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29 December 1960

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



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CONGO

A "balance of weakness" between Glzenga's and Kobutu's forces, in which Mobutu besitated to move militarily against the weak but inaccessible regime at Stanleyville, ended on 25 December when Gizenga's soldiers entered Kivu Province. A force of about 60 men seized provincial leaders and a military comnander regarded as leaning toward

Although his hold on Kivu is probably precarious, the ease with which Gizenga achieved the first of his goals, with little outside help, can be expected to boost the disaldents' prestige both within and outside the Congo.

The situation in Kivu will increase pressure on Mobutu to

undertake military operations against the dissidents, notwithstanding UN opponition. Hammarskjold has sent a letter to Kasavubu implying that Council to take the UN out of the Congo if Mobutu uses force in an attempt to take Orientale Province. Kasavubu--in an apparent attempt to avoid an obstructionist role relative to the UN--

he will ask the Security has indicated

that be is willing to receive the long-delayed UN conciliation commis-810n, preferably at the time of Hammarskjold's visit to Leopoldville on 3-4 Jan-

REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO BUDAN EQUATED C A \circ SE OFFICE OF THE FIGUREDH OF BIDD

Mobutu. Although no nore than a few bundred troops were used by the dissidents, by 27 December much of the province appeared responsive to the Gizenga regime.

By his initiative Gizenga gained control of a food-producing area capable of alleviating the serious food shortage in Stanleyville.

Meanwhile, Guinea, Ghana, Wali, and the UAR have accepted an invitation from King Kohaned V of Morocco to neet in Casablanca on 3 January to discuss common problems. In addition to providing a sounding board for anti-Western pronouncements, tho meeting is expected to promote discussion of possible joint action to aid the Stanleyville dissidents.

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PART I

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Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on 23 December said that the USSR recognizes Gizenga as the "acting premier of the legitimate government of the Congo," but the USSR has so far refrained from extending aid and explicit recognition to his Stanleyville regime. Gromyko, reporting on developments in the Congo, told the Supreme Soviet that "cutthroats in the pay of foreigners" had adjourned the parliament elected by the Congolese people and had inprisoned the lawful premier, Lumumba. He asserted that this, however, could not be regarded as a victory for the "colonialists" because it had dispelled the naive illusion that they will voluntarily rolinquish their rule in the colonies. The failure of the UN in the Congo situation, he said, makes clear the "preseing need" for changing the structure of that body.

Khrushchev, after a delay of ten days, responded on 25 December to an appeal for assist-

ance from Gizenga by reiterating general promises of Soviet
support and sympathy but avoiding any specific commitments.
Moscow may be awaiting the outcome of the Casablanca meeting
of African leaders before taking
a definite stand toward the rump
government.

In Leopoldville, the approach of 31 December, originally set by Mobutu as the terminal date for his interim government, has stirred new dissension over the absence of civil government in the Congo. Mobutu appears to favor the retention of his commissioners under a premier responsive to himself; Kasavubu, on the other hand, favors the restoration of the Ileo cabinet, with which he displaced Lumumba.

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German interzonal trade talks

Following good progress in the earlier talks, East - West Gorman negotiations on reactivation of the interzonal trade agreement were still in the hard bargaining phase as of 29 December. The East Gorman representative on 22 December suddenly reversed his conciliatory attitude, complained about "leaks" to the Western press, and asked for a postponement of the negotiations until 28 December.

The USSR for the first time is giving high-level public support to East Germany's efforts to pressure Bonn into renewing the trade pact. In his speech to the Supreme Soviet on 23 December, Foreign Minister Gromyko warned that failure to reach an agreement would be "fraught with unexpected and quite dangerous consequences." night elicit an East German "retaliatory blow," and could even lead to "a dangerous complication in relations between the four powers." This threat --which contrasts with the general tone of Gromyko's speech -- may indicate that Ulbricht appealed to Moscow for specific support to strengthen his hand in the talks.

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