siles VI/PL. Formerly an employee with hereditarily illegit. Age about 45.
About 1.70m tall, slim, dark hair.
(OSMO - early 45)

JURTSCH

SS Gruppenfuhrer. Head of PIA until Jul 44 when he became SA in connection to KRON. Very intelligent and considered straightforward. (cf. OSMO/OSW/2b 12, para 5(1))

KOSCHKE

Siles Regiment who instructed Politische MAJORS to set up contacts with ROSENZWEIG through Source (see para 5).

LIX

SS Standardfuhrer. Head of Int IX in PIA. Former office boy. 54/162 in World War I.
About 1.70m tall, bald.
(OSMO - par 45)

LOEBLER

SS Gruppenfuhrer. 2 1/2 at Xtrachof's and Verwalterpunkt with whom Source came in contact in connection with foreign purchases. (cf. 1 HQ/OSMO/AD.55 para 6(1))

WASSON, R264/R2

Chief Architect, Head of Siles General Staff Intelligence.

WILKE

Siles Major of the Zankowskibatt's sent to Berlin in 1943 by von BRUNER to attempt to set up contact with REHA (see para 5).

WILKE, Paul - (see)

Major in Siles General Staff Intelligence. Present of Source when he frequently invited to his home at SCHIDEL, WOLFFERSH. (OSMO - early Oct 45)

WILKE, Paul - (see)
Major in Siles General Staff Intelligence
Present of Source when he frequently invited to his home at SCHIDEL, WOLFFERSH.
(OSMO - early Oct 45)

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MUELLER

Swiss Polizeioberst and during war 2 1/2 to
MUSCH. At instigation of MUELLER set up
contact with Source and SCHLEIBER. Passed
information on Allied G of B to SCHLEIBER
through BURCHERT (q.v.).

OKAWANO

Japanese General in ZURICH on whom Source was
asked to call by SAKAI (q.v.). Died from stroke
after defeat of LEBE (see para 7).

OTANI

Japanese Army Colonel in BERLIN interested in
securing commercial advantages for JAPAN
through the Japanese Committee (see para 7).

ROHMARD, Dr.

Head of Swiss Frauenpolizei, sent to BERLIN
in 1943 by Bundesrat von STEIGER to attempt to
set up contact with BHA.

SAKAI

Civilian Assistant to Japanese Naval Attache
in BERLIN. Has English wife in GENEVA (see
para 7).

SCHLAGER

Generaldirektor. Director of Deutsche
Reichsbank and President of Japanese Committee
in BERLIN. In close touch with Reichswirtschafts-
ministerium. Introduced Source to SAKAI (see
para 7).

SCHENK

Swiss. Director of Cotificio Italiano MILAN.
Introduced to Source by his brother-in-law
Hauptmann JUSTI who was his guard while interned
in number 45. Offered Source hospitality in
MILAN.

HOHMED

SS Stenartbefuehrer. Professor. Head of
Referat VI/VI in succession to ZEKNER.
(BERLIN - Mar 45)
(cf. 1 SC/OSWIC/SD 26, para 6(a)(1) and
OSWIC (UK)/AIR.1728)

SEBASTIAN

Regierungsrat. Head of Referat VI/VI until
early 44 when he fell out with SCHLEIBER
and was transferred to Waffn 88 as OR.
Age about 35.
About 1.70m tall, fair hair.
(BERLIN - early 45)
(cf. OSWIC/CW/SD 23, para 4(a))

SEIBERT

Ministerialrat in charge of Swiss Dept at BHM
and very hostile to BHA's attempts to use
commercial channels for espionage in
SWITZERLAND.


STEIGER, von

Swiss Bundesrat, formerly Minister of Justice
now Bundespräsident, interested in setting up
contact with BHA (see para 5).

SUTECK

SS Untersturmfuehrer in Referat VI/VI.
Formerly in textile business.
Age about 42.
About 1.85m tall, well built.
(BERLIN - early 45)

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VANNING

SECRET
SANTO/SP/SD 50

Accusation General Foresterly with U.S. Embassy
in Berlin and subpoenaed by the Germans when
Source got over the border into EASTBERLIN
in 1945 (see para 4).

ZEMER

SS Sturmbannfuhrer. Head of Bureau VI/VI
until mid 44 when he left to go to a University
as student.
Age about 40.
About 1.8m tall, slim build, beyond nose,
bald. Heavily-etched.
(SECRET - early 44)
of: 1 SD/SD/SD 25, para 6 (a)(1), and
CSND (U)/SIN. 1728)

KIRCH

SS Sturmbannfuhrer. Head of "Specializing
See Ziemer" (control of some assignments)
at Hq.
Age about 48.
About 1.7m tall, stout, poty build. "Big
Hofor" type. Heavy features. Intellectual.

3

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