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# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



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## CONGO

Moise Tshombé and Mahmoud Khiari, the Tunisian head of the UN's civil operations in the Congo, reached agreement late on 20 September for a provisional cease-fire in Katanga. This will provide an opportunity for substantive negotiations concerning Katanga's reintegration with the Congo.

Tshombé probably believes that the stipulated "freeze" on the movement of troops and supplies will permit him to maintain his military superiority and to drive a hard bargain in the negotiations. UN officials in Leopoldville indicated on 20 September that he was continuing to demand major concessions from the UN. Earlier he had insisted that the UN not only forego any reinforcements but that its forces retire to their Katanga bases in return for a cease-fire.

The UN's military position had been deteriorating. A besieged Irish unit at Jadotville was overcome early this week, and UN officials in New York told [redacted]

[redacted] that the 3,000 Katangans who had been engaged in the operation were being organized by Interior Minister Munongo for a move to Elisabethville. The UN garrison at Kamina was under attack from 1,000 well-armed tribesmen with Belgian officers.

A planned UN airlift of one Indian and one or two Ethiopian battalions into Katanga had been halted by a combination of Katangan air activity and the inadequacy of night-flying aids.

The flight to Elisabethville of three Ethiopian F-86 jets,

which the UN had counted on to end Katangan air superiority, was held up pending UN assurances that adequate navigational aids, fuel, and spare parts were available. [redacted]

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UN chief representative Linner had told his headquarters that unless the airlift could be resumed, "we seriously risk the defeat of UN forces."

Brigadier Inder Jit Rikhye, --an Indian who was Hammarskjold's military adviser and who, with Under Secretary Ralph Bunche, seems to have assumed direction of the Congo operation--on 18 September gave [redacted] his analysis of the difficulties encountered by the UN forces in Katanga. According to Rikhye, the original UN plan had had the limited objective of closing down the Elisabethville radio station. However, the action triggered the return to their units of many of the European mercenaries who were in the process of repatriation, and fighting spread unexpectedly. The UN then found that the Katanga [redacted] in addition to their overwhelming numerical superiority, often were better armed than the UN troops. [redacted]

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
Rikhye added that the limited UN airlift capability--no aircraft larger than a DC-4 is available--has prevented the use of either support artillery or transport in adequate quantity. He criticized the organization's intelligence staff, which he said frequently depended on reports from diplomatic posts in the Congo, and he stated that the Swedish and Irish troops had been trained mainly in police functions and thus were ineffective in combat.

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[redacted] Premier Adoula has been under increasing pressure to order the Congolese Army to intervene in Katanga.

[redacted] sentiment among Congolese legislators is virtually unanimous in favor of army intervention. The Congolese

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senate has already passed a resolution favoring military action, and General Lundula, Gizenga's former military commander, has offered to place his troops at the disposal of the government for an operation against Katanga.

Adoula, in a conversation on 18 September, indicated to Ambassador Gullion that he realized such intervention probably would lead to civil war and stated that he hoped to head off pressure for military action through a series of delaying tactics. Bunche told [redacted] on the same day, however, that the Adoula government had asked the UN to put its troops in a position to fight on equal terms with the Katangans within 24 hours. Leopoldville added that if the UN could not continue the fight, the Congolese Government would undertake operations of its own and would ask friendly countries for assistance.

On 19 September, Adoula informed the UN that his government would not give its approval to negotiations

for a cease-fire and would not consider itself in any way bound by one. Aware that his army is not equipped at this time for an operation against Katanga, Adoula probably took this step to appease the elements seeking strong action against Katanga.

Anti-American sentiment is increasing in Belgium as a result of Congo developments, and even responsible Belgians feel that the United States has been lax in assuring itself that the UN would properly use the material and political support placed at its disposal. The Belgians bitterly resent UN accusations that the Belgian military are responsible for the fighting in Katanga, with the implication that Tshombé's mercenaries are under the control of the government of Belgium. [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)

[redacted] Belgian resentment can easily lead to a rapid increase in neutralism in a country where fatalism and apathy are already strong. [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)

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