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15 October 1957




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
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
# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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## OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



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# 1. USSR REPORTEDLY PRESSING SYRIA TO SEEK UN SUPPORT AGAINST TURKEY

## Comment on:

The USSR is "putting pressure" on Syria at all levels at the United Nations and in Damascus to bring the Turkish-Syrian situation into the UN General Assembly or Security Council, [redacted]

[redacted] Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and UN delegate Kuznetsov have pressed Syrian Foreign Minister Bitar to introduce a complaint, but Bitar reportedly "feels lost" and has not received instructions from Damascus.

A formal Syrian complaint against Turkey would provide the USSR with a further opportunity to call upon the United Nations to condemn alleged Western plotting against Syria and to endorse the Soviet proposal for a four-power declaration renouncing the use of force and interference in the internal affairs of Middle East countries.

During the opening days of the General Assembly session, Syrian delegates reportedly complained of being "loved to death" by Soviet bloc delegates. The only step taken by Syria so far has been a letter to the UN secretary general on 8 October pointing to the "massing" of Turkish troops. The letter requested no formal UN action.

Although Soviet leaders continue to warn against Turkish intervention, they appear to believe there is a greater likelihood of an internal coup than of foreign military intervention to overthrow the Damascus regime. Khrushchev [redacted] did not expect that the United States and Britain would encourage Syria's neighbors to invade, but would instead attempt to bring about a coup, followed by an appeal by the new leaders to Syria's neighbors to send military forces to support the new regime. [redacted]

## 2. SYRIAN INTERNAL SITUATION

### Comment on:



The election of Baathist leader Hawrani as speaker of the Syrian parliament on 14 October places him in line to succeed the politically impotent President Quwatli should the President resign as a result of the pressures building up in Syria.

While the election of the anti-Western Hawrani, who has feuded with local Communists, does not presage an improvement in Syria's relations with the West, it will prove an obstacle to pro-Soviet Defense Minister Khalid al-Azm, who also aspires to the premiership and the presidency.

The defeat of the former speaker, Dr. Nizam al-Qudsi, whose Populist party is the largest in the chamber, puts a formal seal on the defeat of conservative elements in Syria. The forthcoming 15 November municipal elections are being boycotted by the Populists, in tacit admission of their political impotence.


In the field of inter-Arab relations Hawrani's elevation, taken with the arrival of Egyptian troops in Syria, may tend to offset Soviet influence by reminding the Syrian public their country has an ally other than the USSR. King Saud, however, will find little comfort in this victory of a man who has maligned him so often in the past.



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### 3. TURKISH-SYRIAN BORDER SITUATION

Reference:



Turkish military maneuvers originally scheduled for 15 October have been postponed until the end of the month, according to the American air attaché in

Ankara. A Turkish general officer indicated to him that the maneuvers, concentrated in the sensitive area on the Syrian border, now are scheduled to begin on 29 October or 1 November.

These dates would postpone the maneuvers until after the Turkish national elections on 27 October.



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#### 4. SAUDI ARABIA DELAYS JORDAN SUBSIDY PAYMENT

[REDACTED] Saudi Arabia has delayed payment on the \$6,950,000 balance of its annual subsidy to Jordan because of the Saudi government's shortage of foreign exchange, according to a Jordanian government statement to [REDACTED] the Ottoman Bank. The bank, the official repository for Jordanian government funds, had been alerted early in September to expect payment.

#### Comment

Faced with a serious financial crisis at home, Saudi Arabia apparently now intends to pay the balance of its \$13,900,000 subsidy to Jordan in five monthly installments beginning in November. It may stretch out payment over an even longer period and delay the first payment beyond November.

Seizing on the Saudi government's dilemma, Cairo radio has broadcast reports that the payment will not be made. Neither Egypt nor Syria has made any payment on its share of the Jordanian subsidy.

[REDACTED]

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5. KING SAUD REPORTED INCREASINGLY PRESSED  
BY PRO-NASIR ADVISERS

Comment on:

[REDACTED] Reports from Jidda indicate that King Saud is under strong pressure from four key royal counselors to turn away from the United States and revert to

alignment with Egypt and Syria [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Con-  
servative Saudi officials and businessmen have expressed concern that the United States has been losing ground in Saudi Arabia in recent months, and that the extremely beneficial effect of Saud's trip early this year to the United States is wearing off.

The four pro-Egyptian counselors are said to be Deputy Foreign Minister Yasin, Finance Minister Surur, and the King's uncles, Princes Abdulla and Musaid Abd-al-Rahman. Two of the King's brothers, Communications Minister Prince Sultan and Education Minister Prince Fahad, are reported closely tied to this group. More moderate pro-Nasir influence is probably also exerted by the King's brother, Crown Prince Faysal, and his supporters.



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## 6. NEW VIOLENCE ON CYPRUS POSSIBLE AFTER UN DEBATE

### Comment on:

[redacted] [redacted]  
the Greek Cypriot underground organization has selected targets for terroristic activity and warned its members to be ready for action in case the result of the UN General Assembly debate later this fall does not meet Greek Cypriot demands. [redacted]

[redacted] At this time, it appears unlikely that the General Assembly will do more than call on the interested parties to continue negotiations leading to a settlement of the Cyprus problem.

EOKA suspended its campaign of violence last March. [redacted] the underground organization at present is beset by petty quarreling and dissatisfaction within its ranks. It is possible that EOKA leaders, fearing that inactivity is having an adverse effect on members' morale, may conclude that a resumption of terrorism is necessary to prevent complete deterioration of the organization. [redacted]

[redacted] if violence is renewed, "spectacular damage" could be done in the first weeks, but that the security forces could ultimately control the situation.

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7. SOME YUGOSLAV OFFICIALS CONCERNED OVER  
TITO'S PRO-SOVIET POLICY

Comment on:

[redacted] President Tito's policy of closer association with the USSR--as shown by Yugoslavia's decision to recognize East Germany on 15 Octo-

ber--is said to be causing concern within the Yugoslav regime. Some officials fear that such a policy ultimately will lead to Yugoslavia's complete dependence on the USSR. [redacted]

[redacted] Tito and his intimates are aware of this possibility but believe they will be able to persuade the United States to continue its economic aid.


[redacted] a feeling is growing among what is as yet a small minority of the top Yugoslav leadership that Tito was hoodwinked when he promised to support Khrushchev's foreign policies. This group believes Khrushchev has never forgiven Tito for the break with the USSR in 1948 and will use him as long as needed and then crush him.

Differences within party ranks over the long-term effects of rapprochement with the USSR may have caused the recent postponement of the seventh party congress from November to April, but do not threaten the stability of Tito's government.

[redacted]

## 8. AGITATION AGAINST US TROOPS IN SOUTH KOREA SEEN PROMOTED BY FOREIGN MINISTER

### Comment on:




Ambassador Dowling believes that although the South Korean reaction to recent incidents involving American military personnel and Korean civilians stems basically from growing nationalism, the "irresponsible attitude" of Foreign Minister Cho Chong-hwan has aggravated public feeling.

Cho, who is believed to be working for a South Korean-US status-of-forces agreement to further his personal ambitions, is exploiting distortion of these incidents by the local press to stir up popular agitation for such an agreement.

Despite the new emphasis on these incidents, less than half as many have occurred this year as in 1956, and there have been less than a third as many fatalities, according to American military authorities. Magnification of the incidents, however, threatens to develop significant anti-American sentiment for the first time since the Korean war.

Most incidents have occurred during Korean attempts to steal American military supplies and equipment. General Decker, the UN commander in Korea, has stated publicly that American military supplies worth \$2,000,000, including 1,500,000 gallons of gasoline, have been stolen since January 1956 and that monthly losses now average \$95,000. Following General Decker's statement, the press reported on 12 October that the South Korean government has urged provincial governors and police chiefs to make greater efforts to prevent thefts.

9. THAI PREMIER GIVES VIEWS ON SOVIET EARTH  
SATELLITE AND THAI POLITICAL SITUATION

 Thai Provisional Premier Pote Sarasin told Ambassador Bishop in Bangkok on 9 October that he hopes to withdraw from Thai politics after the December elections and return to the post of secretary general of SEATO, even though Marshal Sarit and others are urging him to stay on as premier. Pote expects the elections to result in a "coalition government" comprising Sarit's military group, the pro-Sarit Unionist party, and the conservative Democratic party of Khuang Aphaiwong. The principal bond uniting these groups is antipathy to the regime of former premier Phibun.

Pote believes that either Khuang or Unionist chief Sukit Nimmanhemmin, currently economic affairs minister, will take over as premier. Pote described Sukit as an economist with moderate "socialistic inclinations," which he thought would be held in check by the "inherent conservatism" of the military group. Bishop believes Pote is unduly optimistic on this last point.

Pote told Bishop the Communists have made "important advances" in Asia during the past three years at the expense of the West, a trend reflected in the fact that Soviet and Chinese Communist accomplishments were "on everyone's lips." He added that previously "no one would even think of the USSR as approaching the US in strength and technical advances." He said many leading Thais now cite the Soviet launching of an earth satellite as an indication that the USSR is ahead of the US in technological development.

Pote informed Bishop, however, that the Thai government was planning three television and radio programs, one of which would be devoted to Hungary as an example of what can happen to a Communist-dominated country. The other two are to point out the value to Thailand of SEATO and American aid.