

~~SECRET~~

10 March 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

ATTENTION : (b)(3)

FROM :

DDA Task Force Representative

VIA : Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT : Damage Assessment of Material Furnished to
the House Select Committee on Intelligence

1. Reference is made to your 29 September 1976 memorandum to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence which established an Agency-wide task force to conduct a damage assessment of classified Agency information/documents furnished to the now defunct House Select Committee on Intelligence (HSC). Reference limited the assessment to a review of that information which, if compromised, would damage "sensitive Agency sources and/or current Agency projects or operations."

2. The appropriate offices within the Directorate of Administration (DDA) have completed their review of all pertinent documents--copies of which were made available to us by the Review Staff Registry. In terms of the DDA, the HSC primarily focused their attention on the Agency's personnel practices; budgetary matters; relationships with other U. S. Government agencies; the methods through which the Agency procures, stores, and contracts for goods and services; and alleged "improper" activities.

3. In general terms, the HSC was provided with detailed information on almost all aspects of the DDA's past and present functions. Our review revealed that the HSC was fully briefed on some of the Agency's most highly classified activities--the disclosure of which could adversely affect ongoing projects and/or programs within the DDA. A brief outline follows highlighting the materials furnished to the HSC which impact on the DDA and are within the guidelines set forth in reference:

~~SECRET~~
 (b)(3)
 US 71112

~~SECRET~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

~~SECRET~~


~~SECRET~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

to the HSC, on a document-by-document basis. When one considers the possible ramifications should all of the information furnished to the HSC be compromised, the impact would be felt by all Agency directorates and would severely damage the Agency's ability to perform its foreign intelligence mission.



(b)(3)
(b)(6)

Distribution:

- Orig & 1 - Addressee
- 1 - DDA
- 1 - OF
- 1 - OP
- 1 - OL
- 1 - OC

~~SECRET~~

L-4-15

UNCLASSIFIED

Approved for Release: 2022/06/06 C02470277

ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File

SUBJECT: (Optional) Damage Assessment of Material Furnished to the House Select Committee on Intelligence

FROM:
[Redacted]
DDA Task Force Representative

EXTENSION
6009

NO.
DATE 10 March 1977 (b)(3)

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE
RECEIVED FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

[Large Redacted Area]

Att: [Redacted] (b)(3)

(b)(3)

[Redacted] (b)(3)

8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

INTERNAL USE ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~REHIRED ANNUITANTS

As of 30 April 1976, there were 212 civilian annuitants on board, either as contract employees or independent contractors. (This number is exclusive of the FBIS/USJPRS rehired annuitants serving as independent contractors performing unclassified translation work in their houses.) With the exception of DDO independent contractors and the FBIS/USJPRS independent contractors, the names of these individuals appear on the Agency staffing complement. In providing a total list to the Senate, it is suggested that there may be some sensitivity in providing the names of those in the DDO because of the nature of their operational tasks.

EXTERNAL EMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE

The External Employment Assistance Branch develops job leads for individuals leaving the Agency who desire to continue working. Locations of job opportunities are fluid at best; however, at present, listings include approximately 150 companies with whom we are in contact.

CONSULTANTS LIST

The Agency is currently engaging 53 individuals, based on their particular skills, as consultants approved by the DCI. It is very conceivable that some of these individuals may wish that their names not be made available to the Committee.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

RECRUITMENT SOURCES

Upon request, can assemble a list of academic and non-academic organizations with whom Agency recruiters maintain contact for routine recruitment purposes.

(b)(3)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

DETAILS

(b)(3)

QUESTIONABLE CONDUCT

On an ad hoc basis, we could provide information on questionable conduct on the part of Agency employees. We should point out, though, that this information will probably be available from the Inspector General -- possibly in more depth.

STAFFING COMPLEMENT BY OFFICE

Shows both staff and contract employees and the Agency component of assignment. In most cases will show grade of position and grade of employee. Certain sections could be sensitive.

PERSONNEL STRENGTH REPORTS

The Office of Personnel has the capacity to produce a variety of personnel status reports concerning employees, positions, strength of various components, average grade, average salary, etc.

CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Director of Personnel
5 E 58 HQ

EXTENSION NO.

DATE 22 JUN 1976

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

- 1. Deputy Director of Security
ATTN: Chief, Policy and Plans Group
4E-58 HQ
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
- 10.
- 11.
- 12.
- 13.
- 14.
- 15.

Attached is the response from the Office of Personnel concerning reports and other materials within this Office in which we may anticipate an interest on the part of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

As regards sensitivity, we should point out that some of our detail arrangements are considered rather sensitive and should be discussed with the Agency component responsible for the detail before release. We have also indicated other areas which could be considered somewhat sensitive, in part or in whole; e.g., the detailed Staffing Complement of the Agency. The possibility of that document being misplaced or lost outside Agency hands is of the greatest security concern.

[Redacted] (b)(3)

for F. W. M. Janney

Dist:

- 0 - Add
- 1 - DD/Pers/SP
- 1 - DD/Pers/R&P
- 1 - DD/Pers/P&C
- 1 - C/SAS
- X - Subject File
- 1 - D/Pers Chrono
- 1 - RDK Chrono

OD/Pers [Redacted] jmm (22 Jun 76)

(b)(3)