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[Redacted]

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8 October 1992

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**TAB A - Current Iraqi Situation**

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8 October 1992

**Current Iraqi Situation**

**Iraqi Kurds Attacking PKK**

Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga are cooperating with Ankara to attack anti-Turkish Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK) rebels based in northern Iraq.

- o Iraqi Kurds, led by Mas'ud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, began operations near the northern Iraqi border on 3-4 October [redacted] They are demanding the PKK fighters disarm and leave Iraq, [redacted] The Iraqi Kurds have already started expelling the PKK from some northern villages.

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- o [redacted]

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- o At least 13 Iraqi Kurds have been killed or wounded, and about 40 PKK members have been killed [redacted]

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While these operations were underway, Iraqi Kurdish leaders have publicly called for a federated Iraq, and the Kurdish parliament voted on 4 October for a "federal" Kurdish state in northern Iraq.

- o While the meaning of such terms remains unclear, it is likely these announcements were timed to coincide with the joint operations in the hope that Turkey may be less willing to denounce such statements than they have been in the past. [redacted]

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**Iraqi Military Activity**

Iraq's military has reduced its country-wide alert initiated in late August in anticipation of coalition attack.

- o [redacted]

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**WARNING NOTICE:  
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES  
OR METHODS INVOLVED**

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In the south, the Iraqis generally are respecting the no-fly zone.

- o Coalition aircraft have not been significantly threatened by Iraq's ground-based air defenses.

- o [redacted] the Iraqis may have flown limited incursions--both with fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters--into the no-fly zone to test coalition response. The suspected violations, however, remain unconfirmed. [redacted]

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The Iraqis continue to use ground forces against the Shia insurgents.

- o [redacted]
- o [redacted]
- o [redacted]

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Meanwhile, Iraqi forces in the north continue to sporadically shell Kurdish villages.

- o The pace of shelling appears to have increased recently, perhaps in response to Kurdish political developments.
- o The Iraqis undoubtedly remain deterred by Provide Comfort forces in the region from initiating major operations to regain control of northern Kurdistan. Some units are beginning to move into their winter dispositions, even more defensively oriented than what we have seen since spring. [redacted]

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**Opposition Unity Builds at Conference**

The Iraqi National Congress (INC) has improved its standing by assembling a more diverse group of oppositionists with a larger potential following inside the country. These actions fall short of agreeing on a shadow opposition government because membership in the national assembly has not been specified, and relations between the institutions have not been worked out.

- o [redacted] the conference decided on a 174-member national assembly, 25-minister government, and

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a three-member presidential council made up of Syrian-backed Hasan al-Naqib, Kurdish leader Mas'ud Barzani, and Iranian-backed Shia religious leader Muhammad Bahr al-Ulum.

- o Conference participants agreed their major goals are to overthrow Saddam, establish a security zone in the South, and lobby for international economic assistance for the Kurds and the Shia [redacted]
- o The next meeting is scheduled to be held in northern Iraq on 23 October. [redacted]

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Syria and Iran apparently decided not to oppose the conference, despite their lingering concern that the opposition might, if successful, threaten Iraq's territorial integrity.

- o Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim, head of the Tehran-based Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI)--the largest Shia opposition group--apparently was either reluctant to risk appearing in Iraq or was unwilling to fully support the conference and sent his deputy instead.

- o [redacted] SAIRI may be interested in publicly distancing itself from Iran because leaders believe the connection diminishes the chance of international acceptance. [redacted]

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The INC has probably increased its credibility in the eyes of other dissidents in exile by meeting inside Iraq, but will now need to demonstrate its ability to cultivate support inside of the country.

- o Leading up to the next scheduled meeting, INC leaders probably will try to elicit increased support from states neighboring Iraq, and increase grassroots political support inside the country. [redacted]

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Personal rivalries and the opposition of regional states still threaten fragile opposition unity.

- o Barzani's nomination to the executive, though done with acquiescence of his longtime Kurdish rival Talabani, expands Barzani's role in opposition circles and may strain relations between the Kurdish leaders in the future.
- o Non-Kurdish groups may fear perceived Kurdish efforts to dominate the INC, and also that Kurdish groups will make unreasonable political demands in exchange for their military support. [redacted]

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