


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20 April 1951

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY




CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

CONGO

There appears to be increasing factionalism within the Congolese centers of power. The Katanga regime in particular appears to be entering a period of instability as a result of a drop in Tshombé's prestige, a rise in tribal tensions, and a growing opposition to the Belgian presence. At the same time, there are indications that both the UN and the radical African powers are adopting tougher Congo policies.

In Leopoldville, Kasavubu on 17 April formally agreed to permit a reorganization of the Congolese Army under UN auspices. However, he seems still unwilling to permit even a token UN military presence in the port of

Republic of the Congo



Matadi. Hammarskjöld is continuing his pressure on this issue, but the UN apparently has arranged to ship goods via Pointe Noire and Brazzaville in the former French Congo if Matadi remains closed.

Nevertheless, the relatively calm state of relations between Leopoldville and the UN could be reversed by Rajendra Dayal's return to the Congo as Hammarskjöld's representative. Dayal reportedly is scheduled to arrive in Leopoldville on 26 April.

In an effort to isolate Tshombé, Kasavubu's agreement with the UN also calls for the expulsion of all foreign political and military functionaries hired by any agency other than the Kasavubu government.

Meanwhile, the situation in Orientale Province remains unclear. Mobutu's announcement of 17 April that he has reached agreement with Gizenga's military leaders has yet to be confirmed by civilian officials in either Stanleyville or Leopoldville. Ileo's government, which has been preoccupied with the dispute with the UN over Matadi, has not provided any direction for solving the internal problems facing it.

Leopoldville's financial situation continues to deteriorate. The treasury deficit for March was \$15,700,000, more than double the month's receipts. The Congolese governor of the

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

National Bank charged on 14 April that the cause of this deterioration is irresponsibility in several governmental agencies, particularly the army.

Rapid and far-reaching political changes are likely in Katanga, according to the American consul in Elisabethville. The UN's apparent determination to contain Tshombé's military operations in the northern part of the province, which led to the UN's takeover of Kabalo and the capture of most of Tshombé's South African "legionnaires," reportedly has been a major setback to the Katanga president and has stimulated latent personal and tribal rivalries.

Interior Minister Munongo, who leads the conservative tribal faction, appears to be behind an attempt in the legislature to create a Katangan prime ministership and to relegate Tshombé to largely ceremonial presidential functions. Tshombé has declared these efforts illegal, but his opponents seem to dominate the legislature.

The internal tensions have been accompanied by an increase in anti-Belgian sentiment among the Congolese, and Tshombé has become isolated to some extent in his continuing support of the Belgian presence. Moreover,

many Belgians in the Katangan armed forces reportedly have begun to question whether they should oppose the UN by force. A feeling is growing in Elisabethville that few of Tshombé's Belgian advisers will remain after negotiations between the UN and the new government in Brussels.

The control of Gizenga and his aides in Stanleyville seems to have weakened. General Lundula, the Stanleyville military commander, reportedly has been unable to establish his authority over rebel army units which recently returned to the city from the Orientale-Equateur provincial border. In addition, district commissioner Bernard Salumu, who has been at odds with Gizenga before, apparently was arrested for a brief period last week but was eventually restored to his position.

The "Casablanca powers"—Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco and the OAR—are again attempting to furnish material support to the Gizenga regime. President Nkrumah announced on 18 April that Accra would send an ambassador to Stanleyville and hinted that arms would also be sent unless Belgian military aid to Tshombé was halted.

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

[REDACTED]

Britannia and IL-18 aircraft in Ghana could be used to move the arms to Stanleyville, but all

efforts to supply Gizenga con-
 tinue to be hampered by the
 refusal of neighboring terri-
 tories to grant transit priv-
 ileges. [REDACTED]

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NUCLEAR TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS

At last week's sessions of the nuclear test ban conference in Geneva, Soviet delegate Tzarapkin made no effort to compromise outstanding differences on key features of the control system or on the research program to improve detection techniques. On 13 April he stated that the whole question of a research program was a "sensitive political" question and the consequences would be serious if the US proceeded unilaterally without Soviet agreement. He declared that both the number of nuclear explosions and their purpose must be agreed to by the USSR.

Tzarapkin specifically objected to the inclusion of artificially suffled explosions in a research program and stated that the USSR could not agree to such experiments on the grounds that they were intended to devise means of evading controls. On the moratorium on underground tests during the research program, he repeated the

Soviet position that the three powers should not automatically be free to resume underground testing when the moratorium expired.

Tzarapkin also clarified the Soviet position as to when on-site inspections could be initiated. On 15 April he explained that inspections in the USSR could not begin until all control posts were installed in the territories of the three powers and in areas where other nuclear explosions might occur. Under the Soviet installation schedule, this would mean no inspections in the USSR could be made until after four years. He charged that Western attempts to show that there were previous inconsistencies in the Soviet position stemmed from a desire to create a propaganda situation in which the West could conveniently break off negotiations.

In his initial comment on the complete draft treaty

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