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26 July 1957



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
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
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CONTENTS

1. *ok* [redacted] REBEL-
LION IN OMAN [redacted] (page 3).
2. *no* SYRIAN MISSION TO MOSCOW [redacted]
(page 4).
3. *ok* TITO REJECTS KHRUSHCHEV INVITATION TO MOSCOW
[redacted] (page 5).
4. *ok* ARGENTINA RULES AGAINST TWO EUROPEAN ELECTRIC
COMPANIES [redacted] (page 6).
5. *no* POSSIBLE REVOLUTIONARY ATTEMPT IN CUBA [redacted]
(page 7).
6. *ok* FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL SEES EUROPEAN
SECURITY MAIN ISSUE IN LONDON TALKS [redacted] (page 8).
7. *no* JAPAN FEARS INVOLVEMENT IN POSSIBLE MILITARY
ACTION IN KOREA [redacted] (page 9).
8. *ok* BURMA REPORTEDLY RECEIVES CZECH ARMS OFFER
[redacted] (page 10).
9. *no* NEW CONSIGNMENT OF SYRIAN AMMUNITION AWAITING
SHIPMENT TO ALGERIA [redacted] (page 11).
10. *ok* PEIPING PROTESTS BRITISH MOVES IN HONG KONG
[redacted] (page 12).
- ANNEX--Conclusions of the Watch Report of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee [redacted]
[redacted] (page 13).

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1. [REDACTED]

REBELLION IN OMAN

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the Sultan of Muscat's field force, the 400-man Oman Regiment, had been outmaneuvered by the rebel leaders in Inner Oman; some of the Sultan's men had deserted and presumably defected to the rebels. The remainder of the Sultan's force could not be committed to a serious engagement without complete reindoctrination. The Sultan thus was said to have no effective force which could be used in the interior. The rebel military commander, Talib ibn Ali, brother of the rebellious Imam of Inner Oman, has reportedly shown unexpected tactical skill and is said to be moving about the interior rousing the tribes.

Comment

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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2. SYRIAN MISSION TO MOSCOW

[REDACTED]

The Syrian mission to Moscow headed by Minister of Defense Azm and Chief of Staff Nizam ad-Din is there to conduct economic talks, according to Moscow Radio. Another Moscow broadcast in Arabic said Public Works Minister Kayyali is a member of the delegation. An official of the Syrian Foreign Ministry informed the American embassy

on 22 July that the mission would seek a "stretch-out" on arms payments.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the Syrian budgetary situation is critical. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 40 percent of the budget cannot be covered by revenue and within three months the government will be unable to pay its employees. In light of these circumstances Syrian leftists might well ask the Soviet Union for some kind of financial help.

[REDACTED]

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3. TITO REJECTS KHRUSHCHEV INVITATION TO MOSCOW

[REDACTED] Marshal Tito, declaring that he will not "join the parade" to the Kremlin, has flatly rejected an invitation extended last week by Khrushchev to visit Moscow, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] he does not expect more than outwardly normal state relations with Moscow and anticipates a continuation of Soviet ideological attacks against the Yugoslav party. [REDACTED]


[REDACTED] Tito said he intends to be cautious with Khrushchev since there is still more than one faction in the presidium and stability of the present ruling group is not entirely certain. In any event, Tito stated, Khrushchev is impulsive and must be carefully watched.

The return to Yugoslavia on 23 July of Micunovic, the Yugoslav ambassador to Moscow, for a three- or four-week vacation also suggests that Belgrade does not foresee any immediate startling developments in Yugoslav-Soviet relations.

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4. ARGENTINA RULES AGAINST TWO EUROPEAN ELECTRIC COMPANIES




Argentina on 24 July nullified two municipal ordinances extending the concessions of two European-owned electric power companies. As a result, the Belgian-controlled concession (CADE) will expire on 31 December 1957, and the Italian-Swiss concession (ITALO) will expire on 31 December 1962.

The decree also provides for immediate government control of CADE, which is charged with inefficient service and with violating its 1907 concession. According to the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, the decree was based on the report of a national advisory commission appointed last April to investigate the legitimacy of the extensions of these concessions.

Comment

The concession extensions have been under sharp attack for over 16 years, with objective observers inclined to believe that graft was involved. The government apparently timed the announcement to gain political advantage in the 28 July constituent assembly elections--as suggested by concurrent praise in the press for the state's own operation of the oil fields. The government apparently hopes that adverse foreign reaction will be diluted by its declarations favorable to foreign investment in power development, as well as by its announcement that the dispute over private versus public power will be settled by the constituent assembly and the next elected government.

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5. POSSIBLE REVOLUTIONARY ATTEMPT IN CUBA

Comment on:



Fidel Castro is rumored to be planning action against the government of Cuban President Fulgencio Batista, and some spokesmen for the rebels have predicted 26 July as the target date. Castro has urged a 15-minute "general strike" on that day.


Castro has said that his plan of action calls for the capture of an important city in Oriente Province--possibly Santiago de Cuba--with the hope that such an action will spark an island-wide revolt. The possibility that Castro will strike soon was strengthened on 20 July by his publication of a manifesto calling for the ousting of Batista by a civilian provisional president charged with holding general elections as soon as possible.

Support for Castro's movement is widespread throughout Oriente Province, where he has maintained revolutionary headquarters since last November. Although not all the political opposition supports Castro, some political leaders and respected business and civic figures throughout Cuba are known to sympathize with his movement. He has little, if any, backing among the military, however, and Batista can weather almost any storm with the support of the army. 

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6. FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL SEES EUROPEAN SECURITY MAIN ISSUE IN LONDON TALKS



A high-ranking French Foreign Ministry official, commenting on differences in opinion on disarmament between the ministry and French UN Disarmament Subcommittee Délegate Jules Moch, described European security as "the issue actually at stake" in the London disarmament talks. He also stated that the French regarded as unsatisfactory a situation in which France would be completely dependent on another nation for atomic capability, but admitted the NATO stockpile idea went far to meet this concern.

Comment

The Foreign Ministry official's comments suggest that French efforts in the London talks will henceforth be directed at avoiding any development which could embarrass Chancellor Adenauer's electoral prospects. French-West German relations are now unusually cordial, but France fears that a future German government might make a deal with the Soviet Union.

Moch differs with the Bourges-Maunoury government and the Foreign Ministry not only in his willingness to accept a partial disarmament agreement excluding French manufacture of atomic weapons but also in his approach to European security, particularly the German problem.

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7. JAPAN FEARS INVOLVEMENT IN POSSIBLE MILITARY ACTION IN KOREA [redacted]

[redacted] Japanese Prime Minister Kishi, as a result of talks in Washington on the military situation in Korea, fears that restoration of friendly relations with Seoul

could lead to Japanese involvement in future military activity in Korea, [redacted]

[redacted] the Foreign Relations Committee of the Japanese Diet to re-examine the advisability of seeking an early agreement with South Korea. The committee reportedly shares [redacted] that an "arm's-length" policy toward Korea is best for the time being. It is expected to give its final recommendation early in August. [redacted]

Comment

The Japanese are extremely fearful that the US-Japanese security treaty, which permits the use of US forces and bases in Japan for military purposes in other Far Eastern areas, will involve them in hostilities involuntarily. [redacted] may intend to use this argument to continue his criticism of the security treaty as well as to lend emphasis to his previous assertion that Japan will not make further concessions to achieve agreement with South Korea.


In any event, Rhee will probably continue to obstruct any move toward friendly relations between Japan and South Korea.

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8. BURMA REPORTEDLY RECEIVES CZECH ARMS OFFER

Comment on:



Czech trade representatives in Burma have offered to deliver Soviet-type military equipment to Burma to be paid for in rice at an "advantageous price," according to press reports. The equipment offered includes jet aircraft, artillery, light arms, and perhaps even a small-arms factory. Burma might be allowed to use its \$17,500,000 trade balance with the USSR, and pay the rest through a long-term credit arrangement.

As reported, the Czech terms would be highly attractive to the Burmese, who need additional arms to implement Prime Minister U Nu's intention to place increased emphasis on the restoration of law and order in the new Four-Year Plan. 

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**9. NEW CONSIGNMENT OF SYRIAN AMMUNITION
AWAITING SHIPMENT TO ALGERIA**



Comment

Syria last summer promised and apparently dispatched to Egypt twelve tons of munitions for the Algerian rebels. Another shipment, consisting of 4,000,000 rounds of ammunition and 75 machine guns, reportedly cleared Latakia en route to Alexandria on 17 April of this year. []

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10. PEIPING PROTESTS BRITISH MOVES IN HONG KONG

Comment on:

In its third official protest in a month involving Hong Kong, Peiping delivered a note to the British chargé in Peiping on 24 July protesting the action of the Hong Kong government in evicting some

200,000 Chinese residents from areas near Kaitak airfield. The note states that the "forcible evictions" and destruction of homes in ten villages north of Kaitak violate the "traditional rights" of Chinese, and that Hong Kong authorities will be held accountable for all consequences.


The recent protests suggest the Chinese Communists are intent on compiling a record to use in some future campaign against the British that shows Peiping as champion of Chinese residents in Hong Kong. They also could be aimed at supporting Chinese Communist suggestions that Peiping be represented in Hong Kong by a commissioner.

The Hong Kong government is engaged in an extensive resettlement and development program to provide improved housing for the more than 300,000 Chinese slum dwellers. The Communists have exploited the temporary disruption caused by this program, and probably will make similar use of the plan to enlarge Kaitak airfield, to fan uneasiness among Chinese residents and, perhaps, to create incidents.

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ANNEX



Watch Report 364, 25 July 1957
of the
Intelligence Advisory Committee

Conclusions on Indications of Hostilities

On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the Intelligence Advisory Committee concludes that:

- A. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the continental US or its possessions in the immediate future.
- B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against US forces abroad, US allies or areas peripheral to the orbit in the immediate future.
- C. Early deliberate initiation of hostilities by Israel or the Arab states is not probable. Although tensions continue between the Arab states and Israel and among certain Arab states themselves, these are not likely to lead to serious conflict in the immediate future.



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