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COPY NO.
OCI NO. 0278/61

4 May 1961

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

DOCUMENT NO. 2
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S (C)
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 1990
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 19/5/90 REVIEWER: 019360

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CONGO

With Tshombé under detention at Coquilhatville, the Katanga regime is in the hands of elements somewhat more favorably disposed toward the UN and toward limited cooperation with Leopoldville. Leopoldville officials apparently believe that with UN help the Congolese Army units now directed from Stanleyville and Elisabethville can be put under their control.

the principal aim of the Coquilhatville conference was to immobilize Tshombé and put pressure on the Katanga and Orientale regimes to permit the disarmament of their forces.

The Elisabethville regime announced on 2 May that it was ready to discuss with the UN

disarmament of army elements in Katanga and the withdrawal of the province's foreign advisers. Tshombé's release apparently is a precondition for this concession, which reflects anti-Belgian sentiment on the part of Tshombé's lieutenants as well as a somewhat more cooperative attitude toward the UN than was evinced by Tshombé and his Belgian advisers.

(b)(1)

Tshombé reportedly is to remain in Coquilhatville until the current conference ends on about 8 May. Leopoldville leaders are reluctant to permit him to attend the meetings, however. His continued absence from Katanga will further weaken his position in the province and may lead to his replacement by an

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anti-Belgian group headed by Interior Minister Munongo.

Contacts between military representatives from Leopoldville and Stanleyville have continued. Six officers from Gizenga's forces attended the Coquilhatville conference and reportedly have returned home to try to persuade Gizenga to put in an appearance. Gizenga --backed up by his military commander, General Lundula--continues adamant that a convening of parliament is a prerequisite for reconciliation, and the Stanleyville military representatives apparently have insisted that the Stanleyville officials be included in any unified government.

Military leaders, who have consistently favored a unitary constitution for the Congo, apparently are also exerting pressure on the Leopoldville government to this end. Their efforts are likely to be abetted by Foreign Minister Bomboko, who has been the key figure at Coquilhatville; they may be opposed by Kasavubu, however.

[redacted] the Gizenga regime is stronger and more stable than in the past. There reportedly is little internal dissension within the government; however, friction still exists between the Gizenga "central government" and the moderate Orientale provincial regime headed by Jean Foster Manzikala. Economic conditions continue to deteriorate in the province, although the scarcity of banknotes apparently has been alleviated and trade across the Uganda border has picked up slightly.

Relations between Kasavubu and the UN remain relatively cordial, but several possible

developments--notably the return of Dayal as UN representative or an intransigent stand by Congolese military leaders on the Matadi issue--might disrupt the rapport.

In New York, Hammarskjold believes that Kasavubu's agreement with the UN over Matadi, together with the Leopoldville regime's apparent willingness to force the disarmament issue with Katanga, has put the Congo problem in a "most hopeful" new phase. He told American officials recently that the action against Tshombé improved the chances of a rapprochement between Leopoldville and Stanleyville, adding that he had received confirmation of the existence of a military agreement between the Mobutu and Gizenga forces. He also indicated that as a result of the improved situation, he might be able to shorten Dayal's stay in the Congo and shortly to substitute a five-man commission for the post of senior UN representative.

However, the Congolese continue to oppose even a brief return to Dayal. Mobutu reportedly told UN military commander McKeown that all cooperation would cease if reports of Dayal's return were true. Kasavubu allegedly is considering sending a telegram to Hammarskjold, declining all responsibility for events if Dayal should be sent back to Leopoldville. (b)(1)

In addition, Mobutu apparently has unilaterally imposed restrictions on UN activity in Matadi which go beyond the recent agreement between Kasavubu and the UN. Neither the UN nor the Congolese seem desirous of inflating this issue into a major conflict; however, incidents could occur as a result of the dispute. [redacted] (b)(3)

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