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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



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WEEKLY REVIEW

CONGO

With a stronger mandate from the Security Council, UN Secretary General Hammarskjold will probably move quickly to try to dissociate Congolese armies from politics--a move he believes is essential to any settlement in the Congo. The latest resolution on the Congo, passed by the Security Council on 21 February, authorized the use of force by UN troops if necessary to avert civil war in the country. This is the first time UN troops have been allowed to go beyond mere self-defensive measures, and the council's action establishes a precedent which many UN members find disquieting. The Korean action was not under the centralized control of the UN; the first armed force employed by the UN, the UN Emergency Force in Gaza, is not authorized to use force.

The resolution failed to meet three key Western demands but met many of the conditions necessary to the UN operation in the Congo. The resolution failed to interdict the movement of materiel as well as personnel into the Congo--which would have been an obvious reference to UAR and other clandestine support of the Gizenga regime. It also failed to specify the UN secretary general as primarily responsible for the UN operation in the Congo. It made no reference, moreover, to the government of the Congo or to Kasavubu as chief of state.

Since the Security Council has again assumed the direction of the UN effort in the Congo, the possibility of a heated debate on the issue at the resumed

General Assembly session has lessened considerably.

The USSR's abstention from voting on the resolution points up the difficulty the Soviet leaders face in their efforts to achieve their objectives in the Congo without at the same time becoming isolated from the "Afro-Asian position." Following the vote, Soviet delegate Zeria stated that the resolution, despite its "shortcomings," can play a positive role in restoring peace to the Congo, particularly those measures calling for immediate removal of the "Belgian aggressors."

While continuing its propaganda attacks on Hammarskjold and the UN Congo operation, Moscow may find it necessary to moderate the uncompromising demands set forth in its 14 February statement. The USSR can be expected, however, to oppose strongly any effort aimed at strengthening Hammarskjold's personal authority in dealing with the situation.

Although Communist China has formally recognized the

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Gizenga regime in Stanleyville, the USSR has not. Repeated expressions of Soviet support for his "legitimate government" are probably designed to allow Soviet leaders a free hand in pressing for his participation in any proposed settlement, without tying their policy to a regime which is beyond the reach of direct Soviet support.

Communist China has used Lumumba's death as the occasion for its most strident propaganda campaign of the year, holding large rallies in Chinese cities to express indignation over the "monstrous crime" allegedly engineered by US and Belgian imperialists and "their agent" Hammarskjold. Chinese pledges of "utmost" support--presumably only moral and financial--have been coupled with expressions of confidence in the ability of the Congolese to win eventual victory and give the impression that Peiping intends to let others carry on the fight. The three Asian satellites have also been loud in their condemnation of Lumumba's "murder."

On 19 February, Peiping expressed readiness to establish diplomatic relations with Gizenga. A joint communique of 20 February announced agreement for an exchange of ambassadors. Peiping is likely to accredit an ambassador in another African country to Stanleyville.

Although the Sudanese Government has continued to resist

UAR and bloc pressure to allow supplies for Gizenga to transit the Sudan, it appears that internal pressures are now forcing the Abboud regime to take a harder line in its relations with the UN. On 16 February the Supreme Council--the country's top ruling body--sent a cable to Hammarskjold stating that the UN had failed to achieve its primary aims in the Congo, and that unless immediate steps were taken to solve the problem, the Sudan would be forced to withdraw its troops from the UN Command.

The decision to send the sharply worded cable was apparently made as a result of public reaction in the Sudan to Lumumba's death. On 14 and 15 February, small but well-organized pro-Lumumba street demonstrations took place in three towns in the Sudan. The government was concerned over the possibility that the internal Sudanese opposition group, which has recently been pressing for a return to civilian government, would use the Congo problem for its own purposes. The cable, which received wide publicity in the Sudanese press, probably does not presage any change in the government's policy of support for the UN, but is rather an attempt to cater to public opinion.

In Accra the foreign ministers of Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, and the UAR have reaffirmed their support for Gizenga and called for the immediate withdrawal of all foreign

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diploamts from the Congo. They re-endorsed Ghana President Nkrumah's plan for reconstituting the UN force into an African command and recommended a halt to mobilization of Congolese forces. They also proposed that all foreign activities be controlled by the UN and that a neutral commission investigate Lumumba's death.

The preliminary report of the UN Conciliation Commission--an 11-member body on which most of the Asian and African nations who have had troops in the Congo are represented--was made public on 19 February. It recommends the establishment of a broadly based Congolese government, the removal of the army from politics and its reorganization under a national defense council, the release of political prisoners, and parliamentary approval of the new government. Since its recommendations use the Ileo government as a starting point for re-establishing a national regime, the report is likely to be congenial to Kasavubu; however, recent reports indicate that Tshombe and his associates are in no mood to accept any reconciliation proposals, although on 22 February he did announce his agreement with UN officials to stop troop movements in Katanga Province.

The reaction of the Gizenga regime to the commission's recommendations probably will depend on the dissidents' estimate of their ability to resist continued economic, political, and

military pressure from a broadly based Leopoldville government. Gizenga's position apparently is weakening: his troops, particularly in the Stanleyville area, are subject to little control from above; funds for paying them reportedly will run out by the end of March; and his lieutenant in Kivu Province, Anicet Kashamura, apparently is resisting Stanleyville's efforts to subject him to closer control. However, Gizenga has little to hope for in a rapprochement with Kasavubu, and he probably would be reluctant to accept a political solution imposed by the UN unless assured of significant influence in the Leopoldville government.

Large-scale reprisals for the death of Lumumba and his nine supporters--two of them in Katanga and seven in Albert Kalonji's "South Kasai" state--have so far not materialized. However, some atrocities, apparently on the part of undisciplined Congolese troops, were committed in Kivu Province. Scattered incidents have occurred throughout the Congo outside of areas controlled by the Tshombe regime.


In Leopoldville, Premier-designate Ileo reportedly has enlarged his proposed government, following discussions with former supporters of Lumumba. The additions allegedly will include several Lumumbists, but many of the appointees have not been personally consulted. The list contains names of individuals generally regarded as

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moderate members of the Lumumba faction; however, many of them are currently working for Gikenga in Stanleyville, Cairo, and New York.



The army, which retains its tribal loyalties, reportedly is also angered at the recent execution by the South Kasai government of seven Congolese, who came from several tribal groups which are represented in the army. It is a 22 February denouncement of any UN disarmament of Congolese forces probably is a response to these pressures.


The economic situation in Leopoldville is deteriorating rapidly, according to a recently appointed UN economic adviser. One of the last acts of Mobutu's college of commissioners before it disbanded on 9 February was to abandon the austerity program which had been developed with UN assistance. As a result, the government deficit for January rose to \$18,000,000. Stop-gap aid is being furnished by the central bank of the Congo; however, this policy is placing more money in circulation, with a resulting inflationary spiral. The UN official believes the only solution is a \$100,000,000 aid program under UN control.

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Economic conditions in other parts of the Congo are also suffering from the political disintegration. A US official who recently visited Stanleyville expects the economy there to collapse in six or eight weeks; Katanga, the richest area in the country, is also running a budgetary deficit.

Republic of the Congo



Before he agreed to limited cooperation with UN authorities, Tshombe reacted vigorously to the Security Council's 21 February resolution. Charging that the resolution was a "declaration" of war by the UN against Katanga and the whole former Belgian Congo, he announced the mobilization of the province's

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population to "defend their lives and property menaced by the United Nations." He said that the UN would be responsible for any bloodshed resulting from the resolution.

This initial reaction apparently was inspired by hard-line mining interests which counseled an immediate attack on UN forces.

Tshombe is reputed to believe he is "fighting for his job and his life" in the face of UN determination to punish him for the death of Lumumba.

[redacted] a considerable number of Africans adjudged loyal to Tshombe have been armed in order to thwart a possible attempt by UN forces to disarm the Katangans. Europeans may have been similarly armed.

Tshombe's regime is now almost completely isolated internationally following its involvement in the death of Lumumba; Tshombe continues to refuse to cooperate with the Ilco government in Leopoldville by taking the ministerial portfolios left vacant for a Katanga representative.

Tshombe's agreement with the UN apparently put at least

a temporary halt to his attempts to continue offensive operations against Baluba tribal supporters of Gizenga in northern Katanga Province. Last week a UN Nigerian patrol encountered a reconnaissance unit of Katanga troops about 50 miles south of Manono, capital of the Baluba "Lualaba state," and was told by a Belgian officer leading the unit that he would capture Manono as part of a general Katanga offensive. Any offensive is likely to be increasingly harassed by the Balubas, who have already made new incursions into the area along the rail line between Jadotville and Kasica which was recently won back by Tshombe.

This military action coincides with the establishment of a "Communist Congolese party" in Manono. The move was probably made at the initiative of Interior Minister Yuna of the Baluba "Lualaba state." Jason Sendwe, a leading anti-Communist Baluba leader in Leopoldville, died on 20 February that any such "youth movement" had been formed.

The Communist label would seem to have considerable appeal to organizations of Lumumba's supporters, although this appeal is likely to be lessened to some extent by the party's tribal connections.

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