


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
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# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN


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## OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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- ok* 1. RESTRICTIONS ON FIRING GIVEN CHINESE NATIONALIST ARTILLERY ON QUEMOYS  (page 3).
- no* 2. PEIPING TO TRAIN TIBETANS FOR PUBLIC SECURITY DUTIES  (page 4).
- ok* 3. FRANCE SEEN STEPPING UP TEMPO OF ALGERIAN OPERATIONS  (page 5).
- ok* 4. FRENCH-TUNISIAN RELATIONS  (page 6).
- ok* 5. BURMA TO EXTEND CONTRACTS OF SOVIET AGRICULTURAL TECHNICIANS  (page 7).

2 July 57

Current Intelligence Bulletin

Page 2

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

**1. RESTRICTIONS ON FIRING GIVEN CHINESE  
NATIONALIST ARTILLERY ON QUEMOYS**

Comment on:

[REDACTED] The Chinese Nationalist Ministry of Defense has ordered artillery units in the Quemoy area to cease all fire unless "lucrative targets" appear.

[REDACTED] American officials comment that if the heavy Communist firing of 24 June was for the purpose of discouraging indiscriminate Nationalist firing at fishing boats, merchant ships, and villages, it has apparently had this effect.

[REDACTED] Artillery fire in the Quemoy area has slackened. Since 27 June, Nationalist artillery has not fired and the Communists have fired only a few rounds, most of them propaganda leaflet shells. [REDACTED]

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**2. PEIPING TO TRAIN TIBETANS FOR PUBLIC  
SECURITY DUTIES**

**Comment**

The Tibetans presumably will replace Chinese public security personnel who are among the 25,000 or more troops and civilian personnel Peiping intends to withdraw from Tibet.

Peiping probably expects that Tibetan resentment of Communist rule will lessen with the increasing use of Tibetans on police and security duties.

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### 3. FRANCE SEEN STEPPING UP TEMPO OF ALGERIAN OPERATIONS

[REDACTED]

The new French defense minister, Andre Morice, reportedly is dissatisfied with General Raoul Salan, the commanding general in Algeria,

and has implied that changes in command will be made in the next two weeks. Meanwhile, he has issued orders to General Paul Ely, army chief of staff, to push the war vigorously in accordance with recent intentions of the pacification policy. The minister believes that measures to close the Moroccan border are 80 percent effective in preventing arms shipments to the Algerian rebels, and he has ordered that the Tunisian border be "hermetically" sealed by September, according to a fairly reliable French journalist who is a close friend of the minister.

The under secretary of state for the army, who strongly supports early political reform for Algeria, believes that "pilot zones" should be created in which to carry out reforms, according to the French journalist. [REDACTED]

#### Comment

The heavy support the French Socialist Party has just voted for a continuation of the strong policy in Algeria will encourage Bourges-Maunoury's emphasis on pacification prior to a political settlement. A new drive has been begun to clear rebel influence from the mountainous region north of Constantine so that a "pilot zone" can be established to permit political reforms at the local level. Bourges-Maunoury's aim is to hold local elections and to work out a new statute for Algeria which would permit some local autonomy. The government has no intention, however, of relinquishing control over the area.

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#### 4. FRENCH-TUNISIAN RELATIONS

Comment on:

The French decision last week to withdraw a substantial number of troops from Tunisia should contribute to the detente which has been developing in French-Tunisian relations since mid-June. Tunisian premier Bourghiba now may be willing to take stronger measures against Algerian militants in Tunisia, and if new incidents between the French and Tunisians can be avoided, French credits may again become available to Tunis in the near future.

Paris has decided to shift a division of between 10,000 and 15,000 French troops to the Algerian side of the Tunisian frontier and to regroup at the Bizerte base and five other points the remainder of its 25,000 ground forces in Tunisia, as well as 10,000 naval and air force personnel. The American embassy in Tunis believes the movements contemplated will reduce but not eliminate the danger of further clashes between French troops and armed Tunisians. The French action apparently falls considerably short of Bourghiba's demand that all French forces in Tunisia be concentrated in the Bizerte area--a condition which still must be met, he indicated on 27 June, before he will enter into negotiations with France for a common defense arrangement.

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## 5. BURMA TO EXTEND CONTRACTS OF SOVIET AGRICULTURAL TECHNICIANS

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] The Burmese government decided in mid-June to extend all Soviet agricultural technical assistance projects until 1960, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The government has already extended for one year the contracts of the 22 Soviet agricultural experts, which would have expired in November, and Soviet-developed agricultural projects have been assigned top priority under Prime Minister Nu's revised four-year plan.

Burma is reported highly pleased with the over-all performance of Soviet technicians, as projects under their supervision are moving satisfactorily. [REDACTED]

### Comment

The Soviet agricultural team's main efforts seem to be concentrated on the construction of a complex of dams for irrigation of arid sections of upper Burma. At least one of the projects in this program has been judged impracticable by American engineers.

The completion of the Soviet program will fulfill an important agricultural need in Burma, and will go far toward making up for Burma's earlier dissatisfaction over its barter trade with the USSR. In addition, the Soviets seem to have made a good impression with some of their other projects, notably the technological institute which they will soon complete in Rangoon.